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Abstract
Systems deployed to automatically identify persons operate in diverse application contexts,
ranging from border control policing to on-line banking, attract benefits and risks to stake-
holder organisations and to their respective user communities. This thesis explores the
efficacy of a systematic methodology to select the optimal system for a given application
context.
We created a systematic methodology in order to ascertain the extent of a systematic method-
ology’s efficacy to select the optimal system for a given application context. We also
developed criteria in order to assess the efficacy of such selection methodologies.
Employing the case study research methodology, we conclude that a systematic methodology
is reasonably efficacious for selecting the optimal system when the circumstances surrounding
the application context necessitate a comprehensive inquiry. An organisation should conduct
a comprehensive inquiry when there is a need to establish objectives and requirements for
the system in order to evaluate a range of candidate systems, employ repeatable systematic
processes in order to reduce their reliance on the capabilities of discipline experts, and/or
produce an audit trail of the programme’s method which may be used as evidence to justify
the system selected.
We ascertained that the scope of a comprehensive inquiry demands a multi-disciplinary
approach to evaluate over 240 factors relating to the selection of the optimal system. An
evaluation needs to examine the application context itself in order to determine the stake-
holders’ objectives and requirements for a system. Candidate systems may then be appraised
on their capabilities to fulfil stakeholders’ requirements.
We used our systematic methodology, in a case study involving the enhancement of an
enterprise’s user authentication system, to identify contextual exemplars demonstrating when
a systematic methodology is efficacious for selecting these systems. Two retrospective case
studies served to identify and explain the proficiencies and deficiencies of current approaches
pursued by organisations’ programmes.
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1.1 Automated Personal Identification
1.1 Automated Personal Identification
Automated personal identification is an increasingly important function for government,
business and society [247, 307]. The assured identification of persons brings benefits to
organisations and user communities that can then rely upon the assertions associated with
authentication systems and identification systems [59, 72].
Authentication systems are deployed as part of preventative measures to control users’ access
to information systems and other resources [11, 271, 287]. Identification systems are often
deployed as detection utilities. Woodward cites [323] the use of a biometric system to expose
multiple fraudulent social benefit claims in the USA. We use the term automated personal
identification in this thesis to describe the information system function of automatically
identifying persons. We use this term because of the lack of uniformity in the terminology
and scope relating to the term identity management found in the literature. We explain our
reasons for using the generic term Automated Personal Identification Mechanism (APIM) to
represent an authentication system or an identification system in Chapter 2. We also describe
other related concepts in order to clarify the scope of our research in that chapter.
Automated personal identification may bring a range of benefits to stakeholders in various
application contexts; however, organisations and their user communities often encounter
issues with deployed APIMs.
1.1.1 Issues Associated with Automated Personal Identification
Information systems are constantly under threat from attackers, which affects the management
of organisational risks [78]. The impacts of risks are often difficult to predict [3] and the
consequences of security breaches are arduous to quantify [282].
The consequences of security breaches relating to an APIM may range from a direct financial
loss to an organisation, through fraud, to an exposure of a user community member’s private
information. On direct losses, for example, the Telegraph newspaper reports that banks in
the UK appear to have lost ground to the criminals after figures showed a 71 percent rise in
on-line banking fraud, up to £29.3m for the first half of the 2014, despite the increased usage
of ‘log-in gadgets’.1
1http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/bank-accounts/11091524/Online-banking-fraud-up-
71pc-despite-rise-of-log-in-gadgets.html
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The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) outlines organisations’ obligations, in
terms of security controls on passwords, which should be deployed in order to protect
individual’s private data. The UK ICO has the power to issue monetary penalty notices to
organisations for serious breaches of the UK Data Protection Act, and for serious breaches
of the UK Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations.2
It is often difficult, however, to acquire evidence to demonstrate that these consequences are
a direct result of a defective APIM deployment. Nevertheless, the frequency of reporting
identity fraud, through organisations such as CIFAS, the UK’s Fraud Prevention Service,
is increasing [139]. Publicly available statistics, however, do not often ascribe the losses
and costs of security breaches or other impacts directly to an APIM failure, although
some surveys, such as the US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate and SRI International, report customers’ experiences as victims of digital identity
fraud [88]. There are some resources, such as Scam Watch3 which provide countermeasure
guidelines to the user community. Reports relating to an APIM’s deficiencies, however, may
have an adverse impact on a user communities’ reliance on the information system and its
services which the APIM is designed to protect.
Some deployed APIMs also attract social acceptability issues [317]. For example, the
UK Identity Card Programme attracted much criticism in the national press because of
potential infringements of civil liberties, as the UK government’s proposed to capture UK
Citizens’ fingerprint data.4 Organisational handling of individuals’ private information, both
autobiographical and biometric data, is a growing concern [45, 308, 178], with complex legal
implications [196]. Many APIMs also exhibit usability design flaws [67, 2, 167] in that users
often have too many passwords or Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to remember,
which may result in the same password or PIN being used to access many different resources.
Some APIMs, particularly biometric systems, are not always accessible to all persons in
the user community [162, 214]. For example, a biometric sensor device may fail to capture
a signal of sufficiently good quality, e.g. a person’s fingerprint, to enable the biometric
identification system to encode that data for processing. Physical disabilities may also limit
a person’s ability to use small devices [250], for example Universal Serial Bus (USB) sticks.
Organisational investment in innovations to automatically identify persons often possess
2https://ico.org.uk/enforcement
3http://www.scamwatch.gov.au/content/index.phtml/tag/identitytheft
4http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8707355.stm
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deficiencies, which may lead to the failure of an APIM deployment to fulfil its intended
purpose.5
1.1.2 Vulnerabilities Associated with Automated Personal Identification
Deficiently deployed APIMs are exploited through their vulnerabilities, which include:
• technological defects [271, 197, 255]. For example, early fingerprint sensors failed to
detect artificial fingers, which prompted biometric device manufacturers to introduce
liveness testing;
• erroneous user actions [182, 9]. For example, a text based password to access a laptop
computer can be easily written down on a piece of paper which may be attached to
that laptop computer for a miscreant to take opportunistic advantage; and
• social engineering attacks [206]. For example, criminals target phishing attacks
on individuals in an attempt to acquire sensitive information such as usernames,
passwords, and credit card details (and sometimes, indirectly, money) by masquerading
as a trustworthy entity, such as a bank.
Software vulnerabilities are difficult to identify and eradicate entirely in information systems
[318]. APIMs rely on software components and such software implementations are not
exempt from possessing vulnerabilities. The Adobe Inc. access control security breach
reported in the media [85] describe security breaches where users’ identifiers and passwords
were captured by miscreants due to a deficient APIM deployment which used cryptographic
protection techniques incorrectly. Identifiers and passwords are often protected by injecting
a unique seed value and then hashing that result rather than encrypting the related password
file. Files containing user identifiers and associated passwords may be attacked using brute
force password cracking tools, such as Hydra.6
Empirical evidence suggests [8] that users do not always follow organisational security
policies on password creation because of users’ limited recall capabilities [324]. Also
users do not always manage passwords in line with organisational security policies and the
authentication data relating to an identifier are often conveyed to other individuals or are
5http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-440069/Safest-passport-fit-purpose.html
6https://www.udemy.com/blog/hacking-tutorial/
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misplaced [9]. Yet, Highland’s predictions [130], that passwords are likely to be used for the
authentication of persons for the foreseeable future, remain valid.
The deployment of a deficient APIM may be explained by organisations’ lack of proper
consultation or engagement with the other stakeholders, particularly the user community,
during the design phases. Authentication guidelines focus [217, 158] on organisational risks,
functionality and performance together with assurance levels of systems despite the need
for wider evaluation of human related factors [1, 2], such as, social acceptability, usability,
accessibility and subjects’ privacy concerns. Some biometric guidelines [38] acknowledge,
however, the need to address the human issues surrounding the usability and accessibility of
biometric systems.
1.1.3 Advances in Automated Personal Identification
The advances in automated personal identification include technological innovation in the
introduction of new biometric modalities 7 and also the use of commonly deployed modalities,
e.g. fingerprints, in the latest communication devices. 8 There are also advances in the
formation of federated identity management schemes, such as the UK Government Digital
Verify Identity Assurance Service 9, which is to become the default way for citizens to access
a variety government services using a single account and authentication mechanism through
an accredited Identity Provider (IP).
Chauhan et al.’s survey [48] of biometric modalities identifies electrocardiogram and lip
prints (cheiloscopy) as emerging means to identify persons, in addition to the more commonly
deployed modalities, such as iris scans, retina scans, fingerprint, face and voice, and possibly
infrequent deployments of signature, ear, keystroke and gait modalities.
Nandakumar et al. propose [214] a multi-biometric system which fuses the signals from the
different biometric modalities in order to improve the implicit upper bound on the accuracy
of a biometric system using a single modality. Data from multiple biometric sources may be
consolidated at the sensor level, using data from the same biometric trait, or feature level
fusion may be used, where the fusion involves different feature sets extracted from multiple
biometric sources. The identification or authentication decision is based upon several data
sources.
7http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/types-of-biometrics.html
8https://www.apple.com/uk/iphone-6/touch-id/
9https://identityassurance.blog.gov.uk
16
1.1 Automated Personal Identification
Similarly, Clarke and Furnell argue [55] that the capabilities of current technologies enables
composite, transparent and continuous authentication, using a variety of data relating to
a user, e.g. keystrokes, as an alternative to a single Boolean user authentication process.
Nevertheless, biometric identification and authentication systems, based on probabilistic
calculations, by design do not always yield impeccable identification decisions [311, 86, 214].
Therefore, an APIM’s decision relating to the identification of the genuine person or the
verification of an owner’s claim to a digital identity may not always be precise.
Organisations create and manage digital identities for their user or subject communities.
Consumers are often required to set up an account with each transacting entity, which
involves the creation of an identifier together with authentication data, e.g. a password. This
account and its authentication mechanism then enables consumers to reap the benefits of
conducting their purchasing activities on-line. Social networking sites also utilise similar
access control measures. The NorSIS Password Survey in 2012 ascertained [285] that the
average minimum number of passwords, used by persons for private purposes is 17 per
person and 8.5 per person for work-related purposes.
The FIDO (Fast IDentity On-line) Alliance was formed to address the lack of authentication
interoperability amongst devices, e.g. smart cards, smart card readers and mobile phones, as
well as the problems users face with creating and remembering multiple identifier names
and passwords for their accounts, by developing user authentication interoperability specif-
ications.10 Organisations are introducing digital identity services to customers to enable them
to use a single credential at various sites on the Internet which require user authentication.
Experian Ltd is an example of an early entrant into the identity provider market in the UK.11
Windley argues [321] that user communities’ confidence in identification and authentication
systems are influenced by economic models, people’s attitudes and behaviour, processes
surrounding their usage and the management of the systems, tools and technologies deployed,
and the governance regimen. Camp concludes [43] that trust in information systems operating
in different communities is difficult to assess. Despite the vulnerabilities associated with
APIMs Birch contends [29] that the assured automatic identification of individuals can bring
benefits to stakeholders by adopting a matured attitude towards the surrounding issues of
managing digital identities.
Deployed APIMs may be considered by some stakeholders, as fit for intended purpose. Con-
10https://fidoalliance.org/specifications
11http://www.experian.co.uk/identity-and-fraud/products/authenticate.html
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versely, other stakeholders may consider these same APIMs as unsuitable for their intended
purposes. Notwithstanding potential conflict in stakeholders’ views and that APIMs possess
vulnerabilities, as well as attracting issues and costs, we consider that the determination of
the optimal APIM for a given application context is an important and laudable aim. The
selection of an optimal APIM and its deployment configuration may then be evaluated in
terms of its appropriateness in respect of its intended purpose within the salient factors of the
specific application context.
1.2 Determining the Optimal APIM
We believe that it is reasonable to assume that organisations’ information system programmes
strive to deploy the optimal APIM for a given application context. In practice, however, it is
possible that an APIM may be deployed on the basis of its adequacy rather than its optimal
fitness for purpose to address identified risks. Equally, organisations may be aware that
an APIM is defective or that it may not be entirely fit for purpose, yet choose to prioritise
investments into other programmes rather than funding additional security measures to
address identified defects.
Irrespective of the terminology employed to depict the desired quality, an APIM cannot be
considered to be fit or acceptable or adequate for purpose unless criteria are established and
relevant data, from the application context, are acquired to perform an evaluation. An APIM
may then be evaluated in respect of addressing stakeholders’ objectives, using a range of
criteria, relating to its deployment in an application context or as a candidate for deployment.
Organisational decision-makers may utilise such evaluations in order to establish whether
the APIM is optimal to meet their objectives of sufficiently minimising the uncertainty
surrounding the effectiveness and efficiency of security controls [164], but also whether it
aligns with organisational investment strategies [77].
1.2.1 Evaluation of an Application Context
Warfel recommends [307] that an evaluation of an application context for automated personal
identification should be based on three axioms:
• the degree of identification is consistent with the need;
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• the ratio of false accepts and false rejects are compatible with the risk and the customs
of the business involved; and
• the costs of the identification are consistent with the need.
Organisations and their respective user communities may have different perspectives on
these axioms because each stakeholder may be impacted in different ways, particularly as
a consequence of a security compromise. Land observes [180] that information systems,
in general, favour particular departments over other parts of an organisation. Stakeholder
perspectives in respect of the needs, costs together with the risks and customs of the ap-
plication context may not only vary within organisations but also externally between the
different stakeholder organisations, including the user communities. Gerber and von Solms
conclude [118] that the multiplicity of risks and the spectrum of social issues, with political
cultural, economic, legislative and social roots, necessitate a multi-disciplinary approach
when evaluating security requirements for an organisation and its user community.
Stakeholder organisations focus on managing digital identities in order to address the risks
and costs associated with protecting access to enterprise information assets [321]. Conversely,
evidence from Weir et al. [314] and Toledano et al. [288] suggest that users are driven by
convenience and usability considerations, preferring to avoid cumbersome or intrusive identi-
fication and authentication routines. In the specific context of health information systems, in
extreme circumstances unreliable authentication mechanisms have a life-threatening impact
[99]. Price recognises [242] that there are both benefits and drawbacks to stakeholders
involved with using digital identities. Striving for balanced security controls, however, can
bring benefits to both organisational and user community stakeholders [246]. The approach
to achieving this balance between stakeholders, however, may be complex due to the diverse
range of factors which may need to be evaluated in the application context. The approach may
also need to incorporate a technique to identify stakeholder compromises for determining the
balanced security controls for the automated identification of persons in a given application
context.
We believe that ascertaining the balanced security controls for the automated identification
of persons in an application context requires the establishment of evaluation criteria and
also the development of an approach in the form of evaluation processes in a systematic
methodology. Criteria need to be established in order to determine, through comprehensive
evaluation, the optimal APIM for a given application context. An evaluation also needs to
encompass a range of perspectives and values from the various stakeholder groups, including
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users, involved in the application context. An evaluation task that aims to strike a balance
between stakeholders’ objectives, using established criteria to evaluate their perspectives
relating to the security, usability and privacy factors for that application context, then raises
the question of which methodology to pursue [123, 333].
Checkland explains [49] in his thirty year retrospective review of information system develop-
ment methodologies, that specific methodologies, irrespective of their hard–soft distinction,
are efficacious for certain types of programme and contextual circumstances. Similarly,
we believe that some methodologies for deploying APIMs may be efficacious for certain
types of programme and contextual circumstances to identify the optimal APIM for a given
application context.
1.2.2 Methodological Considerations
Organisations may consider pursuing a range of strategies in order to select the optimal
APIM for their various application contexts. Some organisations may opt to use the default
APIM provided by an information system, an application program, an operating system or a
device.
The Whither Committee’s Biometrics Report proposes [230] that:
“there are significant opportunities [for researchers] to develop an evaluative
model that would guide potential procurers and users of biometric systems.
Guidance for potential users of biometric systems on an appropriate initial set
of questions to ask before getting into the details of modalities and so forth have
proven particularly useful.”
We consider that these significant research opportunities apply not only to biometric systems
but to all types of systems that automatically identify persons. We propose that the guidance
sought should be in the form of a methodology which evaluates a range of factors, including
stakeholders’ objectives and requirements for an APIM deployment. We believe that such
an evaluation should be specific to an application context so that the optimal APIM for that
context may be identified.
We acknowledge that there may be some contextual circumstances when some methodologies
may not be as efficacious as other approaches (and vice versa) in ascertaining the optimal
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APIM for a given application context. Before attempting to assess the efficacy of various
approaches, we need to establish an understanding of the methodological tools available.
1.2.3 Overview of Existing Methodologies
We now provide an overview of the existing methodological tools in order to reveal possible
research avenues using Avison and Fitzgerald’s methodology era model [18]. Our review of
the Information Security (InfoSec) methodological tools and the tools for evaluating APIMs
can be found in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 respectively. We classified the methodological
tools found in the literature into guidelines, analytical frameworks, conceptual modelling,
heuristic approaches and systematic methodologies. We explain our classification scheme in
Section 3.1.3.
Avison and Fitzgerald’s methodology era model [18] enabled them to reveal the evolution and
development of the methodological tools for information system development methodologies.
Their model identifies four methodology eras:
Stage 1 – pre-methodology era which is characterised as a period where systems are
developed without the use of an explicit or formalised methodology;
Stage 2 – an early-methodology era, which is characterised by approaches that comprised of
phases and stages to enable the management of the discipline of systems development;
Stage 3 – a methodology era, which is characterised by formalised documented methodolo-
gies that were developed from practice or theory; and
Stage 4 – an era of methodological assessment, which is characterised by the reappraisal of
the philosophy, concepts, processes and practicality of system development method-
ologies.
We use the same maturity model to illustrate the relative maturity of methodologies applied
in the InfoSec discipline and the methodological tools for evaluating APIMs.
We claim that InfoSec methodological tools have reached the methodology era [Stage 3]
in that we were able to locate several tools in each of our defined classes. We next provide
a high-level description of the recent InfoSec methodologies in order to demonstrate the
maturity of the tools to support our claim.
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Fle´chais’ methodology [101], based upon Boehm’s software development methodology [33],
is an unstructured heuristic approach to incorporate usable security designs into information
system (IS) development programmes. Similarly, Faily’s collaboration with Fle´chais [93, 94]
resulted in a meta-model evaluation tool to assist requirements engineering processes in order
to design secure and usable information systems. Mouratidis and Giordini’s development
[208] of Secure TROPOS, a security-oriented extension of the TROPOS Methodology [36],
provides an agent-oriented software development methodology. These methodologies tend
to concentrate on software development rather than describing the security procedures in a
security architecture or the expected user behaviour in an application context.
We did not find any evidence which suggests that these InfoSec methodologies have been
validated empirically or that their efficacy has been assessed, which indicates that these tools
have not reached the methodological assessment era [Stage 4] in their evolution.
We claim that methodological tools specifically for evaluating APIMs have reached the
early-methodology era [Stage 2]. From our review of methodologies in the literature we
located several analytical tools and evaluation frameworks which are designed to assist with
the selection of systems for the automated identification of persons.
Ashbourn’s Pentakis approach [15] is an analytical tool for evaluating biometric deployments
only. Similarly, Toledano et al.’s evaluation framework [288] focuses on the evaluation of
four different types of biometric modality. Renaud’s analytical tool [250, 249] concentrates
on assessing authentication systems based upon subject knowledge, e.g. a password. These
contributions evaluate authentication systems or identification systems as solutions without
having sufficient regard to the intended purpose and the factors surrounding the application
context which may influence stakeholders’ decisions.
Royer and Meints’ evaluation framework [258], however, focuses on modelling the factors
relating to the selection of an Enterprise Identity Management System (EIdMS), which
may result in the selection of an authentication system or an identification system, with or
without the use of biometrics. Royer developed [256] the EIdMS Decision Support System
based upon this evaluation framework. It appears that these methodological tools, which we
classify as conceptual modelling and heuristic approach tools respectively, have yet to be
validated empirically.
From our investigations we were unable to locate systematic methodologies in the scientific
literature which are designed specifically to develop or select a system for automated
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personal identification of persons for a given application context. We also located systematic
methodologies used by professional services companies; however, insufficient detail has
been published to enable them to be scientifically assessed. We found the IdMology:
Coherent Identity Management Methodology (CITM) 12 and the MMASQ (Model-centric
Methodology for Analysis, Specification and Qualification) 13 which appear to be used by
practitioners in professional service providers.
The lack of published systematic methodologies for evaluating or selecting APIMs provides
us with a research opportunity to develop such a methodology. Also, we found no evidence
in our review of the literature that methodological tools for evaluating APIMs have reached
the Stage 4 era. This finding provides us with an additional research opportunity to assess
our developed systematic methodology and also to reappraise current approaches.
Based on these two identified research opportunities we next explain our motives for con-
ducting research into systematic methodologies for evaluating and selecting APIMs. Our
focus is on the assessing the efficacy of systematic methodologies, as tools, to select the
optimal APIM for a given application context.
1.2.4 Motivation for Our Research
From the research opportunities identified in the previous section we propose that it is
expedient to expend research effort on establishing a systematic methodology, which can
identify the optimal APIM for a given application context. Also an investigation into the
efficacy of the resulting systematic methodology (and additionally explores the efficacy of
current approaches) may not only contribute to the existing body of knowledge but could
also enhance the understanding of current practices to deploy APIMs.
As we described in Section 1.1.1, there are many issues associated with deployed APIMs.
Similarly, as we identified in Section 1.1.2, there are many vulnerabilities associated with
deployed APIMs. These issues and vulnerabilities may stem from the inappropriate usage of
the identification technologies, deficiencies in the capabilities of the practitioners and/or the
efficacy of the methodology.
The advances in identification technologies, briefly described in Section 1.1.3 and also
reviewed in APIMs in Section 2.4.3, suggest that deficiencies in some APIM deployments
12http://whitepapers.itbusinessnet.com/whitepaper398
13https://www.hjp-consulting.com/consulting/requirements-engineering
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might not be confined to the available identification technologies themselves. An examination
of the identification technologies should, as Polemi argues [238], consider the characteristics
of the application context in which the technology is to be deployed. The vulnerabilities and
issues may, therefore, be the result of deploying inappropriate APIMs for some application
contexts. Some identification technologies may be considered to be optimal for some
application contexts but not for others.
Royer contends [256], from his research involving discipline experts, that the complexity
of evaluating interdependent factors to select and deploy the optimal system for automated
personal identification necessitates the use of a decision support system. His findings suggest
that the selection of the optimal APIM should not rely on discipline experts’ capabilities
alone and that methodological tools are required to complement their current practices.
The practices described by Windley [321], Williamson et al. [320] and Prasad and Rajbhan-
dari [240] appear to place much reliance on discipline expert practitioners’ capabilities to
select and deploy the optimal APIM. Discipline experts, however, possess differing com-
petencies and experience and they may pursue different approaches depending upon the
circumstances surrounding the application context.
In order to ascertain other causes relating to the issues and vulnerabilities associated with
deployed APIMs we believe that an investigation should focus on the problem-solving
processes, i.e. the methodologies, which includes the problem-solving processes pursued by
practitioners.
A methodology, as a problem-solving process, informs programmes on ‘what’ steps to
take, and ‘how’ to perform those steps, and importantly the reasons ‘why’ those steps
should be taken in a particular order [165]. Avison and Fitzgerald argue [18] that the
tighter, more specific the methodology, the more reproducible are the results, particularly
if the methodology specifies the exact techniques and tools to be employed under each
circumstance.
Therefore, we aim to develop a systematic methodology to aid discipline experts select
the optimal APIM for a given application context. We believe that a discipline expert, as
a problem solver, working with a methodical problem solving processes should be more
efficacious in selecting the optimal APIM. Our research inquiry aims to gain an initial
understanding on the efficacy of our systematic methodology. We also seek to identify the
proficiencies and deficiencies of current approaches.
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The identified theoretical gaps in the body of knowledge and the apparent deficiencies of
current approaches served as valuable motivations for our research effort.
1.3 The Research Problem
Given the gaps identified in the body of knowledge and our motivation, we aim to determine
the extent to which a systematic methodology is efficacious in selecting the optimal APIM
for a given application context.
Our analysis of the research problem shows that there is a need to be able to ascertain the
extent to which an APIM is optimal for a given application context in the first instance. From
this understanding an assessment may then be conducted on the efficacy of the methodology
pursued which selected that APIM.
The research problem addressed in this thesis is framed as follows:
How efficacious is a systematic methodology in selecting the optimal automated per-
sonal identification mechanism for a given application context?
Our research aims to ascertain the efficacy of a systematic methodology to select the optimal
APIM for a given application context. We aim to create a systematic methodology and
validate its components empirically. We also aim to assess its efficacy by examining the data
acquired during its utilisation to select the optimal APIM in a real-world instance. From our
acquired empirical data we aim to explain the extent of efficacy of a systematic methodology
in a range of circumstances (and possibly not in others) to select the optimal APIM for a
given application context.
We exclude the direct comparison of the efficacy of a systematic methodology to that of cur-
rent practices in the same application contexts because of the research impracticalities, as we
explain later in this chapter. Our empirical inquiry, however, seeks to gain an understanding
of current practices as well as seeking to identify the circumstances as to when a systematic
methodology may be efficacious. We believe that there are circumstances when a systematic
methodology may be efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM for a given application
context and there are circumstances when other approaches may be more efficacious.
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1.3.1 Research Questions
In order to ascertain the efficacy of a methodology the means to identify whether an APIM is
optimal for its application context needs to be established at the outset. The identification
of the circumstances as to when a systematic methodology is efficacious for selecting the
optimal APIM in turn needs to be broken down into several assessments.
Evidence shows [296, 299, 28] that public bodies and the media often criticise the resulting
APIM deployments as unfit for purpose. We contend, however, that unless the purpose of the
APIM for an application context has been defined at the outset and criteria are established to
evaluate the optimality of the resulting APIM deployment then such criticisms have scant
foundation.
Once the optimality of the APIM deployment is established, the efficacy of the approach
pursued to select that APIM may then be examined. Further criteria are thus required
to assess the efficacy of methodologies designed to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context. The results of the efficacy assessment and the supporting explanations
should then assist in the identification of the circumstances when the use of that methodology
may be most proficient.
Our inquiry into the above research problem is deconstructed, therefore, into the following
research questions:
1. What factors should be evaluated in order to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context?
2. How can information pertaining to an application context be acquired and evaluated in
a systematic methodology so as to determine the optimal APIM?
3. How can the efficacy of a methodology to select an APIM itself be assessed?
4. When is a systematic methodology efficacious for selecting an APIM and if so, under
which scope of circumstances and why or conversely, if not, why not?
1.3.2 Addressing the Research Problem
We adopt a multi-disciplinary research approach to collate, classify and validate a set of
factors in order to conduct an evaluation on the utility of a deployed APIM or APIM
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candidates for a given application context. Essentially, we argue that stakeholders’ objectives
and requirements need to be articulated at the outset in order to establish a representation of
the desired properties of the APIM for that specific application context so that an evaluation
of a deployed APIM or candidate APIMs may be conducted.
We conclude that a systematic methodology is efficacious when the prevailing circumstances
of the application context dictate the need for a comprehensive evaluation. We identify several
circumstance exemplars and provide explanations as to why a comprehensive evaluation for
some application contexts is relevant. We also identify those conditions surrounding the
application context that shows when a systematic methodology is not efficacious.
Our research excludes a theoretical comparison of the efficacy of a systematic methodology
to that of other methodologies because we were unable to find any such methodologies
published with full details in the literature. We, therefore, develop a systematic methodology,
for evaluating an application context in order to select the optimal APIM. Our research
conclusions may therefore be considered as a theoretical stake in the methodological ground.
Our research also excludes a comparison of the efficacy of a systematic methodology to that
of current practices. We believe such comparisons with current approaches practised are
impracticable because the approach may not have actually been documented or it may be
subject to confidentiality protection. We also contend that there are too many real-world
complexities and data acquisition impracticalities to make such comparisons a valid research
aim. We further justify our reasons for excluding such comparisons later in Section 1.6.2.
In practice, we acknowledge that the underlying power influences, i.e. politics, in and
between organisations may negate or reduce the decision-making intentions of our systematic
methodology. Our research approach is cognisant that political and commercial interests
which influence objective reasoning may impinge upon evaluations and deliberations relating
to decision-making on APIM deployments.
1.4 Research Methodology
We used the case study research methodology based upon our critical realist philosophical
orientation, the nature of the research problem and the qualitative research strategy formulated
to address our four research questions. Chapter 4 elucidates and justifies our research strategy
for our research inquiry in detail. Here we, briefly, summarise our research approach, which
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involved two distinct lines of inquiry.
1.4.1 Epistemology
Our philosophical orientation leans towards the critical realist paradigm, in that knowledge is
grounded in social and historical practises, which may or may not be directly observable [198].
The critical realist paradigm is conducive to retroductive reasoning to discover underlying
mechanisms in order to explain observed regularities and also abductive reasoning for
iterative theory building [32].
Our explanatory inquiry seeks to apply Pawson and Tilley’s generative causal model [233]
consisting of a formula of actions in context with intervention mechanisms which produce
outcomes. The evaluation of a programme begins with a theory of causal explanation based
on generative principles, which supposes that regularities in the patterning of social activities
are brought about by underlying mechanisms constituted by people’s reasoning and the
resources that they are able to summon in a particular context [233].
1.4.2 Research Strategy
Our inceptive line of inquiry was to establish a set of factors for evaluating an application
context and then validate them using empirical evidence. This inquiry was exploratory in
nature. An incremental approach was adopted by reviewing the literature and establishing an
initial set of factors. These factors were then validated, using grounded theory qualitative
data analysis techniques [47, 259], against the empirical data acquired from three case studies.
Data from the case studies were used iteratively in order to identify new factors or refine
previously established factors.
We classified our validated factors which acted to inform our efforts to ascertain the require-
ments of a systematic methodology for selecting an APIM. The development of our system-
atic methodology commenced with the review of the literature in order to establish an initial
evaluation framework and a selection method with discrete steps. The methodology was
enhanced iteratively from our analysis of data relating to approaches pursued by programmes
in two case studies. These data enabled the identification of methodological lessons from a
retrospective analysis of the conditions prevailing at the inception stage of the programme,
the events that occurred during the programme and the outcomes of the APIM deployments.
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Our main line of inquiry was to assess the efficacy of a systematic methodology to select the
optimal APIM for real-world case. This second line of inquiry was explanatory in nature.
We used the systematic methodology, as an intervention mechanism as described by Pawson
and Tilley [233], in a real-world case study. We established criteria to assess the efficacy
of our systematic methodology using the data that was acquired during its usage. We also
performed a cross-case analysis of methodological efficacy using the data acquired from our
three case studies in order to identify patterns in our data.
From this analysis and the circumstances surrounding the programme in each case study we
were able to identify the circumstances as to when a systematic methodology is efficacious
for selecting the optimal APIM for given application context. The patterns in our data
provided us with explanations to support our conclusions on methodological efficacy.
1.4.3 Case Study Research Methodology
Data relating to the two retrospective case studies were acquired from documentary evidence
in the public domain and from interviews with participants involved with these APIM
deployment programmes. For the intervention case study, data were generated from using
the systematic methodology in collaboration with an enterprise’s Director of Risks. The
data gathering interactions included several interviews, exchanges of correspondence and
the production of a Request for Information (RFI) document which was sent to potential
suppliers.
Theoretical sampling, as described by Silverman [265], was used to identify three case studies
that were collectively representative to develop our theories. Adhering to the authoritative
guidance [203, 253, 265] on qualitative data coding, we coded the data acquired from our
three data sets. We used Pawson and Tilley’s generative causal model [233] as a framework
to assess the acquired data on methodological efficacy.
We developed a Decision Support System (DSS) as a representation of our systematic
methodology which we used as a repository for the acquired data. The Atlas.ti Computer-
Aided Qualitative Data Analysis System (CAQDAS) tool was used to manage the data sets to
support of the analysis of our data in respect of our main line of inquiry on methodological
efficacy.
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1.5 Contributions to Knowledge
From our research efforts our main contribution to the body of knowledge is our initial
theory on the efficacy of a systematic methodology in selecting the optimal APIM for a given
application context.
We conclude from our research, but we do not prove irrefutably, that a systematic method-
ology is reasonably efficacious when the characteristics surrounding the application context
are such that an organisation needs to conduct a comprehensive evaluation in order to select
the optimal APIM. Our initial theory is founded upon three explanations which we identified
from our analysis of data acquired from using our systematic methodology, Approach to
Select the Most Suitable APIM (ASMSA) Methodology, in a real-world case study.
An organisation should conduct a comprehensive evaluation when the circumstances sur-
rounding the application context necessitates that its programme needs to:
• establish objectives and requirements for an APIM in order to evaluate a range of
candidate APIMs;
• employ repeatable systematic processes in order to reduce their reliance on the capa-
bilities of discipline experts; and/or
• produce an audit trail of the programme’s method which may be used as evidence to
justify the APIM selected.
The extent of a systematic methodology’s efficacy may reach beyond the need to conduct a
comprehensive evaluation. Further empirical research should help to build upon our initial
theory and also identify other reasons for utilising a systematic methodology to select an
APIM.
In answering our research questions our other contributions to the body of knowledge are:
1. a comprehensive range of factors in order to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context;
2. an innovative systematic methodology – the ASMSA Methodology comprising an
evaluation framework and a method to select an APIM; and
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3. a set of criteria to assess the efficacy of a methodology to select the optimal APIM for
a given application context.
As a by-product of our research, we developed the ASMSA Decision Support System
(ASMSA-DSS), as a tool to represent the processes in the ASMSA Methodology in order to
acquire data, store and manipulate data from a case under evaluation.
The establishment of a systematic methodology to evaluate a given application context in
order to select the optimal APIM and the establishment of a comprehensive range of factors
to evaluate APIMs provides a foundation for further theoretical and empirical research.
From the initial use of the ASMSA Methodology, we found that it has the potential, through
further refinement, to become a valuable tool for practitioners. Further research is needed
to identify, understand and represent the rules that discipline experts employ, from their
in-depth experience, in their approach to select APIMs.
We also conclude that organisations should define the pertinent metrics for their application
context and acquire the relevant data in order to evaluate the utility of a deployed automated
personal identification system. Our research supports Jaquith’s argument [164] that organ-
isations need to enhance the measurement of their security controls. We contend that the
absence of such data not only inhibits efforts to evaluate the utility of deployed APIMs, but
also impedes efforts to assess the efficacy of methodologies to select such systems.
The material relating to our publication on factors to evaluate APIMs [226] forms the basis of
the content of Chapter 7; however, these factors and their associated criteria questions have
since been validated and enhanced through our empirical research. The material relating
to our publication on the systematic methodology to evaluate and select APIMs [227] also
forms the basis of Chapter 7, which describes the ASMSA Methodology comprising an
evaluation framework, incorporating factors for evaluating APIMs and associated criteria
questions, and a selection method.
1.6 Restrictions on Research Scope and Key Assumptions
The restrictions discussed in this section relate to those aspects of our inquiries that fall
within our control. We establish and justify the boundaries of our research field in Chapter
2 by defining key terms, describing the fundamental concepts, and the scope of automated
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personal identification. We elected to avoid using the term identity management in this thesis
so as to ensure that the scope of our research and our findings may be understood within
these defined boundaries.
As discussed in Section 1.3, the research problem is framed to restrict our research efforts
to determine the extent of a systematic methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal APIM
for a given context. We exclude research on theoretical and practical comparisons of
methodological efficacy for the reasons given in the next two sub-sections.
1.6.1 Boundaries on Theoretical Scope
Essentially, there are no other systematic methodologies for selecting APIMs in the body of
knowledge in order for us to conduct a theoretical comparison.
An experimental research methodology using relevant case study data, suitable assessor
subjects and different methodologies to select an APIM, is a future possibility; however, we
excluded this research option because our aim was to establish a systematic methodology
in the first instance and to then investigate the extent of its efficacy. We also assumed
that a theoretical research avenue would involve the control of many variables and much
of the research work would focus on the subjects’ knowledge and capabilities and their
interpretation of the data and their understanding of the selection methodology.
The main unit of analysis of our inquiry was to ascertain the extent of a systematic method-
ology’s efficacy to select the optimal APIM for a given application context, as defined in
Section 4.5.1. Our secondary unit of analysis focused on the validation of our systematic
methodology’s components. We believe, however, that future research may enhance the
body of knowledge on systematic methodologies provided that the impact of the assessor
variable, i.e. the competencies of the methodology user, is minimised.
1.6.2 Boundaries on Practical Scope
Additionally, there is the option to conduct investigations on selecting APIMs using discipline
experts and exploring their practices.
Firstly, we had no means to verify an individual’s claim to be a discipline expert in the
field. We also assumed that it would have been difficult to gain consent and willingness of a
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practitioner to participate in our research, particularly to acquire data during an assignment.
Our aim was to collect data from using a systematic methodology during an evaluation
assignment. We believed that a discipline expert’s review of our systematic methodology
in isolation of a specific application context would be inadequate for our research purposes.
We assumed that pursuing a research strategy that used the systematic methodology would
improve the quality of data acquired.
Secondly, we were conscious that some organisations or practitioners may not wish to
disclose sensitive data, particularly on reliability, vulnerabilities and costs of the APIM
deployments. For this reason we justify our research strategy to use the case study research
methodology and selected cases with documentary evidence in the public domain. We
also selected our cases on the basis that there were individuals willing to participate in our
research under the formal arrangement of a consent agreement.
Our main assumption is that we believed that it would be difficult to compare our systematic
methodology with another approach simultaneously in a real-world application context. We
assumed that it may be difficult to differentiate the data generated from using the systematic
methodology’s processes and the data acquired from using a different approach in the same
application context. We also assumed, in reality, that it would be difficult to locate two
identical application contexts in order to compare different methodologies.
Similarly, if a methodology were assessed retrospectively, i.e. after the APIM selection, then
there may be an advantage to the succeeding methodology from having the opportunity to
learn from the preceding methodology and its decision outcomes. Most importantly, we were
conscious that organisational interests and operational constraints often make it difficult to
use controlled scientific intervention, particularly when there is a potential adverse impact
on risk countermeasures.
Our research, therefore, concentrates on developing a systematic methodology and assessing
its efficacy rather than trying to compare the ASMSA Methodology against current practices
directly.
Therefore, our research concentrated upon the efficacy of the systematic methodology as
our main unit of analysis without attempting to nullify or reduce the effects of the assessor
variable. We also recognised that our interpretation of data gathered from the case studies
may also be subject to bias; however, the research methodology was designed to acquire
independently produced data, i.e. interviewees’ insights, rather than our interpretations and
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opinions.
Our research inquiry is based upon our assumption that APIMs are imperfect, in that they
have inherent vulnerabilities, attract issues and stakeholders incur costs. We also assumed
that stakeholder organisations in each application context define the qualities upon which to
evaluate the utility of a deployed APIM.
The significance of our research is that it aims to establish that a systematic methodology
is efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM for a given application context under certain
circumstances. Shostack and Stewart pose [264] many fundamental questions about the
efficacy of some experts’ practises to select effective and efficient security controls. The
results of our research efforts add a specific methodological instrument to the practitioners’
tool box and also provide guidance on the circumstances as to when the use of that instrument
is efficacious.
1.7 Outline of this Thesis
The thesis is structured into nine chapters with 14 appendices. The contents of each chapter
and appendix are as follows:
Chapter 1– Introduction This introductory chapter sets out the research problem addressed
in this thesis together with a description of our motivation to conduct research in
this field. We also describe our contributions to the body of knowledge and the
delimitations of our research efforts;
Chapter 2–Terminology In this chapter we define the terms associated with automated per-
sonal identification and also provide a description of the core concepts of identification
and authentication used in this thesis;
Chapter 3–Research Issues In this chapter we establish a tool classification scheme for
reviewing approaches which can be applied within the InfoSec discipline to achieve a
desired result. We provide our review on InfoSec approaches in literature based on our
classification scheme. We then provide our review of the approaches in the literature
on our immediate discipline of the identification and authentication of persons in order
to identify research issues. We also explain the development of our four research
questions in order to address our research problem on the efficacy of a systematic
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methodology to select the optimal APIM for a given application context;
Chapter 4–Research Methodology In this chapter we outline the theoretical foundations
upon which we based our decision to use the case study research methodology in
order to conduct our research. We also specify our criteria for selecting appropriate
case studies and justify the selection of the three case studies used in our empirical
research. We then define our main unit of analysis to assess the efficacy of a systematic
methodology. We also define our secondary unit of analysis to validate the ASMSA
Methodology’s factors and criteria questions. We also describe the methods used to
gather data from our three case studies and our analytical framework for analysing the
acquired data;
Chapter 5–The ASMSA Methodology This chapter opens with a description of the re-
search problem’s characteristics which motivated us to develop a systematic method-
ology to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. We also describe the
theoretical principles upon which we designed the ASMSA Methodology. We then
provide a description of the ASMSA Methodology’s three components comprising
the ASMSA Evaluation Framework, its factors for evaluating APIMs and associated
criteria questions grouped into evaluation themes, and the ASMSA Selection Method;
Chapter 6–Case Study of an European Union State’s eID Card Programme This chap-
ter describes our initial efforts to validate our identified factors and associated criteria
questions using data from our first case study. We then examine the approach pursued
by the European Union (EU) state’s eID Card Programme. We also provide a summary
of the methodological insights acquired from members of the programme team in
order to identify methodological learnings;
Chapter 7–Case Study of an EU State’s eGates Programme This chapter discusses our
efforts to validate our identified factors for evaluating APIMs and associated criteria
questions using data from this second case study. We then examine the approach
pursued by the EU state’s eGates Programme. We also provide a summary of the
methodological insights acquired from members of the programme team in order
to identify methodological learnings. We also conduct a cross-case analysis of our
methodological findings from our two retrospective case studies;
Chapter 8–Assessing the Efficacy of the ASMSA Methodology In this chapter we begin
by establishing six criteria upon which to assess the efficacy of a methodology to
select the optimal APIM for a given application context. We then discuss our efforts to
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validate our established methodology using data from the inaugural use of the ASMSA
Methodology in the Corporation X’s Two Factor Authentication (2FA) Project. We
also provide a summary of the methodological insights acquired from Corporation
X’s Director of Risks in order to identify methodological learnings. We provide the
results of our assessment of ASMSA Methodology’s efficacy using the data from the
Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study and our established efficacy assessment criteria.
We then identify circumstances when a systematic methodology may be efficacious
for selecting the optimal APIM for a given application context;
Chapter 9–Conclusions and Implications In this final chapter we draw our conclusions
on the achievements of our research efforts. We then discuss our conclusions about
the research problem and our efforts to answer our four research questions. We then
reflect on the research methodology to address our research problem. We summarise
the implications of our research to theory and to practice, and then identify avenues
for further research;
Appendix A Factors for Evaluating APIMs and Criteria Questions Identified from our
Review of the literature;
Appendix B EU State’s eID Card Programme Case Study Interview Questions;
Appendix C Factors and Criteria Questions Status Post First Case Study Validation;
Appendix D EU State’s eGates Programme Case Study Interview Questions;
Appendix E Factors and Criteria Questions Status Post Second Case Study Validation; and
Appendix F Factors and Criteria Questions Status Post Third Case Study Validation.
1.8 Summary of Chapter
This chapter laid the foundations for this thesis and introduced the research issues, the
research problem and its four associated research questions.
Our motivation and a justification for the research were presented and the issue relating to
the uniformity of the key terms were highlighted. A description of the research methodology
was outlined together with our claims on the contributions to the body of knowledge. The
boundaries of our research scope and our main assumptions for the research were discussed.
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Based on these foundations we proceed with a detailed description of this thesis commencing
with definitions of the terminology relevant to this research field in the next chapter.
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This chapter describes the need to define terms in the automated personal identification
research field. We provide descriptions of the underlying theoretical concepts of identification
and authentication together with definitions and scope of the term APIM upon which our
research is based.
2.1 The Need for Consistency in Scope and Defined Terms
The need for consistency in this research field relates to the differing interpretations of
the scope of identity management and the lack of uniformity of terms and their definitions
relating to its key concepts.
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2.1.1 Inconsistencies in the Scope of Identity Management
Bertino and Takahashi acknowledge [27] that researchers and practitioners adopt different
interpretations of the scope of the term and the acronym Identity Management (IdM). Some
of the literature extends the scope of identity management to cover all types of entities
[30, 321, 204]; whereas, other contributions restrict the scope to the automatic identification
or automatic authentication of persons [236, 287, 320]. The main difference between identity
management and automated personal identification appears to be related to scope. The
former term is used to indicate the identification of all types of entity; whereas, the later term
is confined to the identification of persons. We use the latter term because of the uncertainty
surrounding the definitions and scope of the former term.
The ITU-T Standards Organisation recognises [151] the different interpretations of this term
and also the diversity of understandings in respect of its scope. Stevens contends [276] that
identity management is the entirely the wrong term, in that organisations are not trying to
‘manage’ digital identities per se, but to ascertain:
• who an individual is in an information system;
• whether this person is unique in an information system (more than one digital persona);
and
• whether a person is who they claim to be.
The International Telecommunications Union defines the scope of the identity management
in ITU-T X.1252 Baseline Identity Management Terms and Definitions [151] as:
A set of functions and capabilities (e.g. administration, management and main-
tenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and binding, policy
enforcement, authentication and assertions) used for:
• assurance of identity information (e.g. identifiers, credentials, attributes);
• assurance of the identity of an entity; and
• supporting business and security applications.
The following statement appears after the above definition in ITU-T X.1252:
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Please note that this annex does not capture or explain the holistic view of
identity management.
This statement leaves the aforementioned scope of identity management open to differing
interpretations, as there does not appear to be a definition in the literature on what constitutes
an holistic view of identity management.
Similarly, ISO/IEC24760 Part 1–A Framework for Identity Management Terminology and
Concepts defines [157] identity management as:
processes and policies involving the life-cycle and value, type, and optional
meta data of attributes in identities known in a particular domain
ISO/IEC 24761 Authentication Context for Biometrics [156], published by the same stan-
dards working group on identity management, uses the term biometrics processing unit
instead, which is defined as:
entity that executes one or more sub-processes that perform a biometric verifica-
tion at a uniform level of security
We consider the inconsistency in scope of the term identity management in the literature
and the vagueness of the definitions and scope in these authoritative sources are not suitable
foundations upon which to base research and to develop theories. Therefore, we adopt the
term automated personal identification, as established by Warfel [307] over three decades
ago and embraced by Raphael and Young [247] and the U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [177], as our core generic term which relates to systems that
automatically identify or authenticate persons.
Our adopted term may, therefore, be construed to describe the generic requirements for an
Automated Personal Identification Mechanism (APIM) to automatically identify persons.
Those requirements are fulfilled by an identification system or an authentication system.
2.1.2 Lack of Uniformity Relating to Key Terms and Concepts
Clarke states [59] that the practises of identification and authentication have been highly
unsatisfactory for the last two decades, mainly, he claims, because the theory and the terms
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used, e.g. IdM, for such activities are seriously deficient. Chadwick also recognises [46]
the impreciseness of the standards bodies’ terminology to describe an IdM system, in his
endeavour to explain the scope of federated identity management. ISO/IEC24760 Part 1–A
Framework for Identity Management Terminology and Concepts fails [157] to define the
term or describe the concept of an identity management system.
Evidence to support Clarke’s and Chadwick’s observations is exemplified by the standard-
isation bodies’ definitions of IdM terminology in ISO24761 Authentication Context for
Biometrics [156], ITU-T X1252 Baseline Identity Management Terms and Definitions
[151], The Open Group’s Identity Management White Paper and Business Scenarios Report
[269, 286], W3C’s Workshop on Identity Management [304] and NIST’s Special Publication
800-63-2 Electronic Authentication Guideline [217]. The term Personal Identity Verification
(PIV), adopted by NIST [98, 215], covers the automatic personal identification of persons
accessing government information systems as employees or contractors.
Key terminology relating to biometric systems is also not uniformly used in the literature or
in authoritative sources. For example the terms biometric authentication [271], biometric
verification [214, 156] and biometric recognition [230] relating to the same concept are
further evidence that the terminology and scope of this research field needs to establish
consistency. Jain and Li conclude [186] that until consistency in terminology is achieved,
by the respective standardisation bodies, there is always a need to define each term in
publications in the field of the identification and authentication of persons.
We revert to established theoretical identification and authentication models [95, 58] in order
to define the term Automated Personal Identification Mechanism and also to describe the
scope of automated personal identification in this thesis.
2.2 Identification and Authentication Theory
We describe the concepts of digital identity and the interrelationships in respect of identifica-
tion and authentication theory in order to then explain the types of usage transactions in an
identification system or authentication system.
Clarke’s Entity-Relationship of Identity Model [58], shown in Figure 2.1, depicts the concepts
and the terms relating to the identification of an entity, in our case a person using their
characteristics, and the authentication of an entity that verifies a person’s assertion claim to a
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Figure 2.1: Clarke’s Identifier Based Authentication Versus Attribute Based Identification
Model [58]
user account in an information system. Clark invents [58] the term entification to distinguish
between an attribute based identification system and an identifier based authentication system.
As Clarke acknowledges [58] his term entification is not adopted universally; however, we
use this term in this thesis for clarification purposes only.
Everett’s model [91] of the verification of human users’ identity and Fåk’s Theoretical User
Verification Model [95] provide a foundation upon which to develop an abstract transaction
model for automated decisions on the identification or authentication of persons. Figure 2.2,
is adapted from Fåk’s model, using Clarke’s definitions [58], to illustrate an abstract usage
model for entification and authentication decisions. The term entification is defined in Table
2.1. The encoded credential signals for making entification or authentication decisions are
based on a person’s:
• knowledge;
• control of artefacts or tokens;
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Figure 2.2: Abstract Usage Model of Entification or Authentication adapted from Fåk [95]
• physical features or behavioural characteristics; or
• a combination of these signals.
The type of signal data acquired from a person is either discrete, i.e. exact input data, or a
combination of calibrated feature values, i.e. imprecise sensed stream of signals. Credential
and other attribute data may be captured during transactional usage in a disconnected and
discrete mode, for example a keyboard, possibly involving a token under the subject’s
control. Alternatively, continuous signals are captured by a sensor device operating in an
amalgamated mode, for example, a fingerprint scanner or a camera continually scanning
persons’ facial images in a moving crowd.
The input signals may be generated naturally by the person or may require cognitive processes
to recall knowledge data or may require an artefact or token assigned to the individual to
automatically generate additional attributes or alternative encoded signals.
The automated personal identification of a person is accomplished by an authentication
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system, using a previously assigned identifier with credential data. Alternatively, an identifi-
cation system using a person’s attribute data, without an identifier, entifies a person. Both
systems use the data sensed or captured in order to compare the encoded signal data relating
with the attribute data relating to that person in a repository. Some identification systems are
designed to establish that a person and their attribute data are not stored in a repository [323].
Some of the literature describes authentication systems as consisting of identification and
authentication sub-processes [287]. In these instances the identification process provides the
person’s identifier to the security system and evidence, or credential data, that are supplied as
an assertion claim to the account associated with that unique identifier [287]. Identification
systems, or in Clarke’s terminology entification, use attribute data acquired, overtly or
covertly, to entify a person.
We differentiate authentication system and identification system transaction decision sub-
processes with reference to our established usage model:
• Identification and Authentication: In an authentication system a decision is computed
using the identifier to locate the digital identity record of a person and matches the
acquired data either discrete data, such as an identifier and its credential which may be
a Personal Identification Number (PIN) or sensed data, for example, an encoded facial
image relating to that identifier.
• Entification: In an identification system a decision is computed by using the attribute
data acquired, from that person, and by searching through a store of attribute data
relating to digital identities to locate candidates that match the attribute search data.
Based upon our abstract usage model, in Figure 2.2, the results of the computation decisions
which are communicated to an operating system or application’s information system is
differentiated depending upon the transaction usage type and the type of credential or signal
data.
Biometric algorithms match biometric encoded signal data on probabilistic outcomes based
upon similarity measurements against stored template data [311] and not exact matches of
two discrete values, such as an identifier and authentication data, e.g. a password. This
differentiation of transaction usage types and credential data types produces the following
usage transaction decision outcomes:
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1. Authentication System: Correct identification and authentication of subject; or incor-
rect identifier or credential data submitted; or malfunctioning token; or malfunctioning
authentication system; or incorrect decision or
2. Identification System: No candidate subject entified or one or more candidate subject
entified inside the similarity threshold matching search or malfunctioning identification
system or incorrect decision.
Decisions on user authentication and biometric verification operate on a one-to-one matching
basis [271]. Conversely, entification decisions operate on a one-to-many basis, where the
sensed data are used to search through a repository containing feature templates belonging
to community members [186, 214, 162]. Where entification involves biometric modalities
the search involves the interrogation of the modality features of the digital entities stored in
the database. Raskin proposes [248] the use of discrete data entered by the user, such as a
password without the identifier data, for the entification decision process; however, he does
not explain how a digital entifier would preserve its uniqueness in an information system
containing data acquired from many users.
The decisions relating to these usage models are predicated upon the assurance of other
supporting processes, such as activities relating to the enrolment of person relating to a
digital identity. These activities which support the transactional use of authentication system
and identification systems are defined in sub-section 2.4.
We use automated personal identification as a generic term which encapsulates the theory
behind Clarke’s Entity-Relationship of Identity Model [58] and also entification and authen-
tication usage transactions from our adaption of Fåk’s Theoretical User Verification Model
[95].
2.3 Definition of Core Terms for Automated Personal Identifi-
cation
The definitions of the core terms for automated personal identification, shown in Table 2.1,
are taken from a variety of sources. The conflicting use of terminology means that our
definitions for such terms are drawn mainly from sources with established models of identity
and conceptual descriptions of information system processes which automatically identify a
person.
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TERM DEFINITION SOURCE
Automated Digital processes for automated decisions, by information Raphael and
Personal systems, on the identification or authentication Young [247]
Identification of a person
Entification A rule-based process of associating attribute data values adapted from
(or combination of values) with a particular person by Clarke [58]
acquiring the entifier (or entifiers) relating to
that person
Identification A process of associating data with a particular person adapted from
achieved by acquiring an identifier for that person Clarke [58]
Authentication A process that establishes a level of confidence in an Clarke [58]
assertion by cross-checking the assertion against one
or more credentials
Authorisation The granting of rights and, based on these rights, X1252
the granting of access ITU-T [151]
Identifier A representation of one or more attributes used to Clarke [58]
distinguish that digital identity from others in the same
category or domain
Entity In this thesis a human subject or a person Clarke [58]
Entifier Unique reference as a means of distinguishing a person Clarke [58]
in a repository of human entities and their attributes
Digital An abstract representation of a person with one or more X1252
Identity attributes to allow that person to be sufficiently ITU-T [151]
distinguishable within context
Attribute Information bound to an individual that specifies X1252
characteristics of that person. ITU-T [151]
Credential Data with physical or digital existence that serves as adapted from
evidence to establish the claimed identity of ISO9735-1
a person. ISO/TC 154
Subject The person being identified or authenticated or possibly adapted from
the identifyee Warfel [307]
User The person that directly interacts with the information ISO9241-110
system, who may or may not be the subject TC173/SC1
Signal A detectable synchronous event possibly accompanied ISO14776-411
by descriptive data and parameters JTC1/SC25
Encoded Characteristic parts of signal that carry extracted data Fåk [95]
Signals contents for a decision module
Input User controlled device that captures signals and transmits ISO9241-400
Device information to a system TC159/TC4
Table 2.1: Core Terms for Automated Personal Identification
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In this thesis we adopt the term biometric identification for entification based biometric
systems. We use the term biometric verification for identifier based biometric systems. We
use the acronym APIM generically to denote a biometric identification system, a biometric
verification system or an authentication system which uses knowledge, e.g. a password, and
possibly other attributes to verify the genuine user.
We adopt our terminology because we consider it to be sufficiently generic and descriptive so
as to avoid interpretations that may be construed as meaning a particular type of identification
system or authentication system or perceived assurance quality. We append the word
mechanism to the term automated personal identification rather than system, in order to
differentiate the APIM’s purpose from those functions that are performed by the associated
information systems, such as an application program or a computer’s operating system.
Although, we have defined the term authorisation in Table 2.1 these processes are beyond the
scope of automated personal identification. We exclude the authorisation process because it
takes place after the entification or the authentication process has completed successfully
to a specified level of assurance [159]. We acknowledge, however, that the authorisation
of privileges or access rights could relate to the probabilistic degree of assurance in the
entification or authentication process [176].
We define an APIM as a system comprising policies, procedures, technology and other
resources for maintaining information on digital identities, including attribute data, for the
purposes of the entification or the authentication of persons. ISO/IEC 24760 Information
Technology: Security Techniques, Part 1 A Framework for Identity Management - Terminol-
ogy and Concepts [157], as a core international standard, does not include a definition of
the term Identity Management System (IdMS). From our review of the literature an IdMS
appears to relate to the identification and authentication of all entities [30, 151], e.g. an
organisation, a process, a device, a person; whereas, we restrict the scope of an APIM to the
identification or authentication of persons.
Additionally, ISO/IEC 24760 Information Technology: Security Techniques, Part 1 A Frame-
work for Identity Management - Terminology and Concepts [157] extends its scope of
identity-based decisions on entities to beyond the functions of identification and authentica-
tion. According to this standard identity-based decisions could also include choices relating
to the attributes of the entity, e.g. a ruling based upon the age or location of an organisation.
We restrict the scope of an APIM to decisions relating to the functions of identification and
authentication.
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Where we use the term and acronym Identity Management System (IdMS) in this thesis
we are referring to the entification or authentication of entities or decisions relating to the
attributes of entities and the management of those entities’ attributes, e.g. identifiers. An
entity in IdMS may relate to a person, a device, e.g. a utility smart meter, an organisation or
a process in a computer system.
2.4 The Scope of Our Term APIM
Following our definition of core terms and a description of the underlying concepts upon
which base our terminology in this thesis we now we describe the scope of our term APIM.
We outline an APIM’s functional purposes, the life-cycle management of digital identities,
the types of APIM deployments and the governance frameworks for APIMs in order to
clarify the boundaries of our research.
APIMs operate in both the physical world, e.g. automated border control passenger inspec-
tions, and virtual worlds, e.g. Internet banking. Human recognition of other persons is, by
inference, out of scope. The inverse process of persons identifying an information system,
e.g. a cloud service, is also out of scope. We acknowledge, however, that the automatic
mutual authentication of devices, e.g. Transport Layer Security Protocol, may be deployed
as part of a solution to remotely authenticate a user’s computer system.
2.4.1 Functional Purposes
The scope of the term APIM covers fully automated usage transaction processes utilising
devices that measure and decide upon the identification of a person [247].
APIMs are designed to positively entify or authenticate registered subjects to enable access
to resources and to prevent misfeasors from gaining unauthorised access to an information
system’s data and resources. Similarly, an APIM may also, as a separate and dedicated func-
tion, enable the entification of a person who is already known to the biometric identification
system or alternatively ensures that that person is not already known to that identification
system [311].
The scope of the term APIM covers the transactional usage, as described in Section 2.2, for
an information system or an operating system or device to request the APIM to automatically
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identify a person. We exclude automatic processes relating to attribute based decisions, as
described in ISO/IEC 24760 [157], where a relying party may wish to establish that a person
is over 18 years old.
We describe the processes to manage digital identities next.
2.4.2 Life-cycle Management of Digital Identities
Bertino and Takahashi state [27] that the life-cycle management of digital identities consists
of three main activities:
• registration and enrolment of digital identities ;
• operational maintenance; and
• decommissioning.
The life-cycle management activity of a digital identity or an entity of a person commences
with the entitlement checking and registration of that person and it continues throughout
transactional usage in the application context until the eventual decommissioning of that
digital identity.
2.4.2.1 Registration and Enrolment of Digital Identities
The registration of a digital identity or entity is performed by four distinct tasks, which may
not be relevant to all applications.
First, the entitlement task ensures that the person is entitled or authorised to have a digital
identity to access an information system, e.g. a contractor is given approval to access a
client’s system resources.
Second, the identity proofing task attempts establish the veracity of the claimed identity,
possibly using documentary evidence, e.g. individual’s national identity card or birth
certificate. In some circumstances this process may, where relevant, include background
checks on the person’s social footprint, e.g. criminal records and bank account information.
The identity proofing task is normally performed by a Registration Authority (RA) that
captures and verifies the required information from a person’s claim to a real-world identity.
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This task is in the scope because transactional usage is necessarily predicated, in many
contexts, upon the assurance used to verify the claimed identity to be that of the genuine
identity [79].
Third, the registration task is the creation of a digital identity for a person either by acquiring
information from the applicant’s registration form, if applicable, or alternatively a person
uses an automatic self-registration process.
Lastly, the enrolment task involves the personalisation of credentials and attribute data
together with the delivery of credential data to the registered subject, for example a PIN
value via a PIN mailer through a postal service and, where relevant a token, for example, a
bank payment credit card. The enrolment task, depending upon the APIM deployment type,
may involve the capturing of biometric data from the registered subject, where the subject is
required to visit a registration authority’s premises. Alternatively, and possibly additionally,
credential data are generated automatically by the APIM, or by the subject, e.g. a password.
2.4.2.2 APIM Operational Maintenance
Operational maintenance consists of tasks to retain the validity of the identifiers or entifiers,
credentials and attributes data associated with the digital identities to enable the identification
system or authentication system to function as designed.
The operational support functions include the revision of attribute data, for example biometric
template updating, and the updating of specific attribute data, for example the renewal of a
subject’s digital certificates. These maintenance tasks are essential to ensure that a subject’s
digital identity and its associated data remain valid.
The re-activation of credential data may be manually performed by the APIM’s operatives
following user notification to a help desk or the process of re-activation may be automatic. For
example, resetting forgotten passwords automatically may be achieved through functionality
provided by the APIM itself or by an associated information system or by an out-of-bounds
method.
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2.4.2.3 Decommissioning
In this activity data relating to a person’s digital identity are removed from the APIM’s
subject community repository.
This task may include the removal of data relating to identifiers or entifiers and associated
attributes from the centralised repository. The removal of user access to an information
system may include the return of a physical token for destruction or the cancellation of a
token with a limited validity period, for example a five year expiry date on an ePassport.
The decommissioning processes may also involve the revocation of a digital certificate in a
case where there is a suspected compromise of a subject’s credential. Organisations often
overlook this decommissioning process leaving superfluous accounts available which may
be attacked by miscreants seeking to gain unauthorised access to data and resources.
The types of activities to manage the digital identities or entities and their associated attribute
data and credentials depend upon the type of APIM deployed and its configuration.
2.4.3 APIM Deployment Types
We categorise APIM deployment types by the transaction usage decision process, as described
in Section 2.2, as follows:
1. Authentication: The process to determine the authorised subject associated with the
identifier by matching exactly the credential authentication data presented by the
person.
2. Biometric Identification: The process of entifying a person by capturing a signal or a
fusion of signals and conducting a search for candidate entifiers with closely matching
characteristics in a repository containing biometric features of an enrolled population.
3. Biometric Verification: The process to authenticate a subject’s claim to a digital
identity by direct comparison of the similarities of biometric features or signals sensed
to those previously extracted during enrolment.
All knowledge based authentication systems which use credentials, e.g. PINs, passwords,
graphical passwords and rebus passwords, are included in the term APIM. So too are other
forms of credentials such as software and hardware tokens and the use of Short Message
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Service (SMS) technologies to deliver one-time authentication codes, which involve an
interaction with a person. Biometric technologies are included, whether based upon static
physiological attributes, e.g. face, hand geometry, iris biometric modalities, or on dynamic
behavioural attributes, e.g. signature, keystroke dynamics and gait biometric modalities.
Chemical identification technologies, e.g. latent fingerprints, which involve forensic and
biological identification technologies, are excluded because these technologies currently rely
on human intervention.
The term APIM includes physical artefacts or logical tokens as credentials that are under
the subject’s control, which may contain identifiers, authentication data, biographical data,
biometric data and digital certificates. Everett classifies [91] artefacts and tokens as either
passive, without any test of the holder, or active, with an element of intelligence to test
the holder, using knowledge or biometric data. For example, an Integrated Circuit Card
(ICC) containing certificates on a bank payment card artefact is inserted into an Europay
Mastercard and Visa (EMV) compliant card reader challenge device, and a PIN is required
to be entered to authenticate the genuine holder.
Some artefacts and tokens may require the subject to possess a specification compliant
reader device or alternatively another device, e.g. a mobile phone to receive an SMS one-
time authentication code. Artefacts and tokens have varying processing and protection
capabilities to facilitate local or remote authentication of a person. Additionally, tokens
together with associated reader devices, e.g. an Integrated Circuit Card reader, are included in
the scope. We exclude the pre-personalisation processes of token manufacture because these
tokens are not, at that stage, assigned to a digital identity. Persons are normally assigned
an identifier during personalisation processes, which may be synchronised with subject
enrolment processes.
The spectrum of current APIMs and the emergence of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PETS), as surveyed by The Meta Group [201] and Fritsch [105], provide an expanding array
of potential technologies for the deployment of APIMs. Similarly, infrastructures to preserve
privacy and improve digital identity protection in cyberspace, as promoted by Rannenberg et
al. [42], play an essential role to support PETS.
There are some applications where the subject must be identified and authenticated to comply
with legislation, for example the British Banking Association’s know-your-customer rules for
UK banks and building societies as part of their obligations under the UK Money Laundering
Regulations (2007) [284]. Conversely, there are some application contexts, again to comply
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with legislation, where the subject’s anonymity must be maintained, for example eVoting.
The spectrum of solution configurations, as shown in Figure 2.3 should not be construed
as an exhaustive list of APIM deployment types. It is proffered to explain the scope and
subtlety of the various identification technologies and configurations. Importantly, it serves
to justify the use of automated personal identification as a more descriptive and generic term
for this thesis. It also serves to justify our choice of definitions for the core terms for APIMs,
as shown in Table 2.1 and other terms employed relating to APIM deployments, as shown in
Table 2.2.
Additional terms associated with APIMs which are used in this thesis are defined in Table
2.2. This table is not intended to be an exhaustive list of terms relating to identity concepts
or emerging identification technologies or identity infrastructures.
2.4.4 APIM Governance Frameworks
We adopt the model established in ISO 21188: Public Key Infrastructure for Financial
Services–Practices and Policy Framework [153] to distinguish the governance frameworks
for APIMs which involve organisations in different roles, either in issuing digital identities
(issuing authority) or relying upon digital identities (relying party) or both. We classify these
organisations’ roles into the following APIM governance framework types:
• Enterprise: The issuing authority and relying party are the same organisational entity,
which manages the APIM that issues the identifiers and tokens, where required, to
employees, customers and agents;
• Federated: There are multiple relying party organisations that rely on an issuing
authority, e.g. a national identity card scheme with an identifier in a token, e.g. public
key certificate, or alternatively one relying party may rely on digital identities issued
by many issuing authorities, e.g. claims based identity schemes;
• Heterogeneous: There are multiple issuer organisations and multiple relying party
organisations involved with the framework or formalised scheme, e.g. in the case of
EMV Payment Card issuing authorities and worldwide Automated Teller Machines
(ATMs) provided by relying party banks.
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Figure 2.3: Spectrum of APIM Types and Configurations
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TERMS DEFINITION SOURCE
Identity Proofing Verification process to establish or strengthen adapted from
Process confidence in a person’s claimed identity EOI Standard
from evidence provided NZ Government [79]
Registration A process of making a person’s identity known adapted from
to an APIM, associating a unique identifier with ISO24713-2
that identity, and collecting and recording JTC1/SC37
the person’s relevant attribute data
Application Set of interrelated components and processes PAS92 [38] British
designed to perform a specific function Standards Institute
Application Hardware / software system implemented to satisfy ISO /IEC 24713-1
System a broad range of requirements in performing SC37
a specific task
Two Factor The identification process is performed using two FIPS PUB 48 [177]
Authentication separate credential data
Multiple Factor The identification process is performed using multiple FIPS PUB 48 [177]
Authentication credential data
Multi-biometric A system that consolidates evidence presented by Ross et al. [214]
Systems multiple biometric sources with attribute data
Pseudonym A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject other Pfitzmann
than one of the individual’s real name(s) and Hansen [236]
Anonymity The subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, Pfitzmann
the anonymity set Hansen [236]
Undetectability An Item of Interest (IOI) from an attacker’s Pfitzmann
perspective means that the attacker cannot and Hansen [236]
sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or not
Unobservability The Undetectability of the Item of Interest (IOI) Pfitzmann
against all subjects uninvolved in it and the Anonymity and Hansen [236]
of the Subject(s) involved in the IOI, even against the
other Subject(s) involved in that IOI
Unlinkability For two or more Items of Interest (IOIs, e.g., subjects, Pfitzmann
messages, actions, ...) from an attacker’s and Hansen [236]
perspective means that within the system (comprising
these and possibly other items), the attacker cannot
distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not
Table 2.2: Additional Terms relating to Automated Personal Identification
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In all of these types the subject is the person to be automatically identified by the application’s
information system owned by the relying party. Organisations and individuals may place
implicit trust in some issuing authorities, e.g. a passport issuing authority, or trust may be
expressed formally in a contractual cooperation agreement or through trust scheme rules, e.g.
EMV Payment Card Rules 1 or endorsement by an accreditation scheme, e.g. tScheme. 2
2.5 Summary of Chapter
We have defined the terminology and justified our strategy to formulate a set of definitions
relating to automated personal identification. We have also provided an explanation on the
scope of the APIM term so that the research issues relating to methodologies to evaluate and
select such mechanisms may now be elucidated.
In the next chapter we establish the theoretical foundation of our multi-disciplinary research
into methodologies to determine the optimal APIM for a given application context.
1https://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx
2www.tscheme.org
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3.1 Methodology Classification Model
This chapter aims to build the theoretical foundation upon which our research inquiry into
systematic methodologies to select APIMs is based. This aim is achieved by creating a new
classification model founded on our literature review of the classification of Information
Security (InfoSec) methodologies for Information System (IS) development; applying our
tools classification model to classify the methodologies in the body of knowledge on security,
usability and privacy; reviewing and classifying the specific literature on the selection
APIMs, using our InfoSec tools classification model in order to identify gaps in the body
of knowledge; summarising the outstanding research issues identified; describing a new
paradigm to evaluate an application context; and further elucidation of our four research
questions addressed in this thesis.
3.1 Methodology Classification Model
This section reviews the extant literature on the classification of InfoSec methodologies by
Baskerville [24], Siponen [266] and Uzunov et al. [302]. We then define a new model which
we refer to as our tools classification model. We use this model as our conceptual framework
to review the methodological tools which focus on the deployment of secure and usable
information systems which offer privacy protection. We also provide our justification for
creating our tools classification model.
3.1.1 Five Generations of InfoSec Methodologies
According to Hirschheim et al. [132] as the types of applications, information systems and
new technologies continue to grow, so do the number of Information System (IS) develop-
ment methodologies. They quote Jayaratna’s (1994) estimation of over 1,000 development
methodologies in existence. The profile of IS development approaches has undergone funda-
mental changes along with technologies, where each approach, as a single-product based (or
configuration) development, a component-based development, or a proprietary development,
presents different challenges to designers addressing security concerns [293]. Hirschheim
et al. conclude [132] that the research priority is not to introduce new IS development
methodologies but to understand the existing stock and the collective knowledge in them.
We justify our initial choice of commencing with Baskerville’s conceptual framework to
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GENERATION OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENT PRIMARY
METHODOLOGY TOOL CHARACTERISTICS FEATURES
First InfoSec Generation Security checklists and security principles Mapping of limited solutions
Check lists in guidelines, risk analysis on to the problem
Second InfoSec Generation Control point and exposure analysis A partitioned complex
Mechanistic matrices, computer questionnaires solution that matches
Engineering functional requirements
Third InfoSec Generation Abstract representation and transformation Highly abstracted design
Modelling models including logical controls design expressing problem and
and data flow diagrams solution space
Table 3.1: Baskerville’s Classification of Three Generations of InfoSec Methodologies [24]
review the classification of InfoSec methodologies because his seminal work, published in
1993, has been highly cited and it often acts as the foundation upon which many contributions
base their analyses. Siponen recognises [266] that there are many candidate conceptual
frameworks available to analyse InfoSec methodologies [citing Dhillion and Backhouse
(2001), Hirschheim el al. (1995, 1996) and Iivari et al. (2001)]. Siponen opted in 2005 [266]
to extend Baskerville’s three generation model as the basis of his efforts to create additional
classifications (fourth and fifth generation) of InfoSec methodologies.
Similarly, Uzunov et al. extend [302] Baskerville’s three generation model in their construc-
tion of a taxonomy for their survey and analysis of model-based InfoSec methodologies,
from a distributed systems perspective, in 2012. Uzunov et al. conclude [302] the efforts
of recent classification contributions [citing Villarroel et al. (2005), Jayaram and Mathur
(2005), Khan and Zulkernine (2009), Ju¨rjens (2009), Ferna´ndez-Medina et al. (2009), Talhi
et al. (2009) and Kasal et al. (2011)] are deficient. They claim that these classifications, even
taken together, do not provide a suitable framework which would allow a comprehensive
and fair assessment of the range of the InfoSec methodologies available. We examine these
three extant contributions in greater detail in order to identify commonalities, variations and
omissions in their classification models. We then develop our own tools classification model
based on the results of our examination.
Baskerville’s seminal work classifies [24] InfoSec methodologies into three generations
which are summarised in Table 3.1. Baskerville elects [24] to use the generation metaphor
because he claims that it allows a comparison of otherwise dissimilar approaches by focusing
on the intellectual evolution of InfoSec methodologies in response to a changing context,
akin to generations of programming languages.
Siponen extends [266] Baskerville’s classification, using the same generation metaphor, by
59
3.1 Methodology Classification Model
GENERATION OF SECURITY DEVELOPMENT TYPICAL TOOLS
METHODOLOGY TOOL CHARACTERISTICS CITED BY SIPONEN
First InfoSec Generation Security checklists and security principles Wood et al. [322]
Checklists in guidelines, risk analysis Spruit and Samwel [275]
Second InfoSec Generation Control point and exposure analysis BS7799 (replaced by
Mechanistic matrices, computer questionnaires ISO/IEC 27000 series)
Engineering Common Criteria [64]
Third InfoSec Generation Abstract representation and transformation Hutchinson and
Modelling models including logical controls design Warren [310]
and data flow diagrams Straub and Welke [278]
Fourth Generation Socio-technical design approaches Armstrong [14]
Socio-technical Design with user participation Karyda et al. [172]
Fifth Generation User participation, adaptable to different Author claims no
Social and Adaptable system development methods, empirically methodologies in
Design grounded providing evidence on its existence
ease of use and relevance in practice
Table 3.2: Siponen’s Classification of Five Generations of InfoSec Methodologies [266]
introducing a fourth generation of InfoSec methodologies, in recognition of alternative socio-
technical design approaches. Table 3.2 shows a summary of the characteristics of Siponen’s
fourth and fifth generations of InfoSec methodologies together with examples of typical
tools available in 2005. Siponen argues [266] that fifth generation of InfoSec methodologies
should encompass social, and adaptable methods that are rigourously developed along with
practice.
Uzunov et al. argue [302] that activities involved in any InfoSec methodology should
include security requirements determination, security modelling, security implementation,
and configuration and monitoring. These activities should align to a generic software
development life-cycle’s stages of requirements engineering, design, implementation, and
deployment respectively, as depicted in Figure 3.1.
They also propose that an InfoSec methodology should be designated as either a comprehen-
sive methodology (where an InfoSec methodology includes all the aforementioned security
activities to support an IS development programme) or as a partial methodology. Partial
methodologies contain security activities to support parts of an IS development programme.
Uzunov et al. introduce [302] several classification dimensions in their taxonomy for
InfoSec methodologies. These dimensions may be categorised principally as to whether the
methodologies’ paradigm is code-based or model-based. Code-based methodologies enforce
security related activities during a software process without explicit regard for an information
system’s design or architecture. , Uzunov et al. claim [302] that code-based methodologies
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Figure 3.1: Uzunov et al.’s Alignment of an InfoSec Methodology within the Stages of a
Generic Software Development Life-cycle [302]
to be analogous to Baskerville’s second generation InfoSec classification. Uzunov et al.
define [302] model-based methodologies as systematic approaches combining security and
modern software engineering that are based on some form of abstract modelling. These
models are taken into account during the information system’s design activities. Uzunov
et al. consider [302] that their model-based classification aligns with Baskerville’s third
generation of InfoSec methodologies.
While Baskerville’s three generation evaluation framework forms the basis for these other
two extant contributions there are divergences between Siponen’s classification and Uzunov
et al.’s classification. Siponen’s classification of fourth and fifth generation InfoSec method-
ologies aligns with Baskerville’s intention for the classifications to reflect the intellectual
enhancement of InfoSec methodologies in response to the complexities of evolving applica-
tion contexts.
In contrast, Uzunov et al.’s classification recognises that some InfoSec methodologies
contain security activities to support all the phases in a development programme and other
methodologies have a specific purpose in certain phases of an IS development programme.
For example, risk assessment tools contain security activities which are aimed at establishing
the security requirements in the earlier phases of an IS development programme.
While these three extant contributions explain their respective philosophies which underpin
their InfoSec classification models neither consider the InfoSec methodology’s processes
or the impact of these processes on the information system development programme’s
deliverables in their classifications. Avison and Fitzgerald compare [18] system develop-
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ment methodologies primarily according to the methodology’s paradigm, its objectives, its
processes and the types of products to be delivered.
We believe that InfoSec methodologies should be classified according to a methodology’s
objectives, as a problem-solving tool, to address the problem encountered by IS programmes
to deploy secure and usable information systems. As a problem-solving tool, a methodology’s
paradigm and its documented processes which describe its security activities, i.e. detailed
methods, needs to be incorporated into a classification model.
Our aim is utilise a classification model so as to gain an understanding of the existing
stock of InfoSec methodologies and, pertinent to our research problem, to ascertain the
methodological tools that are available which are designed to evaluate and select APIMs.
The use of an appropriate classification model which reflects our research problem then
enables a review the existing methodological tools in the literature.
Next we justify our divergence from the extant InfoSec classification models established by
Baskerville [24], Siponen [266] and Uzunov et al. [302] before we describe our alternative
classification model.
3.1.2 Justification for an Alternative Classification Model
. Notwithstanding that the scope of these extant InfoSec classifications focus on producing
secure information systems outcomes and our scope also includes usability and privacy
protection of information systems, we believe that methodologies may be classified according
to their functions, processes and intended outcomes. We commence by defining the term
methodology and then describe a methodology’s constituent elements in order justify our
deviance from the three aforementioned extant classification models.
From our review of the extant contributions discussed in the previous sections we note that all
authors use the terms method, approach and methodology interchangeably, without providing
definitions of these core terms. Uzunov et al. define [302] a methodology as a systematic
way of doing things in a particular discipline is not sufficient for our research purposes. We
draw on the extant literature on IS development methodologies [165, 18] in order to provide
a definition of a methodology and its constituent components.
According to the Oxford Dictionary a methodology is the system of methods used in a
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particular area of study. 1 A methodology is also defined as the branch of philosophy
concerned with the science of a method. Concentrating on the first definition, in turn,
the Oxford Dictionary defines a method2 as a particular procedure for accomplishing or
approaching something, especially in a systematic or established way.
Checkland contends [49] that while a methodology lacks the precision of a technique (which
is undefined) it will be a firmer guide to action than a philosophy. Avison and Fitzgerald
argue [18] that a technique tells you how and a philosophy tells you what and a methodology
will contain both elements when applied in the IS development discipline. Jayaratna also
disagrees [165] with Checkland’s definition in that philosophies assist in making sense of
reality and are an integral part of a methodology. Jayaratna defines [165] a methodology as:
“ an explicit way of structuring one’s thinking and actions. Methodologies con-
tain models and reflect perspectives of ‘reality’ based upon a set of paradigms.
A methodology should tell you ‘what’ steps to take and ‘how’ to perform those
steps but most importantly the reasons ‘why’ those steps should be taken, in that
particular order.”
Avison and Fitzgerald’s comparison framework aligns [18] with Jayaratna’s definition in
respect of the constitute elements of a methodology. Avison and Fitzgerald state [18] that a
methodology consists of:
• a philosophy, which describes its paradigm, objectives, intended application domain
together with the types of target problems;
• models, with various levels of abstraction and orientation;
• techniques and system tools (if any) employed;
• intended scope to address the stages in an IS development programme; and
• outputs in terms of deliverables.
Jayaratna contends [165] that a methodology should be evaluated not only according to its
philosophical paradigm, but also the by the structuring of the methodology’s stages and steps.
1http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/methodology
2http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/method
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Avison and Fitzgerald also argue [18] that methodologies should be compared according to
their repeatability. They argue that level of granularity in the methodology’s documented
stages and subordinate steps should be sufficiently well-defined, in a method, so that the
methodology’s processes are repeatable and its outcomes are reproducible by alternative
evaluators.
Some methodologies may only contain high-level process descriptions leaving practitioners
to use their skills and competences to interpret the methodology’s underlying philosophy
for their practices; whereas, other methodologies may contain well-defined prescriptive
processes, in a logical sequence. We believe that InfoSec methodologies should be classified
primarily according to their underlying paradigms and their steps, described in processes,
as problem-solving tools to achieve a programme’s desired outcomes. For example, a risk
assessment methodology, as a tool, should identify risks in an application context.
We justify our creation of a new model to classify InfoSec methodologies because Baskerville
[24], Siponen [266] classification model and review are based upon the generation metaphor,
reflecting the intellectual evolution of InfoSec methodologies. In their classification model
Uzunov et al. differentiate [302] between methodologies that enforce security-related activ-
ities and methodologies which act as modelling tools during IS development programme.
The scope of our classification model needs to cover not only security-related activities but
also processes in a methodology’s steps which assist in the design of usable information
systems which offer privacy protection.
We create an alternative classification model based on Jayaratna’s definition [165] of a
methodology to classify methodological tools according to their function. Our model
allows the review of the relevant methodologies based primarily upon the methodology’s
documented steps, as a problem-solving tool, with objectives of producing secure, usable and
privacy protecting information systems as outputs. We use the same model to then review
the methodologies for evaluating and selecting APIMs.
3.1.3 Our Tools Classification Model
Our classification model is based upon the type of methodological instrument, the function
of the instrument and the desired outcomes from utilising the methodological instrument. In
order to further clarify our classification model we provide examples of some InfoSec tools
for each of our five classification categories shown in Table 3.3.
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METHODOLOGY METHODOLOGY LOCATED
CATEGORY TOOL EXAMPLES SOURCES
1. Factor Security Factor Checklists Wood [322]
Guidance Codes of Practice ISO27002
Security and Usability Design Principles Johnston et al. [167]
2. Analytical Evaluation Frameworks Common Criteria [64]
Frameworks Risks Analysis CRAMM [325]
Privacy Impact Assessment NZ PIA Handbook [222]
3. Conceptual Capability Maturity Modelling ISO/IEC 21827 [155]
Modelling Risks Assessment Expert System Kailay and Jarratt [169]
Security Architectures Sherwood et al. [263]
4. Heuristic Security Requirements Engineering Approach Faily and Fle´chais [94]
Approaches Socio-technology Privacy Approach Cavoukian [45]
5. Systematic Iterative InfoSec Methodology Fle´chais [101]
Methodologies Goal-driven Security Requirements Engineering Mouratidis and Ju¨rjens [209]
Table 3.3: Methodology Categories, Tool Examples and their Sources
We use the tools metaphor in order to classify InfoSec methodologies because each tool has a
functional purpose. The functional purpose should be reflected in its underlying philosophy,
as recognised by Uzunov et al. [302], the granularity of detail in its processes [18] and
the structuring of its processes [165]. We adopt the tools metaphor because we believe
that a methodology, as a problem-solving instrument, may used by discipline experts as
problem-solvers to achieve desired outcomes.
The different types of tools may be used to support the development of information systems
during all or part of the four main stages of an IS development programme, as proposed by
Uzunov et al. [302]. The tools may also be used to perform a review, e.g. a risk assessment,
of a deployed information system and/or an appraisal of a deployed APIM.
We now define the five tool types in our tools classification model based upon the function of
each type of instrument:
1. Factor Guidance – information on factors to be evaluated in the application context,
including the IS, operational procedures and human elements in order to gather relevant
data and to inform analytical processes, e.g. check lists and guidance material;
2. Analytical Frameworks – structure to evaluate information acquired from comparison
of alternative perspectives;
3. Conceptual Modelling – refers to mapping concepts and their interrelationships at var-
ious levels of abstraction to assist semantic understandings and to aid communication;
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4. Heuristic Approaches – unstructured processes, based upon a socio-technical research
paradigm, and participative design; and
5. Systematic Methodologies – integration of various methodological tools, e.g. a Deci-
sion Support System (DSS), into an evaluation framework together with well-defined
activities, i.e. documented step-by-step processes in a method.
We proceed with our review of the relevant methodologies now that we have created an
appropriate classification model and defined the types of methodological tools.
3.2 Balancing Security, Usability and Privacy
Rannenberg contends [246] that notion of balanced security strives to determine acceptable
security controls between interacting parties, with their different and possibly conflicting
objectives, risks and issues. We adopt Rannenberg’s term balanced to represent information
systems which are designed to be secure and usable and also offer privacy protection.
Information security impinges on a wide range of research disciplines, which are founded
upon the interactions between technology, processes and people [11, 120]. The body of
knowledge on security, usability and privacy issues draws on research into software engineer-
ing, cryptography, biometrics, regulation, and organisational management, which have roots
in many scientific disciplines, e.g. computer science, mathematics, business, engineering,
law and social sciences.
3.2.1 InfoSec Advisory Tools
This sub-section reviews check list and guidance advisory tools that provide descriptions
on factors which should, according to their contributors, be considered by organisations’
designers when introducing or assessing the security, usability and privacy of a balanced IS.
3.2.1.1 Check List Tools
A check list may act as an aide-me´moire so that all conceivable controls and configurations
can be examined for a balanced IS. A check list tool is primarily aimed at determining a
system’s functionality, however, these tools do not appear to support all the security activities
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for an IS development programme. Some check list tools, however, cover aspects relating to
access control, e.g. recommendations on the length and characters in a password. There are
elements within these check lists which have the potential, when aggregated with elements
from other check lists, to form the basis of a list of factors which require examination in
order to select the optimal APIM for a given application context.
Wood’s comprehensive list [322] is one of the earliest check list tools which is designed to
assist evaluators to assess the appropriateness of a list of security controls for an application
context. Bumgarner and Borg’s check list offers [40] a comprehensive range of controls to
reduce the exploitation of vulnerabilities in an organisation’s information security system
from cyber-attacks.
Similar types of check lists exist for evaluators considering the introduction of biometrics
systems designed to address human identification applications [38, 295]. Pfitzmann and
Hansen’s repository [236] of privacy terminology with current definitions of the properties
of anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability and unobservability, acts as a check list for
evaluators and demonstrates the complexities in interpreting privacy terminology.
A check list may be a valuable tool in terms of its comprehensiveness, in that all the possible
controls are examined in the security requirements determination phase of an IS programme.
Check lists, however, are not incorporated into conceptual frameworks to aid the examination
processes. Additionally, check lists are based upon the assumption that all possible controls
and configurations, as solutions, are known. We believe that a comprehensive check list,
as part of an evaluation framework, should act as the starting point for ascertaining the
relevant security controls which an APIM is required to fulfil. In Section 3.3.1 we review the
literature which contain factors relating to establishing the requirements for an APIM.
3.2.1.2 Guidance Tools for Evaluating Human Factors
Guidelines may assist in the identification of the human factors and also other factors which
need to be examined for the introduction of an APIM for the application context. Additionally,
the discussions contained in guidelines help to reveal the interdependencies between the
factors and also the complexities surrounding the specification of requirements for an APIM.
Our review of the methodologies is not concerned simply with the usability of security
utilities, for example the usability of a cryptographic product [319], but with the security,
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usability and privacy of an application and its information system [270]. Nevertheless, the
results of Whitten and Tygar’s seminal contribution [319] reminds us that individuals either
accidentally cause dangerous security errors or are unable to perform a security task or are
unable to select the appropriate security object for the task.
Alagar argues [6] that information security is by no means entirely a technical issue and the
human aspect of security should play a central role in the design of an information system.
The many human factors relating to security are described by Adams and Sasse [2], Yee
[328], Adams and Blandford [1], Zurko and Simon [334] and Sasse [261].
Both Grinter and Smetters [270] and Zurko [333] conclude that the greatest challenge in
designing secure and usable information systems is one of methodology and not simply
to gain an understanding of the pertinent factors. Zurko and Simon conclude [334] that
while the identification of these interrelated factors should form the basis of improvement in
usable and security of information systems, researchers and practitioners are needed with the
competencies to synthesize knowledge from many disciplines in order to progress the design
of usable and secure information systems.
Balfanz et al. argue [22] that interface designs should address usability issues by improving
the transparency of some security techniques. Ye et al. recommend [326] that security
and users’ perception of trusted applications need to be built into the application from the
beginning rather than added as an after-thought. Trust in an application and, perhaps, the
organisation providing that application, is enhanced if the users’ experience is satisfactory
and the interaction includes specific feedback properties [167].
Factors relating to the protection of users of information systems also require consideration
[245]. In many states the protection of individual’s private information is covered by
regulation; however, citizen privacy is interpreted differently in various jurisdictions [196].
According to Palen and Dourish [225], privacy management is not only about setting rules
and enforcing them but also the continual management of boundaries between different
spheres of action and degrees of disclosure within those spheres.
Gerber and von Solms argue [118] that there are many complex risks factors that organisations
and users face when considering the introduction and usage of information systems, which
also attract political, organisational and social issues. According to Anderson [11] many
information systems fail not because of technical design mistakes but incorrect incentives for
stakeholders.
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Over the last three decades, the ISO/IEC Technical Committee JTC1/SC27 IT Security
Techniques has issued over 80 security standards, excluding corrigenda, which include
standards covering the deployment of security techniques. Working Group 5 of SC27 is
tasked to produce standards guidance material on the security and privacy of information
systems. Many of these standards incorporate normative instructions, for security compliance
purposes, and educational sections, which are advisory in nature.
Guidelines often offer valuable theoretical and practical insights on the factors associated
with ascertaining the requirements for an APIM. As advisory tools, guidelines often do
not include frameworks to enable the analysis of various pertinent factors from differing
perspectives in order to identify the optimal APIM.
3.2.2 Analytical Framework Tools
Next we review analytical instruments which assist in the determination of security controls
and security assurance together with those instruments that address human and identity
privacy issues as analytical framework tools. The advantages of using such tools is that they
often provide benefits expressed as a quantitative monetary value which can be offset against
the estimated costs for controls to protect an information system which includes an APIM.
3.2.2.1 Risk Assessment and Security Audit Tools
The risk assessment tool, formulated by Weingart et al. [313] over three decades ago, was
designed to evaluate the physical risks to information systems in organisations and seeks to
balance the protection of assets and risks using three parameters:
1. The value of the information system and its data (Value);
2. The security of the environment in which the system resides (Environment); and
3. The strength of the protection methods employed (Physical Security Rating).
There are many risks assessment tools available, for example CRAMM3, which is supported
by a risks assessment software application. The Information Risk Analysis Methodology
3http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/auditing/qualitative-risk-analysis-management-tool-
cramm-83
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from the ISF4 comprises a risks analysis workbench, business impact assessment, threat and
vulnerability tools and a control selection tool.
According to Lichtenstein [187] there are so many diverse and imperfect risks assessment
methods available, that, in order to select the most suitable tool, organisations should
establish usability, credibility, complexity, completeness, adaptability, validity and cost
evaluation criteria. Alternatively, Djordjevic et al. argue [81] that risks assessment tools
should be designed specifically for certain types of information systems, e.g. the CORAS
Risks Framework tool for large-scale distributed and critical information systems. Bernard
suggests [26] another strategy of using various risks assessments tools by overlaying several
risks assessment outputs at different junctures during the life time of the IS.
Similarly, security governance and audit tools are in abundance. For example, Control
Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is a framework developed by
Information Systems Audit and Control Association, now ISACA 5, which has its roots
in enterprise governance. COBIT provides [152] a framework that assists enterprises in
achieving their objectives for the governance and management of enterprise information
systems by maintaining a balance between the realisation of organisational benefits and
minimising risk levels.
Nevertheless, despite the wide availability of these tools, Probst and Hunker’s observations
[243] help to explain why organisations often use economic rationale to invoke only basic
controls to counter insider attackers and do not address the more serious external threats.
Moore [12] and Dadayan [76] argue that organisations should perform Return On Security
Investment (ROSI) evaluations that can demonstrate both tangible and intangible benefits of
security controls.
ROSI evaluations do not, however, consider similar values for the intended user community
in that they do not address the latter’s risks [118], their usability issues[67, 2], their accessi-
bility issues [250] or assess the impact on the user communities’ attitudes [23, 280]. User
community concerns may be a consequence of or the fear from social engineering attacks, as
exemplified by the activities of one particular miscreant [206].
The main advantage of using analytical instruments is that the output results, from the
structured analyses, may be traced back to the core source data and the assumptions used
4https://www.securityforum.org/
5http://www.isaca.org
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by the evaluators. We believe, however, that the reliance of analytical instruments on
many assumptions, particularly the nature and severity of threats in risks assessment tools,
leaves opportunity for subjective manipulation. Nevertheless, assessment tools, e.g. risks
assessments and privacy impact assessments, assist in the security requirements definition
stage of an IS programme.
3.2.2.2 Security Evaluation Tools
Security evaluation tools are often used by organisations to demonstrate compliance to a
security specification.
The common criteria framework [64] retains an organisational and technological focus in
evaluating a product’s capability Target Of Evaluation (TOE) of meeting a security Protection
Profile (PP) for a predetermined application context type.
Anderson contends [11] that the fundamental problem that arises with this type of evaluation,
which determines whether an IS meets, or fails to meet, a prescribed assurance target is when
the party who implements the protection differs from the party who relies upon it. Given this
trust issue, Gollmann concedes [120] that the value of the evaluation effort is questionable,
particularly when such evaluations, it is claimed, adds between 10 to 40 percent to the total
cost of the IS development.
The Federal Information Technology Security Assessment Framework provides [220] control
objectives at five levels, to indicate the degrees of information security compliance across
organisations. The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) resource, through its ITIL Version 3
publications, incorporate risks management and security controls into IT services life-cycle
frameworks [309]. This framework, however, is again focused on organisations and does not
encompass the usability and privacy issues of these information systems as they are used in
society.
We believe that the focus of these evaluations to obtain security compliance does very
little to assist IS programmes to ascertain the security requirements for an APIM to protect
access to information systems because the subject communities’ risks, privacy issues are not
considered sufficiently.
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3.2.2.3 Socio-technical Security Evaluation Tools
There is a scarcity of analytical frameworks for evaluating the combined aspects of security,
usability and privacy. Although, there are principles for assessing usability of security in IS
[327] these are not placed in an analytical framework.
Privacy impact assessment tools ensure that an organisation’s and their information systems
comply with a state’s privacy laws [222, 298]. Warren summarises [308] the key benefits of
such tools as:
• the avoidance of loss of trust and reputation;
• the identification and management of risks;
• cost avoidance; and
• meeting and exceeding legal requirements.
Sallhammar et al. propose [260] a real-time evaluation and prediction framework that
monitors information system behaviour and unauthorised use and abuse by misfeasors. We
believe that this type of tool is an encouraging advancement towards understanding some of
the behavioural aspects surrounding user actions (and those of misfeasors) and measuring
those impacts on a balanced IS. Achieving such understanding, we believe will aid the
requirements definition stage of an IS development programme to ascertain the requirements
for an APIM.
These tools tend to base many of their calculations on many assumptions because the primary
input data are difficult to gather and data that are acquired also arduous to verify in terms of
accuracy. Additionally, we note that the tools have grown in complexity as the basic data
matrix is multidimensional representing different perspectives, which has led to many of
these tools being supported by software applications. We review the tools in the literature
which concentrate on the usability and security of APIMs in Section 3.3.2.
We believe that while these tools have the potential to highlight the main requirements for
an APIM, models are required to gain a deeper understanding, through various levels of
abstraction, of the interrelationships of the various factors which assist in the design of an
APIM or the specifications for an APIM.
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3.2.3 Modelling Tools
We review the tools designed to evaluate the security, usability and privacy factors and their
interrelationships through architectures, models and expert systems.
3.2.3.1 Architectures
Enterprise IT architectures act as a planning tool to position the deployment issues and act as
a problem solving-tool to simplify and isolate factors without losing the complexity of the
enterprise [332].
The Zackman architecture [331], which contains a framework to produce a set of abstract
models, may be used to represent various perspectives of an information system in order to
identify security requirements [129]. TOGAF, produced by the Open Group 6, and other
similar enterprise IT architecture tools incorporate security design principles; however, these
tools do not provide a method to develop a security architecture [163].
Sherwood et al. [263] developed a tool in order to represent and evaluate enterprise security
architectures. Security architectures provide enterprises with a strategic framework for
integrating people, process, and technology related controls that address enterprises current
and planned business objectives [13]. Security architectures in enterprises may comprise of
internal policies and standards, technological controls and educational programmes for the
user community, which should be derived from stakeholders’ goals [235].
These tools tend to represent the automated personal identification problem from the enter-
prise perspective and we believe that they do not give sufficient regard to the users’ view
of the APIM. For example, a user may access many enterprise systems, each with its own
APIM, however, these tools fail to represent this issue frequently encountered by users.
3.2.3.2 Models
Tools for modelling information systems and InfoSec representations generally describe
three levels of abstraction [268]:
• Organisational Level: defines the organisation role and context of the IS;
6http://www.opengroup.org/togaf/
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• Conceptual Level: defines the implementation-independent specification for the IS;
and
• Technical Level: defines the technical implementation of the IS.
Kokolakis et al. categorise [175] many of these tools using four criteria; namely, conceptual
constructs, epistemology, business modelling approach and perspectives. Since the introduc-
tion of this categorisation, the efforts by Kim and Lee with their AHP Processes Method
[174], Cresswell and Hassan with their Socio-technological IDEF Method [69] and Assel et
al. with their Collaborative Working Environment Model [16] are examples of tools which
model security and human factors in order to align with business processes.
Grinter and Smetters advocate [123] the use of a user-centred threat model tool, which acts
as the initial starting point to identify explicit security requirements. Once this model is
established, they claim, the design of the security related components then becomes implicit.
There are also modelling tools designed specifically to assist usable and secure requirements
engineering. Faily and Fle´chais developed [93] the Integrating Requirements and Information
Security tool to model, at the conceptual level, five engineering views consisting of task, goal,
risk, responsibility roles and environment. They also developed [94] the Computer-Aided
Integration of Requirements and Information Security (CAIRIS) software program, which
is used to store elicited case data and is designed to aid requirements analysis. It generates
Unified Modelling Language (UML) notation outputs to improve the visualisation of security
and usability design.
The use of modelling tools facilitates an abstract description of the application context’s
problem of automated personal identification and the possibility of abstract descriptions of
candidate APIMs, which may address the articulated problem. We believe, however, that
insufficient focus is afforded in these tools to understand the problem not only from other
stakeholders involved with an IS programme but from alternative disciplines, e.g. compliance
with privacy legislation on retaining person’s biographic and biometric data.
We consider that models, derived from a multi-disciplinary approach, which are an integrated
representation of the automated personal identification problem are more informative to
IS designers than models produced from a single perspective. Such integrated models,
however, as Faily concludes [92] which model a diversity of factors relating to the security
and usability of an IS in an enterprise necessitates the usage of automated tools.
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3.2.3.3 Expert System Tools
The use of expert systems is an alternative way of modelling the complex relationships
between many factors to support business decisions on assessments of risks and their man-
agement. Implementations of these models, however, appear to have not progressed beyond
prototypes.
Dobelis et al. developed [82] an expert system which acquires data for evaluation in
the form of business criteria and, based on internal rules, proposes options for security
requirements and then evaluates the results according to predefined criteria. Similarly, the
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Interaction Tool, developed by Parkin et al. [190],
ensures that an organisation’s security policies are usable from an employee perspective.
Kailay and Jarratt developed [169] the Risk Analysis and Management Expert System
(RAMeX) which is a qualitative based expert system which enables small commercial organ-
isations to model risks and also to conduct risk assessments. RAMeX contains an inference
engine with functionality to perform forward and backward chaining. It is, therefore, a
data-driven knowledge engineering system that uses inference rules.
We believe that their contribution demonstrates that discipline expert’s know-how may be
represented in an expert system and that a knowledge engineering approach may assist in the
design and decision-makings in programmes to select APIMs. We review those tools which
are designed to model APIMs in Section 3.3.3.
Our review of the literature has so far identified tools which are partial methodologies and the
main limitation of these tools is that they do not offer IS programmes comprehensive support
in all stages of an IS development programme. We believe that InfoSec methodologies
should, however, incorporate elements of the tools reviewed so far into an integrated tool,
which may be applied in all stages of an IS development programme. A check list of factors
integrated into an analytical framework could ensure that data relating to those factors are
acquired from an application context. The inclusion of a modelling tool may then represent
the security requirements for an APIM for the application context. Similarly, a modelling
tool could represent candidate APIMs which may then be evaluated against the requirements
of an APIM.
We now review comprehensive InfoSec methodologies which are designed to support all
stages of an IS development programme and may include some of the previously described
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tools types. We commence with those tools which are based upon principles from various
scientific paradigms and describe their approach at high-level only.
3.2.4 Heuristic Approaches
The seminal socio-technical IS development approach, advocated by Mumford [210], takes
account of the technical, organisational, economic and social needs of the user community in
order to create humanistic and effective information systems. Similarly, Cavoukian recom-
mends [45] a design approach that embeds privacy controls into the design specifications
rather than relying of the sufficiency on regulation and policy to safeguard privacy.
Mouratidis and Giordini’s development [208] of the Secure TROPOS Methodology, an
extension of the TROPOS IS Development Methodology [36], is a knowledge engineering
approach that strives to integrate security controls into the IS development stages.
Sasse et al. advocate [262] a holistic design approach to ensure security, usability and privacy
factors are integrated into IS development projects. Similarly, Fle´chais et al. consider [102]
that an approach that models the contexts in which the IS operates, the assets of the IS, and
the operatives of the IS, allows for the documenting of both security and usability needs
for all stakeholders involved with the IS. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that different
stakeholders will have different points of view as to which aspect is most relevant to them.
Alternatively, Siponen et al. consider [267] that their Feature Driven Development (FDD)
approach enables security to be integrated into agile development methods at different phases
during an IS development project:
1. Requirements Analysis Phase:
• A. Identify the security-relevant objects;
• B. Identify the security-relevant subjects;
• C. Determine the security classification of these objects and subjects; and
• D. Perform a risk analysis and evaluate costs of controls against risks;
2. Design Phase:
• E. Ensure security requirements are included in the design phase;
3. Implementation Phase:
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• F. Ensure that the wanted security features are implemented.
Conversely, Yee warns [328] that:
“while it may be easy to write the requirement ‘the information system and its
security and privacy protection controls must be easy to use’ in a requirements
document usability elements can’t be added to an IS like magic pixie dust.”
Yee argues [328, 327] that conflicts between security and usability goals can be avoided
throughout the iterative design processes by addressing users’ expectations and users’ mental
models at an early juncture. Church and Whitten recommend [53], however, that while it is
important to articulate the various levels of abstraction to represent usability requirements
developers need to be aware of the risks to the overall IS development in doing so.
Many approaches to develop security mechanisms for information systems place unrea-
sonably complex demands on all the stakeholders involved in designing usable and secure
information systems [334]. While an IS may possess the desired qualities the behaviour of
users has a significant impact on security [195].
The main advantage of this type of comprehensive methodology is that it offers IS designers
and discipline experts the flexibility to interpret the processes of the tool for the specific
application context in order to select the optimal APIM. We believe that heuristic approaches
may not produce reproducible results. Heuristic approaches contain insufficient detail and
structuring in their processes descriptions to enable different methodology users to arrive at
similar outcomes. Heuristic approaches, therefore, rely on the skills of the methodology user
to interpret a heuristic approach’s processes in order to specify the requirements for an APIM
and their knowledge of candidate APIMs to select the optimal for that application context.
In Section 3.3.4 we review those tools which offer a heuristic approach to IS designers and
discipline experts in the selection of APIMs.
Finally in this section, we review the tools in the literature which incorporate a detailed
description of the stages and steps of the methodology’s process in a well-defined method.
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3.2.5 Systematic Methodologies
We review two methodologies found in the literature which fulfil, although barely, our
classification of a systematic methodology. We review the Mouratidis and Ju¨rjens’ approach
[209] and Fle´chais’ approach [101] in greater depth since this type of systematic methodology
and its efficacy is the focus of our inquiry. These contributions demonstrate that InfoSec
methodologies can offer prescriptive methods based on learning from scientific inquiry and
practitioner know-how in order to select the optimal APIM for a given application context.
Both methodologies conform, to a large extent, to Siponen’s fifth generation criteria in that
they are based on a socio-technological approach and both produce an output, in the form of
UML diagrams to describe security requirements. These outputs can be integrated with the
other types of design documentation created in an IS development project. Mouratidis and
Ju¨rjens’ approach [209] also has the capability to translate its TROPOS secure models into
UML security models for testing [168]. Fle´chais’ approach [101] has a UML meta-object fa-
cility which provides designers with a means of building models to assist with the integration
of InfoSec models into other information system models. While both methodologies do not
specifically include privacy aspects we consider that these methodologies may be extended
to do so.
Mouratidis and Ju¨rjens’ methodology [209], which builds on earlier work on Secure TROPOS
[208], is an integration of the Goal-driven Security Requirements Engineering (GDSRE)
Methodology and Model-Based Security Engineering (MBSE) Method. Their main aims of
the tool are to:
1. Provide a structured process to translate the results of the GDSRE methodology to a
design that satisfies requirements;
2. Allow simultaneous elicitation and analysis of the security requirements and functional
requirements of an IS;
3. Allow consideration of both the social and the technical dimension of the information
systems’ security; and
4. Guide software engineers towards a design that is amenable to formal verification with
the aid of automated tools.
Fle´chais’ Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security (AEGIS) approach
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Figure 3.2: Fle´chais’ AEGIS Activity Diagram [101]
[101] is a socio-technical systematic methodology designed to assist with the difficulty of
reconciling technical requirements and human factors in establishing secure and usable
information systems. AEGIS offers a risk-based approach for security designers that fo-
cuses on acquiring and enhancing contextual knowledge surrounding an IS development
project. This methodology is based upon Boehm’s iterative IS development principles [33].
AEGIS’ principle aim is to improve information quality relating to security decisions for
organisational stakeholders by incorporating and better reflecting users’ needs, as indirect
stakeholders.
The AEGIS Methodology, shown in Figure 3.2, is a meta-process model representing discrete
stages of the methodology’ activities.
The AEGIS Risk Analysis and Security Design processes are shown in Figure 3.3, which
are designed to evaluate the attributes of security properties, using both quantitative and
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Figure 3.3: Fle´chais’ AEGIS Risk Analysis and Security Design Process [101]
qualitative data inputs, to capture stakeholders’ judgments directly. A comparison of the
security properties is used to ascertain which security aspects of the IS are of greatest
important to the different stakeholders.
Fle´chais concedes [101] that the main limitation of the AEGIS Methodology is that it does
not provide a formal decision process. Nevertheless, the AEGIS Methodology provides
evidence that the use of prototyping or simulation tools may be employed to facilitate
improved end-user participation in setting security requirements through iterative design
activities, such as interaction observations, group discussions, analysis of logged data and the
revision of designs. The AEGIS Methodology also demonstrates progress in developing a
methodology that evaluates alternative viewpoints. Fle´chais does not, however, explain how
conflicting ideological perspectives are resolved in his case study research, or how different
stakeholders’ objectives, which were in conflict, were actually reconciled.
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Although we classified these contributions as systematic methodologies, in that they con-
tained a description of their methods, we identified two main research issues relating to the
selection of APIMs.
3.2.6 Identified Research Issues
We discuss methodological risks and practitioner competency influences on the selection of
APIMs from our review of these two systematic methodologies.
3.2.6.1 Methodological Risks
A major limitation of these systematic methodologies is that both describe their processes at
a high-level only which attract methodological risks. For example, neither appears to have
a mechanism for handling conflicts of interest between the stakeholders, as discovered in
practice by Al-Khouri in his case study of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Identity Card
Programme [4]. The decision-making structures in organisations are often complex and
security, and particularly APIM, designs may have to be constructed within an organisation’s
strategic objectives, policies and constraints. We believe that a systematic methodology’s
processes should seek to understand the stakeholders’ interests, as well as the operational
requirements, in terms of functionality and performance, for an APIM in a given application
context.
Hull et al. argue [138] that the design of an IS should be in response to operational require-
ments for that IS. Agile methodologies are valuable to review implementation interaction
designs and features, with periods of reflection and introspection, to facilitate collaborative
decision-making with stakeholders [267]. Agile methodologies, in providing such flexibility,
rely on individuals and their creativity rather than processes, which are used to drive tradi-
tional IS development methodologies [218]. Boehm recognises [34] that the advantages of
agile methodologies and the reliance on individuals in a project team attract risks, stemming
from individuals’ incomplete or incorrect knowledge. Boehm suggests [34] these method-
ological risks are minimised by plan driven approaches designed specifically to produce
architectures and models for external expert review.
The research issue identified relates to whether plan driven systematic methodologies, de-
scribed by well-defined methods, reduce the risks associated with practitioner’s creativity and
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competences to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. We consider that
inquiry is needed to understand the extent to which systematic methodologies, incorporating
plan driven processes, i.e. described in a method, are efficacious in countering these identified
methodological risks for selecting the optimal APIM for a given application context.
3.2.6.2 Practitioner Capability Influences
Fle´chais states [101] “the main weakness for accommodating human factors lies in the
design processes of a secure technical system”.
Neither of the reviewed systematic methodologies describes how data are acquired from the
stakeholders and the application context so that security designs for the IS may be formulated.
Fle´chais et al. acknowledge [102] the importance of the facilitator’s capabilities and their
training requirements from the use of AEGIS in a case study. Therefore, we assume that both
these systematic methodologies implicitly incorporate elements of practitioner know-how
into their respective methods. The practitioner competencies needed to use these systematic
methodologies, including the gathering of information from the application context, are not
made clear in these contributions.
Baskerville suggests [24] in his analysis of practitioner usage of third generation InfoSec
methods (i.e. analytical tools) that while practitioners broadly aspire to use such tools, they
are unable to apply their use in practice. Equally, he points out, that practitioners may
intuitively deviate from such methodologies and, therefore, making it difficult to determine
whether the InfoSec methodology is flawed or incomplete. Nevertheless, despite these
difficulties, we believe that there is theoretical and practical benefit in validating InfoSec
methodologies for selecting APIMs
We consider that if such an approach is open to practitioner interpretation, with deviance
from intended usage, then inconsistencies in output may result when such a flexible approach
is utilised by various practitioners. Conversely, we believe that if a systematic methodology,
incorporating a repeatable method and practitioner know-how, is utilised then that approach
may increase the consistency of selecting the optimal APIM for that application context. The
research issue then becomes the determination of the extent of that systematic methodology’s
efficacy to articulate the requirements for an APIM for the application context and then select
the optimal APIM from several candidate designs.
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Research inquiry is needed, therefore, to understand the viability of integrating practitioner
know-how into a systematic methodology with well-defined prescriptive processes and the
extent of that systematic methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context.
We reviewed InfoSec methodologies which are applicable to determining security controls in
general. The focus of our review now concentrates upon specific methodologies relating to
the selection of APIMs, using our tools classification model, as defined in Section 3.1.3.
3.3 Methodological Tools to Select APIMs
In this section we review the methodologies used to select APIMs. We exclude a review of
the literature which describe APIMs or the issues associated with APIMs because the focus
of our inquiry relates to methodological efficacy.
We review the methodologies in the literature in terms of their function to evaluate and select
an APIM during the four stages of an IS development programme:
APIM Requirements Determination evaluating an automated personal identification prob-
lem in its application context;
APIM Modelling producing a design or a specification for an APIM, which is pertinent for
its intended usage environments;
APIM Implementation comparing candidate APIMs in order to select the optimal identifi-
cation system or authentication system for a given application context; and/or
APIM Configuration and Monitoring reviewing a deployed APIM.
We consider that the methodologies classified in our first three classifications are partial
methodological tools, according to the definition provided by Uzunov et al. [302]. Addition-
ally, the absence of descriptions of the methods to use these methodological tools makes
scientific review problematical. Our research focuses on methodologies which are applicable
across all four stages of an IS development programme which contain descriptions, if only
brief, of their method. We concentrate our analysis, therefore, on heuristic approaches and
systematic methodologies.
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We conclude this section by discussing the identified research issues based on our review of
these methodological tools.
3.3.1 APIM Factor Guidance Tools
There is a large body of guidance documents on factors surrounding the evaluation of APIMs.
Table 3.4 provides, in a compact form, the located guidance tools specific to evaluating
APIMs.
From our review of these tools we ascertained that there is a diversity of factors which
require evaluation in order to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. We
ascertained, however, that there is not a comprehensive check list of factors in the literature
integrating these different perspectives. A consolidated list of factors could be used by an IS
development programme to evaluate and to select the optimal APIM for a given application
context.
Many sets of guidelines contain a list of technological factors [223, 271, 217] for evaluating
APIMs. These guidelines, however, do not evaluate the factors associated with the application
context in which the APIMs are to be deployed. Similarly, recommendations on particular
identification and authentication systems’ configurations, to counter different types of threat,
are often based upon an evaluation of a restricted set of technical factors [287].
We believe that while these types of technical examinations are useful in evaluating APIM
implementation factors, they do not give sufficient regard to other security activities which
take place during an IS development programme, e.g. the macro task of determining the
requirements for an APIM. Polemi recommends [238] that the suitability of biometric
modalities should follow on from gaining an understanding of the requirements for biometric
systems which are applicable to various types of application contexts. Table 3.4 shows the
range of factors which are evaluated by each tool; however, none of these contributions
provide factors which support all the APIM selection tasks, as defined earlier in Section 3.3.
From our review of those sets of guidelines which extended beyond technical considerations,
we note that these guidelines tend to evaluate security, usability and privacy factors (and also
many other factors) relating to APIMs from an organisational slant or from a user-centred
orientation, as reflected in Table 3.4. We identified, however, that there are many common
factors, such as security, usability, accessibility, data capture and privacy protection, which
84
3.3 Methodological Tools to Select APIMs
GUIDELINE’S PUBLICATION TITLE FACTORS
PERSPECTIVE AUTHOR AND CITATION EVALUATED
Organisational 1. Use of Biometrics for Legislative compliance, user attitude,
View Identification and Authentication acceptability, technical resources, systems
- Advice on Product Selection. UK functionality, enrolment policies, cost,
Biometrics Working Group [295] positive/negative identification, user
cooperation, frequency of use, supervised/
unsupervised application, open/closed system,
standard/non-standardised environment, overt/
covert usage and performance accuracy/speed
2. Guidelines on the Evaluation Resistance to deceit, counterfeit of artefact,
of Automated Personal susceptibility to circumvention, time to achieve
Identification. NIST J. Kreps and recognition, convenience to user, recognition
B. Ancker-Johnston [177] device cost, device interfacing, time and
effort in updating recognition data, reliability,
maintainability, cost of protecting device,
cost of distribution and logical support
3. PAS92-Code of Practice for the Security, usability, accessibility, data capture,
implementation of biometric exception handling, privacy protection
systems. British Standards and data protection
Institute [38]
4. Biometric techniques: Review Operational convenience, social acceptability,
and Evaluation of Biometric discrimination, uniqueness, exclusivity,
Techniques for Identification device size, error tolerance, environmental
and Authentication, including an conditions, flexibility of thresholds, cost of
appraisal where they are software/hardware, effort to update template,
most applicable. Polemi [238] data size and device interoperability
User-centred 1. Evaluating Authentication Security, accessibility, password memorability,
View Systems. Renaud [250] special hardware and software requirements,
convenience, inclusivity, cost, control of
environment, user community’s characteristics
frequency of use, trust between stakeholders,
users’ security motivation, unbreakability
and auditing requirements
2. Automated Personal Uniqueness, performance, ubiquity, availability,
Identification. Raphael and indispensability, brevity, reliability, security
Young [247] and acceptability
3. Human Factors Considerations Reliability, accuracy, technology maintenance,
for Passwords and other User recovery, cost effectiveness, usability,
Identification Techniques, Part 2: accessibility and privacy
Field Study, Results and
Analysis. Allendoerfer [9]
4. Usability evaluation of multi- Effectiveness, efficiency, user satisfaction,
modal biometric verification privacy and usability
systems. Toledano et al. [288]
Table 3.4: Factors Related to APIMs which are Evaluated in Guidance Tools
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are common objectives to both perspectives. The guidance material produced by Kreps and
Ancker-Johnston [177], however, attempt to take an objective stance in evaluating the factors
associated with evaluating an APIM.
We believe that the factors for evaluating APIMs in these tools could act as a starting point
to produce an objective and comprehensive check list for use by an IS programme as an aid
to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. The research issue identified
is to determine which factors need to be evaluated by an IS programme in order to select
the optimal APIM. This identified research issue together with others identified during our
review of the methodologies in the literature are developed into research questions in Section
3.4.
Next we assess the tools that are designed to analyse the many and diverse factors involved
with the evaluation and selection of an APIM.
3.3.2 APIM Analytical Frameworks
We review the analytical tools identified in the literature which are based on quantitative or
qualitative data models.
3.3.2.1 APIM Quantitative Analytical Frameworks
Mansfield and Wayman provide [194] a best practices framework for testing the performance,
in terms of accuracy, of biometric systems. The framework includes guidance for technical
analysis and comparison of different biometric modalities from measuring key parameters,
such as False Match Rate (FMR), False Non-match Rate (FNMR), Failure To Enrol Rate
(FTER) and Failure To Acquire Rate (FTAR). These guidelines specifically exclude other fac-
tors, such as reliability, availability, maintainability, vulnerability, security, user acceptance,
human factors, cost benefit and privacy regulation compliance.
The NIST Human Evaluation Framework [202] is a tool for the quantitative testing of
different types of biometric modalities for biometric identification systems. The tool provides
a common evaluation framework for the biometrics community so that a complete set of
standard quality tests can be applied to data sets from different types of matching algorithms.
While these contributions are valuable for testing under laboratory conditions to give general
indications on potential capabilities, the real-life performance of biometric systems depend
86
3.3 Methodological Tools to Select APIMs
very much upon how and where they are deployed [193].
Renaud’s quantitative analytical framework focuses [249] on web based authentication from
a user’s perspective; however, it excludes factors relating to the protection of subjects’ privacy.
All forms of credentials are covered; namely, biometrics and various types of password
schemes, including graphical position based systems. Renaud seeks [249] to ascertain the
quality of an authentication mechanism by establishing its quality co-efficient, through
measuring a solution’s deficiencies, based on the assumption that all web authentication
mechanisms contain deficiencies.
The calculated coefficients are subject to an environment and context factorisation to make
adjustments for the degree to which the environment may or may not be controlled by the
user. Each factor has a simple scalar measurement unit, e.g. zero denoting absence of a
quality, 0.5 denoting quality partially exhibited or one denoting the presence of the quality.
Exactly how the task is performed to set numerical values, based upon qualitative data and
other evidence, is not presented. Furthermore, the transformation from qualitative data to
quantitative data values for analysis, often using subjective opinions, may attract criticisms
of biased interpretations.
Toledano et al. evaluate [288] the effectiveness, efficiency and user satisfaction of a biometric
modality, from a user’s perspective, also using a quantitative approach. They claim that it is
difficult to link some factor variables, as they found with the subjective measurements of
ease of use and overall preference data gathered from users of biometric systems with three
different types of modalities.
Toledano et al. suggest [288] that the factor interrelationships vary according to the appli-
cation context. Nevertheless, they have established some relationships, with both positive
and negative influences, of different biometric modalities between these factor variables.
Conversely, Renaud’s analytical framework assumes that the relationships between the fac-
tors are constant irrespective of application context. Toledano et al. also claim [288] that
the efficiency and the security of a biometric authentication system are not strongly related.
Their analytical framework focuses on the subject perspective only and organisations may
want to use alternative measurements for evaluating effectiveness and efficiency.
These contributions suggest that it is extremely difficult to model the interrelationships
between the factors quantitatively. A qualitative analytical framework which examines
the nature of the influences between the factors may reveal further understandings on the
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complexities involved with the selection of an APIM.
3.3.2.2 APIM Qualitative Analytical Frameworks
There are many tools in this category which use mixed data types to evaluate factors relating
to APIMs from various perspectives.
There are frameworks to evaluate factors that are designed to assist with the selection of
biometric modalities and biometric products [295, 63]. There are frameworks designed
to measure the effectiveness of APIMs, from an organisational perspective [177, 217], a
technical perspective [125, 306, 188] and from a social perspective [244].
Grijpink’s assessment framework evaluates [122] each new identification and authentication
technology in terms of its spoiler effect. A spoiler is defined as an obstacle imposing
difficulties on the deployment of an IdM system. The evaluation of the spoiling factors
from alternative perspectives, e.g. legal and regulatory, acts to identify possible alternative
enhancements to the original proposed IdM system.
Importantly, the benefits of exploring alternative perspectives leads to the proposition that
inquiry into the evaluation of APIMs may benefit from multiple perspectives within a meta-
evaluation framework. The identified research issue is how such a framework can represent
these different perspectives in order to evaluate mixed data types. We consider that the
classification of such factors may then be modelled, at varying levels of abstraction, to
support decision-makers.
3.3.3 APIM Modelling Tools
The modelling tools found in the literature use mixed data types which are designed to
represent the organisational capabilities to manage digital identities in deployed IdM systems.
Capability maturity models evaluate the effectiveness of deployed IdM systems to protect an
organisation’s information assets and determine the degree of achieving legal compliance by
assessing the maturity of organisational processes to manage digital identities [39, 17, 321].
Hughes proposes [137] dashboard indicators to evaluate IdM deployments as an alternative
model to the linear processes used in capability maturity models. He suggests [137] that an
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Figure 3.4: Royer and Meints’ EIdM Decision Support Model [258]
evaluation of the organisational drivers and information systems’ functionality is required
in the first instance. From that point the evaluation should then review the organisational
processes in terms of their importance and fulfilment of requirements within predetermined
acceptability ranges. Each process is evaluated to determine whether the outcomes are
within stated acceptability range. The acceptability of the process may fail because of over
fulfilment or under fulfilment to the stated acceptability range.
None of the capability maturity modelling tools identified evaluate factors relating to issues
surrounding the usability or accessibility of the IdM systems to the user community. The
capability of an IdM system may exhibit mature processes; however, a mature IdM deploy-
ment may not necessarily achieve a balance of security, usability and privacy for all of its
stakeholders.
Royer and Meints propose [258] a meta-evaluation decision model, based on the business
balanced scorecard approach, to aid decisions on evaluating Enterprise Identity Management
Systems (EIdMSs). Their model captures data from a variety of assessment outputs which
include cash flows, budget, data on the information systems in the enterprise, maturity of
process documentation, authentication and authorisation requirements, and physical access
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requirements. The model, shown in Figure 3.4, represents the qualitative and quantitative data
acquired from a financial, a business process, a security risks and compliance requirements,
and an information system and IS support process perspectives.
Royer and Meints acknowledge [258] that the functionality of a Decision Support System
(DSS) should extend beyond that of a single matrix, as the EIdM model places a high demand
on the automated processing of data relating to the underlying complexities between their
identified factors and the aggregation of various data types.
Royer’s development [257] of a prototype DSS, as part of his thesis, is an implementation of
the model established [258] with Meints. The DSS is designed to assist enterprise decision-
makers to select the optimal IdM system given the data acquired from the various input
data sources. His model acquires primary data from the application context to enable a
meta-evaluation of candidate EIdM systems. He identifies six key factors; namely,
1. Organisational operational processes;
2. Monetary aspects;
3. Quality;
4. Existing information systems;
5. Compliance, risks and security; and
6. Acceptance by users.
He also describes 15 relationships, both single and bi-directional, between these six factors.
A factor’s value has a direct or indirectly measurable, positive or negative, influence on
other factors represented in the model. While Royer proposes [257] the use of Microsoft
Excel spreadsheets to store acquired data relating to the six factors, he does not explain the
interrelationship computations between these data elements in order to arrive at a prediction
in respect of identifying the optimal EIdM system for an enterprise.
The creation of his DSS prototype was achieved by conducting proof of concept interviews
with several IdM expert practitioners from six German consultancy organisations. His inquiry
into “How decision-making on IdMs are taking place in practice?” and also “Identifying
the relevant factors and their linkages which need to be taken into consideration?” reveal
that there is a lack of decision support methods and tools for selecting EIdM systems.
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Additionally, Royer ascertains [257] that decision-makers in organisations have a perceived
lack of understanding in respect of the organisational impacts resulting from their EIdM
system decisions.
While it appears that Royer’s model and DSS have not been validated by using either in
a real-world evaluation it reveals the complexities of the interrelationships between the
factors. Leaving aside that the model and the DSS may be relevant only to enterprise
IdM deployments, his research demonstrates that an IdM practitioner’s know-how may be
acquired and represented in an expert system which models complex decision processes. The
identified research issue is how to represent practitioner’s know-how in a series of processes
as an integral element of a methodology or within an expert system.
We consider that further research is apposite to explore how expert practitioners evaluate the
multiple factors associated with selecting APIMs from various perspectives. This inquiry
should aim to understand the methods that practitioners employ and also the models that
they use to evaluate the multiple interrelated factors associated with selecting an APIM.
Next, we review heuristic approaches as tools to select APIMs.
3.3.4 APIM Heuristic Approaches
There is a scarceness of tools in the literature that describe heuristic approaches to select
APIMs.
Vanamali recommends [303] a business driven evaluation approach where the evaluation of
solutions extends beyond the resolution of technical issues to enable businesses to perform
effectively and efficiently, particularly in the business environments where IT budgets are
ever shrinking. Parkin et al. suggest [228] that predicting the effects of amending security
policies on identification and authentication mechanisms, e.g. increasing password minimum
length, is a better starting point for conducting such evaluations. They propose the use of a
mock-up prototype tool to predict the impact, particularly on end users, before trade-offs
between financial costs and benefits are even considered.
These strategies identify the need to understand the effect, in terms of its nature and extent of
impact, which a particular factor has on other factors during the evaluation of an application
context and the appraisal of candidate APIMs. A lack of understanding of these impacts may
result in the inappropriate APIM selection. Heuristic approaches, however, are dependent
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upon practitioners’ interpretation of the approach and their skills and competencies. As
the approaches are not documented, i.e. its method, it is, therefore, difficult to differentiate
between an approach’s proficiencies and deficiencies with the skills of the expert practitioner.
Some approaches may be more efficacious in particular application contexts by adopting a
strategic perspective and commence with stipulating organisational objectives and measurable
outcomes at the outset. Alternatively, some iterative approaches may be more efficacious
when a deployed APIM requires enhancement.
We believe that a tool is required to evaluate the many factors in an application context
systematically in order to minimise decision-making risks on the selection of an APIM. We
acknowledge, however, that application contexts may vary considerably and the system-
atic methodology needs to designed to accommodate such variations. The research issue
identified then becomes an inquiry into the extent of a methodology’s efficacy to select the
optimal for certain IS programme development situations. A methodology, therefore, needs
to be assessed in terms of the extent of its efficacy to address specific types of automated
identification problems of various application contexts each which possess their own distinct
range of circumstances.
Lastly, in this section, we review the methodological tools, which possess systematic pro-
cesses, i.e. a method, to evaluate the factors relating to the selection of APIMs.
3.3.5 Systematic Methodologies for Selecting APIMs
There are no systematic methodologies, incorporating well-defined processes, in the body of
knowledge which are designed, as a tool, to select the optimal APIM for a given application
context.
We found evidence that systematic methodologies exist to aid the selection of biometric
systems with some of these tools being employed by professional services companies
during their evaluation assignments. The properties of these systematic methodologies,
specifically their methods’ processes, have not been published with sufficient descriptive
detail to enable repeatable usage by other evaluators. The lack of well-defined processes
in these methodologies also inhibits a review to assess their efficacy. We categorise these
methodologies based upon whether the evaluation processes are quantitative or qualitative.
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3.3.5.1 Quantitative Methodology
Ashbourn designed [15] the Pentakis Methodology in order to assist organisations to evaluate
the factors surrounding biometric system deployments. The accompanying Pentakis Expert
System has a knowledge base module, in which an evaluator may store data collected from
the case under evaluation and produce a calculated solution preference.
The Pentakis tool evaluates user attitudes, transaction timings, scalability possibilities, popu-
lation profile and costs analysis of a biometric system with various configurations. Pentakis
appears to be designed to conduct evaluations without consideration of the application
context’s operational environment, stakeholders’ objectives and their requirements. We
believe that the risks associated with this type of methodology all too frequently result in
stakeholders’ objectives being unfulfilled.
The majority of subject data are quantitative, e.g. costs and performance timings; however,
an evaluator may use scalar units to represent their evaluation of a biometric system’s
qualitative attributes, e.g. usability. Ashbourn fails [15] to explain the methods’ processes
and the underlying evaluation computations in the Pentakis Expert System in order to review
the efficacy of this systematic methodology. There is no evidence that Pentakis has been
validated by using it for selecting a biometric system in a real-world application context.
Importantly, the Pentakis Methodology reveals the type of know-how that practitioners apply
in evaluating biometric system deployments.
3.3.5.2 Qualitative Methodologies
There appear to be three qualitative methodologies used by consulting organisations; however,
the details that describe these tools remain commercially confidential.
IdMology is a tool designed to evaluate IdM systems based upon the experiences of expert
practitioners in IDFocus LLC [10]. The details of the discipline experts’ practises and the
scientific foundations of the methodology are not publicly available. The sales literature
published by IDFocus LLC provides an overview of IdMology and does not describe the
experts’ practises or scientific foundations upon which it is designed sufficiently for an
objective review.
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HJP Consulting GmBH 7 developed, in conjunction with the Software Quality Lab of the
University of Paderborn, the Model Centric Methodology for Analysis, Specification and
Qualification (MMASQ) for developing IdM systems. This methodology is based on the
V-Modell IS development approach [199].
The MMASQ/V Model contains a series of systematic processes and models to represent
the design components from a systems engineering perspective and produces UML based
requirement descriptions. It is difficult, however, in the absence of any detailed scientific
publication, to conduct a review of this systematic methodology. Despite the lack of descrip-
tive detail in the publication domain this methodology further demonstrates, however, that
practitioners’ methodological know-how may be codified into a systematic methodology.
Al-Khouri claims [4] in his thesis on programme management that the vendor in the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) eID Card Programme refused to disclose their systematic methodology
to the UAE eID Card stakeholders’ representatives. Al-Khouri’s findings [4] are further
evidence that systematic methodologies exist and are employed by technology suppliers. His
findings also suggest that requirements engineering for APIMs need a means to address a
variety of stakeholder conflicts which appear to occur during programmes of this nature.
Despite the lack of details on the vendor’s methodology, Al-Khouri’s thesis provides [4]
valuable insights into the dynamics of a national eID Card programme. The UAE eID
Card Programme established criteria [5], based upon ISO9126 Software Engineering -
Product Quality - Quality Model, to evaluate the quality of the technology deliverables. The
programme considered the task to establish such criteria as a critical activity. Most relevant
to our inquiry Al-Khouri recognises [5] that such methodologies need to be proportional to
the size and importance of the business goals.
Importantly, our review reveals again that practitioner methodological know-how has been
codified into methodologies for the evaluation of application contexts in order to select
the optimal APIM. We do not, however, have an understanding of the methods used by
practitioners in those systematic methodologies. This gap in the body of knowledge presents
a research opportunity to formulate the craft of practitioners into a scientific methodology
in an important and emerging field of study. The research issue identified is to determine
how to represent the practitioner’s craft into a selection method, with well-defined processes,
within a systematic methodology.
7http://www.hjp-consulting.com/consulting/requirements-engineering
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The efficacy of the reviewed methodologies remain largely unknown and there are potential
real-world benefits in gaining an understanding as to when a particular methodology is
more efficacious than other methodologies in order to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context. This identified research issue forms the basis of our research problem
to determine the extent of a methodology’s efficacy for certain types of IS development
programmes.
3.4 Development of Research Questions
We develop our four research questions based on the research issues identified in our review
of the methodological tools in the literature and our analysis of our research problem.
3.4.1 First Research Question
In Section 3.3.1 we identified the research issue of identifying which factors need to be
evaluated by an IS programme in order to select the optimal APIM. Additionally, our review
of the guidelines also suggests that we need to a means to ascertain whether an APIM is
optimal for a given application context in the first instance before an assessment on the
efficacy of the methodology pursued which selected that APIM.
We found, however, that these methodological tools tend to evaluate an APIM in isolation,
as a technology, rather than evaluate the application context in which the APIM will be
deployed. We also identified that many factors affecting the selection of an APIM are
often viewed from a single perspective, either factors that impact largely on organisations’
stakeholders or factors that impact the user community in the application context. Also, we
ascertained that the relationships between the factors for evaluating APIMs are complex
and largely unknown. We believe that a research inquiry to consolidate the factors in these
tools into a comprehensive check list in an evaluation framework would be beneficial both
theoretically and in practice. These identified factors should be validated using data acquired
from empirical inquiry.
We also identified in Section 3.3.2, that analytical frameworks could represent stakeholders’
perspectives of an optimal APIM. Similarly, such a framework has the potential to evaluate
mixed data types. As we indicated in our review of analytical frameworks, the complexities
of mapping factor relationships directly are theoretically prohibitive. We believe it is difficult
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because factor interdependencies are driven by the contextual circumstances and that each
application context is unique. There are, however, analytical models in the literature which
could form a starting point to develop an evaluation framework to represent the characteristics
of the application context and the APIM selection processes. Also, we recognise that there is
a need for varying levels of abstraction and representations of multiple perspectives in such
an evaluation framework.
While the creation of a comprehensive check list of factors, incorporated into an evaluation
framework, would address the identified gap in the knowledge, we believe that such a tool
could be of importance to an IS programme seeking to select the optimal APIM for an
application context. We believe that the availability of such a tool, which may be used
to assist IS programmes to ensure that it evaluates a pertinent range of factors, tackle the
complexities of selecting the optimal APIM, is worthy of research effort. We formulate our
first research question based upon our identified research issue and the decomposition of our
research problem to identify which factors need to be evaluated in order to select the optimal
APIM.
What factors should be evaluated in order to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context?
3.4.2 Second Research Question
As identified in Section 3.3.5, there are no systematic methodologies, with well-defined
processes, to select APIMs in the body of knowledge. We consider it apposite to fill this gap
in the knowledge by developing a systematic methodology for selecting an APIM and then,
as a separate research question in line with our research problem, investigate the extent of its
efficacy to select the optimal APIM.
While our review identified the potential for practitioner methodological know-how to be
codified into a systematic methodology, the identified research issue is to establish how to
represent the practitioner’s craft in well-defined processes of a selection method. We suggest
that practitioner’s know-how could be represented in a series of processes of a method as
an integral element of a systematic methodology. The method’s processes would acquire
information which describe the characteristics of an application context, with its information
system and envisaged usage settings. Acquired data would then be evaluated systematically
in order to support decision-making on APIMs.
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Our second research question seeks to establish a systematic methodology, based upon our
suppositions, to acquire data from the application context in order select the optimal system
from a range of candidate APIMs.
How can information pertaining to an application context be acquired and evaluated
in a systematic methodology so as to determine the optimal APIM?
We believe that a systematic methodology, with well-defined processes, has the potential
to assist IS programmes to select the optimal APIM. We acknowledge, however, that the
methodology’s data acquisition and its evaluation processes requires scientific validation.
The use of the systematic methodology in a real-world application context will not only
provide empirical data for validation purposes but also to generate relevant data to enable an
efficacy assessment. The results from this efficacy assessment are important as they could
help inform current practice.
We aim primarily to create a systematic methodology which incorporates security activity
processes to support all the stages in an IS development programme. Our secondary aim
is to develop a systematic methodology for selecting APIMs which align’s with Siponen’s
fifth generation of InfoSec methodologies. He proposes that such methodologies should
encompass user participation, be adaptable to different information system development
methodologies and should also be validated through empirical grounding.
We believe that methodology’s properties, such as ease of use and its usefulness to practice,
are efficacy considerations. These properties should be assessed using data generated during
a methodology’s utilisation in a real-world application context. Therefore, there is a research
need to define a means to assess the efficacy of a systematic methodology to select the
optimal APIM for a given application context.
3.4.3 Third Research Question
In Section 3.3.4 we identified the research issue of the need to ascertain the extent of a
methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal for a given application context. Additionally, the
decomposition of our research problem suggests that we need to establish a means to assess
the efficacy of methodologies to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. We
formulate our third research question so that we establish a means to assess the efficacy of
different methodologies, including heuristic approaches, to select an APIM.
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How can the efficacy of a methodology to select an APIM itself be assessed?
We recognise that some methodologies may be more efficacious than other approaches in
certain application context circumstances. We aim to develop a set of criteria, therefore, to
assess the efficacy of methodologies or approaches used in the selection of an APIM. Also
from using these efficacy assessment criteria and the data acquired, it may be possible to
identify the circumstances and to explain why a systematic methodology is efficacious for
selecting APIMs in certain situations.
3.4.4 Fourth Research Question
From our review of the methodological tools, we note that the extent of systematic method-
ologies’ efficacy, and also heuristic approaches, to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context have not been investigated scientifically. The aim of our research effort
is to improve understandings on systematic methodologies, as problem-solving processes,
rather than to seek understandings relating to the competencies and strategies pursued by
discipline experts, as methodology users. We, therefore exclude heuristic approaches from
our inquiry.
The Whither Committee Report identifies [230] a significant research opportunity to de-
velop an evaluative framework that would guide potential stakeholders who are considering
deployment of biometrics. We believe that this identified research opportunity should be
extended to a systematic methodology containing an evaluative framework. The systematic
methodology should also contain incisive questions to acquire data from the application
context and also a method to assist stakeholders to evaluate the application context in which
the biometric solution will be deployed. The committee concludes [230], from their survey
of biometric deployments, that failures in biometric systems are often rooted in:
• the lack of clarity about problem being addressed;
• lack of a viable business case;
• inappropriate application of biometrics where other technologies would work better;
• inappropriate choice of biometrics;
• insensitivity to user perceptions and usability requirements;
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• inadequate support processes and infrastructures; and
• poor understanding of population issues.
The issues and vulnerabilities associated with some APIM deployments as identified in
Section 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 respectively together with the results from the Whither Committee’s
survey [230] suggests that some methodological tools might be of benefit to IS programmes.
We consider that research to establish the extent of a systematic methodology’s efficacy is
not only a worthwhile theoretical pursuit but the results of our investigations could also help
to inform practice in the real-world. We acknowledge, however, that different methodologies
may be more efficacious for some application contexts under certain circumstances and less
so for others. We seek to understand the circumstances under which the utilisation of a
systematic methodology is efficacious and, conversely, when, by implication, it might not be
together with explanatory reasons.
Our fourth research question is framed to explore the contextual circumstances surrounding
programmes tasked with deploying APIMs. We also seek to provide explanations as to why a
systematic methodology may be efficacious in some situations and not so in other situations.
When is a systematic methodology efficacious for selecting an APIM and if so, under
which scope of circumstances and why or conversely, if not, why not?
While some commercial systematic methodologies may exist in the marketplace, organisa-
tions often encounter the problem of determining which methodology or approach is most
suitable for them to select the optimal APIM for their application context. Stakeholders’
programmes will have difficulty in determining which methodology to pursue unless an
understanding of the circumstances most relevant for a particular methodology is identified
through empirical inquiry.
We believe that there are significant benefits to IS programmes in gaining an understanding
on the proficiencies and deficiencies of different methodologies to select APIMs. This
understanding may then be used in choose an appropriate methodology for the circumstances
surrounding their IS programme. It appears from our review of the methodological tools that
few of them have been empirically validated or assessed in terms of their efficacy for their
intended purpose.
Our research questions are based upon our main assumption that APIMs are imperfect, in
that such deployments possess inherent vulnerabilities and attract issues, and stakeholders
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incur costs. Nevertheless, we aim to develop a systematic methodology to select the optimal
APIM and then validate it using empirical data. We also aim to answer our research problem
by generating the relevant data, for an efficacy assessment, from the use our methodology in
a real-world application context.
In summary, our main unit of analysis is to inquire into the efficacy of a systematic method-
ology in order to identify and explain the circumstances when the use of such a methodology
by an IS programme might be beneficial. Our secondary unit of analysis is the validation
our systematic methodology and its components. We discuss the selection of the case study
research methodology to conduct our empirical inquiry in Section 4.1 and the framing of our
two units of analysis in Section 4.5.
3.5 A New Evaluation Paradigm for Selecting APIMs
Based on the issues research issues identified from our review of the methodologies in
Section 3.3, we consider that a new paradigm is required to construct scientific theories in
respect of the efficacy of systematic methodologies to select APIMs.
Our review of the methodological tools suggests that greater research emphasis is needed
on methodologies’ processes which aid complex decisions on APIMs. We believe that
scientific effort should be diverted away from the search for the panacea APIM because all
identification systems and authentications systems possess vulnerabilities, attract issues and
incur costs [226].
The efficacy of the systematic methodology should be assessed to ascertain the viability, as
defined by Kalfoglou et al. [170], of a systematic methodology to evaluate real-life automated
identification problems. From our research inquiry, we aim to develop theories concerning
the circumstances under which a systematic methodology may be more efficacious than
other decision-making approaches. We also aim to gather explanatory reasons to support our
theories by establishing efficacy criteria to model the properties of a methodology to select
an APIM.
The next sub-sections justify our reasons to construct a new paradigm in order to develop
our theories.
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3.5.1 Problem Analysis
Researchers to date have largely studied IdMs and biometrics using a solution based perspec-
tive. There is overwhelming evidence [295, 230] that inquiry should be directed at evaluating
the application context, together with its identification problem, and not the APIM itself in
isolation. Our supposition is that the application context, in which the APIM operates, in
turn, influences stakeholders’ decision-making processes to select the optimal APIM.
So where do the real-world problems of establishing the optimal APIM for an application
context lie because there are many advisory tools, as reviewed, in the literature? Do these
problems emanate from stakeholders’ difficulties to understand, analyse and articulate their
business objectives and requirements for an APIM? Do decision-makers focus on candidate
solutions only? Alternatively, could these identified problems lie in the methodology or the
methods used by practitioners in order to select the APIM? Fundamentally, are the method-
ology’s processes sufficiently robust to articulate the complexities relating to stakeholder’s
interests and concomitant issues surrounding the application context?
We propose to address the identified research problem through empirical inquiry using the
four composite research questions stated in the previous section. We classified APIMs into
three governance frameworks types in Section 2.4.4 in order to model the different stakeholder
roles and trust relationships in each deployment type. We aim to conduct empirical research
using case study research with cases from each context type, being enterprise, federated and
heterogeneous, in order to reveal insights into the trust issues in this problem space.
We believe that the optimal APIM may only be determined if the basis upon which it will
be evaluated are articulated at the outset and empirical data are gathered for subsequent
comparison with other candidate APIM. The assessment of a systematic methodology’s
efficacy to conduct that evaluation, in order to determine the optimal APIM, therefore,
becomes our main research problem.
3.5.2 The Need for Assessments
We identify the need for assessment at two levels. Firstly, we need to evaluate the application
context and its identification problem in order to evaluate whether the APIM selected is
optimal. Secondly we need to assess the efficacy of the methodology used to select the
optimal APIM.
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Information security needs suitable metrics to inform practical decisions, which are often
complex [277]. Jaquith recommends [164] cascading technique for measuring the effec-
tiveness of an IdM in an enterprise. Effectiveness of an APIM and other quality properties
identified in Section 3.3.1, such as acceptability and maintainability, therefore, need to be
modelled to enable evaluation of factors relating to the application context.
For efficacy assessments we need to establish efficacy criteria and then acquire relevant data
to conduct an efficacy assessment of our systematic methodology. We also need to ascertain
the desirable properties of a systematic methodology to select an APIM.
3.5.3 Desirable Properties of a Systematic Methodology
Siponen argues [266] that future InfoSec tools should not only be created from the socio-
technical scientific paradigm, encompassing social factors, but also be rigorously developed
in alignment with practices. His argument is based upon the need to incorporate social
techniques so as to ensure the social acceptance of security controls and procedures. Similarly,
Hitching considers [133] that the lack of consideration of human factors is one of the main
deficiencies of traditional InfoSec approaches.
Our inquiry to establish a systematic methodology for selecting an APIM, therefore, attempts
to align with these proposed development strategies through empirical research. From our
analysis of the research issues, the establishment of our four research questions and our
proposed paradigm, we consider that we are ready to select the most appropriate research
methodology in order to conduct our empirical inquiry.
3.6 Summary of Chapter
This chapter reviewed the background parent discipline which describe the methodological
tools in the body of knowledge which assist in the evaluation of security, usability and privacy
issues surrounding the development of information systems. We used our tools classification
scheme in order to review the methodological tools in the parent InfoSec discipline. We
also reviewed the methodological tools which we found in our immediate research field of
automated personal identification.
We highlighted some of the limitations of the tools in the parent disciplines used to evaluate
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the issues surrounding the security, usability and privacy of information systems. The limita-
tions of the tools available in our immediate discipline were also revealed and major research
issues were identified and explained in order to formulate our four research questions.
We identified that research is needed to establish a set of factors upon which to evaluate an
application context in order to determine the optimal APIM for a given application context.
We justified our arguments that there is also a need for a systematic methodology for such
evaluations to aid decisions on selecting the optimal APIM for a given application context.
The properties of a systematic methodology were highlighted and we also identified the need
to establish criteria in order to assess the efficacy of a methodology used to select an APIM.
We concluded that empirical research is needed to determine the circumstances as to when
and why a systematic methodology is efficacious to select an APIM in order to address our
research problem.
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This chapter discusses the characteristics of our research inquiry and our epistemological
standpoint in order to justify the selection of the case study research methodology. We provide
an overview of the case study research methodology and then justify the selection of our
three case studies. We then describe our data collection techniques and our qualitative data
analysis procedures. A discussion on the units of analysis is provided, together with criteria
to assess the quality of our research inquiry and to validate our claims of contributing to
the body of knowledge. Finally, we describe the ethical considerations that governed our
research inquiry.
4.1 Selecting a Suitable Research Methodology
In this section we justify our selection of the case study research methodology to conduct
our empirical inquiry into the extent of a systematic methodology’s efficacy to select an
APIM. We use the term research methodology in respect of our approach to conduct our
investigations to distinguish it from systematic methodology which is the subject of our
inquiry.
We first discuss the characteristics of our research problem and our four research questions.
Next, we discuss the degree of uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon of our inquiry.
We then consider the ontological and the epistemological positions of different research
paradigms before describing the basis of our adoption of the critical realist research paradigm
and its influence on our choice of research methodology. We compare candidate research
methodologies and then justify our choice of the case study research strategy. We also
identify some constraints and limitations of the case study research methodology.
4.1.1 Methodological Choices for Research
While methodological choices for research are sometimes made unconsciously or through
default [52], the awareness of the influences of such choices is critical to the contribution of
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Figure 4.1: Research Design Choices adapted from Blaikie [32]
knowledge and understanding of a particular field [213]. There is also the need to examine
the underlying philosophical assumptions and constructs upon which such understandings
are based [241].
We examine such research design choices for our inquiry by considering the research strategy
questions posed by Blaikie [32] and Trauth’s recommendation [291] to also take into account
the degree of uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon under investigation. We have added
Trauth’s phenomenon question to Blaikie’s questions [32], which are represented in Figure
4.1. We commence with a discussion on the characteristics of the research problem.
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4.1.2 Our Research Problem’s Characteristics
The characteristics of our research problem requires the inquiry into the extent of a systematic
methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. Our
research effort is not aimed at establishing an indubitable reality or, conversely, a falsehood
of a proposed hypothesis.
We believe the nature of the research problem of establishing the extent of methodological
efficacy is context dependent and that the construction of generalisable theories is demanding
because there are so many uncontrollable variables which influence our inquiry. Therefore,
based on our critical realist beliefs, we aim to build plausible theories regarding the efficacy
of systematic methodologies to select APIMs using evidence acquired through empirical
research inquiry.
We aim to establish an understanding of how APIMs are currently selected in practice. We
refrain, however, from comparing our systematic selection methodology with approaches
currently practised by programmes’ practitioners because we believe that it would be difficult
to employ both methodologies simultaneously in the same inquiry. We assume that it
would be a complex task to differentiate between the impacts of each methodology on a
programme’s efforts to select the optimal APIM. This research strategy may also be viewed
as impractical by the stakeholders involved in that inquiry.
The use of a systematic selection methodology on past decisions in the real-world may also
be viewed as impractical and of little benefit to stakeholders. We aim, however, to identify
methodological learnings by examining approaches pursued by IS programmes in order to
inform the design of our methodology. We also aim to use our systematic methodology in a
real-world case so that data are acquired for our two units of analysis, which are discussed in
Section 4.5.1.
4.1.3 Characteristics of Our Research Questions
According to Blaikie [31] scientific research includes starting from observed regularities,
which are produced by hidden mechanisms. From these observed regularities models of these
mechanisms may then be created. Empirical research involves searching in the real-world
for evidence of these mechanisms in existence. We aim to start our inquiry by observing
regularities in current methodological practices as our starting point to gain an understanding
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of these underlying mechanisms and methodological learnings relating to discipline experts’
practises for selecting APIMs.
Our inquiry seeks to build a model of the regularities of programmes and their practitioners’
activities which are tasked by stakeholders to introduce or revise an APIM. We aim to model
the regularities of such a programme that represent the surrounding circumstances at the
programme’s inception, the events and strategies which took place during a programme, the
resulting outcomes and hindsight observations from practitioners involved in the programme.
Avison et al. recommend [19] that researchers should try out their theories with practitioners
in real-life situations and real organisations. We heed their recommendations by employing
our systematic methodology in order to assess its efficacy in selecting the optimal APIM for
a real-world application context.
Next, we review the type of inquiry involved for each of our following research questions.
1. What factors should be evaluated in order to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context?
2. How can information pertaining to an application context be acquired and evaluated in
a systematic methodology so as to determine the optimal APIM?
3. How can the efficacy of a methodology to select an APIM itself be assessed?
4. When is a systematic methodology efficacious for selecting an APIM and if so, under
which scope of circumstances and why or conversely, if not, why not?
4.1.3.1 Research Question 1
We consider that our first research question is exploratory in nature.
Our aim is to identify the relevant factors which should be evaluated by programmes in
order to select the optimal APIM. Such a comprehensive range of factors should incorporate
aspects relating to the application context, the characteristics of user community and their
tasks as well as technology deployment, security, usability and privacy issues.
We aim to consolidate the factors in the literature and then validate them by seeking their
existence in real-world cases using empirical grounding [47] in the data acquired. We also
seek to identify other factors in the acquired data from our empirical research.
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4.1.3.2 Research Question 2
Our second research question is both exploratory and explanatory.
Our initial aim to establish how information pertaining to a case under evaluation may be
systematically acquired, represented and analysed in order to support decision-making on
APIMs is exploratory. Therefore, we aim to create systematic selection methodology that
incorporates factors for evaluating APIM which we have identified in our inquiry to answer
our first research question.
We aim to adhere to Siponen’s criteria [266], for producing a fifth-generation InfoSec
tool, by building our systematic selection methodology based upon the identification of
methodological learnings. These learnings are to be identified by investigating programmes
involved in the selection or revision of an APIM. This empirical research is explanatory in
that we aim to understand practitioner’s practises during programmes to introduce or revise
an APIM. From these understandings we may then incorporate the relevant processes into
our systematic selection methodology.
4.1.3.3 Research Question 3
Our third research question is exploratory in nature.
Our aim is to create a set of criteria which may be utilised to assess the efficacy of a
methodology or an approach to select an APIM for a given application context. Our inquiry
necessitates research into existing decision-making strategies in programme which determine
that the APIM selected or revised is optimal for that application context.
We also seek to understand the methods and the data required by organisations in order
conduct such evaluations for deployed APIMs.
4.1.3.4 Research Question 4
Our aim is to ascertain the extent to which a systematic selection methodology is efficacious
for selecting an APIM is explanatory in nature.
Through empirical inquiry we aim to identify the circumstances surrounding a programme
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that suggest that the use of a systematic methodology is an efficacious strategy to select the
optimal APIM. We also seek to explain the reasons behind the identified circumstances which
support the use of a systematic selection methodology by a programme to select the optimal
APIM. Additionally, we aim to explain the reasons why a systematic selection methodology
might not be efficacious at all for some situations.
Fundamentally, our aim here is to explain the reasons why a systematic methodology might
or might not be efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM for differing application contexts.
From the patterns recognised in our explanations we aim to establish plausible theories on
the phenomenon of methodological efficacy.
4.1.4 Uncertainty Surrounding the Phenomenon
We define our research phenomenon as the efficacy of a systematic methodology to select an
APIM for a given application context.
The impreciseness of terminology that describes the APIM field of study and its scope, as
we discussed in Chapter 2, the vagueness in the approaches and data required relating to
decisions on APIMs and the lack of information on methodological efficacy collectively adds
much ambiguity to the phenomenon of inquiry. We consider the problem of assessing the
efficacy of approaches currently practiced and also systematic selection methodologies is
difficult because efficacy should be assessed, for its fitness for purpose, according to the case
under evaluation. We believe, therefore, that a methodology’s efficacy is context dependent;
however, we assume that the characteristics of some cases are sufficiently similar to build
plausible theories about systematic methodologies’ efficacy.
Our research inquires into the efficaciousness of a systematic methodology to evaluate an
application context in order to select the optimal APIM. Put simply, the extent to which the
phenomenon produces the desired effect of selecting the optimal identification system or
optimal authentication system for a given context.
Our research, including the development of a systematic selection methodology, aims to
improve understandings of this efficacy phenomenon. Little is known about how APIMs are
selected in practice and similarly there are no theories about the efficacy of such approaches.
Equally, the extent to which a systematic methodology might or might not be efficacious for
selecting APIMs is also unknown.
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Next we discuss the research paradigms for conducting information system inquiries that
influence the design of our research strategy.
4.1.5 Research Paradigms
Guba and Lincoln consider [124] that research paradigms, as basic belief systems, are based
on ontological, epistemological and research methodological assumptions. Blaikie asserts
[32] that ontology relates to the nature of what exists whereas epistemology is a theory or
science of how knowledge is known, what can be known, together with criteria for judging
the legitimacy of that knowledge. Ontological assumptions deal with questions about the
form and the nature of reality, and, therefore, what is there that can be known about a
phenomenon [71]. Epistemological assumptions relate to questions about the relationship
between the knower, the inquirer and what can be known [71].
In general, research methodological assumptions relate to how the researcher can go about
finding out whatever he or she believes can be known [124]. From the critical realist research
paradigm, Dobson advises [83] that research inquiry needs to differentiate between the
primary ontological assumptions and secondary epistemological assumptions, the former
being intransitive and the latter being transitive in nature. Trauth argues [290] that episte-
mological assumptions for qualitative research in information systems should be separated
from the research methodology pursued. Additionally, Hirschheim concludes [131] that
all philosophical assumptions need to be exposed irrespective of qualitative or quantitative
methodological base to support claims of valid research and valid research methodologies.
4.1.5.1 Research Paradigms for Information System Inquiries
The spectrum of philosophical assumptions shown in Table 4.1, adapted from Fitzgerald and
Howcroft’s hard versus soft treatise [100] using Creswell’s definitions [70], represents the
dichotomies of positivist and interpretive research paradigms. Quantitative and qualitative
approaches, however, should not be construed as polar opposites but represent the extreme
ends of the research design continuum [71].
Fitzgerald and Howcroft offer [100] four strategies for resolving these competing philosophi-
cal dichotomies in IS research:
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HARD PHILOSOPHICAL SOFT
PERSPECTIVE QUESTIONS PERSPECTIVE
Ontological What is the nature of reality?
Level
Realist versus Relativist
Belief that external world Belief that multiple realities
consists of pre-existing exist as subjective
tangible structures, which constructions of the mind.
exists independently of Socially transmitted terms
an individual’s cognition. direct how reality is
perceived, which varies
across languages and cultures.
Axiological What is the role of values?
Level
Rigour versus Relevance
Research characterised by External validity of actual
hypothetico-deductive testing research question and its
according to the positivist relevance to practice is
paradigm, with emphasis on vital, rather than constraining
internal validity through the focus to that by
tight experimental control rigorous methods.
and quantitative techniques.
Epistemological What is the criteria for constructing
Level and evaluating knowledge?
Objectivist versus Subjectivist
Both possible and essential Situation between the
that researcher remains researcher and the research
detached from the research situation is collapsed.
situation. Neutral observation Research findings emerge from
of reality must take place interaction between the
in the absence of any researcher and research situation.
contaminating researcher The values and beliefs of
values or biases. researcher are central mediators.
Etic-Outsider-Objective versus Emic-Insider-Subjective
Research orientation outside Research orientation centred on
of researcher who is seen as native insider’s view, with the
objective and the appropriate latter as the best judge
analyst of research. of adequacy of research.
Methodological What are the processes of research?
Level
Quantitative versus Qualitative
Confirmatory versus Exploratory
Laboratory versus Field
Deduction versus Induction
Nomothetic versus Ideographic
Table 4.1: Spectrum of Philosophical Assumptions adapted from Fitzgerald and Howcroft
[100] and Creswell [70]
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RESEARCH ONTOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY ASSUMPTIONS ASSUMPTIONS
Positivist Assumes an objective physical and social Empirical testability of theories to be
world that exists independently of humans, verified or falsified. The relationship
and whose nature can be relatively between theory and practice is primarily
unproblematically apprehended, technical and value free.
characterised and measured.
Interpretive Emphasises the importance of subjective Understanding the social world involves
meanings and social-political as well getting inside the world of those
as symbolic action in the processes generating it. The researchers, with
through which humans construct and their assumptions, beliefs, values and
reconstruct their reality. interests can never assume a
value-neutral free stance.
Critical Social reality is historically constituted. Knowledge is grounded in social
Realism Humans, organisations, and societies and historical practices. There can be no
are not confined to existing in a theory independent collection and
particular state. interpretation of data to conclusively
prove or disprove a theory.
Table 4.2: Research Paradigms for IS Compared, adapted from Orlikowski and Baroudi
[224] and Myers [213]
1. Isolationist strategy – operating strictly to a particular paradigm, which is mutually
exclusive and exhaustive; or
2. Supremacy strategy – each research paradigm striving for supremacy; however, dif-
ferent approaches have strengths and weaknesses with usefulness being related to the
nature of the inquiry; or
3. Integration strategy – merging of paradigms; however, this is problematical due to
paradigm incommensurability. Merging paradigms may result in diluting a paradigm’s
particular strengths; or
4. Pluralist strategy – different paradigms are applied in a research situation allowing for
a tool box approach where different methods could be used as appropriate.
Conversely, Orlikowski and Baroudi [224] refine the dichotomy of these philosophical
assumptions, depicted Table 4.1, for IS research into the positivist, interpretive and critical
realist paradigms. Their seminal work is based largely on the Chua’s deliberations [51]
into researching accounting problems. Table 4.2, adapted from Orlikowski and Baroudi’s
work [224] and Myers subsequent efforts [213], represents the diversity in research design
and the philosophical questions for IS researchers to consider in order to establish their
methodological base.
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Positivists believe that reality is value free whereas interpretive paradigm assumes that reality
is value laden [71, 100]. The value aware critical realist stance is that there is a real-world to
discover even though it is imperfectly apprehensible [198]. The positivist research paradigm
is appropriate for inquiries where researchers typically formulate propositions that portray the
subject matter in terms of independent variables, dependent variables and the relationships
between them [213]. The development and use of IS in and by organisations, however, are
intrinsically embedded in social contexts [7].
The aim of all interpretive research is to understand how members of a social group, through
their participation in social processes, enact their particular realities and endow them with
meaning, and to show how these meanings, beliefs and intentions of the members help to
constitute their social action [224].
Critical realists believe that a participant’s perception is just one window through to the
picture of reality, which can be formulated with other participants’ perceptions and other
forms of evidence [127]. The positivist and interpretive paradigms aim to predict and explain
the phenomenon, whereas the critical realist researcher aims to critically evaluate, model and
possibly transform the social reality under investigation [224].
Trauth and Howcroft consider [292] the critical research paradigm in IS is useful for inquiries
that seek to reveal in-depth insights of power dynamics and underlying politics between
stakeholders. Critical realism is relevant for constructing theories with the aim of explaining
how and why events happened as they did, for example on a failed IT project [211]. Gregor
warns [121], however, any ascriptions of causality have to be made with extreme caution.
Publications from the IS research community are predominantly positivist [116, 292, 213];
however, there are calls to increase qualitative research to obtain scientific knowledge to
account for the subject matter in the real-world [50, 117]. Alavi and Carlson believe [7] the
progress in the IS research field is enhanced by adopting a plurality of research perspectives
in order to gain insight into complex information systems. An understanding of the way
we can constitute the phenomenon in different ways, on the basis of alternative paradigms,
provides one means through which we can make sense of the phenomenon [181].
Mingers suggests [205] that for any piece of research, even one in which a tightly drawn
research question implies a particular method, thought should be given to a range of factors
in the situation (including the predilections and experience of the researcher) and the extent
to which other methods may add to the richness and validity of the results. Niehaves argues
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[219] that in order to answer questions regarding the combining of research methods in the
context of multi-method research, it is important to analyse the epistemological assumptions
of the research methods themselves.
Myers concludes [213], referencing Lee’s observations [183], that while the research epis-
temologies are philosophically distinct, as ideal types, the practice of research in these
distinctions is not so clear-cut. He suggests [213] that there is considerable disagreement
as to whether these research paradigms are necessarily opposed or can be accommodated
within one study.
4.1.5.2 Research Paradigms in InfoSec Inquiries
Coles-Kemp argues [61] that the paradigmatic foundations of what constitutes valid knowl-
edge for the InfoSec discipline, through lack of organisational and social theories, is in need
of further research effort. InfoSec research needs to extend beyond technological considera-
tions into understanding the socio-organisational perspectives surrounding the secure use of
information systems [80].
As the InfoSec community’s interest in philosophical and methodological assumptions does
not seem to have kept pace with that of the IS community [61], we draw, therefore, on
InfoSec’s parent IS discipline and the work of Orlikowski and Baroudi as our philosophical
base. We believe, however, that InfoSec research could adopt alternative philosophies from
other parent disciplines.
4.1.6 Our Philosophical Orientation
Our philosophical orientation leans towards the critical realism research paradigm, which
is commensurate with our inquiry to gain an in-depth insight into the decision-making on
APIMs. Nevertheless, we are not so entrenched in our philosophical stance, with strong
positive or negative dogma, so as to discard the contributions to knowledge from other
philosophical paradigms. We recognise that we need a pluralist strategy and to accommodate
different research paradigms in order to address our four research questions. We employ a
pluralist strategy by adopting two different research paradigms.
We employ the interpretive paradigm in order to construct our systematic methodology to
represent discipline experts’ know-how to primarily answer our second research question.
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Our research strategy also employs the interpretative emic research paradigm in order to
answer our first and third research questions, which are exploratory in nature.
For the final research question we employ a critical realist research paradigm in order
to gain in-depth insights on underlying power mechanisms that influence organisational
approaches to selecting APIMs. Here, we adopt an etic outsider objective stance as we are
interested in the participant’s perceptions of the methodological regularities to select APIMs.
Epistemologically, our main inquiry is inclined towards the critical realist scientific paradigm
to develop explanations and to build theories relating to the research problem.
Maxwell explains [198] that qualitative study, adopting a critical realist perspective, seeks to
understand the processes, the meanings and local contextual influences involved with the
phenomenon of interest, for the specific setting or individuals studied. In general, a critical
realist evaluation approach in IS attends to how and why an IS initiative has the potential to
cause the (desired) changes and seeks to understand for whom and in what circumstances
(contexts) an IS initiative works through the study of contextual conditioning [44].
We adopted the critical realist research paradigm because we aimed to critically evaluate the
processes in a programme and the extent of their efficacy to select the optimal APIM for a
given application context.
4.1.7 Research Strategy
Blaikie advises [32] that the choice of research strategy depends primarily upon the differ-
ent ways to answer research questions through introductive, deductive, retroductive, and
abductive logical reasoning.
We chose to adopt a retroductive research strategy based upon our review of Blaikie’s
explanations [32], as categorised in Table 4.3, and our analysis of our research questions.
We commenced our inquiry into methodological efficacy by observing the regularities of
processes in programmes to select APIMs. We used Pawson and Tilley’s causal model [233]
as a framework to analyse our acquired data in order to assist us to locate the real underlying
mechanisms or causal powers responsible for a programme’s selection of a particular APIM.
We describe their causal model in the next sub-section.
Our inquiry, in line with the retroductive research strategy, was to search for consequences
as a result of a mechanism’s existence in a programme’s selection of an APIM. These
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Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive
Aim: To establish universal To test theories, to To discover underlying To describe and
generalisations to be eliminate false ones mechanisms to explain understand social life
used as pattern and corroborate the observed regularities in terms of social
explanations survivor actors’ motives and
understanding
Start: Accumulate data or Identify a regularity Document and model Discover everyday
observations to be explained a regularity lay concepts,
meanings and motives
Goal: Produce Construct a theory Construct a hypothetical Produce a technical
generalisations and deduce model of a mechanism account from lay
hypotheses accounts
Finish: Use these laws as Test the hypotheses Find the real mechanism Develop a theory and
patterns to explain by matching them by observation and/or test it iteratively
further observations with data experiment
Table 4.3: The Logics of the Four Research Strategies Blaikie [31]
consequences were identified in our data which came primarily from observations made by
individuals involved with these programmes. We aimed to acquire qualitative data which
could assist us to observe the regularities in the programmes’ approaches to introduce or
revise an APIM. Retroductive reasoning differs from inductive logic in that it is used to work
back from observations towards explanations [32]. We also aimed to discover and explain
the underlying mechanisms that influence the programmes’ decisions on APIMs.
We aimed to build plausible theories on the efficacy of methodologies to select APIMs
based upon from our analysis of the data acquired, in line with our philosophical stance and
research strategy. We believe there can be no data or application context that will either
conclusively prove or disprove resulting theories on the efficacy of a methodology to select
the optimal APIM for a given application context.
4.1.8 Analytical Framework
We utilised Pawson and Tilley’s evaluation causal model [233], shown in Figure 4.2, as our
framework to analyse the data acquired from our research inquiry. Pawson and Tilley explain
[233] the logic of realistic evaluation research as:
“The task of inquiry is to explain interesting, puzzling, socially significant Regu-
larities (R). Explanation takes the form of positing some underlying Mechanism
(M), which generates regularity and thus consists of propositions about how the
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I An action f-.. is causalonly if ...
. . . its outcome is triggered by a mechanism acting in context
Figure 4.2: Pawson and Tilley’s Generative Causation Model [233]
interplay between structure and agency has constituted the regularity. Within
the realist investigation there is also investigation of how such mechanisms are
contingent and conditional, and thus only fired in particular local, historical or
institutional Contexts (C).”
We use the term underlying mechanism to mean the underlying ‘generative causation struc-
tures’ that work in generating patterns of behaviour, during programmes to select or revise
an APIM.
Our research task was to identify the nature of these underlying mechanisms which produce
APIM deployment outcomes, within the contextual conditions investigated. We also intro-
duced our systematic methodology as an intervention mechanism, to determine the impact
on observed regularities and effects in terms (if any) on these underlying mechanisms and
the eventual outcomes.
This analytical framework enabled us to identify surrounding circumstances when a system-
atic methodology is efficacious and also to explain the extent of that efficacy.
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4.1.9 Justification for the Case Study Research Methodology
The nature of our empirical inquiry led us to set two preconditions, related to the types of
cases and the data collection method, in order to reduce the candidate research methodologies
for our qualitative inquiry.
Firstly, we wanted to gather data on cases where decisions on an APIM had already taken
place. Therefore, we would not be able to record our observations of events as they happened
in an IS programme. We would rely on documentary evidence and interviews as our data
collection sources to analyse an IS programme retrospectively. Secondly, we were not
interested in using participant observation as a method of collecting data because we were
not interested in people’s behaviour or interactions in a social group.
Ethnographical research is suited to providing IS researchers with rich insights into the
human, social and organisational aspects of an IS through gaining a deep understanding
of what people do and say what they are doing, over an extended period of time [212].
We, therefore, discounted research approaches to study social life and cultural practices
of communities, such as ethnographical, phenomenological or narrative research, as the
focus of our inquiry concentrates on processes and organisational decision-making. Our
preconditions led us to consider case study, grounded theory and action research as candidate
research methodologies to conduct our empirical inquiry.
Lee argues [183] that case studies can be used as natural experiments, to demonstrate both
subjectivist and objectivist schools of thought and multiple tests of a theory. He suggests
that case studies can be performed through either natural experiments or other types of
experiments, to enhance degrees of freedom and, hence generalisation. We recognised that
we could use the case study methodology for inquiring into decisions on deployed APIMs
and also as a natural experiment in a case using our systematic methodology. Our selection
of the case study research methodology in order to conduct our empirical research was a
reasonably straightforward decision.
While our preference was to use one research methodology we borrowed techniques, such as
qualitative data coding method [259, 104, 253] from the grounded theory research method-
ology [47], to analyse our data. We also borrowed some of the research protocols that are
applied when conducting action research methodology for our case study involving the use
of our systematic methodology.
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The characteristics of the two other short-listed research methodology candidates are also
described in this sub-section for completeness.
4.1.9.1 Case Study Candidate
Case study research methodology involves the researcher exploring the depth of a programme,
event, activity, or one or more individuals, which are bounded by time and activity [71].
Yin advises [330] that case study research methodology is most relevant when:
• the research inquiry is posed in the form of how or why questions;
• the researcher has no control over actual behaviour or events; and
• the focus is on contemporary events rather than historical events.
We considered that our inquiry met all of Yin’s criteria [330] and that it involved several
organisations and their representatives to acquire data relating to the phenomenon. Myers
recommends [213] that for case study research in the business environment that empirical
evidence are acquired from one or more organisations. Multiple sources of evidence should
be explored, although most of the evidence, he acknowledges [213], comes from interviews
and documents.
We adopted the case study research methodology mainly because; as Maxwell argues [198],
the unique context of each case is retained and data are interpreted within that context
provides an account of a particular instance or event. Our inquiry was event driven in that
we sought cases where decisions on APIMs had already been made, in order to take a
retrospective view on the programmes’ processes and practitioners’ activities to ascertain the
outcomes of the APIM deployments. We also needed a case study where we could utilise
our systematic methodology in order to validate it using empirical data and to acquire data
relating to the extent of its methodological efficacy.
Case study research, therefore, not only enabled us to validate the systematic methodology but
most importantly to generate data on the efficacy of the approaches adopted, the underlying
mechanisms at play and their impact upon the deployment outcomes. We were also conscious
of the limitations of case study research to produce generalisations; however, our aim was to
produce plausible theories rather than irrefutable generalisations.
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Case study research concentrates on the quality of theoretical analysis and intensive investi-
gation of a few cases, i.e. analytical generalisation, rather than statistical generalisation of
many cases [305, 198]. Our in-depth inquiry into the phenomenon of interest was studied
using three cases in context. We adhered to Cunningham’s principles [73] by conducting
intensive inquiry which aimed to develop plausible theories from contextualised evidence
rather than trying to identify generalisations through excessive internal or external validation
sampling. We developed our theoretical case sampling strategy based upon our classification
of the APIM’s application context, as defined in Section 2.4.4.
We explain our reasons for discounting two other research methodologies.
4.1.9.2 Grounded Theory Candidate
Grounded theory is a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher derives a general, abstract
theory of a process, action or interaction grounded in the views of participants [71].
Grounded theory is particularly suitable for researching unfamiliar situations where there has
been little previous research on which to develop a theory [305]. Myers proposes [213] two
criteria by which grounded theory may be considered as an applicable approach, which relate
to the rigour and validity of the data analysis and also the extent to which the researcher may
produce a theory.
We considered grounded theory to be an inappropriate research methodology for our research
inquiry because the literature provides a foundation upon which we are able to address our
exploratory research questions. Nevertheless, we used the qualitative coding methods of
grounded theory in our data analysis to develop our theories on our research problem.
Also, our planned use of the systematic methodology in one real-world scenario meant that
while claims of plausibility could be argued, from one critical case study, we wanted to be
able to counter possible challenges of validity and reliability, due to insufficient sample size,
by using theoretical sampling from other case studies using alternatives approaches.
4.1.9.3 Action Research Candidate
Action Research combines theory and practice through cyclical diagnosis, action intervention
and change reflection in an immediate problematic situation, with practitioners, in a mutually
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acceptable framework [19]. Action research requires the researcher to immerse themselves
with the case subject matter being studied and liaising with the participants to analyse what
practitioners say what they will do and what is actually done and then analysing data acquired
using several reflective modes [200].
The dangers of using action research are often that researchers can become too embroiled
in the problem setting. The interactions with practitioners may become complex, with the
researcher possibly being viewed or utilised inappropriately as a consultant [265]. Conse-
quently, the research aims become blurred, with the result that the researcher often falls short
of meeting their research aims to develop knowledge and create theories [25, 213]. We also
identified the risk that our systematic methodology could be flawed or deficient to be used in
a real-world context and, therefore, it needed prior empirical validation.
4.1.10 Research Project Constraints
Empirical research into information security in organisations often encounter constraints
relating to the access to confidential documentary evidence, due to their commercial sen-
sitivity, and also to conduct interviews with practitioners, due to their limited availability.
Equally, a new systematic methodology is unlikely to be used by an organisation to make real
decisions, until such times that the efficacy of that methodology is validated or demonstrated
in practice.
For these reasons and with possibly other contextual constraints, the opportunities for
researchers to try out their theories or inventions in real-world contexts with organisations
are often few and far between. The use of a systematic methodology could affect the
organisation’s security controls, adversely impact resource costs and possibly damage
personal reputations. While a researcher may learn from errors by applying a theory or
methodology in real-world contexts, the benefits to organisations may not be so rewarding.
Such interventions may cause unintended deleterious consequences for both parties.
Organisations with intractable business problems and the absence of systematic methodolo-
gies to address their APIM selection problems, however, may be willing to explore the use
of an innovative methodology, even if it is to demonstrate transparency or due diligence in
their attempt to identify the optimal APIM for their intended business purpose.
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4.1.11 Our Research Implementation Plan
In view of the constraints identified above, we developed a research implementation plan
for conducting our inquiry into two contemporary case studies initially, where decisions on
APIMs had already been made, before finally using our systematic selection methodology in
a real-world situation. Our research implementation plan, with its four stages, is shown in
Figure 4.3. Stage A involved the identification of the factors for evaluating APIMs and the
creation of the criteria questions to acquire the relevant data from the application context.
This stage also involved the initial design of an evaluative framework and the steps in our
method to select the optimal APIM.
Stage B involved the acquisition of data from our first retrospective case study which was
used to validate our identified factors. These data were also used to identify the proficiencies
and deficiencies of the approach pursued by the IS programme.
Stage C involved the acquisition of data from our second retrospective case study which
was used to further validate our identified factors. These data were also used to identify the
proficiencies and deficiencies of the approach pursued by the IS programme.
These retrospective case studies involved the analysis of historical accounts of the events that
happened during a programme which lead to the selection of the APIM. The data acquired
enabled us to identify the explanatory reasons as to why a particular APIM was selected.
Stage D involved the inaugural use of our systematic methodology during a real-world
project to select the optimal APIM. The data gathered in this third case study enabled us to
validate the components, including our factors, of our systematic methodology. The data
acquired enabled us to identify the circumstances when a systematic methodology may be
efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM.
We developed a means to determine whether a candidate case study was appropriate for our
empirical research, as framed by our research questions. We justify our selection of our case
studies in Section 4.3.
4.1.12 Criteria for Selecting Appropriate Case Studies
Yin advises [330] that it is important to have sufficient access to potential data, whether to
interview people, review documents, or make observations in the field and select cases that
123
4.1 Selecting a Suitable Research Methodology
Figure 4.3: Our Research Implementation Plan
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will most likely illuminate the research questions.
We consider that access to data, particularly sensitive information relating to major decisions
and stakeholders’ risks, is fundamental to our empirical research inquiry. In line with our
research implementation plan we needed to select two retrospective case studies and also
to identify an organisation which would be prepared to use our systematic methodology to
select their APIM.
We examined the suitability of retrospective case studies, involving the selection of an APIM,
based upon the following criteria:
1. Documentary evidence of adequate depth and breadth on the IS programme was avail-
able in the public domain which had been generated by the IS programme’s stakeholder
sources and also review publications from the indigenous scientific community;
2. Individuals involved in the IS programme who were willing to explain their role,
describe their programme deliverables and provide their retrospective insights on the
outcomes of the programme during an interview; and
3. Individuals who were willing to share their experiences of using the deployed APIM
in an interview.
Different criteria were applied for selecting the case study involving an organisation’s use our
systematic methodology to select their APIM. McNiff and Whitehead recommend [200] that
conditions for research interventions in the real-world should be articulated and agreed, with
formal consent, by both parties at the outset. These conditions ensure the rationale of the
intervention is fully understood and, where possible, knowledge of the possible consequences
of the course of actions pursued is acknowledged in advance.
Our primary criterion was to obtain an organisation’s consent for our research intervention.
Secondly, we needed to ensure that we would be able to comply with the terms of that
consent for our research inquiry. We needed provisions in the agreement to ensure that we
could interview and correspond with programme team members and also be allowed access
to data relevant for our inquiry. We discuss the consent issues relating to our investigations
in Section 4.6.2.
Our theoretical case sampling strategy aimed to study one case from each of the three
governance frameworks types (enterprise, federated and heterogeneous) described in Section
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2.4.4. We believed that stakeholder trust relationships in the different type of governance
frameworks played a significant part in the selection of an APIM.
In order to illuminate our research questions, we identified three case studies which had the
potential to generate rich sets of data for our analysis. We justify the selection of our three
case studies in Section 4.3.
4.2 Utilising the Case Study Research Methodology
In this section we provide an overview of the risks and limitations associated with conducting
inquiries using the case study research methodology. We also outline our actions to ensure
validity and reliability of our qualitative research inquiry. Finally, we provide a justification
for the case studies chosen for our inquiry.
4.2.1 Risks of Case Study Research Methodology
Yin warns [330] that while contemporary behaviours and events can be advantageous to
generate natural empirical data there are risks and limitations in selecting case study, as a
research methodology.
There is a risk that potential interviewees may change their minds regarding their consent
to participate in research or documentary evidence may not be released by organisations
for inquiry [265]. We also identified the need to obtain commitment from an organisation
and their representatives to use our systematic methodology for selecting an APIM for their
application context. We also identified a significant risk that the organisation may curtail the
use of our systematic methodology if the period of study became protracted. We reduced
these research risks by assessing each candidate case study against three considerations:-
• The probability of gaining access to documentary evidence not only in terms of breadth
but depth of coverage, e.g. specifications or official tender notices.
• The probability of recruiting a sufficient number of practitioners who were prepared to
agree in principle to be interviewed.
• The probability of gaining organisation approval to use the systematic methodology
for a programme to introduce or revise an APIM from the project’s inception until its
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completion.
For the case study involving the real-world usage of our systematic selection methodology
we thought it necessary to search for a gatekeeper, as defined by Silverman [265], who had
experience of managing processes relating to decisions on an identification system or an
authentication system.
4.2.2 Assessing Case Study Research Quality
This sub-section describes the criteria by which we assessed the quality of the case study
research. Case study research may be performed using the positivist, the interpretive and
the critical realist approach. Each research paradigm adopts different approaches to assess
the quality of case study research; therefore, we limit our discussion on the reliability and
validity of our research design to the critical realist research paradigm.
Yin’s primary criterion [330] for judging the reliability of research designs for case studies
stipulates that the inquiry needs to demonstrate that the operations of the study, such as
data collection processes, can be repeated, with the same results. The goal of the reliability
criterion is to minimise errors and biases in a study [330]. Reliability may be enhanced by
researchers using tactics, such as documenting their procedures during data collection and
also developing a case study database in order to analyse acquired data.
Maxwell argues [198] that qualitative research from a critical realist approach should use the
following criteria upon which to assess its validity:
1. Descriptive Validity – absence of fabrication or distortion of personal accounts or
errors in interview transcriptions;
2. Interpretive Validity – comprehend the phenomenon not on the basis of the researcher’s
perspective but that of the participants within the context; and
3. Theoretical Validity – refers to an account’s function as a theory, comprising concepts
and their interrelationships, of some phenomenon.
Healy and Perry [127] offer similar criteria, shown in Table 4.4, to assess the applicability
and the quality of the case study research methodology for inquiries based upon the critical
realist paradigm. Based upon the above recommendations for judging the quality of our
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Criteria Description of Criteria Case Study Techniques
1. Ontology Research problem deals with complex Selection of research problem, for
Ontological social science phenomenon involving example, is a how and why problem.
Appropriateness reflective people.
2. Ontology Open fuzzy boundary systems involving Theoretical and literal replication, with
Contingent generative mechanisms rather than in-depth questions, emphasis on why
Validity direct cause-and-effect. issues, contextual description of
the cases.
1. Epistemology Neither value free nor value laden, Multiple interviews, supporting
Multiple perceptions rather value aware. evidence, broad questions before probes
of participants and and data triangulation. Self-description
of peer researchers and awareness of own values. Published
reports for peer reviews.
1. Methodological Extent to which research can be audited. Case study database, use in the report
Trustworthiness It is consistent and data are reliable. of relevant quotations and matrices that
can summarise data, and of descriptions
of procedures, e.g. case study selection
and interview procedures.
2. Methodological Analytic generalisation (that is, theory Identify research issues before data
Analytic building) before statistical collection, to formulate an interview
Generalisation generalisation (theory testing). protocol that will provide data.
3. Methodological How well the information about Use of prior theory, case study
Construct constructs in the theory being built database, and triangulation.
Validity are measured.
Table 4.4: Applicability of Case Study Inquiry within the Critical Realist Paradigm Healy
and Perry [127]
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research design, we introduced tactics, described in the following sub-sections, into our data
collection methods and data analysis techniques in order to ensure the reliability and validity
of our research.
4.2.2.1 Reliability Tactics
We documented our processes and protocols for the collection of our data from our three
case studies. The two retrospective case studies involved the recording of semi-structured
interviews where the interviewees were briefed in advanced in respect of the purpose of
the interviews and the intended research questions. We also documented our processes for
locating documentary evidence in the public domain.
We developed a DSS which was used as a database to store acquired data from each of our
three case studies.
4.2.2.2 Descriptive Validity Tactics
In order to ensure descriptive validity, we collected data from published material from
genuine sources and from information in official web sites. Interviewees also furnished us
with internal programme material, which was authorised for disclosure to us for our research
but not made public. As far as we could ascertain the documentary evidence which originated
from official sources was considered to be authentic.
We also conducted semi-structured interviews with participants involved in the programmes
to select an APIM. The questions were posed in such a way so that interviewees described
the events which occurred during the programme, recounted the programme’s outcomes and
explained their views on the approach pursued by the programme.
Questionnaires containing a briefing on our research were provided to most interviewees in
advance of the interview session. This tactic was intended to ensure that the interviewee
understood the question in the manner intended in relationship to their role in the programme.
All interview transcripts were returned to interviewees to obtain their agreement as to the
accuracy of our interview transcriptions. The data collection techniques and case study
protocols are described in detail later in this chapter.
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4.2.2.3 Interpretative Validity Tactics
For interpretative validity, the analytical codes relating to the factors for evaluating application
contexts were formulated from our review of the literature. These codes were validated by
searching for their existence in the data, i.e. ‘grounded’, acquired from our three case studies.
We identified further analytical codes in our case study data which were not contained in the
literature. Our data coding activities also enabled us to identify new factors for evaluating
APIMs.
We could not use the inter-appraiser reliability check, as recommended by Silverman [265],
to ensure validity of our interpretation of these codes, because we were unable to recruit
other willing researchers familiar with coding qualitative data.
As critical realism relies upon the participants’ views and not those of the researcher in-
terviewer’s comprehension to demonstrate interpretative validity, we needed to adopt an
approach to ensure that our bias was minimal. It was important that the interviewee was
aware that their opinion was paramount. Therefore, the interviewee was informed, during
the consent negotiation, about the purpose and the complete data gathering and transcript
validation processes prior to the interview. The interviewees were also informed that the
interview would be recorded and transcribed for their review.
We informed the interviewees that they could delete parts of the transcript, if it might possibly
reveal their identity or expose confidential information inadvertently. Importantly, to assist
interpretative validity, we advised the interviewees that they could amend the transcript to
reduce the ambiguities of their utterances during the recorded interview session. They were
also advised that they could add further information to the transcript to clarify points made
or if they subsequently remembered other pertinent details relating to their comments.
This strategy not only reduced the difficulties associated with interviewees’ recall capabilities
but also ensured the accuracy of their account and minimised the risk of our misunderstanding
their comments. Where relevant, we also reviewed the data from documentary sources to
further validate the data gathered from interviewees.
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4.2.2.4 Theoretical Generalisation Tactics
Yin argues [330] that case study designs should aim towards analytical generalisation, to align
with the theoretical propositions, rather than statistical generalisation involving sampling
units where inference is made about a population or universe. In turn, theoretically defined
purposive sampling demands that researchers think critically about the parameters of the
candidate case study against the research questions, the theoretical propositions and the
explanations which are under development [265].
We selected theoretically driven case studies rather than inquiring into random or repre-
sentative samples. Our supposition was that methodological efficacy is influenced by the
type of APIM governance framework and the nature of the trust relationships between the
stakeholders. Our aim, therefore, was to study at least one case in each of the three APIM
governance framework types, e.g. enterprise, federated and heterogeneous, as defined in
Section 2.4.4. This strategy of pursuing theoretically driven sampling enabled us to conduct
in context analyses and also cross-case analyses in order for us to build our theories.
4.2.2.5 Improving Construct Validity
Construct validity refers to how well information about the constructs in a theory are assessed
in the research [127].
Yin argues [330] that potential problems with construct validity can be minimised by using
multiple sources of evidence to provide multiple measures, e.g. data triangulation of the
same phenomenon. Silverman warns [265], however, that even using a single analytical
model can be tricky in arriving at an overall ‘truth’.
While we used multiple data sources and validation procedures our strategy was to ensure
that we had a variety of views to compare and contrast as to how each individual experienced
the processes in selecting an APIM. Therefore, we were not trying to improve the accuracy
of data collected in order to construct one correct picture of reality.
Maxwell argues [198] that declarations of contributions to knowledge, based on empirical
research context related evidence, depend on:
1. how the fact was obtained;
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2. its plausibility for alternative claims; and
3. that there must be an explanatory connection between the fact and the claim.
We aimed to not only interpret the documentary evidences’ content in literal terms but also
discover the meanings and intentions of the data evidence gathered. Where possible we used
multiple sources of data to construct various views of the phenomenon under investigation
in order to discover alternative interpretations of the data acquired. This strategy in turn
helped us to construct our understandings of the underlying mechanisms that influenced
stakeholders’ decisions. From the case study data sets we developed explanations on the
efficacy of approaches practiced together with that from using a systematic methodology in
order for us to build plausible theories.
In line with Yin’s recommendations [330], the key informant in the third case study, in which
we employed our systematic methodology, reviewed a draft of our case study report in order
to improve research construct validity.
Gallier’s conclusion [116] on attitudes towards contributions to knowledge is succinctly
expressed as follows:
“We are thus led to the conclusion that the proper attitude for the creation of
knowledge is neither of dogmatism of apprehension or comprehension nor of
utter scepticism, but an attitude of partial scepticism in which the knowledge is
held provisionally to be tested against apprehensions, and vice versa.”
Our modest expectations were to build initial plausible theories on the efficacy of systematic
methodologies based upon our tentative suppositions.
4.3 Justification for the Case Studies Selected
Our case study selection criteria, defined in Section 4.1.12, and our research quality criteria,
specified in Section 4.2.2, meant that we were required to review many IS programmes
involving APIMs when selecting our case studies. These IS programmes ranged from
national identification schemes to university campus cards for students.
Our search principally involved networking amongst colleagues in the security industry in
order to approach organisations to seek their interest in participating in our research. As
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expected, there were a number of programmes where our attempt to get formal approval from
the appropriate organisational authorities to undertake a case study was not forthcoming.
Equally, serendipity played an important part in our final selection; however, this fact should
not be interpreted as meaning that these cases were ‘inferior’.
The next sub-sections provide our justification for the three selected case studies. We refrain
from explicitly identifying our case studies and the participants in order to protect the
identity of the individuals and the organisations that contributed to our research. Ethical
considerations relating to our research are discussed later in Section 4.6.
4.3.1 Case Study of an EU State’s Electronic Identity Card Programme
We selected this case study because there were significant documentary evidence in the
public domain relating to the issues surrounding this EU state’s Electronic Identity (eID)
card programme. These documents were mainly published by the state, through its Ministry
of the Interior and regional governments, and by the indigenous academic community.
We also justify the selection of this case study because we were able to obtain consent to
interview two prominent members of the programme team who were involved with the
major decisions in the critical phases of the programme. Although we initially believed
that it would relatively easy to locate and interview citizens who had gained experience of
using their eID card for transactions, this assumption was erroneous. We later discovered,
as we explain in Chapter 6 on the efficacy of the programmes’s approach, that the on-line
functionality of the eID card was under-utilised by citizens.
The programme was being publicly hailed by the state’s representatives, particularly at the
Security Document World and Biometrics Conference conventions during 2009 and 2010,
as a successful deployment of a state eID card for its citizens. Presentations given by these
representatives, responsible for managing the eID Card Programme, explained the business
and technical issues that had been encountered and described how these problems were
overcome by the programme.
We designated this case study as a federated governance framework type in that the state’s
Ministry of the Interior (MOI) was the sole issuing authority of the eID card, with many other
organisations relying on the authentication capabilities of the eID card and its associated
processes.
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Our initial efforts using empirical data to validate our identified factors for evaluating APIMs
and also our findings relating to the efficacy of the EU state’s eID Card Programme’s
approach are described in Chapter 6.
4.3.2 Case Study of an EU State’s eGates Border Control Programme
This second case study was selected because we were able interview several individuals who
were involved in the eGates programme (either directly or indirectly, as an employee of a
supplier of eGates). We were also able to interview passengers who used the eGates on a
regular basis other types of automated border control facilities in other states. Additionally,
there were several specifications relating to electronic passports and automated border control
systems in the public domain.
From our preliminary investigations we located pertinent documentary evidence from the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) relating to improving passenger facilitation
and the use of Electronic Passports (ePassports) at border control crossings. We also found
case study documentation on the use of ePassports in other EU states, which was published
by the EU border control coordination agency Frontex. This state’s border control agency
also maintained a website containing general advice on the availability of the eGates to the
travelling public.
We designated this case study as a heterogeneous governance framework type in that many
EU member states issued ePassports to their citizens and equally there were many potential
border control authority relying parties in the EU. There were immigration control authorities
in other EU member states involved in automatically inspecting passengers’ ePassports
using eGates’ systems. These authorities relied on the electronic authentication of these EU
ePassports as part of their manual passenger inspection procedures.
Our efforts to further validate our factors for evaluating APIMs and also our findings relating
to the efficacy of the eGates Programme’s approach are described in Chapter 7.
4.3.3 Case Study of Corporation X’s Two Factor Authentication Project
We considered this project to be a suitable case study candidate primarily because we gained
formal consent from Corporation X’s Director of Risks (DoR) in Asia to use our ASMSA
Methodology for his project. Additionally, his commitment to collaborate in our research
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and his interests in InfoSec methods were the key reasons for us to select this case to study.
The 2FA Project was established to review Two Factor Authentication (2FA) solutions for
verifying employees and agents of Corporation X.
The consent agreement contained clauses regarding the protection of Corporation X’s com-
mercially sensitive and confidential information. There was very little documentary data in
the public domain; however, the DoR was enthusiastic to employ our systematic methodology
because he claimed “there was no in house IdM expertise”. He confirmed that he was willing
to commit his time and effort to interviews, reviews and exchange correspondence with us
over the anticipated project period.
The terms of the consent agreement also described the case study protocol which restricted
all communication to be channelled through a single point of contact between Corporation
X’s DoR and us. This communication restriction was considered necessary by Corporation
X because the DoR wanted to ensure that all information was aggregated and approved in
Corporation X before it was released to us. We considered, however, that the data released to
us represented the organisation’s consolidated views. The release of data from alternatives
sources, particularly from other departments in Corporation X, would have enabled us
to identify differences between the internal stakeholders perspective for an APIM. The
terms of our consent agreement, however, meant that we were not afforded that opportunity.
Notwithstanding this constraint, we considered that Corporation X’s APIM project gave us a
valuable opportunity to use our systematic methodology for a real-world problem.
The data acquired was mainly gathered through structured and semi-structured interviews and
exchanges of emails, which also included corrections of documents produced by our ASMSA
Decision Support System (ASMSA-DSS). Several semi-structured interviews were also
employed to ascertain the DoR’s reflective views from using our systematic methodology,
particularly its efficacy in addressing the corporation’s business problem.
We designated this case study as an enterprise governance framework type as Corporation X
was the sole issuing authority and the only relying party.
This case study was used to further validate and refine the factors previously validated using
the two retrospective case studies. This case study also generated data which enabled us to
assess the efficacy of our systematic methodology from its use to select the optimal APIM in
a real-world application context.
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Our efforts to validate our systematic methodology and its components and also our findings
relating to the efficacy of our methodology are described in Chapter 8.
4.4 Data Collection
This section describes the data collection strategy adopted for our inquiry and the rationale
behind the strategy to meet the requirements of our two units of analysis to validate our
systematic methodology and, most importantly to assess its efficacy. We also describe the
data collection techniques used in our inquiry.
4.4.1 Data Collection Strategy
Our data collection strategy was formulated to acquire pertinent information from the
literature and then use the data from each case study research iteratively as described in our
research implementation plan.
Our examination of the literature assisted our efforts to:
1. identify the factors relating to the evaluation of an application context and candidate
APIMs;
2. establish an initial systematic methodology comprising factors, with associated criteria
questions, in an evaluation framework and a selection method; and
3. establish a set of criteria for assessing the efficacy of a methodology to select an APIM.
Our strategy was designed to commence with an examination of pertinent literature in order
to acquire data to assist our efforts and understanding to answer our first three research
questions. From our examination of the literature, we formulated an initial list of factors
for evaluating APIMs [226] and we also created the inaugural version of our systematic
methodology [227]. Our strategy was then to use the data from each case study iteratively
for our two units of analysis.
We commenced with the EU state eID Card Programme Case Study, then continued with
the EU state’s eGates Programme Case Study and finally used the systematic methodology
in the Corporation X’s 2FA Project Case Study. The strategy was designed to validate our
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factors in each retrospective case study and to then aggregate the learnings, iteratively, into
the systematic methodology and our DSS. Our systematic methodology and its associated
DSS were also refined following our analysis of its use in the Corporation X 2FA Project
Case Study.
Empirical data from the case studies were used to validate and refine the factors to answer our
first research question. These empirical data were also used to further the development of the
systematic methodology so that we could answer our second research question. Data from
the literature review and the retrospective case studies were used to establish the criteria to
assess the efficacy of a methodology to select an APIM in order to answer our third research
question.
Data from the Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study were used primarily to answer our
fourth research question by assessing the efficacy of our systematic methodology to select an
APIM. Our empirical data corpus was also analysed to identify patterns in application con-
texts so as to identify the circumstances as to when a systematic methodology is efficacious
for selecting an APIM together with supporting reasons. Our data corpus also enabled us to
identify those circumstances when a systematic methodology is not efficacious for selecting
the optimal APIM.
4.4.2 Justification for Our Data Collection Strategy
We justify our data collection strategy on our anticipation that cumulating learnings from
each case study iteratively would maximise the value of our research effort.
We also justify our data collection strategy because we considered that our systematic method-
ology needed to be validated, using the two retrospective case studies, in preparation for its
use with a real-world case study. Our strategy was to validate the systematic methodology as
far as possible with data from each retrospective case study before it would be used with a
real-world evaluation.
The validation tasks mainly included verifying relevancy of the factors for evaluating APIMs,
the criteria questions for acquiring data relating to factors and our methodology’s selection
method. This strategy was designed to minimise both the risks to the organisation arising
from the systematic methodology being insufficiently robust for the intended evaluation and
selection purposes. We also wanted to minimise the risk that an immature methodological
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tool may have also jeopardised our research inquiry and our personal reputation.
4.4.3 Examination of the Literature
We examined the literature specifically covering issues surrounding identification and authen-
tication deployments and also biometric deployments, from both theoretical and empirical
sources, to identify an initial set of factors for evaluating APIMs.
In order to establish an initial systematic methodology we reviewed the general literature
on evaluation frameworks, methodologies and methods. We also reviewed literature on
decision-making, particularly, where there are multiple stakeholders’ objectives and multiple
criteria are to be used in the evaluation of candidate solution options. The guidance contained
in the literature enabled us to establish criteria to assess the efficacy of decision-making
strategies for APIMs.
We also examined the literature to gain a broad understanding on the IS development method-
ology issues, which we assumed would also be encountered in APIM programmes, e.g. agile
methodology versus waterfall approach. We also reviewed literature on the management of
stakeholder consultation processes, particularly Hemmati’s Multiple Stakeholder Processes
(MSPs) [128], designed to address conflicting stakeholders’ objectives, as may be the case
with APIMs.
4.4.4 Documentary Data
Documentary data, which included archival records, for the two retrospective case studies
were gathered from multiple sources, including official government or quasi government
agencies, academic sources, national and specialist industry press, and business related social
networks to get a wide range of views.
There was much documentary evidence in the public domain relating to our two retrospective
case studies. The types of documents included technical specifications, official public
announcements, deployment progress reports, decrees and other legislation.
The strengths of using documentary evidence are that the data are stable allowing repeat
analysis; unobtrusive in that data are not normally created for the case study; exact with
intended references and the detail of coverage [330, 265]. We were aware, however, that our
138
4.4 Data Collection
inability to access confidential documents could potentially hinder our attempts to gain an
understanding of any underlying mechanisms potentially influencing stakeholders’ selection
of an APIM. We were also conscious that some documentary evidence may be written with a
bias for a particular purpose in order to manipulate audience perception.
4.4.5 Interviews
We briefly describe the types of interview, the number of interviews and how the interviewees
were recruited.
We conducted three semi-structured interviews in our eID Card Programme Case Study.
Two of our interviewees were introduced to us through mutual professional colleagues and
the other interviewee was introduced through contacts in the academic community. We
conducted eight semi-structured interviews in our eGates Programme Case Study. One of
the interviewees who was working in the programme was known to us professionally and
he introduced us to five other colleagues involved with that programme. The other two
interviewees were our friends who had used the eGates recently as passengers.
We used semi-structured and structured interviews with the DoR in the Corporation X 2FA
Project Case Study. The DoR was a professional colleague and friend, over several years,
who asked us to assist him with his real-world business problem.
The strengths of undertaking interviews is that the research can focus directly on the research
questions, through the case study, in order to gain insight and explanations from different
perspectives [330]. The risks to gathering data through interviews include bias due to poorly
articulated questions including leading questions, response bias, inaccuracies due to poor
recall and reflectivity, with the interviewee attempting to provide answers that the interviewer
wants to hear [330].
Our in-depth semi-structured interviews with practitioners normally lasted for a maximum
period of one hour. Our interview questions were open-ended and we tried to follow the line
of inquiry in a natural way by posing questions in a non-threatening manner. Our questions
were posed carefully, as part of the case study protocol to avoid posing leading questions,
in an attempt to allow the interviewee to provide their own respective narrative from their
perspective of events and to give their personal opinion. Our questions were furnished to
the interviewees in advance. During the interview, however, we had to slightly amend some
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of the questions actually posed to correspond to the interviewee’s role, previous answers
supplied, and the dynamic nature of the dialogue.
The interviews on the Corporation X Case Study required a different approach. Questions
from the established systematic methodology were used in a methodical, structured manner
to acquire information about the application context from the interviewee. In contrast,
semi-structured interviews were used to acquire the interviewee’s opinion on the systematic
methodology’s efficacy and to elicit other thoughts on its processes in an open manner. We
supplied the interviewee with an agenda that showed the types of questions and issues that
would be discussed in the scheduled interview. Our initial interviews with the DoR were
mainly conducted face-to-face. The Skype teleconference facility was used on all other
occasions as the DoR was based in Malaysia.
We were conscious that the interviewees’ responses in all three cases may be a reflection
of their respective organisations’ official policy or approved communication on matters
relating to the case study rather than an expression of personal reflection or opinion. We
assumed that our analysis of the transcripts would help to identify such biases. The removal
of certain recorded utterances from the transcripts, by the interviewee, also suggested that
the interviewee may have expressed their insights too frankly. As recommended by Coffey
and Atkinson [60], we inspected the literal meaning of the interviewee’s verbal utterances
and also evaluated the function of that communication, as a chronicle of events, influences,
decisions and their justifications.
The data contained in the interview transcripts formed the majority of our evidence for our
data analysis.
4.4.6 Our Memos and Reflective Notes
In line with Richard’s recommendations [253] we created memos based on our observations
during the interview dialogue. We also wrote reflective notes to record our insights following
the analysis of our acquired data. The memos acted as spontaneous informal records of
thought as these ideas occurred. Conversely, reflective notes were created after careful
deliberation of an issue or factual claim during our analysis.
Memos written during data collection activities serve as a significant source of information,
as part of the data making process, in which the researcher records accounts of changes and
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discoveries [253]. We used memos to record how we acquired our data, indicating possible
influences that may have skewed the data, which should be taken into account when the data
are being analysed. We also created memos about documents, particularly those documents
that were not in the public domain. We also created reflective notes relating to contradictions
between interviewee’s accounts and documentary evidence.
These data provided us with the means to record identified disparities in evidence gathered
in order to make independent judgments about the reliability of data gathered. These data
also helped us to recognise power relationships amongst stakeholders in our case studies.
Next we discuss how the data collected were handled to facilitate analysis and to protect the
integrity of the data acquired.
4.4.7 Special Treatment of Data Before Analysis
Several documents in the EU state’s eID Card Programme Case Study were translated into
English language using the Google translation facility. Where relevant, clarification on some
phrases in the text was sought from fluent French speakers.
We used the AVS Audio Recorder Software version 3.9, running on our laptop computer with
its integral microphone, to record all interviews in a variety of locations and environments.
These recordings were saved into the MPEG-2 Audio Layer III (MP3) standard audio format,
which we considered to be an adequate audio recording quality for our research purposes.
We also used the F4 Audio Transcription application software, freeware licensed by Dr.
Dresing and Pehl GmBH 1 to assist in the production of the textual transcripts in Rich Text
Formatted (RTF) files from audio recorded interviews in MP3 format. These transcription
files were imported and saved in Microsoft Office Word 2007 file format.
The translations together with other documentary evidence, including the interview tran-
scripts, were converted into the Portable Document Format (PDF) in order to protect the
integrity of the data collected.
1http://www.audiotranskription.de
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4.5 Data Analysis
In this section we describe our two units of analysis and the methods used to analyse
our acquired data. We also describe the software tools that we employed to conduct our
qualitative data analysis.
4.5.1 Units of Analysis
Patton defines [232] a unit of analysis as the main object being studied, which in social
science includes processes, individuals and organisations (groups of individuals).
Our main unit of analysis was to determine the extent to which a systematic methodology
is efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM for a given application context. The focus of
our analysis is explanatory in that the analysis aimed to recognise patterns in our empirical
data which identified the circumstances as to when, together with supporting reasons, a
systematic methodology to select or revise an APIM is efficacious, and when it is not, for
selecting the optimal APIM for an application context. We also reviewed the literature on
information system development methodologies and decision-making strategies in order to
not only establish criteria to assess efficacy of our systematic methodology in order to answer
our third research question, but also to provide an analytical framework to answer our fourth
and main research question.
This analysis necessitated the recognition of patterns in our data not only within each case
study but also across our three data sets. The use of cross-case data analysis is not only
useful for reassurance that events and processes are not idiosyncratic but also to assists to
understand how they can be qualified by contextual conditions [203]. We used cross-case
data analysis to identify common contextual conditions surrounding each case in order to
identify when a systematic methodology is efficacious together with the contributory reasons.
We developed our theories based upon the exemplary reasons identified.
Our secondary unit of analysis was to establish and validate a systematic methodology
designed to determine the optimal APIM for a given application context. This unit of analysis
addressed our first two research questions. Our research commenced by identifying and
validating factors which should be evaluated in order to select the optimal APIM for a
given application context. The validated factors formed the basis of our inquiry to address
our second research question to establish how information pertaining to an application
142
4.5 Data Analysis
context could be acquired and evaluated, using a systematic methodology, for the purpose
of selecting the optimal APIM. This research question led us to review the literature on
evaluation frameworks for our identified factors and also decision-making processes in
methods in order to develop our systematic methodology.
4.5.2 Methods of Analysis
This sub-section describes our qualitative methods to analyse the case study data collected
for our two main units of analysis.
Miles and Huberman argue [203] that qualitative data analysis comes down to three concur-
rent flows of activities consisting of:
1. data reduction;
2. data display; and
3. conclusion drawing and verification.
For our main unit of analysis in order to analyse our data we employed the qualitative data
coding method, as defined by Richards [253] and Saldan˜a [259], which form the basis for
grounded theory research [47]. The goal of qualitative data coding is to learn from the data
collected, return repeatedly to extracts, until there is an identification of patterns, which can
aid understanding and build explanations [253].
Friese describes [104] qualitative data coding in terms of descriptive level analysis and
conceptual level analysis, the latter acting as input information into developing theories.
Saldan˜a encourages [259] the commingling of the different types of coding, using a code
weaving technique, to form analytical models relative to the research inquiry. Charmaz
argues [47] that theoretical coding should follow descriptive and conceptual focused coding,
which not only conceptualises the codes established but also moves the analytical story in
a theoretical direction. She recommends [47] the use of memos, which we have labelled
reflective notes to differentiate with data collection activities, to analyse data and record
ideas to help develop concepts and theories.
We produced descriptive codes and process codes in our first analytical cycle in order to
reduce our data. We then identified and labelled our conceptual codes in our second analytical
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cycle. We used theoretical coding in our final analytical cycle to identify patterns in our
conceptual codes in order to develop our theories.
4.5.2.1 Data Reduction
We commenced by coding the data for each case into descriptive and process codes in order
to produce causal network diagrams. The causal network diagrams represented the dynamic
nature of the programmes.
Our analysis involved producing a list of descriptive codes from analysing our data, as
recommended by Friese [104], and then grounding our factors by comparing to the de-
scriptive codes produced. We were not interested in establishing the frequency that these
descriptive codes were mentioned in our data, as in content analysis. These analytical
processes required a degree of interpretation because of the use of different terminology and
meanings in our data corpus.
4.5.2.2 Data Modelling
We followed Saldan˜a’s recommendations [259] by grouping our descriptive codes into
categorises of conceptual codes. The analytical framework represented these conceptual
codes as antecedent variables, intervening variables and outcomes variables. We decomposed
Pawson and Tilley’s causal model [233] and developed an analytical framework to represent
these conceptual codes and the dynamics of a programme to select an APIM.
Miles and Huberman contend [203] that a causal network is a powerful instrument to display
the most important independent and dependent variables, with the plot of the relationships
being directional, rather than solely correlational, between these variables. As our analytical
framework, we created a casual network diagram for each case study to represent the
conditions surrounding a programme at its inception, the events that occurred and strategies
pursued during the programme, the deployment outcomes from the programme’s approach,
and retrospective methodological insights from interviewees.
These representations assisted us to identify the underlying mechanisms which were mainly
responsible for a programme’s selection of a particular APIM.
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4.5.2.3 Drawing and Verifying Conclusions
Charmaz contends [47] that coding is the pivotal link between collecting the data and
developing an emergent theory to explain the acquired data. Myers defines [213] theoretical
coding as the formulation of a theory, which is achieved by specifying explicit causal or
correlational links between individual interpretative constructs.
The conceptual codes assisted us in identifying patterns within context and across context.
The causal network diagrams also aided visibility of our data. From these patterns, we were
able to identify explanations as to why certain circumstances and events in the programme
produced certain output deployment patterns. We used our interviewees’ retrospective in-
sights as a means to verify the identified concepts and their linkages, which were represented
in the causal network diagram produced for each case.
We used cross-case analysis on our three data sets using our causal network diagrams from
each case study to identify patterns and links in our data. This cross-case analysis also
included the use of our proposed efficacy criteria to compare and contrast the proficiencies
and deficiencies of a systematic methodology with other approaches. We also used our
reflective notes containing themes describing the patterns that we had identified during our
coding of our data sets.
We then compared these patterns and explanations against the criteria developed to assess
the efficacy of methodology to select an APIM. The exemplars recognised in the data helped
formulate our initial theories on methodologies, their efficacy and the prevailing contextual
conditions at the time of the programme’s inception. Our conclusions and development of
theories were established using theoretical coding in order to develop plausible explanations
based upon the patterns recognised in our data.
For our secondary unit of analysis we needed a different approach in order to verify our
systematic methodology using our acquired empirical data. We divided the textual data
acquired which influenced the decisions on the deployment of the respective APIM into
descriptive codes. We then validated our factors, identified originally from our review of the
literature, by searching for their existence in the descriptive codes which we produced from
analysing our case study data. We also used these descriptive code to identify new factors, to
identify redundant factors and to validate our classification of that factor in its evaluation
theme. These descriptive codes also assisted us in our efforts to validate the factors in terms
of their descriptive label, their relevancy, their consistency and their completeness. We then
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used our descriptive codes to identify common factor themes which we then compared to our
existing evaluation themes.
We used the data from our third case study not only to validate our factors in the systematic
methodology’s evaluation framework but also to validate the systematic methodology itself.
The data produced from its usage acted as input into our main unit of analysis.
4.5.3 Qualitative Research Tools Utilised
The nature of our inquiry required the following specialist application tools to store, to
manipulate and categorise data and to generate various reports and diagrams:
1. Atlas.ti Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis System (CAQDAS) application
software version 6.2;
2. Our systematic methodology’s Decision Support System prototype (ASMSA-DSS);
CAQDAS tools assist [274] qualitative researchers in the complexities of managing large data
sets of mixed data types. These data support tools are designed specifically for researchers
to assist them with the discovery and management of unrecognised ideas and concepts;
the construction and exploration of explanatory links between the data and emergent ideas;
and to create the fabric of argument and understanding [254]. Friese clarifies [104] that a
CAQDAS tool does not, however, perform the analysis itself!
Following our consideration of the features of the main CAQDAS tools available, we selected
the Atlas.ti tool to support our analytical coding tasks. We selected Atlas.ti tool drawing on
Lewins and Silver’s guidance [184] and also Lewis’ assessment [185] of NVivo version 2.0
and Atlas.ti version 5.0. The conceptual underpinning of the Atlas.ti application is based
upon the ‘paper and pencil paradigm’ and its intuitive design and many of its processes are
based upon this analogy [104]. Atlas.ti’s search facility and network diagram functionalities
were the key deciding factors. This software tool was used primarily to address our main
unit of analysis and to construct our causal network diagrams.
Our ASMSA-DSS was implemented as a representation of our systematic methodology. The
system was developed using Microsoft Office Access 2007 version which contained a series
of databases. Each table represented a conceptual theme and the fields within that table
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represented the factors for evaluating APIMs. The interactive processes representing the
steps in our systematic methodology’s selection method are described briefly in Section 5.7.
Our DSS proved a useful instrument in validating our systematic methodology and also for
analysing the large volume of data acquired from our three case studies.
4.6 Research Ethical Considerations
This section discusses our adherence to the research recommendations contained in the Royal
Holloway, University of London’s guidelines [229], which covers the ethical considerations
and our responsibilities to the subjects involved in our research inquiry.
4.6.1 Protecting Subjects’ Identity
We formulated a strategy to manage the ethical issues consistently for all our interactions with
interviewee subjects and their organisations across all case studies. This strategy included
the basis and terms of gaining informed consent from our interviewees, the acquisition of
data, the use data of collected, and the subsequent disclosure of information.
Our strategy here was influenced by Royal Holloway’s Open Access Publications Policy
(OAPP) for research, which includes the publication of doctoral theses. We needed to
establish a strategy that adhered to the Royal Holloway’s policies yet protected the identity
of the subjects involved in our inquiry.
Protection of the interviewees and their organisations’ identity formed the basis of the consent
obtained enabling us to engage with subjects in our three case studies. Therefore, in line with
the consents established with the interviewees, we undertook to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of all interview data gathered, all documentation furnished to us, and any
reports produced from our inquiry, i.e. this thesis. Therefore, we anonymise the names of our
interviewees and their organisations together with the case studies themselves in this thesis.
4.6.2 Informed Consent
Most subjects involved with the case studies were and remain our professional colleagues, or
were introduced to us through a professional contact.
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Informed consents were gained through email dialogue where we furnished the interviewee
with the following information (where appropriate):
• a background to our research, the nature of assistance required and its purpose;
• an outline of how the interview would be conducted and the procedure for the intervie-
wee to change the transcript for their final approval;
• a commitment to protect the identity of the interviewees and their organisations;
• an understanding that the interviewee would obtain authorisation for participating in
the interview and to release documentary material that was not in the public domain;
• an expectation that we might need to communicate directly with the organisation to
sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement;
• an expectation that permission to interview a subject may only be granted on the basis
that any published transcript would need to be vetted, our agreement to anonymise the
subjects’ identities and to protect organisations’ interests;
• a request that documentary evidence not in the public domain may be made available
to us only in order to reduce the demands upon the interviewee’s time; and
• a commitment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the transcript data or other
materials released by the interviewee.
There were several occasions in the two retrospective case studies where the interviewee did
not seek their organisation’s consent, in spite of our repeated requests. Despite the absence
of consent the interviewees were content to be interviewed on the understanding that we
protected their identity and that of their organisation. The interviewees were made explicitly
aware that the data was to be used for our research purposes only. We also reaffirmed
our commitment to protect their identity and the confidentiality of data gathered. This
commitment formed the basis of mutual trust with our interviewees.
Our interviewees were furnished with an explanation of our inquiry, the motivation behind
our research and our proposed interview questions in email correspondence several days in
advance of the interview. We signed a NDA with the DoR of Corporation X after several
amendments to their standard NDA’s draft text. We were conscious that a balance needed to
be struck between providing sufficient information to enable interviewees to understand the
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purpose of the interview and influencing the interviewees to utter comments that supported
our suppositions. We believe that interviewees were honest and were sufficiently comfortable
to express themselves openly during our interview sessions. Our interview transcripts were
compared to documentary data acquired and also examined against data acquired from other
interview transcripts in order for us to corroborate each interview’s account.
No financial rewards or inducements were offered to interviewees; however, several intervie-
wees demonstrated their interest in the prototype DSS as a means of improving their own
organisational information security review processes.
4.7 Summary of Chapter
In this chapter, we have described and justified our research methodology to address our
research aims.
We have described the characteristics of the research problem and the research questions.
We have also described the uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon of our inquiry. We
have explained our leaning towards the critical realist research paradigm to conduct our
inquiry. We have justified our selection of the case study research methodology. We have
also described and justified our research strategy and outlined our research implementation
plan.
We have set out criteria upon which we assessed and protected the quality of our research
and the basis of our contributions to the body of knowledge which align with the realist
evaluation paradigm. Descriptions of the data collection strategy and the case studies selected
together with their justification have also been provided, together with a description of our
procedures for gathering information. We have described our main and secondary units of
analysis and the methods used to conduct our qualitative data analysis.
We have also provided a discussion on our endeavours to conduct our research and to report
our findings ethically, not only to comply with the university’s policies, but also to maintain
our personal integrity amongst fellow researchers, colleagues and practitioners.
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This chapter opens with our analysis of the problems to select the optimal APIM for a given
application context. These problems motivated us to develop a systematic methodology to
assist the decision-making processes. We describe our method to identify factors in order to
evaluate APIMs and also provide the results of our efforts. We then describe how we used
these identified factors as our basis upon which to develop our systematic methodology. We
continue by providing an overview of the ASMSA Methodology, definitions of its terminology
and a description of its concepts. We then describe the ASMSA Methodology’s three compo-
nents comprising ASMSA Evaluation Framework, factors in their evaluation themes, and the
ASMSA Selection Method. We conclude by briefly describing the ASMSA Decision Support
System which was developed to aid our empirical research.
5.1 Exploring Methodologies to Select APIMs
From our review of methodologies in the literature many contributions suggest [230, 38, 63,
27] that there is a need to explore alternative approaches for selecting APIMs. We consider
that empirical inquiry is also needed to gain an understanding of current approaches and
their efficacy to select the optimal APIM. Current approaches appear to rely on the skills
and competencies of discipline experts rather than well-defined processes of a methodology.
Exploration into approaches which contain well-defined processes, however, may help to
inform current practices.
Our supposition is that a systematic methodology, providing structure and repeatable pro-
cesses, may be more efficacious, in some circumstances, to select an APIM than other
approaches. Systematic processes have the potential to help reduce inconsistencies due to
variations in discipline experts’ interpretations.
We believe that employing a systematic methodology with a selection method and a compre-
hensive range of criteria questions, in an evaluation framework, ensures that required data
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are acquired from the application context and that data are evaluated methodically so that the
optimal APIM can be identified. A systematic methodology may improve the consistency of
evaluations and the accuracy of current practices to select the optimal APIM.
We consider the characteristics of the problems to evaluate and select an APIM for a given
application context before we focus on our method to develop the ASMSA Methodology.
5.1.1 APIM Selection Problem Characteristics
Smithson and Hirschheim state [272] that Information System (IS) assessments are complex
and demanding. We believe that the selection and configuration of APIMs are equally
problematical because stakeholders’ objectives are often driven by conflicting interests,
incentives or motivations and the diversity of factors relating to an application context which
require evaluation.
IS development programmes may not always be able to determine an agreed set of require-
ments for an APIM due to stakeholders’ conflicting objectives. Additionally, we consider
that the evaluation of an APIM is also complex, as highlighted by Farbey et al. [97] for
evaluating information systems generally, because of the difficulties in measuring intangible
benefits within Return On Investment (ROI) decisions.
Keeney et al. conclude [173] that decisions on information systems necessitate a single
decision point which should attempt to accommodate conflicting objectives by establishing
stakeholders’ preferences. Some APIM programmes, such as the ID Card Programme in the
United Arab Emirates [4], set up communication processes and structures in order to resolve
conflict and disputes within a generic IS programme methodology. Royer concludes [257]
that the complexities of decisions to select enterprise IdM systems necessitates the use of
decision support tools.
An APIM may be considered as part of a security architecture to control risks associated with
accessing organisation assets and resources. Organisational management of risks, in turn,
attracts political, organisational and social issues [118]. Rannenberg proposes [245] that
the use of evaluation criteria assists organisations to evaluate whether information systems
fulfil a range of requirements, not only in terms of functionality, but also their security and
usability effectiveness. These evaluation complexities may also be exacerbated because IS
programmes are often forced to make many assumptions in respect of the application context,
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the purpose for the APIM and the capabilities of various APIMs. We believe that decisions
based on a diverse range of stakeholders’ objectives and evaluation criteria may reduce some
of these evaluation complexities, particularly where the data are imprecise due to incomplete,
conflicting or non-accessible information.
Fuzzy decision-making methods for multiple objective decision-making are categorised
by Lai and Hwang [179] according to the availability of preference information to the
decision-maker:
1. no articulation of preference information;
2. a priori articulation of preference information;
3. progressive articulation of preference information; and
4. posterior articulation of preference information reached by an interactive method.
We consider that the APIM selection problem falls into Lai and Hwang’s third category, in
that the progressive articulation of preference information is required for decisions involving
multiple stakeholders’ objectives and multiple evaluation criteria. We believe that decisions
on APIMs are founded upon too many assumptions and the lack of clear objectives and
requirements for an APIM. We believe that a methodology should systematically acquire and
record pertinent information relating to an application context, together with stakeholders’
objectives and requirements for an APIM, in order to select the optimal APIM.
5.1.2 A Systematic Methodology for Selecting APIMs
We believe that the nature of the APIM selection problem suggests that a methodology,
progressively obtaining stakeholders’ preference information and data to reduce assumptions,
within well-structured processes, is a valid decision strategy. Such a strategy should include
iterative stages of evaluation with stakeholders in order to progressively gain sufficient insight
into the personal automated identification problem for the application context.
White recommends [316] that methodologies should always incorporate feedback from
stakeholders to validate any assumptions made in the decision-making processes. We believe
that stakeholder feedback on articulated stakeholders’ objectives and requirements for an
APIM should assist IS programmes to produce unambiguous requirement specifications and
explanatory statements to justify assumptions.
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Patton advises [231] that qualitative evaluation methods are well-suited for disciplines that
are developing, innovative or changing. We believe that automated personal identification is
an emergent discipline which necessitates a systematic methodology to evaluate qualitative
and qualitative data acquired from the application context and the candidate APIMs.
Our research plan was to identify which factors needed to be evaluated in order to select
the optimal APIM for a given application before we commenced the construction of other
components in our systematic methodology. We now describe our effort to address our first
research question.
5.2 Identifying and Classifying Factors
This section describes our research method to identify an initial set of factors for evaluating
and selecting an APIM. These research activities relate to the first two steps of our research
implementation plan shown in Figure 4.3 on page 124. We then describe the results from our
research efforts in this subsection. Our research method to classify these identified factors is
then described in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Method for Identifying Factors
Our method commenced by noting the factors expressed explicitly in methodological tools in
the literature, some of which are reviewed in Section 3.3. We then identified factors contained
in publications from standardisation bodies, e.g. NIST. We supplemented these identified
factors by reviewing the security, usability and privacy literature relating to automated
personal identification. We provide a discussion on these further identified factors in the next
subsection.
We assigned a descriptive label to each identified factor and also constructed a criterion
question for each factor. The purpose of a criterion question is to acquire subject data related
to an identified factor. We elucidate on the relationship between these two concepts in
Section 5.3.4.
We then examined the literature relating to a prominent, and often considered as controver-
sial, programme to introduce an APIM for employees and contractors into United States
of America (US) government departments. We scrutinized the issues raised by Karger
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[171], surrounding the US Homeland Security Presidential Directive [300] and the Federal
Employee Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Programme’s Specification [98] in order
to identify further factors. We chose to examine the literature relating to this programme
because there were, at the time, many articles appearing in scientific publications, in pro-
fessional community discussion forums and in the international press, which discussed the
merits and drawbacks of introducing such an APIM into US government departments.
Our review of the literature relating to this programme helped to identify some of the
implementation factors and issues encountered when an APIM is introduced into a particular
user community. We concluded our method by reviewing Allendoerfer’s comprehensive
field surveys [8, 9]. These surveys assisted us to identify factors relating to usability issues
that arise as a consequence of imposing multiple APIMs upon a user community.
5.2.2 Method for Classifying our Identified Factors
We collated these identified factors into a master list which we then classified into 18 factor
groups. These 18 groups were then classified into three perspectives.
Each factor group represented a conceptual theme, e.g. reliability, for evaluating APIMs.
The factor groups were further classified into perspectives (risk management, requirements
and solutions’ attributes) to align broadly with Warfel’s three axioms [307] for evaluating
identification technologies. Each factor group was then assigned an evaluation theme label,
e.g. Reliability Testing Evaluation Theme. The concepts relating to each evaluation theme
within our three perspectives are elucidated in Sections 5.2.6 to 5.2.8.
We used the qualitative data conceptual coding technique, as advocated by Richard [253], in
order to recognise the evaluation themes in our identified factors. The conceptual coding
technique functions as a way to categorise a set of data into an implicit topic that organises
a group of similar repeating ideas or concepts [259]. This data coding technique allowed
us to amalgamate factors, from diverse perspectives, in order to create a theoretical list to
begin to address our first research question. The additional review of relevant standards
and guidelines ensured that sufficient breadth was covered to formulate an inaugural list
of factors for evaluating APIMs. This inaugural list could be then validated through our
empirical inquiry.
We labelled each of our identified factors and evaluation themes in order to minimise
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ambiguity. The grouping of the identified factors into evaluation themes assisted us to
identify and to eliminate redundant factors. Our classification also helped to ensure the
integrity and consistency of our research method to identify these factors in the literature.
5.2.3 Identified Factors for Evaluating APIMs
We identified 207 factors for evaluating APIMs from our examination of the literature,
which are detailed in tables contained in Appendix A. The majority of our identified factors
originate from the literature produced by government agencies [295, 177, 98, 252].
We found that contributions in the literature that evaluate security, usability and privacy
factors (and also many other factors) relating to APIMs adopt an organisational slant [295,
252] or emanate from a user-centred leaning [334, 126]. We identified, however, from
our literature review that there are some factors, such as assurance, trust and confidence,
that appear to be common aims for all perspectives. From our review of this literature,
in particular, we found that the following issues on automated personal identification are
discussed frequently:
1. Acceptability Issues – the benefits, social acceptability, risks, control, usefulness and
the costs of the APIM to the respective stakeholders [247, 56];
2. Usability and Maintainability Issues – the ability of users to perform their tasks and
the ability of the system owners to manage the APIM [288, 15, 125]; and
3. Accessibility Issues – inclusiveness in terms of human physical capabilities, knowledge
and equipment (hardware and/or software) [250, 238].
The discussions surrounding these issues assisted us to identify further factors. These
discussions also assisted us to formulate our criteria questions relating to a factor.
5.2.4 Purpose of Factors and Criteria Questions
We explain the purpose and relationship of our identified factors and their associated criteria
questions before presenting our classification of the factors identified in the literature.
A factor is an element that requires evaluation, together with other elements, for the purposes
of enabling the informed selection of an APIM for a given application context. Essentially,
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a factor serves as an aide-me´moire to remind an IS programme that a particular aspect
needs sagacious consideration because that factor, e.g. cost, has the potential to influence the
selection of the optimal APIM for the application context.
Subject data for a factor are acquired by using its associated criterion question to extract
the relevant data from the application context in question. Data acquired may be contained
in an assessment report or information may be acquired from other primary sources. Each
factor is assigned a descriptive label in order to identify that factor in an evaluation theme.
Each evaluation factor has at least one criterion question to acquire data corresponding to
that factor.
The close inspection of the factor entries in the tables in the appendices reveals that some
factors have similar identification labels. These apparent similarities, however, are not
erroneous replications. We found that there are common factors where such considerations
are evaluated from different perspectives.
5.2.5 Results of our Classification of Identified Factors into Evaluation
Themes
In this section we present the results of our factor classification effort. The factors and
evaluation themes shown in tables contained in Appendix A also appear in our paper
Criteria to Evaluate Automated Personal Identification Mechanisms [226]. Many factors,
notably costs, often had multiple sources in the literature. We opted to cite only one source
reference for each factor in Appendix A because these identified factors were to be validated
empirically.
We classified our identified factors into 18 evaluation themes. These themes were further
classified into the following three perspectives, as shown in Table 5.1, to align broadly
with Warfel’s three axioms [307] to evaluate identification technologies. We assigned the
following labels and definitions to our identified perspectives:
• Risks Management Perspective – Factors in this category are designed to evaluate
stakeholders’ information on the rationale and extent to which an APIM should protect
an asset, or allow entitlement, commensurate with the risks and customs of the subject
community;
• Requirements Perspective – Factors in this category are designed to evaluate informa-
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RISK MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS SOLUTIONS’ ATTRIBUTES
FACTORS PERSPECTIVE FACTORS PERSPECTIVE FACTORS PERSPECTIVE
1. Strategic Issues 6. Functionality 12. Security Architecture
2. Risks Assessment 7. Community and Usability 13. Identifier Credential
3. Social Acceptability 8. Privacy Compliance 14. Reliability Testing
4. Risks Controls 9. Credential Registration 15. Usability Testing
5. Business Case 10. Controls’ Performance 16. Technology
11. Assurance Requirements 17. User Accessibility
18. Owners’ Costs
Table 5.1: Factor Perspectives and Evaluation Themes
tion regarding the degree of the identification assurance required for the APIM which
should be consistent with the stakeholders’ objectives; and
• Solutions’ Attributes Perspective – Factors in this category are designed to evaluate
data relating to a candidate APIM’s capability to fulfil the articulated requirements for
an APIM, e.g. does the candidate APIM authenticate users within the required time of
one second.
We believe that our criteria questions, when applied to an application context, have the
potential to produce a plethora of data for evaluation which may also reveal conflicting
requirements, issues and constraints. We consider that the evaluation of these factors are
best tackled within an evaluation framework. For now we simply present our factors and
their associated criteria questions in their respective evaluation themes and perspectives. We
explain how these evaluation themes are incorporated in our methodology in Section 5.3.5.
5.2.6 Evaluation Themes in the Risks Management Perspective
The five factor evaluation themes in this perspective are the Strategic Issues Evaluation
Theme, the Risks Assessment Evaluation Theme, Social Acceptability Evaluation Theme,
the Risks Controls Evaluation Theme, and the Business Case Evaluation Theme.
The factor themes in this perspective relate to the strategic considerations to introduce or to
revise a deployed APIM, the issues surrounding the risk assessment process to determine
the need for an APIM, which may fulfil an identification problem. The factor themes also
cover issues surrounding the social acceptability of an APIM in the application context and
the objectives for an APIM as a control mechanism. The factor themes also cover the issues
surrounding the creation of a business case in order to obtain investment for the APIM for
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the application context.
We now describe the thematic concepts which we recognised in our analysis of the identified
factors.
5.2.6.1 Strategic Issues Evaluation Theme
We recognised a theme in the identified factors relating to strategic issues surrounding the
selection of APIMs, which concerns the stakeholders’ objectives for introducing or revising
an APIM and its intended purposes.
Gerber and von Solms argue [118] that organisations should form their security objectives
within the regulatory, political and economic boundaries, with due consideration of the
community’s cultural and historic background. We believe that their argument applies
equally to selecting an APIM. The factors grouped into this theme relate to the need for an
APIM, the benefits derived from investment in an APIM, the purpose of an APIM within the
organisational objectives, and any political or legal imperatives which impact the selection
of the APIM. Such considerations and decisions are often undertaken at a strategic level in
an organisation.
The factors which relate to our strategic issues evaluation theme, together with their criteria
questions, are shown in Table 1A of Appendix A.
5.2.6.2 Risks Assessment Evaluation Theme
This evaluation theme relates to issues surrounding the stakeholders’ risks in using the
APIM for its intended purposes in its envisaged usage environments. These issues are often
considered during a risks assessment.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the attack likelihood or compromise probability
on an asset or resource, the threat motivation for misfeasors, the vulnerabilities in the
organisation’s operational context, and the organisation’s general strategy for managing
risks.
As a control measure, an APIM often forms part of security architecture to minimise
risks to assets. A risk assessment should, as a minimum, specify the information assets,
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their estimated value, identify vulnerabilities, acquire threat intelligence, ascertain incident
probabilities and likely impact on those assets in the event of a successful attack in order to
determine risk controls [234].
Our identified factors do not relate to project risks here; however, an IS programme’s failure
to specify sufficient controls to protect the assets could impact upon the effectiveness of the
APIM deployed. While security controls may improve risk management, development and
operating costs, as well as political and other economic interests, should be accommodated
to achieve an acceptable balance for organisations and their intended user community [252].
The factors which relate to risks assessments, together with their criteria questions, are shown
in Table 1.B of Appendix A.
5.2.6.3 Social Acceptability Evaluation Theme
The evaluation theme recognised in the identified factors relate to acceptability of the APIM
to the intended user community.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the relationship between the user community
and the APIM organisation, the obligations placed on the user in using the APIM, the general
social attitudes towards the use of APIMs in the application context and the users’ costs of
using the APIM.
Adams and Blandford recognise [1] the gaps which exist between organisational approaches
to securing systems and the user’s role in operating security mechanisms within communities
of practice. They argue that the degree of trust between organisations and their users,
particularly where an affiliation has not been established, appears to influence the social
acceptability of some security mechanisms.
Dourish et al. contend [84] that users’ perception of security has an important role to play in
helping communities understand the purposes and benefits of security mechanisms. Some
organisations attempt to manage their user community’s perception of security [9]. Never-
theless, users may still become disillusioned with an APIM as a result of bad experiences
from deceptive interactions [326].
The factors which relate to issues surrounding the social acceptability of the APIM, together
with their criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.C of Appendix A.
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5.2.6.4 Risks Controls Evaluation Theme
The theme recognised in the identified factors relate to risks controls for the application in
its context and the need for an APIM as a control mechanism.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the countermeasures risks, the objectives of the
controls, the budget allocated for the controls and the security policies and privacy policies
which influence the APIM as a control mechanism.
The need to introduce or revise a deployed APIM could be an organisational response to an
identification of increased or decreased risks. The need may also be a response to an APIM
which is attracting many usability problems or the need for an organisation to comply with
regulation. It appears in practice, however, that changes in policy, covering the protection of
assets, are often only brought about as a response to significant security breaches [300]. An
organisation may need to revise security policies or privacy policies, which include references
to standards or guidelines on deploying information security controls, e.g. ISO/IEC 27002
Information Technology – Security Techniques - Code of Practice for Information Security
Controls.
The factors which relate to risks controls and the implementation of security policies, together
with their criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.D of Appendix A.
5.2.6.5 Business Case Evaluation Theme
The identified factors which relate to business case to the evaluation theme to introduce an
APIM or to revise a deployed APIM.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to understanding the business problem, the rationale
for stakeholders to introduce or revise an APIM, notably the sponsoring stakeholders, the
constraints which may impact a project to introduce or revise an APIM, the standards which
the APIM must align with, particularly for interoperability purposes, and the acquisition of
information relating to similar deployments to the application context in question. Also, we
identified a factor which relates to methodology for gathering the business requirements for
the APIM.
An organisation may decide to minimise the risks to assets by instigating a change programme.
Usually, a feasibility study estimates the costs and benefits to implement these business
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strategies and to sustain the controls over an acceptable lifetime. The analysis of similar
identification challenges, contexts or user community characteristics may help reveal the
type of solutions previously implemented, the resulting issues, the major project risks, the
investment effort, and elapsed time necessary to allow benefits to be realised.
The factors which relate to business case for an APIM evaluation theme, together with their
criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.E of Appendix A.
5.2.7 Evaluation Themes in the Requirements Perspective
The six factor evaluation themes in this perspective are the Functionality Evaluation Theme,
the Community and Usability Evaluation Theme, the Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme,
the Registration and Credential Issuance Evaluation Theme, the Controls’ Performance
Evaluation Theme, and the Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme.
The factors in this perspective relate to the requirements for an APIM, compliance with
privacy legislation, the registration and enrolment of subjects including identity proofing,
and the distribution credential (if relevant) to users. These factors also cover the functional
requirements for the APIM in the application context including the design issues surrounding
usability and accessibility. The factors also cover performance and assurance requirements
for the APIM.
Experience in deploying biometric system suggests that the analysis of the application
context’s human identification problem and the statement of business requirements are
fundamental before any consideration of technical solutions [295]. Objectives to resolve
problems or transform operations should be expressed as requirements (at least at a high-
level) for a service or business control or enabling process and should not be solution driven
[295]. The elicitation, analysis and specification of these business requirements are critical
success factors for APIMs [295]. Operational requirements, including the APIM’s interactive
design, may best be achieved through a prototype or pilot in a live environment to validate
the security specification and configurations requested [65].
There is a range of vulnerabilities associated with all existing APIMs and the efforts to
articulate requirements should concentrate how stated objectives should be met and not a
description of possible solutions [63]. Statements on performance requirements also need to
be expressed as an assurance rating, capable of measurement, and not in abstract terms [98],
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e.g. a ‘secure system’.
5.2.7.1 Functionality Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the functional requirements for the APIM in the
application context’s usage environments.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the functional requirements for the APIM
surrounding:
• positive or negative identification;
• overt or covert identification;
• structured or random identifier data;
• the types of data available which may be used for identification purposes;
• the users’ tasks dynamics;
• the degree of supervision, if any; and
• the degree of control over the physical and logical environments.
The functions contained in authentication systems and identification systems offer biometric
solution types to various business problems [295]. There are, however, a multitude of local
and remote device configurations which impact the functional requirements for APIM. The
issues relating to APIM deployment not only complicates the articulation of functional
requirements but also affects the degree of control that organisations and users have over
these mechanisms in both networked and physical environments [271].
The factors which relate to the functionality for the APIM, together with their criteria
questions, are shown in Table 1.F of Appendix A.
5.2.7.2 Community and Usability Evaluation Theme
The factors grouped into this theme describe the characteristics of the subjects in the com-
munity and their required interactions with the APIM so as to complete their intended
tasks.
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An APIM’s design impacts upon users’ tasks to achieve their desired goals [194]. Sasse
argues [261] that designers should be encouraged to be more empathetic towards users’ goals
and should accommodate users’ security motivation in relationship to the application context.
Yee also argues [327] that designers should develop interfaces that consider the users’ tasks
and the pressures of their environments. He also contends [328] that gaining an insight into
users’ security awareness would certainly assist with the design of a security mechanism,
particularly when to invoke the security interactions within the users’ tasks structures. Leech
contends [182] that employers should instigate well-structured training programmes focused
on improving user security; however, we believe that education should supplement intuitive
design and not replace it.
The factors which relate to the community and usability requirements for the APIM, together
with their criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.G of Appendix A.
5.2.7.3 Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the legal compliance of the specified APIM with
the privacy legislation and other similar regulation. The theme also includes the processes
which are required for the APIM to be able to demonstrate such compliance with provisions
of the legislation.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the requirements for the APIM to enable the
system owner to demonstrate compliance with privacy, social accessibility and discrimination
legislation. We acknowledge, however, that similar compliance factors could be relevant to
other laws, regulations and corporate governance policies.
Some organisations may diligently perform their responsibilities to protect users’ private
data, by incorporating appropriate processes into their governance structure [98]. Conversely,
some heterogeneous implementations need the direction of a central or scheme body to set
out the governance rules and security policies for using private data to identify individuals
[41].
User privacy management requirements have a significant impact on the APIM’s interactive
design and security architecture, which must choose between two distinct architectures
for preserving private data [283]. Organisations may maintain control of private data by
technical enforcement [41], possibly supplemented by legal protection. Alternatively, the
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APIM’s security architecture could delegate the control of private data to the user, as the data
owner, together with the tools to manage consent operations [283].
The factors which relate to privacy compliance requirements for the APIM, together with
their criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.H of Appendix A.
5.2.7.4 Credential Registration Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to requirements for the registration and enrolment
of subjects from the intended user community.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the requirements for verifying the identity of a
subject, i.e. identity proofing, registering that subject in the APIM, acquiring or generating
data for identification or authentication, the issuing and distribution of credentials to a subject
and the distribution of devices or artefacts (if required) to users.
Where risks dictate, additional controls are introduced to identify applicants in order to
minimise attacks designed to subvert the subject registration process for the APIM [79]. The
consequential risks from failure to detect falsified or counterfeit seed identity documents,
e.g. a birth certificate, in order to steal or invent an identity, are minimised by incorporating
stringent identity checking controls [79].
Individuals appearing in person with their identity evidence, to register for an APIM, provide
the opportunity to undertake biometric enrolment and also to distribute credentials, such as
an ePassport. The registration process, however, is often undertaken as a remote activity with
the system owner accepting the veracity of the user’s claim to an identity.
The factors which relate to registration requirements for the APIM, together with their criteria
questions, are shown in Table 1.I of Appendix A.
5.2.7.5 Controls’ Performance Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the performance requirements for the APIM in
terms of acceptable speed and accuracy for identifying persons.
Our analysis of the factors in the literature suggests that organisations need to balance the
performance practicalities associated with application context and the capabilities of the
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different types of APIMs. Although this recommendation is directed mainly at deploying
biometric systems [63], we consider that this advice applies to all types of APIMs.
Performance may be crudely expressed as the decision trade-off between the APIM’s speed
and accuracy to identity or to authenticate a person. This trade-off decision is particularly
relevant where a biometric identification system operates in a very large community [119].
While biometrics may strive to meet tough acceptable impostor rate thresholds the true
accuracy of user authentication is often masked [230]. Authentication data, e.g. passwords,
may be passed to colleagues or captured by masqueraders, thereby casting doubts over
the effective performance of an authentication system [9]. Conversely, user authentication
systems, using password data, often have better response times than biometric authentication
systems.
Requirements analysis should determine acceptable and realistic accuracy targets, based
upon the practical experience of testing the performance of biometric systems in similar
environments [194]. Evidence suggests that for some biometric projects insufficient thought
has been given to setting acceptable performance in relation to risk [63]. The inevitable
result is the performance of some biometric solutions often falling short of expectations.
An excessive accuracy expectation applies equally to authentication mechanisms, as the
user should be the only individual to know the authentication data [9], but increasingly this
condition is not the case, e.g. phishing attacks.
The factors which relate to control performance requirements for the APIM, together with
their criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.J of Appendix A.
5.2.7.6 Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the assurance requirements for the APIM in
terms of the APIM’s capability to resist attack and the capability to detect that an APIM has
been compromised. The factors also include the requirements for conducting assurance tests
and the testing methods in order to ensure that it is possible to demonstrate than an APIM
conforms to a specified assurance quality.
The Biometric Working Group recommend [63] that it is important to stipulate the assurance
tests requirements at the outset so that relevant data may be generated in order to assess a
system’s assurance effectiveness. They also state that it is equally important to describe the
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framework and conditions in order to produce substantiated evidence for evaluation.
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation provides [64]
a universally available evaluation framework for organisations to describe their assurance
requirements for an APIM in the form of a protection profile for a specific system or product
or Target Of Evaluation (TOE). Weingart et al. suggest [313] that the assurance sought in a
system should, in theory, match those controls stipulated in order to reduce identified risks to
an acceptable level.
Commonly, system assurance testing takes place in controlled environments before such im-
plementations are released to users [221]. The UK Biometrics Working Group recommends
[295] that assurance testing should also involve subjects from the intended user community in
their operating environment as this additional data may augment assurance evidence gained
in the laboratory.
The factors which relate to the assurance requirements for the APIM, together with their
criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.K of Appendix A.
5.2.8 Evaluation Themes in the Solutions’ Attributes Perspectives
The seven factor evaluation themes in this perspective are the Security Architecture Evalu-
ation Theme, the Identifier Credential Evaluation Theme, the Reliability Testing Evaluation
Theme, the Usability Testing Evaluation Theme, the Technology Evaluation Theme, the User
Accessibility Evaluation Theme and the Owners’ Costs Evaluation Theme.
The evaluation themes in this perspective relate to the attributes of an APIM, as a candidate
solution, which may fulfil the requirements for an APIM to address an identification prob-
lem. The evaluation themes which describes the APIM’s attributes includes the solution’s
security architecture, its technical components and the processes describing how subjects are
registered and enrolled, how subjects and possibly other entities may use the APIM (with or
without a credential), and how a subject’s entitlement to access an asset or resource using that
APIM is terminated. The factors also cover the mechanism’s attributes relating to reliability
testing, usability testing and accessibility testing of the APIM. There are also factors relating
to the various types of costs associated with designing, developing, deploying, operating and
maintaining an APIM.
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5.2.8.1 Security Architecture Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to security architecture attributes of a candidate
APIM or a deployed APIM in an application context. These attributes include a description
of the data used to identify subjects and the protection of that identification data.
The main factor relates to the type of data, e.g. user knowledge, biometric modality or code
generated from an artefact, which is used to identify the subject. There are also factors
relating to the modes of operation for the APIM’s identification data. The other factors
grouped into this theme relate to the attributes describing the technological components,
the infrastructure, the processes surrounding the acquisition of subjects’ identification data
and the processes to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of that data during usage and
storage.
From our analysis of these factors we identified that an APIM may be an integral element
in an security architecture which contains other complimentary risks controls. We also
recognised that a security architecture may support a system with the dedicated purpose of
identifying persons, i.e. a biometric identification system which utilises bespoke sensing
devices and software. Cotroneo et al. recommend [65] that authentication systems should
utilise ubiquitous devices and software elements in order to improve technical interoperability
and usability for users; however, this advice is often difficult to embrace.
The factors which relate to the security architecture attributes, together with their criteria
questions, are shown in Table 1.L of Appendix A.
5.2.8.2 Identifier Credential Management Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the description of the APIM’s credential
management processes associated with identifiers assigned to users. An identifier is datum,
e.g. an email address, X500 distinguished name or a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID),
which uniquely identifies the subject of this digital identity within a given application context.
Credentials are data associated with a subject, e.g. possession of a password or a private key,
which serve as evidence to assert the claimed digital identity of a person.
The key factors associated with credentials relate to distinguishing goals of the credential,
the data model of the credential, the physical (if relevant) and logical data structure of the
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credential and the design limitations of the credential [216]. The other factors grouped into
this theme relate to the credential’s lifetime, the credential’s authenticity, the credential
integrity, the processes for maintaining the credentials, the delivery of the credential to
the user, the credential use locations and the requirements for credential accreditation (if
applicable).
Biometric identification requires a person’s biometric data credential and their associated
identifier to be stored in a central repository [162]. Data used in an authentication system
may be stored in a central database and/or on an Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) or other
types of storage device. Credentials embedded in ICCs provide the capability for users to be
verified locally without the need for host connections [271].
The distribution of credentials, e.g. payment cards and PIN mailers to account holders, by
the APIM’s issuing authorities often brings logistical challenges. Credentials, e.g. User
Identifiers and passwords, both initial and re-issued, may be sent, possibly separately, to users
through the postal system or across open networks. The controls for credential distribution
should be directly correlated to the risks and costs for both the system owner and user [79].
The factors which relate to the attributes of an APIM’s credentials, together with their criteria
questions, are shown in Table 1.M of Appendix A.
5.2.8.3 Reliability Testing Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the reliability test results of a candidate APIM
or deployed APIM for the application context.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to test result information on the APIM’s perform-
ance, in terms of accuracy and speed to identify or authenticate authorised users and to detect
unauthorised users, its resistance to attack, the difficulty of producing a counterfeit artefact
and/or credential data to circumvent the identification system or authentication system.
Tests planned for an appraisal regime or evaluation framework should produce substantiated
data for reliability assessments [64]. Gathering information on APIMs, as they are used in
practice, also provides data to validate reliability indications [63, 324]. While formal security
evaluation helps to form independent opinion the real challenge appears to be to reassure
organisations to rely upon access control security mechanisms and other parties to trust that
protection [11].
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The factors which relate to the reliability of an APIM evaluation theme, together with their
criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.N of Appendix A.
5.2.8.4 Usability Testing Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the usability test results of a candidate APIM or
deployed APIM for the application context.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to tests results from users’ utilisation of the APIM’s
Human Computer Interface (HCI), the visibility of the security status, the alignment of the
APIM with the user’s tasks, and the users’ satisfaction of the APIM gained from their usage
experiences.
The inadequacies of HCI security design often dilute the effectiveness of preventative controls
[68]. Even with usability design deficiencies, security effectiveness is improved by enabling
users to make informed decisions from having a better understanding of a device’s security
operations [237].
Knowledge based authentication systems mainly attract user password management problems
[9]. Increasing the number of password attempts could help users’ chances of recollection
success; however, this strategy may marginally increase the opportunity of an external
adversary obtaining that authentication data [262]. While aids to improve password recall
may assist in some contexts, e.g. rebus passwords [189], effort should be focused on
improving authentication system security designs [2, 261, 315].
The factors which relate to the usability of an APIM evaluation theme, together with their
criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.O of Appendix A.
5.2.8.5 Technology Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the technology and the resources, in terms of
systems, personnel and skills, to support the APIM for the application context.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the computer systems, networks, devices and
other components for the APIM, the anticipated life time of these technologies, how the
identification data and infrastructure are protected and the competencies of the personnel
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required to support the APIM.
APIMs rely upon many technological components that include system servers, networks,
personal computers, user input devices and supporting application software. Some of
these components are ubiquitous while many are bespoke to a specific type of APIM.
Some biometric solutions use proprietary algorithms, e.g. facial recognition, although
international effort has agreed common biometric data exchange formats in order to improve
interoperability [160].
Technological components should respond with inferred protective actions from users’
intentions [123] and reflect the state of those trusted interactions [328]. Operating System
designs that permit an application program to use one of several identification security agents
running concurrently, in a layer between the security tasks layer and the operating system
containing security data objects, is a possible research direction [289].
The factors relating to an APIM’s technological components and associated criteria questions
are shown in Table 1.P of Appendix A.
5.2.8.6 User Accessibility Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the accessibility test results of a candidate
APIM or deployed APIM for the application context.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to the results of conducting sensory, skills and/or
cognitive tests, which may prohibit users from using the APIM as designed. This theme also
includes factors relating to the need for users to possess artefacts, devices or special software
to use the APIM. It also contains factors relating to the measurement of user confidence
in using the APIM and the user efforts required to maintain the devices and credentials
associated with the APIM.
Some individuals may fail to enrol on some biometric systems because they are unable
to provide the minimum distinctive user input signals required, e.g. capturing fingerprint
minutiae [311], to sensory devices. In some countries there are regulations to ensure
organisations provide alternative arrangements to individuals with disabilities that may
impinge upon their ability to use devices or systems effectively.
User access exclusion may also relate to technological constraints or interoperability issues,
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such as bespoke devices or type of operating system or application. The need for individuals
to purchase devices, e.g. smart card readers, may also impact upon user accessibility to use
the APIM purely on affordability grounds. A system owner often has to consider the benefits
and the adverse impact of utilising proprietary technology or adopting the use of ubiquitous
technology or a configuration of both.
The factors which relate to the user accessibility of an APIM for the application context,
together with their criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.Q of Appendix A.
5.2.8.7 Owner’s Costs Evaluation Theme
The factors in this evaluation theme relate to the costs associated with a candidate APIM or
deployed APIM for the application context over the required operational period.
The factors grouped into this theme relate to that various types of costs associated with
the implementation, deployment and maintenance of the APIM in the application context.
The cost elements also include the costs of input devices, artefacts, infrastructure costs and
recovery costs.
These cost elements to deploy an APIM in an application context are required for return
on investment and budget considerations. Some contingency should also be planned as
poorly designed security interfaces often lead to user errors and the system owner incurring
unbudgeted costs, e.g. administrators reissuing tokens to users. The type of costs relating to
APIM deployments may be designated either as capital investments or revenue expenditure;
however, without delving into the complexities of accounting practices, the provision of
precise costs will assist organisational investment decisions.
The factors which relate to the costs associated with an APIM for the application context,
together with their criteria questions, are shown in Table 1.R of Appendix A.
In accordance with our research implementation plan, we aimed to validate our identified
factors by grounding their existence in data acquired from our three case studies. We also
aimed to identify new factors for evaluation from our qualitative analysis of data acquired
from these case studies.
From applying our criteria, potential candidate APIMs may now be compared objectively
with the risk management objectives and stated requirements for the APIM in its target
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application context. We believe that this comparison is best undertaken within an evaluation
framework, using a well-defined method, within a systematic methodology.
5.3 Development of the ASMSA Methodology
We developed the ASMSA Methodology based upon our supposition that a systematic
methodology is efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM for some application contexts.
We pursued our aims to develop a systematic methodology by building upon our efforts
to identify factors for evaluating APIMs as described in Section 5.2. While our identified
factors and their criteria questions were grouped into common themes [226], we recognised
that an evaluation framework was necessary to serve as a way of modelling the data acquired
and representing the attribute interrelationships from an application context. This model is
designed to assist with gaining an understanding of the APIM selection problem from three
perspectives.
Additionally, we recognised that we needed to develop a selection method to acquire data
from the application context in question and to synthesize that data systematically in order to
demonstrate objectivity. We also recognised the need to create well-defined processes so that
the selection method is repeatable by other methodology users.
5.3.1 Method for Developing the ASMSA Methodology
This section explains how we utilised our factors and their associated criteria questions in
order to develop a methodology to answer our second research question.
Our research method for developing the ASMSA Methodology’s components commenced
by undertaking a high-level review of literature covering IS evaluation, modelling concepts
and their relationships, decision-making, and multiple stakeholder consultation process
management. We then analysed the characteristics of the APIM selection problem, as
described in Section 5.1.1, and developed a model which could represent the factors and their
interdependencies. We also reviewed commercially available IdMS assessment methods in
order to consider their applicability for evaluating APIMs.
We developed the ASMSA Evaluation Framework iteratively by creating a provisional model
to represent the concepts identified in the classification of our identified factors. This model
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was then revised to reflect the purpose of the evaluation and the problems associated with
selecting the optimal APIM for a given application context. We discuss the general problems
of selecting information technologies in the next sub-section.
We developed the ASMSA Selection Method by creating a series of processes, based upon the
requirements engineering processes, as specified by Hull et al. [138], and then decomposed
each process into discrete steps. These discrete steps were designed to acquire data from
the application context using the criteria questions associated with our identified factors.
We then integrated data manipulation steps into our method which draws on Keeney et
al.’s Multiple Objective Multiple Criteria (MOMC) technique [173] for decision-making
situations involving multiple stakeholder objectives and multiple criteria. We next elucidate
on our choice of this technique which has been applied to investments decisions on IT.
5.3.2 Decisions on Information Technology
We reviewed literature covering IT evaluations [97, 272, 251, 76] to enable us to understand
how different factors impact upon information technology selection problems. We also
reviewed literature on Multiple Stakeholder Processes (MSPs) [128], as we recognised from
our factor classification work that APIMs are often implemented in situations where there
are many stakeholders with similar, and often conflicting, objectives.
We also needed to understand qualitative decision-making approaches and methods applied in
qualitative selection processes [316, 231]. We recognised that there was a need to incorporate
techniques which are designed for decisions involving multiple stakeholders with multiple
objectives, as described by Keeney et al. [173] and Homburg [134] into our methodology.
We also needed to incorporate techniques into our methodology which, according to Ehtamo
et al. [87], attempt to address persistent conflicting issues between stakeholders.
We also reviewed literature specifically covering the general study of evaluation frameworks
[165, 281] in order to assist with the construction of a model to represent acquired data and
the interrelations of the factors involved in selecting APIMs. After constructing this abstract
framework we were then positioned to develop a corresponding method for evaluating and
selecting APIMs.
There are many types of IT assessments that provide analytical information from a range of
subjective and objective inputs [272]. We considered it appropriate to design an approach
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that exploited these various IT assessment types in order to acquire a rich set of data from
the application context to be evaluated in ASMSA’s evaluation framework. Our exploratory
research led us to construct an evaluation framework and meta-evaluation selection method,
to use secondary data, as defined by Stuﬄebeam [279], in our evaluation framework which
draws information from a combination of several types of primary assessment. In this sense,
the ASMSA Evaluation Framework may be regarded as a high-level evaluation of several
evaluations.
5.3.3 Methodological Design Choices
This section describes our design choices in the creation of our systematic methodology,
Approach for Selecting the Most Suitable APIM (ASMSA) Methodology.
From our review of our identified factors, we observed that the factors were of mixed data
types, ranging from factors on political considerations for an APIM to the costs for deploying
an APIM. The methodology’s design, therefore, needed to evaluate both qualitative data and
quantitative data acquired for the purposes of selecting the optimal APIM. For the design
of our methodology, we considered the strategy of using quantitative analysis techniques
by evaluating qualitative data quantitatively. For example, the usability of an APIM could
be expressed as a scalar measurement, as reflected in the design of Ashbourn’s Pentakis
Methodology [15] for selecting biometric systems. We discounted assigning a numerical
value to indicate the usability of an APIM because, as we found from our classification of
our factors, the attributes relating to usability are expressed in qualitative terms, for example
an intuitive interface [167].
We recognised that the attributes of some of our factors needed to be expressed qualitatively
while the attributes of other attributes, e.g. False Acceptance Rates must be expressed
quantitatively. We needed to design a methodology which accommodated mixed data types
and processes that incorporated quantitative data and qualitative data analysis techniques.
Keeney et al. argue [173] that complex decisions involving multiple objectives and multiple
criteria with a rich set of mixed data requires a qualitative approach to enable value based
compromises. While Royer adopts a quantitative approach [257] for selecting enterprise
APIMs, we adhere to the qualitative approach recommended by Keeney et al .[173].
We concede, however, when there may be two candidate APIMs exhibiting the necessary
capabilities and attributes to fulfil the requirements for an APIM, then the comparison of
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numerical values, e.g. impostor detection rates and costs, should be incorporated into our
methodology. We incorporated qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques into our
methodology’s design in order to evaluate mixed data types.
We developed the ASMSA Methodology to support complex decision-making by incorporat-
ing:
• discrete actions in our selection method;
• structured criteria questions to acquire data relating to our factors;
• techniques to manipulate acquired data; and
• processes to evaluate acquired data in an evaluation framework.
Therefore, we created the ASMSA Methodology, comprising of a tentative evaluation
framework in order to represent mixed data types based upon our identified factors and
our classification of these factors into evaluation themes within three perspectives. We
also constructed a provisional selection method with detailed steps in three stages and
criteria questions to acquire data from an application context relating to our identified
factors. Essentially, we constructed and published our systematic methodology before we
commenced our empirical research. Our aim was to use the empirical data gathered from our
three case studies, described in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, to validate our identified factors and also
to refine the ASMSA Methodology’s components.
5.3.4 Development of the ASMSA Evaluation Framework
Jayaratna states [165] that frameworks improve the understanding of a range of concepts,
models, techniques and methods that aid decision-making. The construction of a well-
articulated model which defines the concepts and describes the interrelationships between
the concepts then allows for solution options to be derived and also to be evaluated.
We created the ASMSA Evaluation Framework to correspond to our three perspectives, our
evaluation themes and the factors located in the literature. We recognised the need to revise
the labels of our three perspectives, during our efforts to create our evaluation framework,
from Risks Management, Requirements and Solutions’ Attributes to Understanding, Effec-
tiveness and Efficiency Perspectives respectively, as now shown in Figure 5.2. The titles of
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the evaluation themes and the identified factors, however, remained the same during this
stage of our implementation plan.
We reference Table 5.2 in our explanation of the concepts which underpin our methodology
in Section 5.4.3 and also our description of our evaluation framework in Section 5.5. We
describe our rationale for renaming our three perspectives in Section 5.4.3.1.
UNDERSTANDING EFFECTIVENESS EFFICIENCY
PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE
1. Strategic Issues 6. Functionality 12. Security Architecture
2. Risks Assessment 7. Community and Usability 13. Identifier Credential
3. Social Acceptability 8. Privacy Compliance 14. Reliability Testing
4. Risks Controls 9. Credential Registration 15. Usability Testing
5. Business Case 10. Controls’ Performance 16. Technology
11. Assurance Requirements 17. User Accessibility
18. Owners’ Costs
Table 5.2: Evaluation Perspectives and Factor Evaluation Themes
5.3.5 Development of the ASMSA Selection Method
The ASMSA Selection Method is constructed to align with the decision analysis path
recommended by White [316], consisting of:
• problem formulation;
• constructing and testing a model;
• deriving a solution;
• implementation; and
• monitoring issues and risks.
From our analysis of the characteristics of the APIM selection problem in Section 5.1.1,
we considered that the Multiple Objective Multiple Criteria (MOMC) decision-making
technique, as described by Keeney et al. [173], is a relevant strategy upon which to base a
method for selecting APIMs.
Keeney et al. recommend [173] the MOMC decision-making approach is pertinent for
extracting order from the morass of diverse, generally conflicting, uncertain and often
evolving attitudes in complex decision-making cases. According to Farbey and Finkelstein
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[96], MOMC explicitly recognises contrasting viewpoints and uses more than one set of
values to facilitate objective decision-making.
The MOMC decision-making approach incorporates an iterative approach to data acquisition
so that it may be employed from the conceptual phase of a development project onwards,
where assumptions require investigation, to help identify stakeholders’ objectives together
with compromise options and preferences. According to Homburg [134], the more objectives
are sub-divided into a hierarchy, the easier it usually is to identify attribute scales that can
be objectively assessed. Establishing a decision hierarchy of objectives for an IT selection
process, as illustrated by Sylla and Wen [281], also helps to identify the benefits and other
intangible decision factors.
We developed ASMSA’s Selection Method and its processes based upon the principles of
MOMC decision-making approach, in order that it possessed the capability to systematically
identify similarities and conflicts in stakeholders’ objectives and requirement preferences.
We also recognised, however, the need for separate processes in our method to reconcile
conflicting objectives for an APIM with stakeholders.
Hemmati defines [128] Multiple Stakeholder Processes (MSPs) as “methods which aim to
bring together all major stakeholders in a new form of communication for decision-finding
and (possibly decision-making) on a particular issue”. We consider that MSPs, as advocated
by Hemmati [128], are relevant techniques to engage stakeholders in a dialogue in order to
reconcile potential conflicts in stakeholders’ objectives and for addressing any assumptions
made regarding the requirements for an APIM. We embedded the principles of MSPs into
the processes of our selection method so that stakeholders’ objectives and preferences may
be reconciled methodically.
5.3.6 Methodological Efficacy Considerations
Avison and Fitzgerald contend [18] that unless a methodology contains a specification of
a method or a plan of discrete actions, then its processes cannot be easily repeated and
may be open to various interpretations by methodology users, e.g. programme managers or
discipline experts.
We acknowledge, however, that unless a methodology is adhered to then it will be difficult to
gather the relevant data in order to assess the methodology’s efficacy. Additionally, for such
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an assessment there is a need to segregate data that represents discipline experts’ skills and
other competencies developed from data generated from the use of the methodology. Avison
and Fitzgerald concede [18] that the comparison of development methodologies, whether
theoretical or in practice, is a very difficult task. We also believe that comparing approaches
to select the optimal APIM for an application context is not a trivial task.
The efficacy of our methodology (and other approaches) to select the optimal APIM for cer-
tain application contexts, therefore, requires a means to assess the efficacy of their problem-
solving processes. We define criteria specifically to assess the efficacy of a methodology
to select an APIM in Section 8.1. We developed these criteria from Lai and Hwang’s crit-
eria [179], designed for assessing fuzzy decision-making methods, and our methodological
learnings based upon our two retrospective case studies.
We recognise that there may be situations when a systematic methodology may not be the
most efficacious approach to select an APIM, for example when the circumstances demand
expediency. Nevertheless, we believe that unless a methodology in an IS development
programme incorporates the means to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of APIM
candidate solutions, then stakeholders cannot objectively determine the potential and actual
utility of their investment. Similarly, the effectiveness and efficiency of a deployed APIM
cannot be determined objectively for the specific application context, unless there is the
means to determine such utility.
5.4 Overview of the ASMSA Methodology
This section provides an overview of the ASMSA Methodology. The succeeding sections
describe the ASMSA Evaluation Framework and the ASMSA Selection Method in detail.
Our systematic methodology is also described in the publication ‘Approach for Selecting the
Most Suitable Automated Personal Identification Mechanism (ASMSA)’ [227].
5.4.1 ASMSA Methodology’s Philosophy
Avison and Fitzgerald argue [18] that the philosophy of IS development methodologies
comprise of:
• the underlying paradigm underpinning the approach;
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• the objectives of the methodology;
• the domain of situations that the methodology addresses; and
• the applicability of the methodology (whether targeted at specific types of problem or
general purpose).
The ASMSA Methodology is based upon our belief that a multi-disciplinary approach is
required to address the problem of selecting an APIM. Our belief is based upon the range of
evaluation themes, e.g. risk management, regulation, security assurance, privacy protection,
usability, costs, demonstrated in our identified factors for evaluating APIMs. The range of
evaluation themes suggests that an evaluation based on a single perspective, e.g. cost, may
not necessarily lead to the identification of the optimal APIM. We believe that the optimal
APIM can be identified by evaluating a range of factors from our three perspectives in order
to determine its fitness for purpose.
Howell contends [135] that critical thinking is only possible when the judgments of others
are brought into the equation; when the standpoints of each and all are open to inspection.
We believe that a methodology based upon the examination of differing standpoints, e.g.
legal, operational, risk, financial, within an evaluation framework which employs systematic
well-defined processes has the potential to improve decision-making for APIMs.
The ASMSA Methodology is designed as a process-oriented methodology in that we lay out
its processing steps in significant detail. Its functions are designed to:
• acquire data relating to the background of the application context and evaluate the
stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM;
• acquire data relating to the requirements for the APIM for the application context
and evaluate the effectiveness of the articulated requirements which aim to fulfil the
stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM; and
• acquire data relating to the candidate APIMs and evaluate the efficiency with which
each solution fulfils the requirements for the APIM.
We designed the ASMSA Methodology to address a specific pre-identified problem, in that
some stakeholders in the application context may claim that a deployed APIM is ineffective
or inefficient. Our methodology acquires data to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of
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a deployed APIM in order to provide evidence to corroborate or contradict such claims. We
also designed our methodology to address the problem of selecting the optimal APIM for
situations when new information systems are being introduced.
The ASMSA Methodology is applicable for determining the optimal APIM to authenticate
persons wishing to access information or resources. It is also applicable for determining the
optimal APIM where the sole function of the information system is the identification of a
person, as a known member of the subject community.
5.4.2 Overview of ASMSA Methodology’s Components
The ASMSA Methodology consists of:
• the ASMSA Evaluation Framework;
• identified factors for evaluating APIMs and associated criteria questions to acquire
relevant data; and
• the ASMSA Selection Method.
The ASMSA Evaluation Framework is designed to represent the current state of the applica-
tion context and its APIM selection problem. The framework also models the objectives and
requirements for a desired state, which relates to the introduction or revision of an APIM.
The ASMSA Method is designed to systematically acquire data, using criteria questions,
relating to the application context and the candidate APIMs. There are also techniques in our
method to reconcile, manipulate and evaluate data acquired. Our method aims to gain an
understanding of the application context. It then aims to ascertain whether the description of
the requirements for an APIM are effective. The comparison of the candidate APIMs’ are
then compared against the stipulated requirements in order to identify the optimal APIM for
that application context.
The ASMSA Evaluation Framework component evaluates the application context and candi-
date APIMs to be deployed (or that have been deployed) from three perspectives:
1. Understanding Perspective – an understanding of the application context which
includes the articulation of stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM;
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2. Effectiveness Perspective – the effectiveness of the articulated requirements for the
APIM which aim to fulfil stakeholders’ objectives; and
3. Efficiency Perspective – the efficiency with which each candidate APIM or deployed
APIM satisfies those stipulated requirements.
For brevity, we use Understanding Perspective; Effectiveness Perspective; and Efficiency
Perspective as defined terms in this thesis. The ASMSA Evaluation Framework is a meta-
evaluation framework that uses information from other evaluations, e.g. risk analysis, privacy
impact assessment, and other primary information related to the application context as its
subject data. We describe the ASMSA Evaluation Framework in Section 5.5.
The identified factors for evaluating APIMs and the associated criteria questions are the
second component in our methodology. A criterion question is designed to acquire data about
a particular factor in a perspective’s evaluation theme. Each factor is assigned at least one
criterion question to acquire the relevant data. The acquired data, in response to the criterion
question posed, is then represented as an attribute value associated with the respective factor.
As an illustration of our factor classification structure, a criterion question with the factor
entitled ‘Overt or Covert Identification’ seeks to acquire information on whether the APIM
is to automatically identify persons transparently and the legal and/or technical issues which
may apply to covert identification. This factor falls under the Functionality Evaluation
Theme within the Effectiveness Perspective which is located in Table A.6 of Appendix
A. The criteria questions are used to acquire subject data at discrete steps in the ASMSA
Selection Method’s three stages.
The ASMSA Selection Method is the third component of the ASMSA Methodology. Our
selection method’s processes are contained in discrete steps within three stages as represented
in Figure 5.3 on page 197. The ASMSA Selection Method processing steps are explained in
Section 5.6. The processing steps in our method are represented in the ASMSA Decision
Support System.
The ASMSA Decision Support System (ASMSA-DSS), described in Section 5.7, is a
representation of the ASMSA Methodology’s components. The system was originally
designed to assist us with the management of the data acquired from our three case studies.
We enhanced this system to represent the logical flow of processing steps in our selection
method. The ASMSA-DSS guides the user sequentially through the processing steps of our
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TERM DEFINITION
Objective Aim that is pursued to its fullest extent.
Goal Priority value or level of aspiration that are achieved, suppressed or not exceeded.
Factor for Aspect of an application context that requires evaluation by a stakeholder organisation’s
Evaluation programme in order to select the optimal APIM.
Factor Description of the reasons for evaluating a particular factor for selecting the optimal APIM.
Explanation
Evaluation Organised category of conceptually congruent factors that form the
Theme basis of an evaluation in the ASMSA Evaluation Framework.
Criterion Interrogative query designed to acquire attribute values from the application
Question context under investigation, which relate to a specific factor.
Attribute Qualitative or quantitative data properties of factors that provide a means to
Values evaluate an application context.
Stage One of the three phases in ASMSA’s Selection Method.
Step One of the series of processes employed within a Stage of ASMSA’s Selection Method
Table 5.3: Definitions of ASMSA Methodology’s Terminology
selection method. In our third case study the DoR used the ASMSA-DSS to guide his efforts
to evaluate and select an APIM.
We define our terms and describe the concepts which underpin our methodology in order to
explain these aforementioned components in greater detail.
5.4.3 ASMSA Methodology’s Terminology and Concepts
We define the terminology used in the ASMSA Methodology and its concepts in Table 5.3
and also provide a description of the concepts and their relationships which underpin our
methodology.
The ASMSA Evaluation Framework models the characteristics of the application context so
that the selection problem is evaluated from three perspectives; namely, the Understanding
Perspective, the Effectiveness Perspective and the Efficiency Perspective. Data acquired,
represented in evaluation themes, of each perspective influences factors in succeeding pers-
pectives. Subject data are acquired using tools in the ASMSA Selection Method. Subject
data are manipulated and synthesized by techniques in the ASMSA Selection Method.
The concepts in the ASMSA Methodology are defined as:
• Perspectives – Data which describe a view of the APIM selection problem;
• Influencers – Effects of data in a perspective on a succeeding perspective;
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• Tools – Assessment instruments which acquire subject data from multiple primary
sources; and
• Techniques – Subject data that are validated, manipulated or categorised in our selec-
tion method’s processes.
We now provide a description of the function of these defined concepts in the ASMSA
Methodology.
5.4.3.1 Perspective Concept
A perspective represents, through data acquired, a view of the application context and its
selection problem.
We adopt a ‘fitness for purpose’ philosophy to address the selection problem which is similar
to Sherwood et al. [263] business driven approach for designing security architectures. The
three perspectives in our evaluation framework do not, however, represent the different
views of technology specialists, e.g. an architect, designer or developer. We believe that the
commingling of technological viewpoints may not determine the effectiveness or efficiency
of candidate APIMs to fulfil stakeholders’ objectives because the utility of an APIM should
include factors from broader perspectives, such as regulatory compliance and financial
management.
Our evaluation framework explicitly recognises that enterprise stakeholders may have similar
or conflicting views, internally between departments, and externally with other enterprises or
governments or customers or citizens, which need to be reconciled. Those views need to
be captured and represented in a model for evaluation. We equate our three perspectives to
White’s recommendations [316], as follows:
1. Understanding Perspective equates to problem formulation of the application context
in its current state;
2. Effectiveness Perspective equates to constructing and testing a model to represent the
desired state; and
3. Efficiency Perspective equates to deriving a solution together with the identification
and monitoring of issues and risks.
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Each perspective is elucidated in respect of our evaluation framework as follows:
Understanding Perspective We formulate the problem by articulating an understanding of
the application context’s background, the stakeholder participants and their objectives
for an APIM, together with legal, regulatory and other constraints. The understanding
data are represented in attributes of the evaluation themes in the left column of Table
5.2. Importantly, this perspective includes data on the business case so that the benefits
of the APIM are articulated at the outset.
Effectiveness Perspective We construct and test a model of requirements by specifying
the functional, performance and assurance attributes for the APIM. This model also
includes the processes to register and enrol subjects, the automated identification task’s
dialogue in the intended usage environments and privacy compliance regulations. The
effectiveness data are represented in attributes of the evaluation themes in the middle
column of Table 5.2.
Efficiency Perspective We derive a solution by modelling the properties of each candidate
APIM or APIM deployment in terms of its identifier management characteristics,
proposed security architecture, and its technical properties. The perspective also
represents data relating to testing the usability, reliability, and accessibility of an
APIM. We also include properties relating to identified vulnerabilities, issues and
stakeholders’ costs associated with an APIM. The efficiency data are represented in
the attributes of the evaluation themes in the right column of Table 5.2. We equate the
monitoring of issues, vulnerabilities, and also stakeholders’ costs as outputs from the
evaluation of candidate APIMs or a deployed APIM.
These three perspectives in the ASMSA Evaluation Framework are represented by the bold
rectangular boxes in the centre of Figure 5.1 shown on page 188
5.4.3.2 Influencer Concept
The influencer concept describes how data, represented in a perspective, effects data in
succeeding perspectives in the ASMSA Evaluation Framework. The influencer concepts are
depicted by the broad solid patterned dark grey arrows in Figure 5.1. The influencer concept
is not bi-directional.
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ASSESSMENT TYPE EXAMPLE ASSESSMENTS
Type A – Understanding Privacy Impact Assessment, Risks Assessment, Organisational Policies,
Assessments Feasibility Study, Business Case, Use Cases, Data Protection Legislation,
Return On Security Investment, Social Studies, Threat Analysis
Type B Effectiveness Business Requirements Analysis, Costs Benefits Analysis, Review of
Assessments Simulation, Conceptual Prototype Review, Case Studies, Pilot Deployment
Assessment, International Standards, Scheme Specifications
Type C – Efficiency IT Architectural Review, Functional Tests, Supplier Product Specifications,
Assessments Performance Test Results, Vulnerability Assessment, Device Specifications,
Usability Testing Results, Software Code Analysis
Table 5.4: Assessment Types and some Example Assessments
An example of an influencer may be social norms relating to citizen’s views on the protection
of their private information which constrain the functional requirements for the APIM.
Similarly, a deployed APIM which possesses vulnerabilities, attracts various issues and
incurs costs may influence stakeholders’ objectives to revise an APIM.
The ASMSA Evaluation Framework is designed, as a meta-model, to represent the persistent
tensions between these three perspectives and the iterative nature of setting objectives,
evaluating effectiveness of the requirements for an APIM, and also evaluating the efficiency
of candidate APIMs or an APIM deployment against articulated requirements. We describe
the influences in ASMSA’s Evaluation Framework in Section 5.5.3.
5.4.3.3 Tools Concept
Tools are used by the ASMSA Selection Method to acquire subject data relating to the three
perspectives from primary data sources. The data acquisition flows are represented by the
three narrow horizontal patterned dashed arrows on the right hand side of Figure 5.1. We
categorise the data acquired based on the types of assessment tool, as shown in Table 5.4, to
correspond to ASMSA’s three perspectives.
5.4.3.4 Technique Concept
We use the term techniques to describe other procedures in ASMSA’s Selection Method that
manipulate, reconcile or transform subject data and the processes to manage the dialogue
with stakeholders.
The main technique used in our method is a process to prioritise stakeholders’ objectives,
which is based upon Keeney et al.’s MOMC guidelines [173]. We adapt the MOMC decision-
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making technique in order to enable the establishment of a preference of stakeholders’
objectives. A secondary technique reconciles stakeholders’ objectives with operational
requirements by employing Homburg’s Hierarchical Objectives Mapping Technique [134],
which deconstructs stakeholders’ objectives into sub-objectives in order to identify high-level
requirements. We use this technique in order to provide a link between an objective and at
least one requirement for the APIM. This reconciliation technique ensures that all objectives
link to at least one corresponding requirement and that all requirements link to at least one
objective. An objective that is not linked to a requirement suggests that the requirements
gathering activities are not complete. The presence of a requirement that does not link to an
objective suggests that there is either an objective omitted or the requirement is beyond the
scope of the programme, i.e. the identification of scope creep.
Our third technique uses Hemmati’s MSP methods [128] to manage the stakeholder consulta-
tion processes with the aim of resolving differences in stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM.
Hemmati provides [128] guidance on how to identify stakeholders, both direct and indirect,
and to communicate information, articulate stakeholders’ objectives and preferences, and to
resolve conflict between stakeholders. Our use of the MSP technique should also assist with
the identification of compromise positions on stakeholders’ objectives for an APIM.
In the next two sections we provide further explanations of how these concepts are used in
our evaluation framework and in our selection method.
5.5 The ASMSA Evaluation Framework
We now describe the ASMSA Evaluation Framework in detail by explaining its three
evaluation perspectives based upon the concepts defined in the previous section. We also
explain the interrelationships between the perspectives in our framework, with our factors
and criteria questions, and also with the ASMSA Selection Method. The ASMSA Evaluation
Framework is represented in Figure 5.1.
The ASMSA Evaluation Framework is a meta-evaluation framework operating at a second
order level, aggregating and manipulating data, from primary evaluations, such as a privacy
assessment impact. Data acquired from primary evaluations are the subject data of meta-
evaluations [279]. Subject data acquired are applied against the criteria questions associated
with the factors in the ASMSA Evaluation Framework.
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Figure 5.1: The ASMSA Evaluation Framework
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The evaluation framework is not a simulation of an APIM. It represents a particular appli-
cation context under evaluation, where an APIM has been deployed or an APIM may be
introduced. This model is designed to represent our three identified evaluation perspectives,
which relate to the characteristics of the application context in its current state, the objectives
and requirements for the APIM in a desired state, and the attributes of candidate APIMs or a
deployed APIM.
5.5.1 Aims of the ASMSA Evaluation Framework
The ASMSA Evaluation Framework aims to identify discrepancies in acquired data to
introduce an APIM or to review a deployed APIM. The discrepancies are identified by
comparing the acquired data in the evaluation themes of each perspective. The identification
of the discrepancies in the acquired subject data help to inform decision-makers as an
IS programme progresses from its inception stage, where purpose and incentives require
sagacious consideration, through to eventual deployment and operation.
Data acquired relating to the application context, in the inception stages of an IS programme,
may need to be expressed in broad terms. It may also be necessary to make many assumptions
regarding the requirements for the APIM. As more information becomes available, from the
use of our selection method with its criteria questions, data relating to these assumptions are
refined, recalibrated or eliminated. Previously acquired data should then be compared in
order to identify discrepancies between the existing data set and the additional acquired data
set. The framework is designed to allow for iterative refinement of acquired subject data,
i.e. revision of stakeholders’ objectives and requirements, as further data are acquired from
various primary sources as the IS programme progresses.
Subject data are gathered from primary data sources, categorised into assessment tools types,
as shown on the three dashed horizontal patterned arrows on the right hand side in Figure
5.1. We describe the types of primary data sources later in Section 5.5.4. Data gathered from
these sources are then used to respond to the criteria questions and are represented as subject
data attributes in the evaluation themes of our evaluation framework.
5.5.2 ASMSA’s Evaluation Perspectives
We elucidate on ASMSA Evaluation Framework’s three perspectives.
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Understanding of the Strategic Goals This perspective represents data relating to the
strategic goals for application context in which the APIM will be introduced or has been de-
ployed. This perspective aims, through using the criteria questions in the relevant evaluation
themes, to acquire data so as to gain a thorough understanding of the application context, its
stakeholders and their objectives for the APIM, particularly its main usage purpose and its
intended subject community.
Data are acquired for this perspective using the criteria questions from the evaluation themes
in the left column of Table 5.2 on page 177. The term understanding is preferred to the
term acceptability because we believe that acceptance of an APIM may only be achieved
through gaining an understanding of all stakeholders’ views and their motivations related to
application context in question.
Effectiveness of the Requirements This perspective is designed to acquire and represent
the requirements for the APIM in order to determine whether the stipulated requirements
fulfil stakeholders’ articulated objectives.
Data are acquired for this perspective using the criteria questions from the evaluation themes
in the middle column of Table 5.2. The requirements are expressed as functional requirements,
performance requirements and assurance requirements. This perspective also represents
information regarding the nature of the user’s interactions to use the APIM. It also represents
information about the assurance test plan or test scheme describing as to how, and the extent
to which, the assurance properties of the APIM need to be tested.
Criteria questions in the Effectiveness of Requirements Perspective also seek to help define
the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in order to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of
each candidate APIM as a solution to the identification problem. The criteria questions also
seek explanations on how the defined KPIs are to be evaluated and the data to be acquired in
order to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of a candidate APIM.
Efficiency of APIM Solutions The efficiency of solutions perspective is designed to
represent the attributes of candidate APIMs or a deployed APIM in order to determine the
extent to which a candidate APIM or deployed APIM satisfies the stipulated requirements
for an APIM. Data are acquired for this perspective using the criteria questions from the
evaluation themes in the right column of Table 5.2.
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This perspective also represents the vulnerabilities, issues and costs associated with the
candidate APIM or deployed APIM. We observed through our classification of factors that
all deployed APIMs possess vulnerabilities, attract issues and incur costs; however, this
statement requires empirical grounding using data from our case studies. The selection of an
APIM is identified on the basis of its efficiency to satisfy the stipulated requirements for the
APIM together with the evaluation of the APIM’s associated vulnerabilities, issues and costs.
5.5.3 Interrelationships Between ASMSA’s Components
ASMSA’s Evaluation Framework, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, is designed to work in con-
junction with ASMSA’s Selection Method, as represented in Figure 5.3. The 18 evaluation
themes identified are incorporated into the respective perspectives of the evaluation frame-
work as shown in Table 5.2. The types of tools to acquire subject data for each perspective
are represented by the dashed arrows on the right hand side of Figure 5.1.
The data acquired for the factors in their evaluation themes, using the criteria questions,
collectively represent the three perspectives in the ASMSA Evaluation Framework. The
ASMSA Selection Method comprise three phases which uses the criteria questions to acquire
data for the ASMSA Evaluation Framework’s three perspectives.
The influence relationships between the data recorded in the three perspectives of the ASMSA
Evaluation Framework are:
1. Output Data from the Understanding Perspective The influencer data outputs from
the Understanding Perspective are the stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM; the constraints,
e.g. legal, legacy infrastructures and budgetary; and broad organisational and social policies.
The term policy should be construed as consisting of general principles rather than low-level
implementation security policies, e.g. minimum number of characters in a user’s password.
The constraints set the scope of the APIM and its boundaries in which the requirements are
determined.
Output data represented in the Stakeholders’ Objectives, Policies and Constraints evaluation
themes from the preceding Understanding Perspective as shown in Figure 5.1, forms part
of the input data into in the Effectiveness Perspective. Subject data acquired from Type B
Effectiveness Assessments are the alternative data source.
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2. Output Data from the Effectiveness Perspective The data outputs from the evaluation
themes of the Effectiveness Perspective form data inputs into the Understanding Perspective.
The data outputs in the Functional Requirements, Performance Requirements and Assurance
Requirements evaluation themes of the Effectiveness Perspective also form the data inputs
into the Efficiency Perspective.
The effectiveness attribute data in the Functional Requirements, Performance Requirements
and Assurance Requirements evaluation themes of the Effectiveness Perspective form the
basis upon which candidate APIMs or an APIM deployment are to be evaluated in terms of
their capability and efficiency to fulfil the stipulated requirements.
The influencer data output from the Effectiveness Perspective, as represented by the return ar-
row, form the influences into the Understanding Perspective, which may require stakeholders
to revise their objectives or review identified constraints and policy directives. These data act
as feedback validation of stakeholders’ objectives to the Understanding Perspective. This
review activity enables the identification of discrepancies between the data represented in
the Understanding Perspective and the Effectiveness Perspective.
3. Output Data from the Efficiency Perspective The output data from the preceding
Effectiveness Perspective forms part of the input data for the Efficiency Perspective. Subject
data acquired from Type C Efficiency Assessments are the alternative data source.
The return arrow from the Effectiveness Perspective, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, representing
the identified issues; identified vulnerabilities and actual stakeholders’ costs in the respective
evaluation themes influence the data in the Understanding Perspective. The identification
of discrepancies between the Understanding Perspective, representing the objectives for the
APIM, and the Efficiency Perspective, representing a candidate APIM or a deployed APIM,
acts as feedback to stakeholders to enable them to review their objectives. Our evaluation
framework is designed to enable evaluation at any juncture in an IS programme or upon
demand following the deployment of an APIM.
The reconsideration of the data in the Understanding Perspective, from data outputs from
the Effectiveness and Efficiency Perspectives, and Type A Understanding Assessments may
bring about changes in stakeholders’ objectives or revision of some constraints. An APIM
may also be granted exemption from certain organisational policies. Any amendments are
then reflected in the respective evaluation themes in the Understanding Perspective.
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Figure 5.2: Spectrum of Assessment Tools for Acquiring Subject Data
5.5.4 Categorisation of Primary Data Sources
We used Smithson and Hirschheim’s comprehensive review of IT assessments [272] as our
basis to formulate our categorisation of the types of assessment tools containing primary data.
IT assessments fall across the spectrum between objective and rational analysis to subjective
and political considerations [97]. Additionally, we also recognise that assessments may
report their findings with varying degrees of granularity and scope, from high-level macro
assessments through to micro interrogations, e.g. program coding reviews, as represented in
Figure 5.2.
We categorise the primary data sources into three broad types to correspond with the ASMSA
Evaluation Framework’s three perspectives. The assessment tool examples shown in Figure
5.2 are indicative only, based upon our review of the literature, and these representations
should not be construed as an exhaustive list of primary data sources.
Subject data are acquired from the primary data contained in the following assessment tool
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types:
Type A – Understanding Assessments Subject data for the Understanding Perspective
are acquired from primary data contained in understanding type assessments, which have
investigated the characteristics of the personal automated identification problem in the
application context and have ascertained stakeholders’ objectives.
The purpose of an APIM may be part of an organisation’s security architecture which
controls employees’ access to enterprise data and resources. Alternatively, the introduction
of a business application may require an APIM as an enabling technology. For example, an
Internet banking service must, in accordance with financial regulations in some jurisdictions,
identify and authenticate its customers.
Subject data are designed to be acquired from primary data contained in understanding
assessments data during a programme’s inception stages to introduce an APIM or during the
initial stages to review a deployed APIM.
Type B–Effectiveness Assessments Subject data for the Effectiveness Perspective are
acquired from primary data contained in effectiveness type assessments, which focus on the
stipulation of requirements for the APIM.
Effective requirements engineering is fundamental to an organisation’s ability to develop
products and services in order to keep pace with change and increasing complexity [138].
The form of the primary data describing requirements for the APIM information may be
contained in documentation, expressed in natural language, or in UML notation, or may be
represented by a prototype APIM implementation.
The requirements in the ASMSA Evaluation Framework need to be expressed in natural
language, however, to enable direct comparisons with data acquired in other perspectives.
Requirements expressed in different forms which use different communication protocols,
irrespective of their levels of abstraction, serve as subject data for the Effectiveness Perspec-
tive.
Subject data are acquired from effectiveness type assessments during a programme’s require-
ments development stages after stakeholders’ objectives have been identified and articulated
to introduce or to review an APIM.
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Type C–Efficiency Assessments Subject data for the Efficiency Perspective are acquired
from primary data contained in efficiency type assessments, which occur during the activities
to evaluate candidate APIMs or to evaluate a deployed APIM against stipulated requirements
for the APIM.
The primary data for a candidate APIM may be generated by potential APIM suppliers,
possibly in the form of a bid response to an organisation’s Request For Product (RFP) notice,
which describes the functionality and performance capabilities of their offering. Alternatively,
data may emanate from supplier’s technical specifications.
The data for a deployed APIM may come from a variety of sources, both internal and
external. An organisation may seek data from performance tests to ascertain availability
statistics, throughput rates, and failure rates from an internal laboratory deployment. These
types of statistics from deployed APIM may be derived from event entries collated in audit
logs. Alternatively, data may originate from other sources where the APIM technology has
been deployed in similar application contexts or may originate from independent accredited
assurance sources.
Subject data are acquired by using the criteria questions and extracting the relevant data
evidence from the primary source material available.
5.6 The ASMSA Selection Method
In his framework for evaluating methodologies Jayaratna defines [165] ill-structured con-
textual situations as circumstances when stakeholders’ objectives are vague or conflict, the
identification problems are not understood, the subjects’ attitudes are uncooperative, and
the relationships between the stakeholders are complex and highly political. The circum-
stances surrounding decisions on APIMs often appear to meet for Jayaratna’s criteria for
ill-structured situations. For example, the introduction of an electronic identity card for UK
citizens attracted much criticism because the objectives for the card were not made clear by
the UK Government [317, 21].
We believe that the selection of the optimal APIM for ill-structured situations necessitate
the use of well-defined systematic processes in order to formulate an understanding of the
problem in its current state, a representation of the desired state to address the defined
problem. In turn, candidate APIMs, or a deployed APIM, should be evaluated on the basis
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of their capabilities to achieve that desired state. The ASMSA Selection Method is a meta-
method, operating at a second order level, which aggregates and manipulates data acquired
from primary evaluations, such as a risks assessment or a coding review. Data acquired
from primary evaluations are the subject data of the processes and steps in our method. Our
method consists of systematic processes segregated into three stages as represented in Figure
5.3. Each stage is deconstructed into discrete steps, to acquire and evaluate data for the
selection of the optimal APIM for a given application context. Some steps are designed
to acquire subject data from the application context while the remaining steps involve the
manipulation, validation and reconciliation of that acquired subject data.
The ASMSA Selection Method’s processes acquire subject data, using the criteria questions,
systematically in order to extend the breadth of coverage and the granularity of data acquired
for evaluation.
The ASMSA Selection Method’s processes, using the criteria questions, are designed to
remove misunderstandings that may arise from vague or implicit interpretations of primary
data. As supplemental information are acquired during the use of our selection method
then previous responses to criteria questions may need to be reconsidered or outstanding
assumptions revisited. We acknowledge that there may be some assumptions, however, that
cannot be eliminated entirely. For example, assumptions relating to threats are inevitable as
miscreants’ underlying motives are ephemeral and speculative by nature [78].
The ASMSA Selection Method consists of three stages which aims to inform decision-makers
continuously. The purpose of each stage is to ascertain:
• Stage 1 - an understanding of the application context in order to identify and articulate
stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM and a hierarchy of stakeholders’ preferences;
• Stage 2 - the effectiveness of the stipulated requirements for the APIM to fulfil
stakeholders’ objectives by reconciling requirement statements with stakeholders’
objectives; and
• Stage 3 - the efficiency with which a candidate APIM or a deployed APIM satisfies
the stipulated requirements.
The ASMSA Selection Method identified and articulates stakeholders’ objectives at the
outset so that requirements for the APIM may be reconciled against those stated objectives.
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Figure 5.3: Overview of the ASMSA Selection Method
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Similarly, our method requires candidate APIMs or a deployed APIM to be described com-
prehensively so that their capabilities may be evaluated against the stipulated requirements.
This evaluation includes a task to rate the capabilities of candidate APIMs or a deployed
APIM quantitatively. Our method also contains processes to identify the APIM’s issues,
vulnerabilities and costs associated with deploying an APIM in the application context. The
ASMSA Selection Method analyses several key variables with mixed data types in order to
select the optimal APIM.
Our selection method incorporates a parallel task, throughout all stages, to manage stake-
holder consultation processes, as advocated by Hemmati [128], for reconciling conflicting
stakeholders’ objectives. The use of this technique in our methodology relies upon collabora-
tive dialogue between stakeholders’ representatives, including subjects and users, in order to
acquire data on stakeholders’ objectives and also to coordinate effort to facilitate stakeholder
trade-off compromises and preferences for the APIM.
Our method is designed to ensure that data are acquired, reconciled and manipulated in a
systematic manner, in order to bring regularity to the programmatic processes of selecting
the optimal APIM for a given application context. We now describe the steps in each of the
ASMSA Selection Method’s three stages.
5.6.1 Stage 1–Establishing an Understanding of Stakeholders’ Objectives
The purpose of this initial stage of our selection method is to identify and articulate stake-
holders’ objectives for the APIM and a produce a hierarchy of preferences from an under-
standing of the application context.
The five steps in Stage 1 of our method are designed to acquire subject data relating the
application context from the information contained in outputs produced from Type A Un-
derstanding Assessments. The stakeholders’ objectives based upon contextual information,
together with assumptions, policy directives and constraints influence the evaluations in Stage
2 of our method. The ASMSA Selection Method incorporates the principles of the MOMC
decision-making technique [173, 96] to identify and articulate stakeholders’ objectives and
to prioritise their preferential values for the APIM. The stakeholders’ objectives are then
deconstructed in order to produce a hierarchy of objectives and preferences.
The primary data sources may include a business case for the APIM, feasibility study for
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the APIM and project initiation documentation that describe the purpose for the APIM,
the intended subject community, and the environment, both physical and logical, in which
the APIM will operate. Primary data from assessments, such as risks assessments, privacy
impact assessments are also used to acquire data in order to respond to the criteria questions.
The method depends upon the output of a risks assessment, however rudimentary, in order to
determine the extent to which identification assurance is needed for the APIM.
While the output in these assessments may contain factual impact data, e.g. actual losses,
much of these types of assessment rely on probability predictions and assumptions. Prob-
abilities, which are based upon individuals’ beliefs, preferences and utility judgments,
influence subsequent analysis and decision-making [179]. The method is designed so that
probability predictions may be recalibrated following the acquisition of further relevant
data. The method is also designed to reduce the impact of assumptions by ensuring that all
assumptions are reviewed at the end of each stage in our method.
5.6.1.1 Step 1–Understand the Application Context
An understanding of the application context is achieved by acquiring subject data, using
the criteria questions in the Strategic Issues, Risks Assessment, Social Acceptability, Risks
Controls and Business Case evaluation themes from the application context’s primary data
sources.
This step requires that the rationality for introducing or revising an APIM is articulated
concisely by the sponsor stakeholder, in order to avoid misinterpretation, irrespective of
the underlying political or commercial drivers. Clarity of the APIM’s purpose assists the
processes in our selection method to acquire the relevant data and the evaluation of that
acquired data in its succeeding steps.
We anticipate that a substantial amount of data acquired in this step may be based on assump-
tions; however, our method allows for data to be added or revised following corroboration
with other data acquired during later steps of our method. The design of our selection method
enables an iterative approach in that an evaluation may return to any previous step.
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5.6.1.2 Step 2–Ascertain Stakeholders’ Objectives
This step is one of the most critical in our method because stakeholders’ willingness and
commitment to use an APIM should be determined at the outset. The criteria questions in
the Business Case Evaluation Theme are used to acquire data on the stakeholders’ objectives
for the introducing or revising an APIM.
Subject data are acquired from all relevant stakeholders so that a diversity of viewpoints
help to reduce the risks of specifying incomplete objectives for the APIM. There may be
circumstances, however, which prohibit the involvement of the subject or user community or
there may be monetary or time constraints that inhibit efforts to establish all stakeholders’
objectives, given the core purpose for the APIM.
This step requires managed consultation with the stakeholders in order to obtain their views
and degree of commitment for introducing or revising a deployed APIM for the application
context. The initial task of stakeholder identification is important, so that interested parties,
both direct and indirect entities, engage in the consultation processes.
In some application contexts the objectives of indirect stakeholders, not operating in the
application context, are also identified and included within the consultation processes. Indi-
rect stakeholders may be impacted adversely by the failure of an APIM to identify genuine
subjects to a predetermined level of assurance.
The data acquired representing the stakeholders’ objectives are then compared for alignment
with the sponsor stakeholder’s purpose for the APIM. Depending upon the outcome of the
processes to align stakeholders’ objectives, with the stated purpose of the APIM, this step
may require the re-evaluation of the stated purpose for the APIM or further clarification of
some of the stakeholders’ objectives.
The sponsor stakeholder may, however, opt to cancel or postpone the introduction of an
APIM where significant conflict between stakeholders may not be resolved satisfactorily for
all interested parties. In such cases our method should be aborted at this step.
5.6.1.3 Step 3–Ensure Alignment with Policies
This step requires the acquired stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM to be checked for their
alignment with stakeholders’ organisational policies. These policies may include ethical
200
5.6 The ASMSA Selection Method
policies and environmental directives together with security policies. The criteria questions
in the Risks Controls and Social Acceptability Evaluation Themes should be used to acquire
data to ensure alignment with stakeholders’ organisational policies.
From the result of these comparisons, it may be necessary for some organisations, particularly
the sponsor, to seek exemption or refine policies in order to accommodate all the stakeholders’
objectives. Alternatively, some objectives may need to be re-evaluated and possibly revised
or removed where the results of comparing the objectives for the APIM contradict a policy
that may not be revised.
5.6.1.4 Step 4–Identify Constraints
This step requires the identification of constraints to introduce an APIM or revise a deployed
APIM for the application context. The criteria questions in the Business Case, Social
Acceptability and Strategic Issues Evaluation Themes are used to acquire data in order to
identify the constraints relating to introducing or revising an APIM.
Information system development effort together with associated budgetary restrictions and
delivery timescales are often recognised as constraints on APIM deployments. Nevertheless,
other constraints need to be identified, such as international interoperability, social norms,
infrastructure limitations and legacy system restrictions, which may impact the stakeholders’
objectives.
5.6.1.5 Step 5–Establish a Hierarchy of Objectives
In this step we draw heavily on Homburg’s technique [134] to create a hierarchy of objectives
and preferences for the APIM. The hierarchy of stakeholders’ objectives articulated are to be
mapped to requirements in Stage 2 Step 2, which we describe later in Stage 2. The tasks in
this step are as follows:
A. Review Articulation of Objectives Review the stakeholders’ objectives data acquired
in order to determine whether the objectives have been described sufficiently to reflect
the purpose for the APIM. This task also ensures that implied objectives are stated
explicitly. Also the review determines whether the stated objectives for the APIM have
the potential to be achieved within the identified policies and constraints. The result of
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this review may require a revision of some stakeholders’ objectives.
B. Rank Objectives through Consultation Consult the stakeholders to rank the stated ob-
jectives, using the MSP technique, as a continuation of their engagement that was
established in Stage 1. This prioritisation task is geared to demonstrate the sponsor or
decision authority’s accommodation of the stakeholder’s preferences and to provide
documentary evidence where trade-offs have been conceded. Each high-level objective
is assigned to a preference category, e.g. must have, should have, and desirable, to
indicate its agreed priority with stakeholders. There may be a point where a judgment
has to be made regarding stakeholders’ expectations. The engagement of an acceptable
independent mediator, using MSP consultation processes, has the potential to identify
compromises, with advantages for all, thereby overcoming disputants’ tensions and
antagonisms [87]. Failure to obtain stakeholder acceptance may result in stakeholder
actions that hinder progress to realise the stated purpose or goal for the APIM.
C. Decompose the Objectives Decompose the APIM’s objectives until the sub-objectives
become broad high-level requirement statements. This task results in a description of
the sub-objectives to fulfil the prime stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM. Homburg
advises [134] that the more the objectives in the hierarchy are sub-divided the easier
it becomes to recognise the attributes for measurement and their appropriate scale.
These attributes, i.e. requirements, are acquired and validated in the next stage of our
method.
5.6.2 Stage 2–Reconciling Requirements to Stakeholders’ Objectives
The main aim of our method in Stage 2 is to identify and articulate the requirements for the
APIM. The secondary aim is to identify potential issues and deficiencies in the requirement
statements to fulfil the stakeholders’ objectives.
The steps in Stage 2 of our method acquire subject data using the Type B Effectiveness As-
sessments in order to document the requirements for the APIM. The stipulated requirements
for the APIM are then reconciled against the stakeholders’ objectives and preferences, as
represented in the hierarchy of objectives. This reconciliation task determines whether the
stipulated requirements effectively fulfil the stakeholders’ objectives and preferences for the
APIM.
The functional, performance and assurance requirements statements together with the pro-
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posed assurance test plan, as outputs from Stage 2 of our method, represent a requirements
specification for the APIM. This specification may be used to engage with potential suppliers
of APIM technologies or services; however, such procurement processes are beyond the
scope of our research.
5.6.2.1 Step 1–Requirements Data Acquisition
This step uses the criteria questions in the Functionality, Community and Usability, Privacy
Compliance, Credential Registration, Controls’ Performance and Assurance Requirements
evaluation themes in order to acquire the data to specify the requirements for the APIM.
Information system requirements are captured from a variety of primary sources which in-
clude interviews with stakeholders, scenario exploitation in workshops, appraisals of existing
systems, prototyping and studies [138]. Our method is designed to utilise these primary
data sources and also outputs from participative design tools in order to acquire subject
data relating to the requirements for the APIM. Avison suggests [20] that the advantages
of using a participative design approach, not only includes output covering the design of
the information system and identification of its required technological components, but
also the deliverables expected during the various stages of the IS development project, e.g.
requirements specification.
The following tasks in this step are also designed to review the acquired requirement state-
ments in Stage 2 against the objectives in acquired in Stage 1 in order to identify discrepancies
in the data for the APIM:
A. Validation of Requirements A review of stipulated requirements is required to identify
contradictory and vague expressions which may result in misinterpretations. This
activity also involves checking the alignment between the APIM’s user interaction
dialogue and the users’ operational tasks. This activity is also designed to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the functional and non-functional requirements for the
APIM. The output from using of prototypes, simulations, or where possible, pilot
APIMs in live operational environments is used to validate stipulated requirements
and also to identify refinements.
B. Costs Estimations Cost estimations are performed to determine whether the proposed
requirements for the APIM, as stipulated at this juncture, have the potential to fulfil the
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benefits, as stated in the business case, within the budget, as estimated in the feasibility
study. The main output from this task is to estimate the costs for the APIM and to
identify issues which may impact stakeholders’ objectives.
C. Test Methodology and Assurance Resources The test methodology is employed to as-
sess the assurance attributes of the candidate APIM or deployed APIM. The aim here
is to state how data test evidence to substantiate claimed capabilities are to be collated
and represented. Criteria questions are designed to acquire data on test plans and
corresponding test specifications of the functional and non-functional requirements
for the APIM. The APIM may also need to be tested to meet assurance requirements
set by external governance parties to a commonly recognised assurance scheme, e.g.
common criteria protection profile, to demonstrate specific assurance capabilities.
D. Reduce Assumptions This task is designed to eliminate assumptions made in response
to the criteria questions, during the data acquisition processes of Stage 1 and Stage
2. Where it is not possible to eliminate assumptions then the basis upon which those
assumptions need to be reviewed. Where data acquired include calibrated estimations,
based on Hubbard’s measurement rules [136], then the basis for these projections also
need to be reconsidered. The aim of this task is to reduce uncertainties for the APIM
by minimising the risks associated with assumptions.
5.6.2.2 Step 2–Matching Requirements to Objectives
In this step, the requirements specified are reconciled against the agreed stakeholders’
objectives in order to identify any discrepancies in the acquired data. Essentially, the
effectiveness of requirements is determined by the extent to which they fulfil stakeholders’
objectives for the APIM, within the limitation of identified constraints and policies.
The first task in this step is to reconcile stakeholders’ objectives and requirements to ensure
that all stakeholders’ objectives have at least one statement of requirement. A requirement
may fulfil one or more stakeholder objective. Where a requirement cannot be reconciled
to a stakeholder objective investigation is needed to ascertain whether there is a missing
stakeholder objective or the requirement is spurious.
The aim of this reconciliation task is to ensure the requirements are complete, appropriate and
consistent with the stakeholders’ objectives. It also provides a means to identify redundant
requirements. Depending upon the results of this step the objectives may need to be reviewed
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with the stakeholders or the requirements for the APIM may require further examination.
The second task in this step is to evaluate envisaged issues and vulnerabilities together
with estimated costs of introducing an APIM or revising a deployed APIM against the
stakeholders’ objectives. The outcome of this evaluation is to be communicated to the
stakeholders to ensure that these envisaged issues, vulnerabilities and costs are acceptable to
them in terms of fulfilling their respective objectives. The outcome of this evaluation may
identify the need for some stakeholders to reconsider their objectives.
The task to ensure that envisaged issues and vulnerabilities together with estimated costs
are acceptable to the stakeholders, therefore, is a critical activity in the ASMSA Selection
Method.
The outcome of consultations between the stakeholders may result in the dilution or re-
prioritisation of some of the stakeholders’ objectives or alternatively it may indicate the need
to increase the budget for the APIM or the termination of the IS programme. Apart from
termination, if other options are chosen then the processes in Stage 2 of our selection method
are to be repeated.
The data acquired and reconciled successfully, as a result of the two tasks in this stage,
represent the qualities of APIM, i.e. requirement statements, which need to be evaluated
against the attributes of candidate APIMs or deployed APIM. The steps for evaluating
candidate APIMs or a deployed APIM are performed in Stage 3 of our selection method.
5.6.3 Stage 3–Efficiency of Candidate APIMs or Deployed APIM
The aim of our method in Stage 3 is to evaluate the subject data describing the capabilities of
candidate APIMs or a deployed APIM against the stipulated requirements for the APIM in
order to identify the optimal APIM for selection.
The initial processes in this stage evaluate the capabilities and the efficiency with which
an APIM candidate fulfils the requirements for the APIM. Our method allows for several
candidate APIMs to be evaluated against the requirements in order to perform comparisons
between the candidates. This stage is also designed to identify vulnerabilities, issues and
costs associated with each candidate APIM or deployed APIM.
The steps in Stage 3 of our method acquires subject data from primary data contained
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in outputs from Type C Efficiency Assessments in order to represent the attributes and
capabilities of the APIM. The extent to which an APIM’s capability fulfils a requirement
may be rated by an evaluator or, alternatively, an evaluation panel. A deployed APIM’s
capabilities are rated in respect to which its attributes currently fulfils the stated requirements.
These rating values are generated in Step 2 and used in Step 4 and Step 5 in processes to
ascertain the optimal APIM.
5.6.3.1 Step 1–Candidate APIM Data Acquisition
This step uses the criteria questions in the Security Architecture, Identifier Credential and
Technology evaluation themes to acquire data in order to articulate the attributes of the
APIM and its proposed configuration for the application context. The criteria questions in
the Reliability Testing, Usability Testing and Accessibility testing evaluation themes are
used to acquire data regarding an APIM’s reliability, usability and accessibility capabilities
respectively.
The primary data for these four evaluation themes may be acquired from a supplier, testing the
candidate APIMs using trial deployments in a controlled environment, e.g. laboratory, and/or
in the production environment, where possible. The application context may require specific
tests to be performed in order to acquire data relating to an APIM’s potential performance
in a specific production environment. Performance testing in the laboratory or simulated
use cases may also provide data on the accuracy and speed of an APIM to identify a person.
These activities and subsequent analysis help to highlight the issues and vulnerabilities, if
any, between requirements set and a candidate APIM’s actual performance, later in Step 2.
Vulnerability assessments by the IS programme may be undertaken to determine the effort,
i.e. the resources and knowledge, required to exploit possible attack vectors in the APIM for
that application context. Additionally, a code inspection may also reveal lower level software
flaws that could, potentially be exploited by miscreants. Vulnerabilities in APIM designs
may not only stem from technological attack vectors but also those flaws emanating from
user erroneous misuse of the APIM.
Usability tests and user accessibility tests may be undertaken by the IS programme to identify
any interaction design deficiencies in the proposed APIM. These tests are user-focused to
validate that the user is not only able to undertake their task efficiently, but also, as Yee
advises [329], to assess the extent to which the user has confidence in the system to protect
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their interests. These data are used to identify issues relating to the APIM later in Step 3.
5.6.3.2 Step 2–Rate the Capabilities of Each Candidate APIM
This step uses the data acquired in the previous step to evaluate a candidate or deployed
APIM’s capabilities against the stipulated requirements. The data acquired are used to rate an
APIM’s capabilities in respect of the extent to which it satisfies the stipulated requirements
for the APIM.
This step requires a rating value for an APIM’s capability to be entered against the factors in
the Functionality, Privacy Compliance, Credential Registration, Controls’ Performance and
Assurance Requirements evaluation themes. This evaluation depends upon the sufficiency of
data acquired in the previous step. Inadequacies in data acquired may require an evaluator to
make assumptions, which need to be recorded.
The method uses a rating scheme based upon percentage fulfilment of the requirement. The
rating scheme also employs adjusted weightings for either an evaluation theme or a specific
factor. We have opted for a quantitative evaluation scheme rather than a qualitative scheme
in order to provide greater granularity of grading an APIMs’ capabilities to satisfy specific
requirements. The use of quantitative evaluation scheme enables direct comparisons of
fulfilment, for each evaluation theme, between the candidate APIMs’ capabilities.
The data acquired from the previous step may contain specific values, e.g. false accept rates,
or mixed data types from appraisals that use opinion based evidence. APIMs that fully satisfy
all the requirements for APIMs are strong candidates for selection; however, the aim of this
activity is to articulate the extent in terms of the proficiencies and also the deficiencies of
each APIM to fulfil the stated requirements.
5.6.3.3 Step 3–Identify Issues, Vulnerabilities and Costs of Each Candidate APIM
The aim of the evaluation in this step is to identify issues, vulnerabilities and to clarify the
costs associated with each candidate APIM or deployed APIM.
Subject data for this step are acquired from the tests results data using the criteria questions
in the Reliability Testing, Usability Testing, User Accessibility Testing evaluation themes.
Data from the remaining evaluation themes are also reviewed in order to identify issues and
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vulnerabilities and to clarify the costs associated with each candidate APIM or deployed
APIM. Subject data may also be acquired from deployments using the APIM in other similar
application contexts.
The issues associated with an APIM may range from the need for users to purchase equipment,
e.g. smart card readers, to the limitations of biometric identification technologies to acquire
biometric data to an acceptable quality, e.g. fingerprint minutiae, for some subjects in the
community. The vulnerabilities associated with an APIM may range from the identification
of software coding errors to the distribution of users’ authentication data, e.g. a PIN value,
to the users through an open mail network.
The issues and vulnerabilities identified may be capable of being fully resolved, partially
resolved or may be regarded by stakeholders as intractable. This step, however, is to identify
and record those issues and not to address them at this juncture. Some issues relating
to technological limitations of deployed APIMs suggest that stakeholders may need to
re-examine their objectives or requirements. Some identified vulnerabilities may require
additional security controls to minimise the impact of their exploitation.
A stakeholder may choose to accept some identified vulnerabilities and manage the residual
risks associated with the identified vulnerabilities; however, at this juncture subject data
are required on the estimated costs related to managing identified issues and the costs of
additional controls to minimise the impact of an identified vulnerability.
Subject data for the APIM costs may be acquired from suppliers and also from internal
reviews of the impacts of the APIM on existing information systems, infrastructures and
resources. Our criteria questions are posed to acquire data on various costs elements from the
capital cost elements, e.g. purchase of technology, technology development and integration,
and maintenance costs relating to the effort to support the APIM continually.
The completion of this step enables the cross-case evaluation of candidate APIMs for a new
application context and also the evaluation of candidate APIMs to replace or to enhance a
deployed APIM.
5.6.3.4 Step 4–Comparison of Candidate APIMs
This step differs depending upon whether the evaluation relates to the introduction of an
APIM or a deployed APIM.
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For those circumstances that require to introduce an APIM then our method compares
the data acquired for each candidate APIM. This step involves the cross evaluation of the
candidate APIMs against four main constructs:
1. The capability ratings of the candidate APIM against the stated requirements.
2. The issues associated with the candidate APIM.
3. The vulnerabilities associated with the candidate APIM.
4. The level of investment required by the sponsor and other stakeholders to deploy and
operate the APIM.
There may be several candidate APIMs that possess the required capabilities, possess
vulnerabilities with minimal impact, attract issues that may be resolved or managed with
reasonable effort, and require a level of investment that falls within the budget to introduce
and operate the APIM over its expected life time.
The method, at this juncture, requires the elimination of some of the candidate APIMs, using
the capability and investment constructs in order to produce a short-list so that selection
effort is concentrated on two or three candidate APIMs.
The initial task involves the elimination of candidate APIMs with capabilities that that do
not satisfy the stipulated requirements for the APIM, in that their assigned scores fall below
the 50 per cent threshold, i.e. denoting that their capabilities are insufficient.
Next the remaining candidate APIMs are eliminated from the selection process if a candidate
APIM possesses vulnerabilities which are not capable of being remedied or accepted by
stakeholders. Similarly, a candidate APIM that could potentially attract intractable issues,
which may be impractical to manage, e.g. large proportion of subject community unable to
produce a specific biometric modality, is also eliminated from the selection process. Where
stakeholders opt to include a candidate APIM with issues and vulnerabilities then the costs
of compensating for these two elements need to be ascertained by the evaluator.
The total cost of an APIM is derived by aggregating the investment required for the candidate
APIM together with the costs related to managing the identified issues and the costs of
controls to reduce the risks related with identified vulnerabilities which are associated with
the candidate APIM. Candidate APIMs with total costs that exceed the budget for the APIM,
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over its expected life time, are eliminated from the selection process. We eliminate these
candidate APIMs on the assumption that it would be difficult to justify the deployment of an
APIM if its total costs exceed stakeholders’ loss expectancies or the claimed stakeholders’
benefits for the APIM were exceeded by the total costs for the APIM.
The candidate APIM with the highest capability score is evaluated as being the optimal
APIM for the application context provided that the total cost of that candidate APIM falls
within the budget allocated by stakeholders.
If no candidate APIM remains within the budget allocated then our method requires the
stakeholders to review the original budget against the stakeholders’ objectives and the
requirements for the APIM. Stakeholders may decide to refine their objectives or revise their
requirements for the APIM. Stakeholders may also decide to terminate the introduction of an
APIM. Our selection method is then invoked at the appropriate juncture and the evaluation
continues with the modified data, depending upon the outcome of stakeholders’ deliberations
on increasing the budget and/or revising the requirements for the APIM.
In order to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of a deployed APIM, then this step
requires a gap analysis to be performed between stipulated requirements and the APIM’s
actual performance together with an evaluation of the identified issues, vulnerabilities and
total costs. The system owner or stakeholder decision authority may, depending upon the
outcome of the gap analysis, choose to remain with the deployed APIM or may decide to
investigate possible changes to the deployed APIM.
Data acquired from candidate APIMs to replace or enhance a deployed APIM may then
be evaluated against the stipulated requirements using the steps in Stage 3 of our selection
method. Based upon the results of these evaluations stakeholders may select to remain with
the deployed APIM or may decide to enhance or replace the existing APIM.
5.6.3.5 Step 5–Select Optimal APIM
This step uses the extrapolations in the previous step to select the candidate optimal APIM
with the highest scored capabilities exhibiting manageable issues and vulnerabilities together
with acceptable costs to fulfil the requirements for the APIM. An optional task in this step is
to formulate a justification for the selected APIM.
Where the results of these evaluations produce are two candidate APIMs with the identical
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capabilities then the weightings for critical factors are adjusted according to stakeholders’
preferences. It may also be necessary to review the rating values allocated to these factors
for other candidate APIMs which were eliminated from selection in the previous step. The
resulting scores for candidate APIMs with identical capabilities should then reveal the more
favourable candidate APIM; however, the variation between weighted scores may only be
marginal.
Each candidate APIM possesses capabilities to fulfil the stipulated requirements and also
some deleterious properties. Where a situation demands demonstrable impartiality or decision
transparency, it may be appropriate to engage an independent authority to oversee some of the
processes in our selection method. An independent authority may also need to communicate
the justification of their decision to select a particular APIM to stakeholders and other
interested parties.
Essentially, the data acquired and data manipulation activities in ASMSA Selection Method’s
processes form an audit trail which provides substantiated evidence to justify the selection
of a particular APIM. We recognised, from the development of our selection method, that
further data, in addition to data relating to our initially identified factors, needed to be
acquired from the application context, e.g. stakeholder’s objectives and predictions on costs
for the APIM. The data acquired from our three case studies not only enabled us to validate
our initially identified factors but also assisted us to identify further factors for evaluating
APIMs.
5.7 The ASMSA Decision Support System
This section describes the ASMSA Decision Support System (ASMSA-DSS) which is our
implementation of the ASMSA Methodology. We did not set out to develop a decision
support system per se; however, we recognised that we needed a software tool to support our
research activities.
A Decision Support System (DSS) is an interactive computer-based system or subsystem
intended to help decision-makers use communications technologies, data, documents, knowl-
edge and/or models to identify and solve problems, complete decision process tasks, and
make decisions [239]. A DSS is a type of expert system which is often used to solve or to
provide a software support tool in order to solve problems that are normally encountered by
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human experts, or practitioners, in given situational contexts [294].
Royer argues [257], based upon interviews with several IdM discipline experts, that a DSS is
necessary, due to the contextual complexities, to support decision-makers in selecting the
appropriate enterprise IdM system. We developed the ASMSA-DSS prototype to assist our
research effort to validate our methodology and to manage our large data sets (mainly in text
form) acquired from our three case studies.
5.7.1 Design of the ASMSA-DSS
The design of our DSS draws on Sowa’s knowledge representation principles [273] to
represent discipline experts’ knowledge in an expert system.
The ASMSA-DSS prototype is designed to mirror the stages and steps of the ASMSA
Selection Method, which include the factors and the criteria questions in the evaluation
themes of the ASMSA Evaluation Framework. The steps in the ASMSA-DSS involve data
acquisition, using the criteria questions or data manipulation tasks to align with the ASMSA
Selection Method. The ASMSA-DSS is designed to aid the evaluation of qualitative acquired
data, in a series of processes, in order to identify the optimal APIM.
The ASMSA-DSS prototype possesses functional utilities to search for textual elements in
the acquired data sets and to generate standard reports, which include tables and graphs.
These utilities proved a valuable tool in our analysis of our three case study data sets. The
ASMSA-DSS also contains a program function to differentiate candidate APIM capability
rating scores quantitatively. The ASMSA-DSS prototype does not determine the optimal
APIM for the application context in question by using fuzzy logic or similar mathematical
decision modelling techniques. Its main purpose is to manage large data sets in order to
evaluate data qualitatively.
Makowski and Wierzbicki argue [192] that the key design question for decision support
systems is about separating the representation of objective knowledge and subjective infor-
mation in the decision context. Objective knowledge relates the external physical, technical
and environment characteristics of the application context. Subjective information includes
the individual knowledge and preferences of stakeholder organisations’ decision-makers.
We adopt an integrated approach in that some of our criteria questions seek factual knowledge
from the application context while other criteria questions demand sagacious consideration,
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particularly information relating to a contemplation of values and expression of preferences.
An example of a criterion question requiring a careful contemplation of values could relate
to a trade-off between increased investment levels versus marginal system performance in
terms of identification throughput speeds.
The ASMSA-DSS prototype system allowed us to segregate our efforts to manage our
acquired case study data from our activities of amending, creating and removing factors as a
result of our factor validation efforts. Our DSS is essentially a software application in which
we could manipulate its processes and content to align with the ASMSA Methodology’s
components as they evolved during the implementation of our research plan.
The ASMSA-DSS prototype is designed to be utilised by an evaluator user or discipline
expert user to acquire data from an application context in order to identify the optimal APIM.
The interface is menu-driven in that the user may choose when to insert data acquired relating
to a specific factor rather than being forced to answer the criteria questions in the prototype
sequentially. We provide screen shots samples of an evaluator’s tasks to input data into the
ASMSA-DSS prototype and also to manipulate that data.
Figure 5.4 shows the ASMSA-DSS’ user interface for the evaluator user’s task to enter
acquired data, in this case a requirement for covert or overt identification. This figure shows
the factor of ‘6. Overt or Covert Identification’ followed by two criteria questions underneath
and the acquired data ‘The identifier / password is overt identification ..... ’ in the dialogue
input box below.
Figure 5.5 shows the ASMSA-DSS prototype’s user interface for the evaluator user’s task
involving a data manipulation activity, where the objectives for an APIM are reconciled
against the detailed requirements for an APIM. This figure shows ‘Objective 1 of 66’ with
the objective of ‘Minimise any learning.....’ in the dialogue box below, which has been
reconciled against the requirements listed in the ‘Matched requirements’ dialogue box. The
list of requirements in the dialogue box below ‘Available requirements’ may be selected by
the evaluator user to fulfil the stated objective of ‘minimising any learning’.
One of the key functionalities of the ASMSA-DSS prototype, in order to align with Hom-
burg’s objectives deconstruction technique [134], is to ensure that all objectives possess
subordinate requirements and all requirements are linked to one or more parent objective.
The ASMSA-DSS prototype provides screen warnings if these conditions, as shown in the
top right quadrant of Figure 5.5, are not met.
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Figure 5.4: Entering Acquired Data into the ASMSA-DSS Prototype
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Figure 5.5: Manipulating Acquired Data in the ASMSA-DSS Prototype
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Figure 5.6: Managing Factors in the ASMSA-DSS Prototype
The ASMSA-DSS prototype is also designed to be utilised by an administrator user with
the functionality to add, amend and delete a factor or to move a factor between evaluation
themes. We used the administrator user account to add the initial factors identified in our
review of the literature. We also used this account to add the steps within each stage of
the ASMSA Selection Method. The administrator user account also contains functions to
rename a factor title or to revise the criterion question related to a factor.
Figure 5.6 shows as an illustration of the ASMSA-DSS prototype’s user interface for an
administrator user’s task to amend a criterion question relating to a factor. In the example
the criterion question text alongside the ‘Criterion Definition’, shown in Figure 5.6, may be
amended by the administrator user. We used this functionality to revise our criteria questions
as a result of our factor evaluation efforts.
The administrator user’s amendment of the criteria questions are then reflected in the
ASMSA-DSS prototype’s user interface when an evaluator user attempts to enter acquired
data, in this case a requirement for covert or overt identification, in the respective dialogue,
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box as shown in Figure 5.4.
We used this administrator account extensively to update the prototype as a result of our
factor validation efforts. We used the evaluator user account to enter the subject data acquired
from each case study against the respective factors and also to subsequently manipulate
that acquired data. The evaluator user account was used by the Director of Risks during
Corporation X’s utilisation of the ASMSA Methodology to determine the optimal two factor
authentication solution for their employees and agents.
5.7.2 Development of the ASMSA-DSS Prototype
Our method to develop the ASMSA-DSS prototype commenced with producing a functional
specification for a decision support system based upon the initial ASMSA Methodology. We
then tested the core functionality of the prototype against our functional specification, for
example adding textual information acquired to a factor data field. We updated the factor
labels, the criteria questions and the factor explanation notes iteratively as the result of our
efforts to validate our identified factors.
We based our implementation of the ASMSA-DSS around the Microsoft Access 2007
database product because this application was readily available to us and amendments to the
visual basic application code could be achieved relatively easily. We took the decision to
use commercially available software to implement the ASMSA-DSS prototype in order to
allow us to focus our efforts on pursuing our case study research activities. For our prototype,
we did not wish to spend significant effort on assessing and learning to use an artificial
intelligence software programming language, such as LISP (LISt Processing).
Our ASMSA-DSS prototype implementation contains a series of front-end data entry forms
and back-end databases. The prototype’s application code, compiled using visual basic in
the .net environment, provides the functionality for the front-end data entry forms and also
the facilities to search for textual strings in acquired data, and to generate reports from the
data, stored in its back-end databases.
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5.8 Summary of Chapter
This chapter provided descriptions of our efforts to identify factors to evaluate an APIM and
also to develop a systematic methodology for selecting APIMs for an application context, in
order to address our first two research questions.
We described the characteristics of the selection problem and explained our rationale for
developing a systematic methodology and how a systematic methodology could be used
to select an APIM. We described the ASMSA Methodology and how it could be used as
a means to acquire data pertaining to an application context and to evaluate that data in a
systematic fashion in order to support decision-making.
In order to address our first research question, we detailed our method to identify factors for
evaluating APIMs for an application context. We then described our method to classify the
factors we identified in the literature. These factors are presented in tables in Appendix A.
Based upon our classification of our factors and their classification into evaluation themes,
we then describe our method for developing an evaluation framework and a selection method
for our systematic methodology. We provided a description of the underlying principles
upon which the ASMSA Methodology is designed. We also provided a detailed description
of the ASMSA Methodology and its components.
We described the ASMSA-DSS prototype. This implementation is a decision support system
based upon the components of the ASMSA Methodology. We briefly described our software
development approach and have given examples of how the prototype may be used to support
our research aims and to manage large volumes of qualitative and quantitative data.
In the next two chapters, we describe our efforts to validate our identified factors and their
associated criteria questions using data from our two retrospective case studies. We validate
the design and assess the efficacy of the ASMSA Methodology in our third case study.
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This chapter describes our case study of an EU state’s eID Card Programme. We begin by
describing the background details of our case study and the data acquired. We then discuss
the results of our efforts to validate our identified factors using data from this case study.
We then focus on our main unit of analysis by examining the approach pursued by the EU
state’s eID Card Programme. We also examine interviewees’ retrospective insights on the
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expert-led approach pursued by the programme, using our analytical framework, in order to
identify methodological learnings. Finally, we draw our initial conclusions on our two units
of analysis.
6.1 Background on the EU State’s eID Card Programme
This section describes the background of this programme without revealing details about
the state, organisations or individuals involved in the research. This section builds upon
the information provided in Section 4.3.1. We anonymise the identity of our interviewees
and their organisations in accordance with the agreed consent arrangements. Therefore, we
provide general descriptions about subjects and objects rather than divulging specific names.
Our case study relates to a member state of the European Union (EU) which was one
of the earliest states in the world to introduce an Electronic Identity (eID) card for the
purposes of providing on-line authentication for its citizens. It was possibly one of the
most mature eID card deployments, at the time of our research, judging by the extent and
quality of educational material made available to its citizens by the state’s Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) Agency. There are several scientific papers on the ID
card’s implementation and deployment, particularly the identification of security and privacy
vulnerabilities relating to the eID card’s usage on the Internet, produced by members of the
indigenous academic community. Our case study period concentrates from the inception of
the eID Card Programme in 1999 until 31st December 2010.
The aim of this EU state’s eID Card Programme was primarily to replace paper based national
identity cards with a contact smart card, containing an Integrated Circuit Card (ICC). The eID
Card would be designed to provide face-to-face identification and also on-line authentication
of the state’s citizens to government and commercial relying parties. The introduction of the
eID card was considered by the EU state’s Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to be an enabling
technology to support this state’s strategic objective to increase on-line transactions, as part
of the state’s drive to modernise its society’s use of technologies.
The EU state’s eID Card Programme had three main objectives:
• to migrate from a paper based identity card to an eID smart card in order to reduce
counterfeiting;
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• to introduce on-line authentication capabilities for its citizens on approved Internet
applications; and
• to enable its citizens to generate digital signatures in compliance with national leg-
islation, representing that EU state’s adoption of the EU Directive on Electronic
Signatures.1
This state’s citizens had used identity cards since the Second World War. The state’s National
Identity Registry (NIR) maintained the central repository containing information on citizens
which mainly consisted of a citizen’s national identifier reference, their biographical data,
and a facial image. The NIR had developed information systems for managing citizen’s
personal data and the local municipality governments possessed systems to perform the
registration of citizens and eID card administrative duties.
The MOI, through its system integrator partnerships, was the sole issuing authority for
producing the eID cards to the state’s citizens. There were many organisations, including
government departments and commercial businesses, which relied on the eID card for citizen
identification and authentication, for both face-to-face identity verification purposes, e.g. by
the police authorities, and also for on-line transactions over the Internet, e.g. government
websites.
Relying party organisations, e.g. the police, used the facial image embossed on to the
surface of the plastic eID Card for the face-to-face identity verification functionality. The
cryptographic capabilities of the eID card are used by relying parties for authenticating
citizens’ transactions over the Internet. The citizen was required to enter their Personal
Identification Number (PIN) to activate the cryptographic capabilities of their private keys
embedded in the eID card. The citizen typically transacted remotely with federal government
websites in order to submit their income tax returns; with local municipal government in
order to request rubbish disposal facilities; and with commercial organisations in order to
purchase goods and to use on-line services.
The state’s MOI concluded that a plastic smart card with a contact ICC and specific logical
properties, together with other physical controls, would offer the appropriate counterfeit
protection. It transpired that the programme concentrated the majority of its efforts on the
development and deployment of the functional capabilities of the eID card and the associated
middleware to enable the on-line identification and authentication of its citizens, by relying
1http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31999L0093:en:HTML
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parties, for eGovernment and eCommerce services.
6.2 Data Gathered
This section describes the data gathered using our stated data collection techniques, described
in Section 4.4, in terms of documentary objects acquired; subjects interviewed; and the
recording of our own observations.
6.2.1 Documentary Evidence
Our case study documentary evidence comes mainly from three main sources; namely,
official government sources in the EU state, the state’s indigenous academic community
and study reports produced by internationally recognised organisations, e.g. OECD and
independent research bodies supported by EU funding.
Much documentary evidence was acquired from the EU state’s federal government websites
and from the official publications issued by the federal and local governments of that state.
Our interviewees obtained the necessary authority from their respective organisations to
release some programme documentation to us, e.g. tender documentation, which were no
longer in the public domain.
6.2.1.1 EU State’s Publications
We found 22 publications which were produced either by the state’s MOI, its Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) Agency, or by departments in its regional governments.
We refrain from producing a list of these publications because their titles would enable the
identification of the programme in this case study.
The most pertinent documents to our case study research were those produced, by a pro-
fessional services company, for the EU state’s MOI; the ICT Agency; and the NIR. These
documents included the Request for Proposal (RFPl) for the manufacturing, personalisation
and distribution of digital identities and the provision of certification services. The ICT
Agency and the eID Card Programme were formally established shortly after the production
of these documents.
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The confidential eID card chip (ICC) specifications and the requirements for certification
practice statements for the eID card documents contained sufficient detail to enable us to
obtain a technical understanding of the eID card’s functionalities. Our interviewees, who
assisted in the production of these documents at the professional services agency assigned to
the programme, released these confidential documents to us.
The ICT Agency published strategy reports on the usage of eID cards in order to promote
eGovernment and eCommerce transactions. The ICT Agency’s annual activity reports
provided an historical account of the type of activity that occurred during the programme’s
development and deployment phases. The ICT Agency also published a series of system
architecture documents and specifications for web application developers in relying party
organisations which could use the eID card’s capabilities for authenticating citizens’ on-line
transactions. The ICT Agency also maintained a website that described the capabilities of
the eID card, a link for citizens to download the middleware for the eID card application,
installation guidelines for that middleware, and authorised suppliers of eID card readers. The
on-line resources that describe the eID card itself, the smart card reader specifications and
the associated middleware component were particularly useful in clarifying the functional
aspects of the eID card.
Our analysis of this documentary evidence showed that the programme concentrated upon
developing and circulating the eID card itself in the first instance before developing the smart
card reader middleware technologies and designing the application architectures to enable
the issued eID cards to be used for on-line applications. The state’s federal government had
also established two privacy laws about six years prior to the inception of the programme.
Most of the relying party websites related to eGovernment services and there were very few
commercial eCommerce services available on-line.
We were unable to gain access to the three feasibility reports for the eID card produced by
different sources between 1999 and 2001; however, one of our interviewees outlined the
recommendations contained in each report during our interview session.
6.2.1.2 Scientific Papers from Indigenous Academic Community
We found 15 in-depth analytical research papers, from the indigenous academic community,
which identified flaws in the eID card’s design.
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These publications highlighted the security vulnerabilities and privacy protection deficiencies
in the eID card during its usage for on-line transactions. These papers often contained
recommendations on how to modify the eID card’s logical design in order to reduce the risks
associated with the identified design flaws. Many of these papers argued that the removal of
the design flaws would lead to the increased utilisation of the eID card by citizens. Some of
these papers also suggested alternative applications for the eID card to those applications
approved officially by the ICT Agency.
Citizen under-utilisation of the eID card’s capabilities for on-line authentication of citizens’
transactions was a common theme amongst these publications. Citizen under-utilisation of
the eID card had occurred for many reasons as we explain in Section 6.4.4.
6.2.1.3 Independent Reports on eID Cards
We found 14 study reports and surveys of national electronic identity cards and eGovernment
authentication services.
These pan-European publications provided both qualitative and quantitative data which was
useful for comparing social attitudes on similar eID card deployments in other EU states.
We also found a security alert issued by a Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT)
relating to the eID card’s middleware.
The breadth and depth of documentary evidence enabled us to not only validate our identified
factors but also gain an understanding of the development and deployment approach pursued
by the programme.
6.2.2 Interview Transcripts
We now describe the protocols and data acquired from two semi-structured interviews con-
ducted with two InfoSec practitioners (Interviewee F and Interviewee S) from the professional
services company which were assigned to the programme team.
We were introduced to Interviewee F through a professional colleague, who had worked
with this person in the same professional services company on a social security identity card
contract in the EU state. We were introduced to Interviewee S by a fellow Royal Holloway
Ph. D. student who had worked briefly with this person on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
224
6.2 Data Gathered
contract in the EU state.
Interviewee F acted as the lead expert consultant within the programme and his team was
tasked to produce the RFPl tender notice for the MOI and also the eID card’s specifications.
The objective of his assignment was to help modernise the systems that managed the ID
card for the ICT Agency and also for the NIR, which were operated by separate government
entities. The assignment was also to explore the possibility of incorporating the functionality
of other existing identity documents, e.g. social security identity card, into the new eID card.
Interviewee S was also employed by the same professional services company and acted as
the eID card lead architect. His main responsibilities were the development of the eID card’s
architecture and the PKI’s design. His activities also included writing the test specifications,
producing system integration documentation, specifying the middleware and software drivers,
and overall project coordination for the deployment of the eID card for on-line transactions.
Our interviewees from the professional services company had gained recent experience
on assignments relating to the issuance of electronic bank payment cards, under the EMV
Global Payment Card Scheme, which are used by bank customers in ATMs and retail card
payment devices. These bank payment cards used a PIN to authenticate the card holder.
Interviewee F described the background of his company’s involvement and the nature of
their professional services engagement as follows:
“There had been two feasibility studies that were not conclusive and the MOI
called upon an external consultancy to finalise the requirements for the eID
Card. One study, produced by academics at an indigenous university, provided
evidence for significant cryptographic controls, mainly from a cryptographic
threat perspective; however, the MOI wanted the team [which he represented]
to stipulate requirements from practical considerations.”
As far as we were aware these interviewees did not advise or collude with each other
regarding their involvement in our research. These individuals provided their consent on
the basis that identity remained confidential. Interview S acknowledged, however, that
that aim may be difficult to achieve due to his “renowned and significant contributions to
the programme”. At the end of the interviews both interviewees offered to answer further
questions by email exchange. They both provided further clarification of their answers to our
questions following their review of the interview transcripts. There were two further email
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exchanges with Interviewee S to clarify our understanding of the deployment.
We designed our interview questions, shown in Appendix B, to ensure that the interviewees
had indeed been involved with the programme by ascertaining their role, activities and their
contributions to some of the programme’s deliverables. Our questions were also posed to
enable us to obtain an understanding of the issues encountered during the programme and,
most important to our inquiry, to acquire our interviewee’s personal insights on the approach
pursued by the programme.
We made the purpose of the interviews clear to the interviewees at the outset, as shown by our
briefing and questions in Appendix B, that our intention was not to criticise the programme’s
approach or comment on the deployment itself. We explicitly acknowledged that decisions
by the programme were based on the data available and the circumstances prevailing at the
time. The two interviewees could have acted defensively; however, our data shows they were
prepared to discuss openly the strategy pursued by the programme, the events that occurred,
the eventual outcomes and their thoughts on the merits and drawbacks on their programme’s
approach. We provide extracts from these transcripts in Section 6.4.5.
We undertook semi-structured telephone interviews with our interviewees. Interviewee F did
not want our conversation to be recorded. Therefore, we generated an interview transcript
note to represent our understanding of the conversations in the interview. Interviewee F then
revised our transcript note of that conversation. Interviewee S agreed for the interview to be
recorded. We transcribed that recording and Interviewee S corrected the transcript document
directly.
These interviewees were given the opportunity to make revisions to the transcript draft to
ensure their utterances reflected their intentions and also the facts recorded were accurate,
e.g. the correct sequence of the events in the programme. Their recollections of the events
needed validation because our interviews were conducted more than five years after their
activities in the programme. Both interviewees provided other documentation, e.g. the RFPl,
which was no longer in the public domain, and some confidential material, e.g. the ICC’s
logical specifications.
We also exchanged email correspondence with two other individuals; one individual from the
EU state’s ICT Agency that managed the eID card and the other individual being a researcher
in information security from an indigenous university.
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We attempted to obtain an interview with a representative from the ICT Agency responsible
for managing the eID card deployment; however, executive approval was not forthcoming.
This individual, being a public spokesperson for the ICT Agency responsible for promoting
the eID card, however, agreed to provide us links to four sets of his publicly available
conference presentation slides and to answer our questions via email.
We also attempted to interview an academic researcher who had published several papers
on the eID Card Programme. He also managed a dedicated website on government eID
cards. He declined our request to be interviewed, however, he directed us to many useful
publications which detailed the history of this state’s eID card programme and also revealed
some of the eID card’s vulnerabilities and deployment issues.
6.2.3 Our Observation Memos and Reflection Notes
We produced an observation memo immediately after each interview and also after the
changes requested by the interviewees following their reviews of the transcripts. We stored
these memos in a diary format in a Microsoft Word document.
We also produced 26 reflection notes during our qualitative analysis of our data using the
Atlas.ti CAQDAS tool. Our analysis included the comparison of the key statements contained
in different data sources, in the interviewee transcripts and in the documentary evidence.
These reflection notes also describe our observations of each source’s perspective, patterns
identified in our data regarding preconditions and eventual outcomes, and our identification
of patterns in the approach pursued by the programme.
6.3 Validation of Our Identified Factors
This section describes our efforts and results, at Stage 6 of our research implementation
plan, to validate our factors for evaluating APIMs and our criteria questions for acquiring the
relevant data, both of which were based upon our review of the literature.
In order to validate these identified factors we first define our criteria which we used in our
validation assessment efforts. We then provide the results of our validation assessment efforts
using these definitions and the data acquired from this case study.
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6.3.1 Our Factor Validation Criteria
We define the criteria which we used in our efforts to validate our factors for evaluating
APIMs using data acquired from our three case studies. We then describe our methods and
the tools which we used to validate our factors in our acquired data.
Silverman argues [265] that textual analysis of qualitative data consists of two main activities:
• Firstly, counting the number of mentions of specific textual strings in source data
(quantitative); and
• Secondly, what these mentions are about (thematic or sometimes referred to as dis-
course analysis).
We were seeking to confirm that a factor exists within our data by locating at least one
mention of that factor in the textual data in order to ground that factor. We use the term
grounded from the qualitative data analysis technique, as defined in grounded theory research
[253, 274, 47], in order to conduct our validation assessment.
Our focus was identifying the thematic relevancy and breadth of factors for evaluating the
application context in order to enable the optimal APIM to be identified. The number of
em mentions of a factor in our data helped us to confirm its thematic relevancy. We were
also seeking to identify new factors in our empirical data to supplement the factors identified
from our review of the literature. We also needed to determine which of our identified factors
cannot be grounded empirically and were, therefore, irrelevant to real-world evaluations.
For our assessment each factor was appraised in terms of its label’s description, the profi-
ciency of the criterion question to acquire data relating to that factor and the relevancy of the
acquired data on decisions to select an APIM. The data would enable the evaluation of an ap-
plication context and the requirements for an APIM together with the attributes of candidate
APIMs. We also assessed the factor’s consistency with other factors, e.g. contradictory, and
whether the breadth of factors may be considered as complete.
We define our criteria for validating factors relating to the evaluation and selection of APIMs
as follows:
Factor Identifier Label is defined as the identifier of a factor in an evaluation theme and
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whether the properties, e.g. distinctiveness, of the factor’s identification label is
sufficient in order to understand that factor and its properties for evaluation.
Factor Relevancy is defined as the appropriateness of a factor and its associated criterion
question which requires evaluation in order to select an APIM.
Factor Consistency is defined as the congruency of a factor with respect to other factors in
an evaluation theme and whether the factor’s associated criterion question is suitably
constructed to elicit the relevant data from the application context data.
Completeness is defined as the comprehensiveness of the set of identified factors in order
to evaluate the application context and candidate APIMs. In short, have all the factors
for an evaluation been identified and are there any replications to be removed?
We considered that provided that the factor is mentioned verbatim as textual content, i.e.
directly, in our data or is alluded to, i.e. can be deduced indirectly, then for the purposes of
our validation efforts we interpreted that factor to be grounded. We do, however, differentiate
between direct and deduced grounded factors in the report of our validation results.
We used the qualitative data coding method, at a descriptive level, as described in Section
4.5.2, to identify the textual strings relating to our factors for evaluating APIMs in our
acquired data. The Atlas.ti CAQDAS tool was used to annotate all the textual strings relating
to our factors which we identified in our data. The textual strings relating to an existing
factor was allocated to the pertinent field in our ASMSA-DSS tool to indicate that that factor
had been grounded. Textual strings relating to a new factor, which we had not previously
identified, meant that we had discovered a new factor for evaluating APIMs.
We added the new factor into our ASMSA-DSS tool and then allocated the respective textual
strings from our data set to that new factor. We then generated reports from our ASMSA-DSS
tool showing those of our original factors (and also new factors) which had been grounded in
our data, with relevant supporting textual data, as validation evidence. These reports then
enabled us to concentrate on those of our original factors which were Not-grounded in our
data.
We analysed our data set again in an attempt to find textual strings which would enable us
to deduce the validation of those factors which were Not-grounded. This deduction was
necessary where our data, in textual form, did not contain the textual strings sought in order
for that factor to be grounded. We exercised a degree of interpretation in our validation of
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factor mentions in our textual data because of the differing terminologies and expressions
found in our data. Some of our deductions relied upon plausible assumptions. For example,
we deduced that a budget was set to meet the supplier’s costs to manufacture and personalise
the eID card in accordance with the specifications for the eID card contained in the ICT
Agency’s RFPl.
The use of the Atlas.ti CAQDAS tool was used to search for alternative textual strings in our
data set. Where we located the pertinent data, the relevant textual strings, upon which our
deductions were based, were added to the respective factors in our ASMSA-DSS tool. We
used the qualitative data coding method, at a conceptual level, as described in Section 4.5.2,
to identify the evaluation themes in our validated factors.
A final summary report was produced from our ASMSA-DSS tool which enabled us to
identify those factors that were grounded, new factors, deduced factors and factors that were
Not-grounded in our data.
6.3.2 Results from Our Factor Validation Efforts
This section presents the results of our efforts to validate the factors at Stage 6 of our research
implementation plan, as shown in Figure 4.3 on page 124, using the criteria definitions in
Section 6.3.1 and the data gathered in this case study.
We provide results showing those of our initial factors which were grounded in our data, new
factors identified in our data set, those of our initial factors were deduced and those of our
initial factors which we were unable to ground in our data, for each evaluation perspective.
We explain the reasons as to why in several instances that a factor identifier label or a criterion
question required enhancement.
The rows in Table 6.1 represent the results of our factor validation assessment as follows:
1. The Grounded Factor row shows those instances where our factors are present or
mentioned in our data.
2. The Deduced Factor row denotes those instances where the data acquired required
minor degrees of interpretation and also plausible assumptions to be made in order to
ground that factor.
3. The Not-grounded Factor row shows, and is defined as, those instances where factors
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were not found or mentioned in our acquired data. The reasons why we were unable
to ground these factors in our data are discussed in the following sub-section.
4. The Relabelled Factor row depicts those instances where the factor label required
enhancement, due to the inadequacy of its descriptive label, irrespective of whether
the factor could be grounded or deduced or was found to be Not-grounded.
5. The Revised Criterion Question row represents those instances where the criterion
question to acquire data relating to the factors required significant revision. Grammat-
ical errors and rephrasing of questions for clarity purposes are excluded here. The
scope covers those cases where the factors were such that the current structure of the
criterion question may have inadvertently excluded certain APIM configurations or
failed to acquire the appropriate data relating to that factor.
6. The Deleted Factor row represents redundant factors which were subsequently re-
moved from the respective evaluation theme.
7. The New Factor row represents those new factors identified in our case study data.
8. The Reclassified Factor row represents those instances where a factor was moved,
i.e. reclassified, from one evaluation theme to another evaluation theme in a different
perspective.
9. The New Evaluation Theme row represents the addition of a new evaluation theme to
an evaluation perspective.
10. The Evaluation Theme Name Change row shows the number of evaluation theme
name changes within a perspective. For example, we changed Task Environment to
Task Dialogue because we considered that the latter better describes its classifica-
tion and its purpose of capturing data relating to the user’s task interaction and not
the ergonomic environment in which the automated personal identification task is
undertaken. Task environment factors are evaluated by several factors in the Usage
Environment Evaluation Theme in the Understanding Perspective.
Table 6.1 shows the number of factors before this case study, at the top of the table, and the
number of factors following our effort to validate the factors at the foot of the table. The
number of evaluation themes is shown for each evaluation perspective. Table 6.1 contains
three columns to correspond to the Understanding Perspective, Effectiveness Perspective, and
Efficiency Perspective of the ASMSA Evaluation Framework and also a summary column.
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Factors For Understanding Effectiveness Efficiency Row
Evaluating APIMs Perspective Perspective Perspective Totals
Pre-Case Study
Stage 3 34 factors 74 factors 99 factors 207 factors
Conceptual Groups 5 factor groups 6 factor groups 7 factor groups 18 factor groups
Grounded
Factors 47 (77%) 45 (74%) 46 (46%) 138 (62%)
Deduced
Factors 8 (13%) 10 (16%) 17 (17%) 35 (16%)
Not-grounded
Factors 6 (10%) 6 (10%) 37 (37%) 49 (22%)
Relabelled
Factors 19 9 10 38
Revised
Criteria 16 7 13 36
Questions
Deleted
Factors 3 1 1 5
New Factors
Identified 14 3 3 20
Reclassified
Factors
(Between +16 net –15 net –1 net 0
Perspectives)
New Evaluation
Themes +2 +4 –1 +2 +7
Evaluation
Theme Name 4 3 4 11
Change
Post Case Study
Stage 6 61 factors 61 factors 100 factors 222 factors
Evaluation Themes 7 factor themes 9 factor themes 9 factor themes 25 factor themes
Table 6.1: Factor Validation Results using the EU State’s eID Card Programme Case Study
Data
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We directly grounded the majority, i.e. 62% of our original factors in our data out of the new
total of 222 factors identified, the latter figure includes 20 new factors identified. If those
factors which were deduced, i.e. 16%, are also included, then the result of our validation
effort improves to 78%, with 22% being Not-grounded out of the total number of 222 factors
now identified. We disassemble these high-level results in the next sub-section.
The 25 evaluation theme tables in Appendix C show which of our original factors were
grounded, deduced and Not-grounded in our case study data. We detail the 20 new factors
which we identified in our data and also show which factors were deleted due to replication
in Appendix C. We also indicate those factors which required their factor identifier label to be
changed or their criteria question to be amended. We assign an identifier to each factor, e.g.
A.1.1. (denoting stage created, evaluation theme and factor reference number) to a specific
factor in these tables so that its validation may be tracked, e.g. label revised or reclassified,
through each stage of our research implementation plan.
6.3.3 Discussion of Our Validation Results
This sub-section disassembles and discusses the results from our efforts to validate our
factors, which originate from our review of the literature. We also highlight some of the
limitations on our validation efforts due to the lack of available data relating to the reliability
and usability aspects of the eID card.
We acknowledge that the main issues which influenced our validation results may emanate
from our interpretive bias, or our inability to identify the necessary text in our data to ground
that factor, or our failure to acquire the relevant data. It is also possible that we were unable
to ground some factors because of the absence of the relevant data in that the programme
may have overlooked some factors, e.g. usability of the eID card for on-line transactions.
The deduction of some factors relied critically on our interpretation of the data evidence. We
were cognisant that our deductions needed to be logical and that our assumptions required
plausibility. For example, we deduced, and we believe that it is highly probable, that the MOI
set a budget for the programme although we were unable to establish the exact budget amount.
We reiterate that our objective of our validation was to determine whether the factor had been
considered by the programme as evidenced by the case study data gathered. Knowledge that
a budget existed, in all plausibility, sufficed for our factor deduction validation.
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Additionally, our inability to locate the pertinent text in our data for some factors may
have influenced our validation assessment results. In order to improve our efforts here
an alternative researcher could have also performed this validation task; however, such
resources were not available to us. Therefore, a degree of caution needs to be exercised in
the interpretation of these factor validation results based upon our inaugural validation effort
using data from this case study.
Our results are next examined in more detail using our factor validation criteria defined in
Section 6.3.1.
6.3.3.1 Factor Identifier Labels
Our results show that 38 of our initial set of 207 factors, about 18%, required their factor labels
to be improved. Similarly, 36 of our criteria questions, about 17%, required enhancement to
ensure that the correct data for that factor are acquired from the application context. In some
respects our criteria questions were too specific and required generalisation in order to allow
for greater flexibility in the acquisition of relevant data. Some criteria questions required
enhancement because our phrasing was overly complex.
In order to reduce these ambiguities so as to improve clarity, we considered that each factor
would benefit from having explanatory note describing why the factor needed to be evaluated.
Essentially, this explanation clarifies the factor’s purpose. We considered that the precise
explanation of a factor would then make it easier to assign an appropriate factor identifier
label and also to construct a concise criterion question. We show these factor explanations
in the tables of Appendix E, which were produced during our efforts to validate our factors
at Stage 9 of our research implementation plan, using data from the EU state’s eGates
Programme Case Study.
Therefore, we amended our ASMSA-DSS tool to allow for the inclusion of a factor explana-
tion note for each factor in preparation of our efforts to validate these factors using the data
from succeeding case studies.
6.3.3.2 Relevancy of Our Factors
Relevancy is indicated by the number of instances where factors can be grounded directly or
can be grounded indirectly through interpretation. Those factors that cannot be grounded
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may be considered to be irrelevant.
The results of our validation efforts, shown in Table 6.1, warrant further explanation and
also careful scrutiny in order to obtain an understanding of their implications to answer our
first research question. The intention here is not to describe variations of each factor but to
explain our results generally.
As 86% of our 202 original factors (five were deleted) were grounded, directly or deduced,
we regard that these factors are relevant for the evaluation of this type of APIM. A new
factor identified in the data is considered to be validated. Therefore, the remaining 49 factors,
representing 22% of our new total of 222 identified factors, require explanation as to why
these factors were Not-grounded in our data.
Our Not-grounded factor validation results can be interpreted in one of three main ways:
1. the factor is not relevant, or
2. either the programme team did not actually consider these factors (they may have
overlooked the factor or thought the factor to be irrelevant or thought the factor could
be ignored), or
3. alternatively the programme team did consider the factor, but chose to keep such data
confidential or did not produce any data relating to that factor.
Our data suggests that the factors which were Not-grounded in the Usability Results Evalu-
ation Theme, shown in Table C.20, corresponds to the second interpretation where the
usability issues associated with the eID card’s usage for conducting on-line transactions
was ignored by the programme. Our data also suggests that the factors in which were Not-
grounded in the Reliability Results Evaluation Theme, shown in Table C.19, corresponds
to the third interpretation that reliability testing was performed but the result data were not
publicly disclosed.
Most of the 37 Not-grounded instances, in the Efficiency Perspective, as shown in Table
6.1, relate to these two aforementioned evaluation themes. The results and our interpreta-
tions require elucidation concerning their implications in order to answer our first research
question.
While reliability test results are often classified as confidential it does not necessarily follow
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that reliability test specifications and the corresponding results data were not generated by
the programme. We believe that it is reasonable to assume that an eID card test specification
was produced, based upon the eID card specifications in our acquired documentary evidence,
and that the tests were performed by the eID Card Programme. We, therefore, consider that
our reliability factors are relevant but remain Not-grounded due to the unavailability of the
data. We recognise that the organisational need for information confidentiality, by controlling
access to reliability test data, may prove problematical for us to achieve our research aim by
grounding these factors through further empirical research.
Our failure to ground some of the usability factors has three plausible explanations. Firstly,
usability factors do not have to be evaluated; however, any such argument contradicts much
of the evidence found in the literature [27, 38]. A second explanation is that we failed to
identify these factors in our acquired data.
A third explanation is that the relevant data were not produced. We believe that it is plausible
that usability issues were deliberately or inadvertently ignored by the programme and us-
ability test data were not generated. We would have expected to have found usability design
guidelines, produced by the programme, on behalf of the ICT Agency, for organisations
developing applications for the eID card. They produced, however, extensive technical
documentation to integrate the technical components associated with performing the authenti-
cation of citizens’ transactions using the eID card. The programme may have also considered
that the usability of the eID card to be beyond the scope of their responsibilities and left such
issues to relying parties, e.g. government departments, local municipality administrations
and commercial organisations, and their website designers to resolve.
Alternatively, the programme may have considered that usability issues encountered by their
citizens would be recoverable as and when the usability design flaws occurred or they may
have considered such usability design flaws to be a low priority issue. The familiarity of bank
payment cards to the citizens, using similar artefacts frequently in cash machines appeared
to have influenced the programme team’s strategy on evaluating usability issues for the eID
card. Interviewee S claimed that “as there were similarities of the bank payment card and
the eID card in size and physical appearance, it was assumed, by the programme team, that
citizens would be familiar with using eID cards”. The eID card was designed to be used by
citizens in their own home with their own computer and smart card reader devices or used in
kiosks located in public places, e.g. shopping malls.
We found that the programme ran into usability issues with citizens experiencing problems
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in downloading the eID card middleware from the ICT Agency’s website and installing it on
their home computers. We recognise, in hindsight, that we could have been more persistent
in our attempts to interview citizens who had had experience of using the eID card with an
on-line service. We were, however, unable to recruit citizens who had experience of using the
eID card for on-line transactions and also willing to participate in our research. We conclude,
therefore, that in all probability the programme team deliberately ignored usability issues
associated with using the eID card.
We understand that our data for each case study is unlikely to be complete and there is
always a need to gather a comprehensive data set. Nevertheless, we recognised that some of
our identified factors may not be relevant to all cases. Equally, we acknowledge that some
factors may be more relevant than other factors for some cases. Therefore, we retained those
original factors that we were unable to ground in the data of this case study as we anticipated
that we may be able to ground them in further case study research. We also recognised that
the absence of a complete data set to ground our factors may hamper our future validation
efforts.
Our assessment results suggested that data from further case studies were required to improve
the relevancy of our identified factors and their associated criteria questions.
6.3.3.3 Consistency of Our Factors
We found very few of our factors were self-contradictory and we did not find incompatibilities
between our factors.
This result can be explained partly in that we classified our original factors into evaluation
themes, within each perspective, making it easier to assess the congruency of those factors in
that group. Each factor is, therefore, a characteristic of a main conceptual evaluation theme.
For example, the Aesthetic Minimalist Design Factor (A.15.5.) is an integral element of the
Usability Results Evaluation Theme, shown in Table C.20 in Appendix C, to determine the
usability of an APIM.
We restructured our evaluation themes which resulted in a net increase of seven evaluation
themes to the original 18 evaluation themes. We also renamed 11 of our evaluation themes
to improve the alignment with the factor concepts which we found in our data. We also
identified 20 new factors in our case study data during our validation assessment. Most of
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these new factors related to the newly created evaluation theme entitled Envisaged Issues
Evaluation Theme. This evaluation theme is explained in Section 6.3.3.4 and is represented
by the factors shown in Table C.14 of Appendix C. We also recognised the need to rename
11 evaluation theme titles to represent these conceptual themes in a more descriptive manner.
As only 16 factors needed to be reclassified, our results lead us to believe that there is a
reasonably high degree of consistency in our factors, in that they are placed within the
appropriate evaluation perspectives.
6.3.3.4 Completeness of Our Factors
As there are only five factors that were deleted, due to replication, our results here suggest
that factor redundancy is low. It can also be interpreted as meaning that the identification
of all the relevant factors was far from complete at this juncture of our research. This
interpretation is supported by our results in that we identified 20 new factors in our case
study data.
One important pattern recognised in our data led us to create three new conceptual themes;
namely, Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme (Table C.14), Envisaged Vulnerabilities Evalu-
ation Themes (Table C.15) and Forecasted Costs Evaluation Theme (Table C.16). The eID
Card Programme appeared to have made many compromises between the requirements, as
reflected by the architectural designs and eID card specifications, and the eventual deploy-
ment.
We consider that such compromises, whether inconsistencies between stakeholders’ objec-
tives, the requirements for an APIM or the deployed APIM actually deployed need to be
recorded so as to identify disparities between these perspectives using our evaluation frame-
work. For example, while there may have been a consensus amongst the state’s agencies
concerning the eID Card Programme’s objectives there were discrepancies between the eID
card’s specifications and the deployed eID card. Our interviewees acknowledged the need
for compromises on deliverables during the programme. Our creation of new factors was
aimed at recoding these underlying disparities.
Interviewee S also described a specific issue encountered after the deployment commenced
and the technological compromises that resulted because he believed that the technical issue
was not considered adequately during the programme. “I think that the major surprise from
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the government point of view and most of the citizens’ point of view was to discover that
identity was not enough. To authenticate the person, name or an identifier, was not enough
in a lot of cases. You, especially for business applications, also needed some other attributes.
Basically, this problem did not come in the physical environment and people would just
sign manually and nobody verifies the signature. But now everybody wants to automate the
process because of the chip and the digital identity they need to put the processes in place
obviously. Then they realised they do not have the information [in the deployed APIM].”
Therefore, factors and criteria questions relating to design compromises identified in our
data formed the basis of our new Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme. This conceptual
theme acknowledges the often varying tensions in an APIM programme, from the different
perspectives held, on the objectives of the APIM, the stated requirements for the APIM and
the APIM eventually deployed. Equally important, as we found in our validation, is the need
to state here that the same factor may be included in each of ASMSA’s three perspectives;
for example, budgeted costs, estimated costs, and actual costs. We apply different factor
identity labels to distinguish between the respective factors.
From our factor validation efforts using this case study data, we have identified 222 factors,
as shown at the foot of Table 6.1, which have been classified into 25 evaluation themes within
our three evaluation perspectives.
6.3.4 Patterns in Our Validation Results
This initial case study research reveals that there are some early indicative trends that can be
extracted from our validation efforts. These indicative trends help to partly answer our first
research question to identify and validate those factors which should be evaluated in order to
select the optimal APIM for a given application context.
As the majority of our initial factors in the Understanding and the Effectiveness Perspectives
were grounded or deduced, using the data from this case study, we identified that 122 factors
require evaluation for the introduction or revision of an APIM. These factors represent the
objectives and the requirements for an APIM in an application context. Conversely, we
identified 100 factors which describe the attributes of an APIM and its capabilities; however,
37 factors out of the original 98 factors (1 deleted), i.e. 38%, were Not-grounded.
We consider that it is too early to claim that we have formulated a complete list of validated
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factors. Many of our original factors were not validated directly, i.e. 17% were deduced,
and some of these factors and the Not-grounded factors may not be relevant for evaluating
APIMs. Equally, we recognise that our list of factors may not (ever) be complete.
In the absence of data to validate the factors in the Usability Testing Evaluation Theme and
the factors in the Reliability Testing Evaluation Theme, we believe that it is too early to draw
any conclusions about the validity of the factors in the Efficiency Perspective. Significant
gaps in our case study data and the reliance on our own interpretations mean that we are
cautious about making any claims based on these early indicative results. Additional case
studies are required to validate our original set of factors and to identify further factors and
evaluation themes.
The patterns in our validation results indicate that the majority of our criteria questions,
i.e. 186 out of 222 factors (84%), were reasonably well constructed in order to acquire the
relevant data in this application context. We recognised that some of the factors’ identifier
labels still required descriptive refinement, although the majority, i.e. 184 factors out of 222
factors, served their purpose during our factor validation efforts.
We conclude from these initial validation results that our factors are some way off from
reaching their saturation point in terms of comprehensiveness and maturity in terms of their
relevancy and conciseness to provide a full answer in order to our first research question.
6.4 Methodological Observations on the Programme’s App-
roach
This section describes the eID Card Programme’s approach for selecting the APIM for their
application context. Our case study commences by describing the prevailing circumstances
at the time of the eID card’s conceptualisation through to its deployment, which includes a
period covering three years’ live operation. We also describe the major events that occurred
during the programme and strategies pursued by the programme together with the eventual
outcomes. We also provide the retrospective comments, on programme’s methodological
efficacy, from our two interviewees who worked on the programme.
Our aim here was to also identify, through qualitative analysis of our data, patterns in our
data which indicated that underlying mechanism’s influenced the programme’s deliverables.
We also provide an historical account of the decisions made by the eID Card Programme
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during the different phases to deploy the eID card.
6.4.1 The eID Card Programme’s Approach
This EU eID Card Programme Case Study proved to be a compelling case study in that
the breadth and quality of our data enabled us to build a detailed historical account of
the eID Card Programme over our ten year study period. Our two interviewees provided
their incisive methodological insights on the approach pursued by the programme and also
provided detailed explanations of the key issues encountered during their assignments to
deploy national eID cards. Figure 6.1 represents the programme’s approach pursued during
our case study period, which was produced from the Atlas.ti CAQDAS tool following our
descriptive coding of the data gathered. Figure 6.1 is based upon Miles and Huberman’s
causal network diagram [203] for representing a narrative flow of events in a programme
commencing with antecedent variables, intervening variables, and outcome variables.
Figure 6.1 shows the sequential progression of the programme from its inception through to
the outcomes as at the end of our case study period. Figure 6.1 should not be construed as
a causal network as our data are insufficient to identify direct causal effects throughout the
programme. The conditions prevailing at the time of the programme’s inception, depicting
the antecedent variables, are shown in the boxes in the left column and the eventual outcomes,
i.e. outcome variables, are shown in the boxes in the right column of Figure 6.1. The boxes in
between the preconditions column and the outcomes column represent the strategies pursued
and the significant events that occurred during the programme, i.e. the intervening variables.
Our main finding was that the eID Card Programme did not follow a systematic method-
ology containing step-by-step method. Interviewee F stated that “we used the skills of the
practitioners and took a pragmatic approach using our skills from years of experience”.
Interviewee S commented that “the decision was fairly straightforward to select a plastic
card for the eID card, similar in size to a bank payment card, with citizens using a PIN to
authenticate themselves remotely”.
We found that the professional services company was required to deliver a feasibility report
for eID cards to the MOI in four months. Their feasibility study, upon which the MOI’s
major decisions were based, was completed under much pressure and contained many
assumptions about relying parties’ and citizens’ requirements. We did not, however, establish
the exact motive behind the MOI’s drive to progress the programme at such pace. The MOI’s
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Figure 6.1: Approach Pursued by the EU State’s eID Card Programme
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underlying political agenda appears to have influenced the programme’s early activities to
concentrate on replacing the paper based identity cards as a matter of priority.
We found that the programme concentrated on the production and distribution of the eID
cards to citizens for the first five years and postponed their programme activities to establish
requirements for on-line transactions. Our findings show that the programme focused on
establishing eID card specifications for card personalisation and technical specifications for
a certification authority service provider to issue the eID card. The programme curtailed its
efforts to establish specifications to use the eID card’s functionality for on-line transactions.
The programme conducted consultations with federal and local government departments in
respect of the objectives and business requirements for the eID card. Little attention appears
to have been afforded to the gathering of the objectives and the business requirements of
commercial relying party organisations, notably the indigenous banking sector, for conduct-
ing on-line transactions. Additionally, the programme did not conduct consultations with the
state’s citizens.
In the absence of consultations with the commercial stakeholders, as relying parties, and its
citizens, as users, the programme had to make many assumptions, particularly on the type of
business on-line applications which would use the proposed authentication capabilities of the
eID card. The programme, based on their assumptions of the nature of the relying parties’
business transactions, pursued a standards based approach for the implementation of the eID
card. The eID card contained the citizen’s private keys, associated X.509.3 compliant digital
certificates and the citizen’s facial image. The eID cards were distributed to citizens, usually,
upon the expiry of their paper based identity card.
In early 2006 the programme then turned its attention to developing middleware technologies
to facilitate the usage of the eID card’s potential capabilities for authenticating citizens’
on-line transactions at relying parties’ websites. The programme concentrated on developing
middleware for browser applications running on Microsoft Windows operating systems.
The programme team took over three years to resolve the technical problems relating to
integrating their middleware utility with the Microsoft Windows operating systems together
with various browser applications in order to enable a citizen to use their eID card in a
compliant smart card reader to complete an on-line transaction. This middleware utility for
citizens and the specifications for relying parties to build compliant website interfaces were
not made public until 2007.
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The main outcome of the eID Card Programme was that commercial relying party organisa-
tions remained reluctant to build retail business applications for citizens on their websites
which would use the eID cards’ authentication capabilities. Also citizens tended to avoid
using their eID card for authenticating on-line transactions with federal and regional gov-
ernment entities. As at the end of our case study period after a decade into the programme
there were very few relying party applications which used the eID card’s functionality to
authenticate citizens for on-line transactions.
The EU state’s main objective for the programme was fulfilled by replacing a paper based
identity card with an eID card which was more resistant to counterfeit or falsification. The
on-line authentication capabilities of the eID card, regarded by the programme as a long-
term objective or supplementary objective, remained under-utilised by the relying party
organisations and also by the state’s citizens, as at the end of our case study period.
Our data suggests that the underlying mechanism, in that the MOI controlled the programme’s
activities by instructing them to avoid conducting consultation with external non-government
stakeholders including its citizens, influenced the adoption strategy and the usage of the
eID card for on-line transactions. Our data suggests that the MOI preferences were to issue
eID cards, as replacements, as quickly as possible at the expense of conducting meaningful
consultations with external stakeholders.
The MOI and the programme appeared to be concerned that allocating resources to resolve
citizen acceptability and privacy issues could have become protracted by engaging with
political activist groups. We found that the lack of relying party on-line applications,
providing significant benefit to citizens, was the main cause for the under-utilisation of the
eID cards’ on-line capabilities.
The next three sub-sections provide a detailed historical account of the eID Card Programme
by describing the conditions prevailing at the time the programme was established, describing
the significant events that occurred and strategy pursued by the programme, and describing
the eventual outcomes as at the end of our case study period.
6.4.2 Prevailing Conditions
We provide a list of the conditions prevailing at the time the eID Card Programme was
established, informally around 1999, with supporting descriptions.
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1. Complex Governance Landscape The EU state had passed federal laws relating to the
national identification card and privacy laws and had also established the NIR’s systems
and infrastructure to support the paper based identity card. There was a complexity
of roles and responsibilities between the federal state’s agencies, the regional state
government agencies, and the municipalities for managing identity cards and for
managing citizen’s personal data.
2. Social Norms of Possessing Identity Cards In this EU state identity cards for citizens
had been obligatory since the Second World War. Citizens had become accustomed to
carrying identity cards and showing these security documents to the police and other
authorities upon demand. There appeared to have been a general perception, according
to our interviewees, that fingerprint authentication functionality, on an eID card, would
not be socially acceptable. A facial image printed on the plastic eID card which was
also stored as a JPEG file in the ICC were deemed to be socially acceptable.
3. Legacy Systems and Infrastructure The paper based identity cards were supported by
a national register of citizens through a national registration system operated by
the NIR. Electronic identity cards for social security benefits and driving licences
had recently been introduced into the public domain. An early objective was to
merge the functionalities of the different eID cards into one national eID card with
multiple purposes. The federal government had gained experience in operating identity
management systems for the paper based national identity card and the existing eID
cards. Local municipalities had established procedures for undertaking registration
processes for all these different card types. There were, however, many system legacies,
in terms of separate information systems and procedures for managing the registration
processes for these different identity cards. The registration of citizens and their
entitlement to possess an identity card relied on the experience of the civil servant staff
in the municipalities.
4. No Deployment Precedents Our interviewees claimed that there were no precedent
national eID card deployments offering on-line authentication capabilities operating
in Europe or worldwide from which the programme could learn or use as the basis
for their development and deployment. There were, at that time, two other EU
states introducing eID cards, which were at the same conceptualisation stage in their
programmes, as our case study. Our interviewees acknowledged that the pioneering
nature of these eID card programmes, venturing into deploying innovative solutions,
attracted high risks not only in terms of delivery, but also acceptance by citizens.
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6. Expert Panel Steering Group The EU state’s MOI had appointed a panel of five experts
to act as a technical steering committee. There appeared to have been a general per-
ception in the panel then, that the migration to a plastic eID card from the paper based
identity card, similar to a bank debit or credit payment card, using PIN authentication,
would be acceptable to citizens. The panel believed that a plastic card, carrying a
visible chip (ICC), similar in appearance to bank payment cards in circulation, could
be used by citizens in both face-to-face identification scenarios and also for on-line
transactions. The panel of experts recommended to the MOI and to the programme
that the use of biometrics would be infeasible because the technology was perceived,
by them at that time, to be too immature and too expensive for purpose.
6. Unconvincing Feasibility Studies In late 2000 the Council of Ministers in the EU state
approved the eID card concept study. Following three feasibility studies the state’s
Council of Ministers decided upon the basic concepts of the eID card with X.509.3
standard certificates for authenticating citizens remotely. Also, the new eID card
would not be integrated with existing chipped cards. These feasibility studies for
the MOI contained recommendations that citizens would readily adopt an eID card
with a chip; however, smart card readers for eID cards were not available at that time.
The third and final feasibility study was completed in just four months. The urgency
placed on the professional services company to deliver their feasibility report in such
a short space of time meant that many assumptions were made regarding citizens’
attitudes to performing transactions on-line. There was also a lack of consultation
with commercial organisations as to what type of on-line services they would consider
making available to citizens to use the authentication functionality of the proposed
eID card. Additionally, the regional governments’ and municipalities’ objectives and
business requirements for the eID card appear to have been evolving at that time.
7. Premature Design of eID Card The eID cards’ design was formulated from the recom-
mendations contained in the third feasibility study. In 2001 the Council of Ministers
approved the basic concepts for the eID card and decided to incorporate certificates
into the smart card. Citizen access to their private keys stored on the smart card, for
on-line authentication and for digital signatures, was to be protected by a four digit
PIN. A citizen’s national identification number was to be included in their X.509.3
subscriber certificates, embedded in the ICC, in order to link the eID card to the citizen
for the related on-line transactions. The eID card would also display the citizen’s name
and their national identity number and their facial image. The ICC would contain the
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citizen’s autobiographical data, private keys and certificates and the citizen’s facial
image in JPEG file format. Essentially at that conceptualisation stage, the decision on
the eID card specifications and the programme’s responsibilities and deliverables had
already been made by the MOI before consultation with stakeholder relying parties
and citizens had taken place.
8. Clear Assignment of Programme Roles and Responsibilities The MOI assigned the
roles and responsibilities for the governmental entities involved with the programme
and also the programme’s objectives and deliverables. The MOI was responsible for
the overall infrastructure and for managing the legal framework to ensure eID card
aligned with privacy regulations. The municipalities were to continue to perform
registration and enrolment processes with citizens; however, for the new eID card
this administrative task also involved the delivery of the eID card’s PIN, contained in
sealed PIN mailer envelope, to the citizen. The MOI was also responsible for selecting
the eID card production supplier, the personalisation supplier, and the certification
authority services supplier. The MOI delegated the responsibilities to the programme
to produce the specifications for the eID card and the X.509.3 certificates together
with the certification practices statement requirements document.
In the first five years of the development of the eID card the programme concentrated on
producing the eID card and delivering these artefacts to its citizens. The specifications
describing the interfaces between the eID card, smart card readers, operating systems and
client’s browser together with relying party’s web based applications were not produced
until 2007.
6.4.3 Strategies Pursued and Significant Events
We now describe the strategies pursued by the programme during the development and the
deployment phases of the eID card programme, together with significant events that took
place during that period up until 2011. The programme commenced developing the eID card
around summer 2001.
According to Interviewee F “the eID Card Programme team took a ‘business driven approach’
to deal with the complex processes that can be broken down into two discrete functions;
namely, the processes to make the card and the processes to use the card”. The programme,
according to our interviewees, did not follow a system development methodology or a
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programme management methodology.
We provide a list of the intervening variables, which include the strategies pursued by the
programme and the significant events that occurred.
A. Formation of the ICT Agency The ICT Agency was formally established by the MOI
in 2001 to run the eID Card Programme from 2002. Its main role was to represent the
MOI and fulfil the objectives of the federal government for the eID card’s deployment.
The programme was also required to communicate information on the eID card and the
progress of the programme to the public, through a dedicated website and also through
annual activity reports. It also had the responsibility for undertaking the marketing
activities relating to the usage of the eID card for on-line transactions on behalf of the
MOI.
B. Limited Stakeholder Consultations There appears to have been very little consultation
between the programme and the commercial sector during the early development phase
of the programme to elicit external stakeholders’ objectives. Limited consultation took
place between the programme and public sector organisations, mainly with federal
civil servants and local government representatives from regional governments and
municipalities. According to Interviewee S “many commercial stakeholders adopted
a wait-and-see approach that made the limited consultation processes that were
conducted difficult to progress to any agreed conclusions”. Interviewee S believed
that it was a critical mistake by the MOI to specifically exclude banks from the very
few consultations that did take place, as he regarded that “the banking industry had
the potential to deliver the so-called ‘killer applications’ to citizens”. There also
appears to have been no consultation during the development stage of the programme
with citizens or citizens groups regarding their use of eID cards. The consequences
of limited stakeholder consultation were that the programme had to make many
assumptions concerning requirements on the utilisation of the eID card for on-line
transactions.
C. Lack of Business Requirements In the absence of business requirements the programme
adopted an “ open standards approach”, as described by Interviewee F, for the design
of the eID cards and the production of specifications. The available ISO Standards,
e.g. ISO 7816, were used to define the interactions between the operating system, the
card reader and the eID card’s chip. The use of smart cards and smart card readers
for authenticating users remotely was a major technical challenge in the latter part
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of the programme. The programme team did not have business requirements from
stakeholder organisations which might introduce on-line applications due to the lack
of consultations. Equally, the programme did not have any requirements from citizens
or citizen groups as to how they might use the applications with a smart card and smart
card reader.
D. Restrictions on Selection of eID Card Suppliers Following formal tender processes,
the MOI selected the eID card manufacturer, the eID card personalisation supplier and
the certification authority services provider in 2002. These suppliers were required
to integrate their proposed systems with the existing national identity systems at
the NIR and the registration information systems used by registration officers in the
municipalities. All of these suppliers had to have operations located in that EU state.
E. Introduction of eID Cards through Pilot Deployments The first eID cards were deliv-
ered to a small group of selected civil servants in the first quarter of 2003. The first
pilot to issue eID cards through a municipality took place in the second quarter of
2003. Following a number of further pilot deployments during late 2003 and early
2004, the nationwide roll-out commenced in the third quarter of 2004. From the third
quarter of 2006, all issued national identity cards were to be the new eID cards and the
paper based identity cards were no longer to be issued. By 2009, all citizens in that
EU state possessed an eID card.
F. Formation of the Privacy Commission In 2004, the EU state set up its Privacy Com-
mission (PC) to act as an independent supervisory body for data protection of citizen’s
private data. The PC was mandate to authorise relying party’s applications which used
citizens’ national identity numbers for on-line eID card authentication purposes.
G. Unavailability of Applications Pilot on-line applications did not appear until around
2007. The facility for citizens to check or amend their personal details at the NIR ap-
peared to have been the initial application. There were a number of technical problems
and usability issues encountered by the programme with these initial applications. The
programme required revisions in the Microsoft Windows operating systems in order to
enable the eID card, in the smart card reader, to function with the middleware utility
and the browser applications to authenticate the citizen. According to Interviewee
S “ the eID card middleware utility that was made available to the public originally
was, for the average computer user, technically challenging to install”. Many early
adopters failed to install the middleware and drivers for the eID card to function as
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intended by the programme. These problems remained until 2009, when a middleware
installation and configuration wizard application was developed by the programme
and made available on the ICT Agency’s website for citizens to download. These
problems appeared to have contributed to the low utilisation of on-line applications
by citizens which required authentication using the eID card. At the end of our study
period there were over four hundred on-line applications available.
H. Low Utilisation of On-line Applications In 2007, as very few smart card readers had
been purchased by citizens, the MOI, with the ICT Agency, formulated a strategy
to increase the on-line utilisation of the eID card by distributing 100,000 smart card
readers free of charge. The MOI targeted the delivery of these devices to specific citizen
groups, e.g. teenagers, based on the assumption that these identified groups would
readily use the eID card for applications that were available at that time. Additionally,
the MOI, through the ICT Agency website, made citizens aware of the eID card
programme and the benefits of using the eID card for on-line transactions. The
MOI also pursued a strategy to coerce manufacturers to reduce their prices on smart
card readers. Most of the early applications which relied on the eID card’s on-line
authentication capabilities came mainly from the public sector, departments in the
federal government and regional governments, rather than the commercial sector. For
example, there was a pilot application introduced in 2007 for citizens to report crime
to the police on-line.
I. Lack of Trust between Stakeholders The formation of the Privacy Commission was a
federal government response to the claimed potential abuse of citizens’ privacy, by
organisations, from citizens’ usage of their eID card for authenticating on-line transac-
tions. There was a perception, according to one of our interviewees, that government
authorities would be more trustworthy than commercial enterprises in handling citi-
zens’ national identity number and other personal information. Both interviewees also
claimed that the Privacy Commission and many citizens regarded the risks associated
with the commercial organisations’ management of citizens’ private data, including
their national identification number, to be very high. Both our interviewees claimed
that there was a general perception amongst citizens that commercial organisations
would use citizens’ private data for direct marketing purposes. Interviewee S also
claimed “that there was also a certain degree of mistrust, by many indigenous commer-
cial enterprises, in the technical capabilities of the eID card, as several vulnerabilities
had been exposed by the indigenous academic community”. Interviewee F also claimed
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that “the lack of trust openly displayed between these organisational stakeholders was
a contributory factor to explain citizens’ low utilisation of eID cards for authenticating
on-line transactions”.
J. Poor Return on Investment Our interviewees also claimed that commercial enterprises
regarded the business risks associated with developing and operating on-line services
to be too high. Such deployments would incur excessive costs with the potential to
generate only moderate financial rewards. Both our interviewees claimed that the
Privacy Commission’s strict interpretations of the EU state’s privacy laws made it very
difficult for commercial entities to develop profitable applications because of the effort
and costs involved to comply with the Privacy Commission’s security requirements.
According to Interviewee F “the main driver for the federal government was not
based on a return on investment consideration”. The investment by the EU state’s
federal government, through its MOI and the ICT Agency, was primarily to issue
identity cards that were more resistant to counterfeiting. Increasing its functionality
for authenticating on-line transactions, through the use of a common identification and
authentication mechanism was only a secondary objective.
K. Promoting the Benefits of eID Cards The marketing of the eID card in both the public
and private sector appears to have lacked coordination. Citizens often received con-
flicting advice from various government sources and commercial sources over several
years. According to Interviewee S: “citizens are not always aware of the on-line
services that are available or where to obtain information on them or the benefits
of these services”. Interviewee F commented that “the deficient marketing strategy
proved to be one of the main stumbling blocks to utilisation”.
We next describe the outcomes of the eID Card Programme as at the end of our case study
period.
6.4.4 Programme Outcomes
The main outcome of the programme, according to our interviewees, is the under-utilisation
of the eID card for authenticating on-line retail business transactions.
We found that most of the issues encountered by the programme during the development
and deployment phases, as described in the previous sub-section, remained outstanding as
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at the end of our case study period. We list the outcome variables from the programme
outcomes together with supporting descriptions together with explanations proffered by our
interviewees.
1. Partial Fulfilment of Stakeholders’ Objectives The MOI’s main objective was ach-
ieved; however, the utilisation of the eID card for on-line transactions, in both the
public and commercial sector, remained low. Our data suggests that the second objec-
tive had not been achieved by the end of our case study period. By 2011 all citizens in
the EU state possessed an eID card and also there were similar national identity eID
cards issued for non-citizens and minors in that state. Citizens’ on-line usage of the
eID card remained low despite the promotional strategies pursued by the MOI and the
ICT Agency. Our interviewees and some of our documentary evidence showed that
the low utilisation was caused by the lack of applications that were of sufficient benefit
to citizens. Interviewee S concluded that “once these beneficial applications become
available citizens may then be persuaded to purchase smart card readers and install
the middleware application”.
2. Outstanding Security Vulnerabilities The indigenous academic community published
many articles which revealed several security vulnerabilities associated with the eID
card. Interviewee F acknowledged that “in hindsight the inclusion of citizens’ national
identity number in the subject’s X.509.3 certificates was unnecessary”. Similarly,
Interviewee S admitted another technical oversight, by the programme team, which
related to the passing of attribute values between the eID card’s middleware and the
relying parties’ on-line applications for the associated authorisation processes. A
small number of security vulnerability alerts had been issued by independent security
analysts that related to program coding flaws in the middleware utility.
3. Outstanding Usability Issues There were some outstanding usability issues associated
with the installation of the middleware utility and its configuration. There was also
usability issues associated with the eID card’s digital signature functionality. Intervie-
wee S stated that “the inclusion of latter functionality to perform digital signatures
prolongs and complicates the installation of the middleware utility”. We were unable
to establish whether there are usability problems associated with citizen’s usage of the
eID card for authenticating their on-line transactions. We deduced that the programme
did not produce usability guidelines for relying parties’ developers because there was
an assumption that the citizen interaction dialogue to enter a PIN value was already
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familiar to citizens.
4. Outstanding Trust Issues According to Interviewee S, that “the apparent mistrust be-
tween the commercial sector and the EU state’s Privacy Commission regarding the
approval to use of citizens’ national identification numbers led to very few commercial
organisations that were willing to develop on-line applications that exploited the
capabilities of the eID card”. Interviewee F concluded that “the lack of consultation
by the programme with the commercial organisations, notably the banking sector, was
the prime reason why these stakeholders, as relying parties, remained reluctant to
develop on-line applications”.
5. Outstanding Privacy Issues There appeared to remain, amongst the EU state’s pop-
ulation generally, a concern over commercial enterprises’ use of citizens’ national
identification numbers and citizens’ private information. Public concern over the
protection of their private data in conducting on-line transactions is another plausible
reason for low utilisation, despite the Privacy Commission’s supervision of those
enterprises that have complied with the privacy regulations. The eID card was con-
figured so that its on-line capabilities could be deactivated. A citizen could request
their local municipality, acting as the registration authority, to deactivate their eID card
by revoking (as the subject) their certificates. We were unable to find data on citizen
deactivation requests to the municipalities.
6. Limited Value Propositions for Stakeholders According to our data, the lack of ben-
eficial on-line applications meant that there were insufficient benefits to citizens to
encourage them to invest money, time and effort to purchase a compliant smart card
reader and to install the middleware utility on their desktop or laptop. According
to Interviewee S: “it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many card readers are in
operation; however, the commercial sector indicates that the number remains far too
low for them to consider investing in developing on-line services”.
Interviewee F summarised the EU state’s eID card initiative: “the objectives of an eID card
must fulfil long-term goals and some would need a ten year period to see the benefits”. We
believe that it is plausible that the MOI adopted a long-term strategy to fulfil their main aim
initially and to address their secondary aim, of rectifying security vulnerabilities and issues
relating to the eID card deployment, over several years as the technologies matured.
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6.4.5 Methodological Insights
We now provide retrospective comments from our two interviewees on whether the approach
pursued by the programme was efficacious for the eID card deployment. Essentially, we
asked them two questions:
1. What should the programme have done in hindsight; and
2. Is there any methodological learning from your experience?
The purpose of our questions were designed acquire data in order to identify methodological
proficiencies and deficiencies and also learnings from the approach pursued by the pro-
gramme.
6.4.5.1 Efficacy of the Programme’s Approach
Both our interviewees confirmed that they would not change their “expert-led” approach to
developing the eID card. Both our interviewees acknowledged, however, that the deployment
and marketing strategy of the eID card programme required a different approach to the one
pursued. Importantly, both our interviewees considered the eID card deployment to be the
optimal solution which met both the MOI’s primary and secondary objectives.
Despite these claims, our data suggests that the eID card possesses known security vulner-
abilities and there are privacy design flaws. We found no data linking under-utilisation of
the eID card with citizens’ negative attitudes towards levels of identity assurance for on-line
transactions. Interviewee S acknowledged that “some aspects of the eID card’s functionality
relating to authorisation attributes were overlooked by the programme”.
Interviewee F commented that “the marketing strategy proved to be one of the main stumbling
blocks to deployment and the lack of consultation with professional bodies who expressed
their reluctance to issuing the ID cards”. Our data shows that these professional bodies, e.g.
notaries, offered commercial products and services to citizens at that time and the state’s
introduction of a common eID card could have jeopardised their future business incomes.
We have categorised our interviewee’s insights into methodological learnings relating to con-
sulting stakeholders, investigating assumptions, anticipating evolving stakeholder attitudes,
validating identification technologies in context and tracking the programme’s progress.
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6.4.5.2 Consult Stakeholders
Both our interviewees commented that the stakeholder consultations were very badly man-
aged by the programme. The programme had not instigated the task to identify the direct
and indirect stakeholders which could have potentially used the eID card for authenticating
citizens for on-line transaction purposes.
Interviewee F concluded that “proper consultation with stakeholders and the resolution of cit-
izen’s requirements and privacy issues play an important role in respect of the acceptance of
on-line services, whether provided by government or by the commercial sector”. Interviewee
stated “that exclusion of representatives from the banking industry was a misguided strategy”
because he regarded “the banking industry as being the most likely sector to provide the
services that would be beneficial to citizens”.
Both our interviewees commented that they encountered many objections raised by stake-
holders, some of which they considered were valid issues. They also encountered, however,
many obstacles which they considered were aimed at protecting specific organisation’s
interests. Interviewee S commented on a specific pressure group’s criticism of the eID Card
Programme’s activities: “they even sometimes tried to kill the project saying that it [eID
card solution] should do this and this but well nothing really. We should do something and
you should hire us to make studies and do things that way. They are a bit dangerous in fact”.
The programme team suspected that some of these issues were designed to prevent or hinder
the deployment of the eID card.
Interviewee F stated that “a government centred consultation approach, with legislative
backing, could inform citizens on their rights; however, any consultation would have to
have an expiry date to prevent the consultation period becoming protracted”. This type of
facility was available to the eID card programme, through municipalities, but was not used
extensively. He also suggested that “the eID card programme could have exploited the use
of local groups to build dialogue with citizens as end users of the eID card”.
Interviewee F considered that “state’s eID card programmes need to facilitate long-term
goals and acknowledge that benefits are not immediately demonstrable”. He concluded
by stating that “this problem is best addressed by stakeholder participation to stand a
better chance of achieving these long-term goals”. Interviewee S reiterated that “in the
private sector the business drivers would only come once the benefits can be realised by both
commercial organisations and also the citizens, as consumers”.
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Our interviewees’ opinions on the merits stakeholder of consultation and participation
demonstrates that stakeholder consultation processes need to be managed proficiently in
order to achieve effective dialogue on stakeholders’ objectives for an APIM.
6.4.5.3 Investigating Assumptions
The pressure on the programme to deliver the feasibility study, produce the eID card specif-
ications and select suppliers in such a short timescale, to the exclusion of consulting com-
mercial stakeholders, appeared to be a deliberate strategy pursued by the MOI. According
to Interviewee F “these consultations would have delayed the delivery of the eID cards
considerably”.
Conversely, Interviewee S stated that “making so many assumptions about the possible
applications increased the risks to the programme”. He continued by commenting that
“we should have made more challenges on the assumptions that were made early in the
programme. Such challenges would have then helped us to reduce the risks associated with
these assumptions and to get a clearer picture on stakeholders’ objectives”.
Our interviewees’ comments suggest that an approach that investigates assumptions relating
to the application context and clarifies stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM could reduce
programme delivery risks. The investigation processes should according to our data be
proportional to the complexities and uncertainties of the application context.
6.4.5.4 Anticipating Evolving Stakeholder Attitudes
Our data suggests that programmes need to accommodate evolving attitudes towards citizen
usage of new identification technologies.
Interviewee F stated that “there had been a landscape change in citizens’ attitudes towards
the management of electronic data and privacy concerns in the last decade”. He suggested
that “there is a now a strong requirement to recognise the rights of the citizen and that
EU states providing electronic identity cards need to be careful about privacy issues and
the aggregation of information in various government departments and also by the com-
mercial sector”. He commented that “some EU states instruct their various governmental
departments to have a separate identifier in order to prevent identification though data
aggregation”.
256
6.4 Methodological Observations on the Programme’s Approach
Interviewee S considered that “regular consultation with citizen groups may have helped
to reduce some of the privacy issues in the eID card deployment, e.g. the removal of the
subject’s national identity number from the certificates in the eID card”.
Both our interviewees considered that citizen’s perception of using an eID card for authen-
ticating on-line transactions had changed over the decade. They both concluded that the
marketing tactic to distribute free smart card readers to target younger citizens was correct in
that they believed that this social group would be more likely to use the new identification
technology.
These comments demonstrate that there is a need for state eID card programmes to not only
consider evolving attitudes towards privacy issues but also changes in citizens’ perceptions
about using eID cards for the authentication of on-line transactions.
6.4.5.5 Validating the Technology in Context
We found that the programme was unsure as to whether the eID card was capable of
functioning and performing as required in the intended operating environments.
Interviewee S suggested that “there should be more experiments on the functional aspects of
the eID card and better estimations on longevity and usability of such systems at the outset”.
Additionally, he commented that “there is always the danger that some software technology
is simply not available or scalable that can handle millions of users”. The programme could
not test a prototype of the eID card because the Microsoft Windows operating system needed
to be enhanced specifically to meet the requirements of this eID card programme.
Interviewee S claimed that he would have preferred “to have removed some of the technolog-
ical assumptions, using a prototype, by demonstrating the on-line transactions operating in
the municipality with the individuals involved in order to improve the visualisation of the
equipment required and their interactions”. This increased visibility, he suggested, “would
have helped many stakeholders understand how these elements work together”. This under-
standing, he continued, “would have helped develop the specifications for the certification
authority services that were required to issue over 8 million subscriber certificates”. He
commented that “the certification authority provider’s estimation of the subscriber certifi-
cates got the scaling badly wrong and their pricing of these certificates was miscalculated
seriously”.
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An approach that exploits opportunities to validate an APIM prototype in an operational
application context could assist a programme gain understandings on potential functionality
and performance capabilities of different identification technologies and their configuration
options.
6.4.5.6 Tracking the Programme’s Progress
Both our interviewees recognised the need for some methodological support tools to help a
programme track its progress to fulfil stakeholders’ objectives.
Interviewee F suggested “that a tool indicating the progress of a programme might be a
useful tool to programme managers”. He also suggested that “a tool that could validate or
invalidate stakeholders’ objectives with stakeholders would be useful to the industry and
other stakeholders alike. It would also benefit the users of the identity management system”.
He continued: “as a minimum it could help identify possible delays, or as a maximum, such
an evaluation could supply evidence to cancel the programme”. He quoted the Australian eID
card programme as an example stating that “it was terminated when the proposed solution
gained better visibility and understanding on its implications to stakeholders’ interests”.
Our case study findings suggest that a tool for reconciling stakeholders’ objectives could
assist stakeholders and IS programme in their efforts to design, develop and deploy APIM,
in some application contexts. Our data suggests that such tools could be most efficacious
during the conceptualisation and design phases of national electronic identity programmes.
6.5 Methodological Learnings
This section describes the methodological learnings from the patterns recognised in our case
study data relating to the expert-led approach pursued by the eID Card Programme. We also
reflect on the efficacy of the programme’s approach to select the optimal APIM.
Interviewee F commented that “there is always a constant political agenda associated with
[national] eID card programmes”. His statement supports our supposition that underlying
political interests influence the design of an APIM. In this case study the ‘stakeholders
underlying political agendas’ influenced the eID card’s design, the timings and priority of
the programme’s deliverables and also helped to explain the programme’s inadequate efforts
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to consult with commercial stakeholder organisations and with citizens.
Notwithstanding the political influences the selection of an eID card and its configuration, an
expert-led approach appears to be an efficacious methodology to select an APIM when the
stakeholders’ decision is straightforward.
6.5.1 Approach Led by Experts
We provide explanations from our case study data to support our aforementioned statement
on methodological efficacy, by classifying the patterns in our data on the methodological
proficiencies and deficiencies of an expert-led approach.
6.5.1.1 Methodological Proficiencies
From our analysis of our case study data we found that an expert-led approach was efficacious
because the decision for the eID card solution was reasonably straightforward for its intended
application contexts. Our data suggests that the selection of the eID card and its configuration
was not one single decision but a series of design choices in respect of developing, configuring
and promoting the eID card to match the application context and to address a variety of
constraints, including technological legacies and social norms.
Our data suggests that the selection of a plastic card with an ICC, containing a citizen’s
subscriber certificates and protected by a PIN, was a straightforward configuration choice
for the eID Card Programme. Our documentary evidence, however, reveals that there were
several acknowledge flaws in the design of the eID card. While there were claims of technical
expertise by our interviewee practitioners, gained from their previous experience in identity
card deployments using face-to-face citizen identification, there were, however, no precedent
national eID card deployments from which the programme team could formulate their
specifications for on-line transactions.
We found that the programme placed heavy reliance on expert practitioner knowledge
and skills and did not appear to use an established project management methodology, e.g.
Prince2, to manage the programme. The possibility of using an established IS development
methodology had not occurred to our interviewees.
The design configuration of the eID card appears to have been based on the technical
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recommendations of expert practitioners in the programme team. In turn, these practitioners
were partly influenced by an external panel of five prominent experts in the steering group.
As biometrics were considered by the steering group to be too technically immature and
disproportionately expensive at that time, the expert practitioners’ recommendations to the
programme for a knowledge based mechanism, e.g. a PIN, to activate the eID card’s logical
functionality appears, therefore, to have been a straightforward choice.
We found that this expert-led approach enabled the programme to respond quickly to requests
for deliverables made by the MOI sponsor. The use of a systematic methodology may have
reduced the programme’s flexibility to allocate resources to produce a deliverable in the
time scales set by the MOI. Both our interviewees, however, acknowledged that there were
methodological learnings to be elicited from their experiences in this programme, which we
have described in Section 6.4.5.
6.5.1.2 Methodological Deficiencies
This expert-led approach appears, however, to have encountered difficulties in the design
phase due to diversity and significance of many assumptions which were made by the
programme team. The main assumptions related to relying party organisations’ and citizens’
objectives and requirements for authenticating on-line transaction. Both our interviewees
conceded that there should, in hindsight, have been more challenges on the assumptions
made by the programme team. Our data suggests that there was an over reliance on our two
interviewees, as security practitioners’ assigned to this programme, to produce eID card
specifications in the absence of the objectives and requirements for an APIM.
The design errors identified relate to security vulnerabilities and the protection of citizen’s
private data. Interviewee S, as an expert practitioner, also concede that the programme
also overlooked the capturing of vital attribute data for the authorisation process which
are generated during the on-line authentication session of a citizen. Our data also reveals
that there were usability problems with installing the middleware utility because there was
insufficient expertise in the programme team to assist with the interaction designs.
The main causes for the design errors appear to emanate from a lack of consultation with
external stakeholders, an inability to build a functional prototype because the technologies
were not available at the time, and failure to demonstrate the eID card system, or a simu-
lation, in operation to stakeholders. The programme did not appear to have given external
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independent discipline experts the opportunity to evaluate the eID card specifications and
implementations despite the concerns raised by the indigenous academic community.
The testing of the eID cards with the middleware utility appears to have overlooked the
security and privacy vulnerabilities which were later found during examinations by external
entities, e.g. the academic community. The security vulnerabilities uncovered by external
examination may have been known by the programme or it may be that their testing of the
eID card was deficient. Our data suggests that there were gaps in the knowledge and skills
within the programme team in specific disciplines, e.g. a usability specialist.
Our data also suggests that the lack of consultation with commercial organisations resulted
in organisations, as relying parties, being reluctant to develop on-line commercial applica-
tions for citizens. Similarly, the lack of consultation with citizens to ascertain their value
proposition, i.e. benefits of using the eID card, resulted in low utilisation of the eID card.
Our data suggests that the lack of consultation was a deliberate strategy pursued by the MOI
and was not an outcome from using an expert-led programme approach.
Our data suggests that a multi-disciplinary approach, engaging a range of discipline expert
practitioners, with alternative perspectives, may have assisted the programme team to reduce
some of the eID card’s design errors. Our data also suggests that such an approach in a
programme of this nature needs proficient engagement with potential replying parties and the
intended user community in the application context in order to reduce assumptions relating
to the objectives and requirements for an APIM.
6.5.2 Our Reflections on Methodological Efficacy
Our reflections on methodological efficacy concentrate on the time taken by the programme
to execute their expert-led approach and the accuracy of the selected APIM.
We did not locate an objective in our data which indicated the programme delivery timescales
for the eID cards to be made available to citizens. Similarly, we did not locate data which
established the proposed delivery timescales for the architecture and functionality to enable
citizen’s to conduct on-line transactions using the eID card. We found that the programme’s
approach took about three years to achieve the MOI’s primary objective and approximately
seven years to fulfil the MOI’s secondary objective. The MOI’s third objective for electronic
signature capability appeared to have taken a low profile; however, the ID card incorporated
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a digital signature functionality.
The delay on the second objective was caused mainly by the technical restrictions of the
Microsoft Windows operating systems which were beyond the programme’s control. Our
data suggests that an approach which excludes the validation of technologies in the conceptu-
alisation phase is a high risk strategy. Suppliers may not always be willing or technically able
to enhance their technologies. Our data shows that the supplier did enhance their technology;
however, those enhancements delayed the programme’s secondary deliverable severely.
We found that the MOI opted to progress the eID card implementation quickly in the initial
stages rather than to instruct the programme to consult with potential stakeholder organisa-
tions and citizens. Our data suggests that the MOI considered that such consultations would
have become protracted due to the programme’s attempts to reconcile these stakeholders’
risks and issues. We believe that it is plausible that the MOI, through the programme, opted
to pursue their primary goal in their desired (unpublished) timescales, which were not known
within the programme team, at the expense and risk of not accomplishing their secondary
objective until much later.
In the absence of objectives set by the programme our reflections on accuracy are based upon
the programme outcomes and the claims made by our two interviewees. Our data suggests
that the programme’s approach resulted in the selection of the optimal eID card solution.
There were, however, design errors relating to eID card’s on-line authentication functionality
caused mainly by the programme having to make many design assumptions and also the over
reliance on some of its discipline experts.
According to both of our interviewees the programme selected the optimal APIM, despite its
low usage, exposed security vulnerabilities, outstanding privacy issues, and minor usability
design flaws. Our documentary evidence suggests that these adverse outcomes could have
been avoided. The programme could had devoted more effort during the conceptualisation
and design phases of the eID card to evaluate its potential effects on citizens’ on-line
experiences and its impact upon relying parties’ web application systems.
We believe that is difficult to substantiate any claims of selection accuracy because the
external stakeholders’ objectives, including citizen’s viewpoints, were not acquired by the
programme team. Also, it appears that the programme did not set metrics to measure the
effectiveness of the solution. A post programme review in order to assess the efficacy of
approach pursued by programme was not undertaken.
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Our data suggests that an expert-led approach appears to be efficacious when the choice
of APIM is reasonably straightforward to the stakeholders in the application context and
the discipline experts involved with the programme possess the relevant range of skills and
knowledge to deploy that APIM. Both our interviewees, however, acknowledged, based on
their experiences, and our other acquired data suggests that an expert-led approach could be
enhanced.
6.6 Our Conclusions from this Case Study
In this section we describe our conclusions on our efforts to validate our identified factors
using data acquired from this case study. We also summarise our conclusions on the
methodological efficacy of an expert-led approach to select an APIM.
6.6.1 Efforts to Validate Our Factors
Our conclusions, based upon the data acquired in this case study, are that the majority of our
identified factors are relevant for evaluating APIMs.
From our validation assessment, we have ascertained that our factor list for evaluating APIMs
is not complete. Moreover new factors need to be identified and redundant factors should
be removed from our list. Many of our validated factors, at this stage in our research, lack
terminological consistency. We ascertained that there is a need to develop explanatory text
for each factor in order to reduce ambiguity in our factor identifiers, i.e. their descriptive
labels.
Further empirical research is required to extend the range of factors for evaluating APIMs.
6.6.2 Methodological Efficacy
We conclude that an expert-led approach is efficacious for programmes to select the optimal
APIM when the choice is straightforward and the programme is prepared to rely on expert
practitioner knowledge and capabilities to deploy that selected APIM.
Our evidence suggests, however, that a programme might benefit from using tools to reconcile
the APIM’s proposed design against stakeholders’ objectives in the conceptualisation and
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design phases of a programme. We found that the underlying mechanisms that controlled
the programmes’ activities influenced its ability to challenge the significant assumptions,
relating to stakeholders’ objectives and requirements, upon which the eID card design was
based.
The methodological insights from the two interviewees, as expert insiders, proved most
valuable in gaining understanding about the dynamics of an APIM programme and the
efficacy of an expert-led approach.
Further empirical research is needed to ascertain the impacts on the selection of an APIM
when that choice is not so straightforward to the programme. Further research should also
encompass circumstances when a programme does not have access to wide range of expert
practitioner knowledge and skills.
In the next chapter, we describe our efforts to further validate our identified factors and
their associated criteria questions and also elucidate on methodological learnings from data
acquired from our second case study.
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This chapter describes our case study of an EU state’s Border Control eGates Programme.
We begin by describing the background details of this case study and the data acquired. We
continue by discussing the results of our efforts to validate our identified factors using data
from this case study and describe the patterns that we recognised in our assessment results.
Next, we examine the iterative deployment approach pursued by the eGates Programme for
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our main unit of analysis. We also examine interviewees’ retrospective insights on the app-
roach pursued by the eGates Programme in order to identify methodological learnings. Next,
we compare the methodological patterns identified in our data relating to the approaches
pursued by the eID Card Programme and the eGates Programme. Finally, we draw our
conclusions on our analysis of the data from these two retrospective case studies for our two
units of analysis.
7.1 Background on the EU State’s Border Control eGates Pro-
gramme
This section describes the background to this programme without revealing details about
the state, organisations or individuals involved in our research. This section builds upon the
information provided in Section 4.3.2.
As with all our case studies, we anonymise the subjects and their organisations in order to
protect their interests, in accordance with the agreed consent arrangements; therefore, we
give general descriptions about subjects and objects rather than provide specific names. Our
case study concentrates on the period from the inception of the EU state’s eGates Programme
in November 2007 until December 2012.
This case study focuses on an EU member state that commenced deploying Electronic
Gates (eGates) for automated border control crossing inspections, using Electronic Passports
(ePassports), of passengers around 2008. States commenced issuing ePassports which
complied with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9303 Specification
on Electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (eMRTDs) [146, 41] in 2004. An
ePassport was a type of eMRTD. Other forms of eMRTDs included biometric residence
permits and national identity cards.
In October 2012 the ICAO’s Technical Advisory Group (TAG) reported [147] that 23
countries had deployed Automated Border Control (ABC) systems, which used ICAO
compliant eMRTDs, to automatically verify passengers. The earliest ABC deployments were
at airports in Australia and Portugal. We use the term eGates to imply a form of ABC system,
which uses an ICAO compliant eMRTD, to verify its holder.
The types of ABC systems being piloted in airports were either biometric identification
deployments or biometric authentication deployments. Biometric identification systems
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used an enrolled biometric feature, e.g. iris or fingerprint modalities, to identify a person
and did not, therefore, require a security document. Biometric authentication systems used a
security document, e.g. an ePassport, which was authenticated electronically using X.509.3
digital certificates. Following the successful authentication of the eMRTD by the eGates’
inspection system the holder’s biometric feature, i.e. facial image, was then captured and
compared against the extracted image from the eMRTD, in order to verify its holder. All
state’s ePassport’s issuing authorities distributed their certificates and Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs) to their indigenous border control police authorities and to other states’ border
control police authorities, through a centralised digital certificate distribution hub, in order to
support the eMRTD authentication process.
The self-service eGates were designed to inspect EU citizen’s ePassports at border control
crossings in airport terminals. Passengers arriving at airports had the option to use the eGates,
in order to pass through immigration control, rather than queuing at the manned border
control police channels. The eGates’ inspection systems validated the authenticity of the
ePassport and also captured the holder’s facial image in order to verify that representation to
the facial image extracted from the holder’s ePassport.
Typically, a set of eGates comprised several parallel enclosures or physical channels each
with an eMRTD Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) scanner, an initial physical barrier,
which opened once the passenger’s eMRTD was authenticated by the inspection system. The
eGates also comprised a camera to capture an image of the passenger’s face and a second
physical barrier, which opened for the successfully verified passenger to walk though and
exit the border control environment. At the time of the programme’s inception there were
several eGates pilot deployments, with different configurations, in Australia, Asia and Europe
between 2005 and 2007, which verified passengers’ identity automatically at border control
crossing points in airports.
The eGates, in our case study, were normally supervised by two border control police officers.
Typically, one border control police officer acted as the eGates’ system operator, watched
a monitor screen that displayed the progress of each passenger as they navigated their way
through the eGates’ enclosures. The other border control officer, who acted as an usher in
front of the eGates, encouraged passengers to use the eGates and to assist those passengers
who were experiencing difficulties with using the eGates. Also, where appropriate, the usher
would redirect ineligible passengers to the queues for the manually operated border control
channels. Certain passengers were ineligible to use the eGates because their ePassport
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was not chipped, or because the passenger’s nationality was outside the EU or because the
ePassport presented by the passenger to the eGates failed to authenticate correctly, i.e. was
potentially a counterfeit. There were two different eGate configurations deployed by the
programme at the state’s airports which were provided by the different eGates manufacturers
in two separate supplier consortia.
Typically, the passenger placed their ePassport on to an ePassport RFID reader. If the
ePassport was not authenticated successfully, the usher referred that passenger to join the
manual border control checks performed by border control police officers. If the ePassport
authenticated correctly, then the ePassport holder was prompted, by the first eGate barrier
raising, to walk into the eGate enclosure to a fixed position for the facial capture process.
A camera then scanned the passenger’s face and this captured data was compared to the
facial image extracted from the ePassport. If the captured facial image data matched the
facial image data extracted from the ePassport, to a predetermined verification threshold, the
second barrier in the eGate enclosure lifted and the passenger was allowed to pass through the
border control crossing. Essentially, eGate passenger inspections were self-service processes
which was supervised by two border control officers.
The particular state in our case study pursued a strategy to pilot both types of ABC system,
with a biometric identification deployment at one major airport and biometric authentication
eGates, with various configurations, also at this major airport and also at terminals in
several regional airports. The biometric identification pilot deployments involved capturing
passenger’s iris image data for identifying passengers whereas the eGates pilot deployments
involved the use of the passenger’s authenticated ePassport to perform facial verification. We
will later reflect on the state’s border control police decision to continue to operate the eGates
deployments for verifying passengers and to gradually withdraw the biometric identification
deployments.
7.2 Data Gathered
This section describes the data gathered using our stated data collection techniques, described
in Section 4.4, in terms of documentary objects acquired, subjects interviewed, and our own
observations and reflections.
The eGates Programme pursued an iterative deployment approach that produced some design
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specifications from evaluating several deployment configurations. We discuss the status
of these deployments, i.e. proof of concept, trial and pilot, in Section 7.4. Stakeholder
objectives and business requirements documentation were not created by the programme at
the outset.
7.2.1 Documentary Evidence
We concentrated on gathering data from a variety of reliable sources because we were unable
to gain formal consent to access documentation produced by the programme itself.
Through our interviews with members of the programme team we discovered that the pro-
gramme’s focus was on producing test plans and test result reports rather than documentation,
such as a feasibility study, business requirements document, risks assessment, privacy impact
assessments. We were unable to find documents which described the business rationale or
objectives for introducing the eGates. Indeed, as we discuss later in Section 7.4, our data
suggests that these documents were not actually produced at all due to the approach pursued
by the programme.
The main source of our documentary data came from ICAO, particularly the Technical
Advisory Group (TAG), which produced the specifications for eMRTDs and the specifications
for testing the eMRTDs with inspection systems.
The list of publications acquired from ICAO include:
• Biometric Deployment of MRTDs Development and Specification of Globally Inter-
operable Biometric Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using
MRTDs [140];
• MRTDs Development of a Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Optional Capacity Ex-
pansion Technologies v 1.7 [141];
• Guide to Interfacing eMRTDs and Inspection Systems [142];
• Doc 9303 MRTDs Part 1 Machine Readable Official Travel Document Volume 2
Specifications for electronic Enabled MRTDs with Biometric Identification Capability
[146];
• MRTDs: History, Interoperability and Implementation v1.4 [154];
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• MRTDs RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for ePassports - Part 2 Tests for
Air Interface, Initialisation and Anti-Collision and Transport Protocol [143];
• MRTDs RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for ePassports – Part 3 Tests
Application Protocol and Logical Data Structure [144];
• MRTDs RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for ePassports – Part 4 Reader
Tests for Air Interface Initialisation and Anti-Collision and Transport Protocol [145];
• Guidelines on eMRTDs and Passenger Facilitation [148];
• Technical Advisory Group Report on Machine Readable Travel Documents Twenty-
First TAG Meeting Dec 2012 [147]; and
• ICAO MRTD Report Global Standardization Volume 7 Number 2 [150].
Another major source of case study documentary data, specifically on eGates deployments
in Europe, came from the Frontex Organisation. Frontex was the European Commission
agency responsible for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of
the EU Member States.
The list of publications acquired from Frontex include:
• BIOPASS Study on Automated Biometric Border Crossing Systems for Registered
Passenger at Four European Airports [106];
• SeBoCom Pre-Study: A Preliminary Study on Secure Border Communications [75];
• BIOPASS II Automated Biometric Border Crossing Systems Based on ePassports and
Facial Recognition: RAPID and Smartgate [107];
• Beyond the Frontiers - Frontex: The First Five Years [111];
• Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2011 [109];
• Ethics of Border Security produced by University of Birmingham for Frontex [301];
• Futures of Borders - A Forward Study of European Border Checks [114];
• Best Practice Guidelines in the Design, Deployment and Operation of Automated
Border Control Crossing Systems [110];
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• Frontex Risks Analysis Network Quarterly Issue 3 July-Sept 2011[112];
• Operational and Technical Security of Electronic Passports [108]; and
• Situational Overview on Trafficking Human Beings [113]
We also located reports from non-EU organisations, such as the World Bank, which described
the problems faced by border control police to balance security, e.g. detection of illegal
immigrants and the illegal trafficking of human beings, while improving passenger facilita-
tion, e.g. reducing passenger queues at border control crossings. We also found publications
relating to cross-border control systems, e.g. Schengen Information System (SIRENE), used
by states’ border control police to identify persons wanted for extradition. We also found
video footage on the Internet demonstrating the use of the eGates at airports in Australia.
The list of publications acquired from other recognised organisations include:
• EU Schengen Catalogue–Schengen Information System (SIRENE): Recommendations
and Best Practices [66];
• European Commission–Biometrics at the Frontier: Assessing the Impact on Society
[90];
• UK Home Office–Physical data: voluntary provision Iris Recognition Immigration
System (IRIS) Scheme Definition Document [296];
• International Air Transport Association (IATA)–Simplifying Passenger Travel: Ideal
Process Flow V2.0 [149];
• British Airports Authority MiSense Summary Report V 2.00 [37];
• UK House of Lords European Union Committee 9th Report of Session 2007-08
Frontex: the EU External Borders Agency Report with Evidence [297];
• European Commission–Communication COM(2008) 359 final A Common Immigra-
tion Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools [62];
• German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)–Technical Guideline TR-03110-
1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for MRTDs [41];
• European Commission–Guidelines Integrated Border Management in EC External
Cooperation [89];
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• The World Bank–Collaborative Border Management: A New Approach to an Old
Problem [115]; and
• Centre for European Policy Studies–Border Security, Technology and the Stockholm
Programme [74]
We found very few scientific publications relating to automated passenger identification or
border control eGates. Nevertheless, we found MacLeod and McLindin’s contribution [191]
on a Methodology for the Evaluation of an International Airport Automated Border Control
Processing System particularly valuable to this case study. We found that there were many
similarities in the approach pursued by the eGates Programme to MacLeod and McLindin’s
recommended methodology.
We found the main difference between their theoretical methodology and the eGates Pro-
gramme’s approach was mainly that the programme did not define the problem space in order
to capture the raw qualitative and quantitative data for analysis. We discuss this absence of
data which defined the identification problem in this case study in greater detail in Section
7.5.
For our specific case study we located publications from the relevant state’s national press,
specialist industry publications, presentation slides from pertinent industry conferences, and
discussion threads in a professional network community, e.g. LinkedIn eGates Professionals
Group. Some of our documentary data came from the state’s border control police authority’s
website. We also discovered a government department report relating to the border control
police authority’s performance and the impact of deploying eGates for automatic border
control inspections.
7.2.2 Interview Transcripts
We also acquired data from conducting eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews which
were recorded, transcribed and subsequently reviewed by the respective interviewee. The
questions posed in our interviews are shown in Appendix D.
We designed our interview questions to ascertain the interviewee’s role in the programme,
their activities and their contributions to some of the programme’s deliverables. Our questions
were also designed to acquire their insights on the approach pursued by the programme and
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the issues encountered during the programme in order to ascertain the proficiencies and
deficiencies of the programme’s approach.
We did not, however, use these questions for our interviews with passengers because we
wanted to them to concentrate on their most recent experiences of using an eGate, as subjects,
in order to acquire data on usability factors. We requested our two passenger interviewees to
recall each experience and, where relevant, asked them to explain any difficulty encountered.
Our interviewee set comprised three members of the border control authority’s eGates
Programme (Interviewees A, B and C), three eGates supplier employees (Interviewees X,
Y and Z), and two passengers who had used the eGates on a regular basis (Interviewees M
and N). We had, therefore, established the means to gather data from the organisation which
owned and operated systems supporting the eGates, organisations which supplied the eGates
technologies and passengers who used the eGates. We were, however, unable to interview
police officers, as users of the eGates, in order to complete our interviewee set. We failed
to obtain the necessary authorisation from the border control police authority to interview
border control police officers or their union representatives. A police officer’s role, as a
user of the eGates, was to monitor the displays which showed the status of each passenger
verification transaction.
Interviewees A, B and C were seconded, at the request of the senior management in the
border control police authority, to the programme team. Interviewee A’s role, seconded
from the border control police’s research and development department, was to act as the
immigration and customs expert advisor to the programme. Interviewee B’s role, seconded
from the travel document inspection department, was to act as a security expert on ABC
inspection systems. Interviewee C was seconded from one of the airport authorities and had
acted as their leading representative on the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
Simplifying Passenger Travel Interest Group. Interviewee C’s role was to act as a programme
manager in the eGates Programme.
We were introduced to Interviewee A by a professional colleague who had worked with this
person on a previous project relating to the issuance of ePassports for the EU state’s Ministry
of the Interior (MOI). Interviewee A assisted us in recruiting Interviewees B and C who were
all close colleagues in the programme. Interviewee B introduced us to three eGates supplier
employees.
Interviewee X represented a global technology manufacturer that supplied ICAO compliant
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RFID scanning devices to electronically read data from an eMRTD. Interviewee X’s role was
to ensure that his RFID scanning devices were compatible with the border control systems
and managed the related technical issues that arose during the deployments. Interviewee Y
represented one of the two companies that manufactured the eGates which were deployed
by the programme. As a pre-sales engineer his duties were to ensure that his company’s
eGates were technically compatible with the border control systems and he also dealt
with performance issues, which centred mainly on the usability of the deployed eGates.
Interviewee Z was a pre-sales engineer who represented a company that installed and
configured the eGate deployments. This company was a systems integrator and did not
actually manufacture the eGates. Interviewee Z’s role focused on the integration of eGates
systems and the border control systems and dealt mainly with technical compatibility and
performance issues.
We made it clear to all the aforementioned interviewees, at the outset, that the purpose of
our interview, as reflected in our briefing emails and questions posed in Appendix D, was
to ascertain their views on the approach pursued by the programme. All interviewees were
provided with an explanation of the aims of our research.
Interviewee M and Interviewee N were our long-term friends from the European banking
industry. During a social gathering both interviewees expressed an interest in our research
on eGates. Both our friends were citizens from our case study state and were frequent air
travellers who had had experience from using biometric identification systems and also
eGates. Their experiences were not confined to our case study state as they had used other
ABC systems in other EU member states on several occasions. Interviewee M was the leader
of a municipality who often went on his holidays to his apartment in Portugal. Interviewee
N was a sales representative in the food production industry who often travelled to see her
clients in Europe.
We refrain from including data from our own personal experiences of using eGates. We were
conscious of the need to pose open and unbiased questions to our two interviewees in order
to avoid influencing their descriptions of their experiences. We reiterated to them that we
were interested in gathering data from their recent personal experiences of using eGates at
airports in our case study state.
All interviewees provided their approval as to the accuracy of the transcripts produced from
the interview recordings. Some parts of the transcripts were amended or removed, at the
request of interviewees, due to the sensitive nature of their statements. We provide extracts
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from our final interview transcripts in Section 7.4.
7.2.3 Our Observation Memos and Reflective Notes
We produced an observation memo immediately after each interview and also after the
changes requested by the interviewee following their review of the respective transcript.
These memos helped us to gain an understanding of the interviewees’ perspectives and their
attitudes towards the programme’s approach and the utility of the eGates deployments.
We also produced 20 reflective notes during our qualitative analysis of our acquired data. Our
analysis included the comparison of the key statements made by different stakeholders both
in the interviewee transcript data and in the documentary data. These reflective notes were
created and stored within the Atlas.ti CAQDAS tool. Our notes also describe the patterns
that we identified in our data regarding the outcomes from the iterative approach pursued by
the programme.
7.3 Validation of Our Factors
This section presents the results of our efforts to validate the factors as at Stage 9 of our
research implementation plan, as shown in Figure 4.3 on page 124, using the criteria
definitions in Section 6.3.1 and the data gathered in this case study.
We then provide a discussion on our results and a description of the patterns that we
recognised in our assessment. We also compare the results of this assessment against our
assessment results using data from the EU state’s eID Card Programme Case Study.
7.3.1 Results from Our Factor Validation Effort
Despite the absence of documentary evidence, generated by the programme itself, we were
able to validate more factors using the data in this case study, than using the data from the
EU state’s eID Card Programme Case Study. We discuss this improvement in our assessment
results in the next sub-section.
Table.7.1 shows the total of 222 factors as at Stage 6 of our research implementation plan, at
the top of the table, and the status of the 234 identified factors for evaluating APIMs as at
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Factors For Understanding Effectiveness Efficiency Row
Evaluating APIMs Perspective Perspective Perspective Totals
Pre-Case Study
Stage 6 61 factors 61 factors 100 factors 222 factors
Evaluation Themes 7 factor themes 9 factor themes 9 factor themes 25 factor themes
Grounded
Factors 38 (63%) 55 (79%) 68 (65%) 161 (68%)
Deduced
Factors 14 (24%) 10 (14%) 29 (28%) 53 (23%)
Not-grounded
Factors 8 (13%) 5 (7%) 7 (7%) 20 (9%)
Relabelled
Factors 28 21 28 77
Revised
Criteria 36 33 43 112
Questions
Deleted
Factors 1 0 2 3
New Factors
Identified 0 9 6 15
Factor
Explanations 60 70 104 234
Factor Theme
Name Change 1 1 3 5
Post Case Study
Stage 9 60 factors 70 factors 104 factors 234 factors
Evaluation Themes 7 factor themes 9 factor themes 9 factor themes 25 factor themes
Table 7.1: Factor Validation Results using the EU State’s eGates Programme Case Study
Data
Stage 9, at the foot of the table, following our validation efforts.
Table.7.1 shows that the total number of factors had increased overall by 12 and the majority
of our identified factors, i.e. 68%, were now grounded. The results also show, however, that
over one third of the factors required their label to be more descriptive and that over half
of the criteria questions required enhancement to elicit the required information from the
application context.
Next, our results are examined in more detail.
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7.3.2 Discussion of Validation Assessment Results
The unavailability of documentation from the programme influenced how we used our
acquired case study data to validate our factors.
As described earlier, the programme adopted an iterative deployment approach, which
involved eGates pilot deployments from various manufacturers, with different configurations,
at several airport terminals in the state. Interviewee A stated that “this approach meant
that the programme produced very little documentation in terms of agreed stakeholders’
objectives and business requirements”. The programme concentrated upon producing
documentation covering design specifications and operational performance constraints which
were incorporated into the Request For Product (RFP) procurement document.
Interviewee B claimed that “these documents were rushed and were not fully completed
because of the Minister of the Interior’s unexpected public announcement and instruction
to the programme to install eight further sets of eGates within ten weeks”. We describe the
eGates Programme’s development and deployment approach later in Section 7.4; however,
for our factor validation assessment, we acquired data from other creditable sources. We
used the ICAO Doc 9303 specifications on MRTDs, e.g. an ePassport, and the video footage
on eGates together with data collected from our interviews with our supplier employees in
order to ground our identified factors in the Effectiveness and Efficiency Perspectives of our
evaluation framework.
In the absence of documentary data describing stakeholders’ objectives to introduce the
eGates, we relied on interviewee comments and had to make deductions, based upon our
plausible assumptions, in order to ground the factors in the Understanding Perspective. The
lack of documentary data generated by the programme, however, restricted our ability to
identify new factors in the Understanding Perspective.
7.3.2.1 Factor Identifier Labels
We found that 77 of our 222 factors, i.e. 35%, required their factor label to be more descriptive.
Our results also show that at least 50% of our criteria questions required enhancement. This
first result is broken down into 45%, 34%, and 28% for the Understanding, Effectiveness and
Efficiency Perspectives respectively. The second result is broken down into 59%, 54% and
43% respectively.
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Our first result suggests that the factor descriptions were more accurate according to the
type of perspective and the degree of granularity of the data relating to that factor, e.g. a
false acceptance rate. Factors in the Understanding Perspective are primarily concerned
with evaluating knowledge about the application context and the stakeholders’ objectives
for the APIM. This information tended to be broad and conceptual in nature. Factors in the
Effectiveness Perspective were descriptive in terms of APIM’s functionality and performance
requirements. Factors in the Efficiency Perspective related to specific configuration detail,
e.g. the identifier data assigned to identify a subject, and, by nature, concerned required
factual information.
Our second result suggests that it is more difficult to construct criteria questions to acquire
factual data than questions to acquire data that are conceptual in nature. Our difficulty to
construct concise criteria questions to acquire factual data may be explained by Homburg’s
hierarchical multi-objective decision-making model [134] where objectives are characterised
by broad implicit declarations and the subordinate sub-objectives are concise explicit state-
ments. The results of our validation efforts showed that the higher the level of granularity
of the data related to a factor the more likely that that factor label and its associated criteria
question needed revision.
We also found that many of our criteria questions were too narrow and were only relevant to
specific types of APIM. Therefore, we identified the need to generalise the phrasing of these
criteria questions so as to accommodate all types of APIM.
We concluded that our strategy to introduce factor explanations for our identified factors,
in this case study was justified as these explanations enabled us to locate inadequacies of
our factor description labels and their associated criteria questions. Our factor explanations
also helped to identify that around 10% of our factors needed reclassification within each
perspective. The tables in Appendix E reflect those factors which were reclassified between
evaluation themes. There were no factors or evaluation themes which required reclassification
between perspectives.
7.3.2.2 Relevancy of Our Factors
The comprehensiveness of the data that we were able to collect enabled us to directly ground
the majority of our identified factors. The data also enabled us to make plausible deductions
to ground most of our remaining factors.
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Our assessment shows that 79% of the factors in the Effectiveness Perspective, excluding
nine new factors, out of 70 factors were grounded and 14% were deduced leaving only
7% Not-grounded. This result was mainly due to the availability and granularity of detail
in the ICAO specifications on issuing eMRTDs and electronically inspecting eMRTDs.
These specifications were designed primarily to ensure technical interoperability between
issued ePassports and the reading of the ePassports with a border control police officer
manually passing the RFID chip in the ePassport across an ePassport RFID scanner. The
same specifications were also applied for passengers performing the same task as part of a
self-service automated inspection process, using eGates.
We were only able to ground 65% of the factors in the Efficiency Perspective, excluding
new and deleted factors, out of 104 identified factors and needed to deduce 28% of our
factors in this perspective. This meant that 7% of our factors were Not-grounded. While
the aforementioned ICAO specifications helped to ground many of the factors relating to
the configuration of the eGates we had to make many assumptions on factors relating to the
reliability and usability of the eGates.
Our data shows that the programme generated much test data on the reliability and usability
of the eGates using observation techniques, video recordings of passengers using eGates, and
from conducting interviews with passengers after they had used the eGates. As these test data
were not available to us we used our documentary evidence and interview transcripts from
our two passenger interviewees to validate the factors in the Usability Results Evaluation
Theme, shown in Table E.20. Many of the factors in the Reliability Results Evaluation
Theme, shown in Table E.19, however, were Not-grounded or required deduction due to the
restrictions on releasing sensitive data to us.
We also identified the need to amend five evaluation theme titles slightly in order to improve
clarity of the classification of our evaluation themes. We found that 9% of our original factors,
located in the literature, were Not-grounded. We discuss the patterns of our assessment
results, including cross-case analysis using data from both of our retrospective case studies,
in Section 7.3.3.
7.3.2.3 Consistency of Our Factors
The introduction of an explanation note for each factor highlighted the need to reclassify
approximately 10% of our factors. The reclassification of our factors across perspectives are
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reflected in the tables in Appendix E.
From our assessment efforts, we recognised the need to differentiate between the operator or
user of the APIM and the subject to be automatically identified. We found 15 factors and
their associated criteria questions needed to be revised to reflect this distinction. Our results
here suggest that either the factors were reasonably consistent or our method for assessing
the consistency of factors was deficient, or possibly that our factor classifications need further
refinement.
We believe that further empirical research will assist in the reducing the remaining inconsist-
encies between our factors and also improve our efforts to define the scope of each factor in
the relevant evaluation theme.
7.3.2.4 Completeness of Our Factors
From our assessment, we identified 15 new factors which were classified into the evaluation
themes of the Effectiveness and Efficiency Perspectives.
The lack of documentary data from the programme was the main reason behind our inability
to identify new factors for the Understanding Perspective. We found that only three of our
identified factors needed to be deleted due to redundancy. The identification of 15 new
factors suggested that, after validating our factors using data from two case studies, we had
not reached the saturation point where we could claim that the factors for evaluating APIMs
were in any way complete.
In order to reduce the reliance on our deductions and assumptions, we concluded that further
empirical research, generating data from the use of the ASMSA Methodology, would improve
our factor validation efforts.
7.3.3 Patterns Recognised in our Assessment Data
We now describe patterns recognised in our factor validation assessment in order to answer
our first research question. We also provide a cross-case analysis of our validation efforts in
this case study and the results of our validation efforts using the data from the EU state’s eID
Card Programme Case Study.
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We consider that our first research question has not, after using data from two case studies,
been answered completely. Our case study data, however, has enabled us to reach a point
where we consider that most of our evaluation themes in our evaluation theme have been
validated, although all factors in our evaluation themes may not be entirely complete. We
believe that the research effort needed to establish a comprehensive list of factors may need
to investigate many different types of application contexts. Indeed, we believe that it would
be inappropriate to claim that such a list is (ever) complete because of the impracticalities of
empirical verification.
The comparison of the factor validation results in this case study to those results from the
previous case study reveals general trends. The cross-case comparison reveals that the total
directly grounded factors in this case study increased to 68% from 62% of the directly
grounded factors in our assessment of the data acquired from the EU state’s eID Card
Programme Case Study. Additionally, the percentage of Not-grounded factors has reduced to
9% for this case study from 22% as in our initial case study. Conversely, the percentage of
deduced factors increased to 23% in this case study from 16% as in our initial case study.
This pattern suggests that either our acquired data was more comprehensive for this second
retrospective case study than our initial retrospective case study, or that our identified factors
for evaluating APIMs are becoming more descriptive, through enhancement, or that some of
our assumptions for this case study may not be entirely plausible.
From our cross-case comparison of validation results, we found that 157 out of 207 76% our
identified factors, originally located in the literature, were grounded directly, at least once, in
the data of our two retrospective case studies. Factors identified in our case study data sets
are, by definition, grounded. Therefore, excluding the eight factors which were originally
identified, 42 20% out of our original 207 factors have been either deduced or Not-grounded.
From further analysis of these remaining factors we found that following five factors were
Not-grounded in either of our two retrospective case study data sets:
1. Duress Policy in the Policies Evaluation Theme (Identifier A.17.8.) –see Table E.7. in
Appendix E);
2. Template Update Notification Factor in the Reliability Results Evaluation Theme
(Identifier A.16.19.) –see Table E.19. in Appendix E);
3. Signal Retrieval Strategy Factor in the Usability Results Evaluation Theme (Identifier
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A.15.9.) –see Table E.20. in Appendix E);
4. Signal Meaningfulness Factor in the Usability Results Evaluation Theme (Identifier
A.15.10.) –see Table E.20. in Appendix E); and
5. Backup Methods Factor in the Technology Management Theme (Identifier A.16.8.)
–see Table E.21. in Appendix E).
The relevancy of these five factors requires scrutiny during further factor validation assess-
ments. Also, these assessments should aim to eliminate the need for validating our identified
factors using our deductions and our plausible assumptions. We recognise, however, that
some factors may only be relevant for certain types of application contexts or particular types
of APIMs.
The significant increase from 38 relabelled factors in our initial assessment to 77 relabelled
factors in our second assessment suggests that our factor identifier’s descriptions still needed
improvement to make them more illustrative of our identified factors. Similarly, the revised
criteria questions from 36 in our first assessment up to 112 instances in our second assessment
suggests that our criteria questions also needed enhancement. Nevertheless, we consider
that our strategy to include an explanation note for each factor had a positive impact upon
our validation results in the second assessment. The explanations assisted us to identify
the descriptive deficiencies of our factor identifiers and also to identify the improvements
required for our criteria questions.
We concluded that further assessments were needed to validate our factors which had not
been directly grounded in the data of our two retrospective case studies. The acquisition
of relevant data is key to validating these remaining factors. We consider that using our
identified factors in our methodology to evaluate an APIM for a real-world application
context, using a participative research approach, e.g. action research, as described in Section
4.1.9.3, may offer greater potential to further validate our factors than using data from another
retrospective case study. We describe our efforts to validate our factors (and to identify new
factors), by gathering data from employing the ASMSA Methodology in the Corporation X
2FA Case Study.
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7.4 Methodological Observations on the Programme’s App-
roach
For our main unit of analysis on methodological efficacy, we now describe our interviewees’
observations on the programme’s approach to deploy eGates at terminals in several airport
locations. We commence by providing an historical account of the eGates Programme.
7.4.1 The eGates Programme’s Approach
We begin by describing the prevailing conditions at the time of the eGates Programme’s
inception. We then describe the strategies pursued by the programme and the significant
events that occurred during the programme, and the eventual outcomes as at the end of our
case study period.
The programme pursued an iterative deployment approach to introduce the eGates into
border control crossings. This approach involved several deployment, test and review cycles.
There was confusion, however, amongst our interviewees as to the actual approach pursued
by the programme. During the programme there were several eGates introduced, either as
proof of concept or pilot deployments, in various airport terminals operating with different
configurations simultaneously. Interviewee B used the term “experimental approach” while
Interviewee C claimed that the programme followed “robust methodological development
processes”.
Interviewee A claimed that “the eGates were installed as an experiment, to ascertain whether
eGates would be “useful” to border crossing controls”. The main undocumented objective,
according to Interviewee B was “for the eGates to increase the throughput rate of border
control passenger inspections without compromising security”. At that time there were long
passenger queues in airports at manually operated border control crossings.
The iterative deployment approach required the programme team to gather data, during
passengers’ usage of the eGates, from several deployment iterations. Acquired data were
then analysed and the eGates’ configurations were subsequently revised and retested with
passengers. The main outcomes from the approach pursued appears to be the sporadic
availability of the eGates at some airport terminals, passenger confusion as to whether they
are eligible to use the eGates, and usability problems, particularly for infrequent travellers.
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We found that the programme did not follow a formal systematic methodology. One of our
supplier interviewees interpreted the two initial deployments as “proof of concept” instal-
lations; however, the programme did not produce a feasibility study document or criteria
evaluate those deployments. The programme produced designs and specifications for the
eGates based upon these initial deployments. We found that there were no documents out-
lining stakeholders’ objectives or business requirements for an ABC; however, the business
problem appeared to be understood by our interviewees. The programme’s task was to
integrate new eGates technology into existing infrastructures and systems rather than to
introduce a complete solution to address their recognised business problem.
None of our interviewees claimed that the eGates deployments had been a success or a
failure; although, most interviewees thought that benefits of the stakeholders’ investments
in the eGates would be reaped over a long period. Much of the programme effort went into
iterative performance testing with suppliers enhancing and reconfiguring their systems in
order to improve automated passenger inspection throughput rates. We found that there
were increases in passenger inspection throughput rates only at major airport terminals. The
eGates deployed at smaller terminals were under-utilised. We also found that the eGates
were not always available at the major terminals because there were outstanding contractual
issues. Also these eGates and the supporting systems did not possess sufficient processing
capacity to serve passengers, on occasions, at peak demand.
We found that the deployed eGates had not been evaluated by the programme team to
ascertain whether the programme’s main objective to increase the throughput rate of border
control passenger inspections without compromising security had been met. The programme
team did not even attempt to gather the biometric authentication decision accuracy data
required in order to assess their main objective.
Interviewees A claimed that “the performance objective that had been set could not be easily
assessed in practice”. There appeared to be a difficulty in gathering the relevant data sets on
manual border control inspections and also the eGates inspections in order to assess whether
the main objective was achieved. Both data sets were required to establish ground truth
knowledge 1 the genuineness of the verified passengers and their ePassports. This genuineness
would then allow the programme to identify verification false acceptances and verification
false rejections. Additionally, as Interviewee A commented, that “a border control police
1Dunstone and Yager describe [86] ground truth knowledge as a correct data match because the biometric
verification comparison, between data samples acquired, originate from the same genuine user.
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officer may have behaved differently if they became aware that their identification decisions
were being monitored in order to test their performance accuracy”.
Figure 7.1 is a representation of the programme’s approach which has been generated from
the Atlas.ti CAQDAS tool following our descriptive coding of the data gathered. Figure
7.1 is designed to show the progression of the programme from its inception through to the
programme’s outcomes as at the end of our case study period. Figure 7.1 should not be
construed as a causal network as our data were insufficient to identify direct causal effects
throughout the programme.
The conditions prevailing at the time of the programme’s inception, represented by an-
tecedent variables, are shown in the boxes in the left column and the programme’s outcomes,
represented by outcome variables, are shown in the boxes in the right column of Figure 7.1.
The boxes in between the preconditions column and eventual outcomes column represent the
strategies pursued and the significant events that occurred during the programme, i.e. the
intervening variables.
In order to protect the identity of our case study, we refrain from providing dates in Figure
7.1; however, we provide elapsed months in our descriptions to reflect the impact that the
MOI’s imposed delivery timescales had on the programme’s outcomes.
7.4.2 Prevailing Conditions
This sub-section describes the prevailing circumstances prior to the programme’s inception.
There were notable variations in our interviewees’ accounts regarding the prevailing condi-
tions to commence the eGates Programme. Our aim, from a critical realist standpoint, was to
analyse each interviewee’s perspective and not to establish the irrefutable truth.
According to Interviewee A “the programme commenced when the head of the state’s border
control police authority watched a manufacturer’s eGates in operation, at a technology
exhibition, and then decided to experiment with the eGates to ascertain whether they would
be beneficial to the border control authority’s operations”. The eGates Programme Team
was setup shortly afterwards with a mandate to determine the automated passenger inspection
capabilities of eGates deployments at the state’s airports and seaports.
Interviewee C stated, however, “the introduction of eGates was the next step onwards from
the passenger identification experiments that had been performed in other states”. This
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Figure 7.1: Approach Pursued by the EU State’s eGates Programme
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interviewee, as a member of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Simplifying
Passenger Travel Interest Group, had conducted research into how a passenger journey
through an airport could be improved through the use of technology, particularly by reducing
the passenger queues at border control passenger inspections.
We provide a list of the conditions prevailing at the time of the programme’s inception with
supporting descriptions.
1. Long-Term Strategy for Border Control The MOI had published a five year strategy
to encourage the introduction of innovative technologies into border control crossing
locations as a response to the projected increases in passenger numbers and the threats
emerging from terrorist attacks, illegal immigration and people trafficking.
2. Existing Border Control Systems There were border control systems, with high secu-
rity classifications, which assisted the border control police officers to detect stolen
passports and also to identify individuals that appeared on a blacklist. These officers
were trained to detect fraudulent and counterfeit passports and other forms of travel
document, e.g. identity cards. They also received psychological behaviour training in
order to pose incisive questions to passengers about the legitimacy of their visit to the
state.
3. Greater Restrictions on Operational Budgets The border control police authority man-
agement, in response to government operational budget restrictions, had pressure
placed upon it to reduce its operational costs.
4. Poor Industrial Relations with Border Police Officers The industrial relations between
the border control police officers, represented by their unions, and the border control
police authority’s management team had deteriorated over several years.
5. Greater Risks from Terrorism, Smuggling and People Trafficking The risks of these
illegal activities, together with illegal immigration, were constantly increasing and the
threats posed to the state’s citizens were reported regularly in the media.
6. Existing eGate Experiments Deployments of eGates in other states either complemented
a biometric identification ABC or were run as standalone biometric verification ABC
experiments. Several of these ABC experiments were supplier-funded.
7. Global Issuance of ePassports The introduction of ePassports meant that an increasing
number of passengers carried an ICAO compliant ePassport, with an ICC, containing
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their biographical and biometric data to enable automated passenger inspections at
border control crossings. All ePassports contained, in accordance with the ICAO DOC
9303 Specification [146], the holder’s facial image and there were many EU states’
ePassports that contained the holder’s fingerprint images.
8. Space Restrictions in Airports Airport authorities sought to improve the utilisation of
the restricted space in airport terminals in order to realise further commercial opportu-
nities.
9. Continual Increases in Passenger Numbers Long passenger queues at airport border
control inspection points were regularly reported in the media, not only in the case
study state, but in many other states worldwide.
10. Lack of eGate Deployment Standards There were no interoperability or security stan-
dards that the programme could use to assist with the configuration of the eGates.
11. Passengers Unfamiliar with ePassports Passengers were unfamiliar with ePassports,
in that they were not aware that they possessed an ePassport or that it had an ICC
which could be used in an eGate or similar ABC.
Interviewee A conceded that “there were very few instances of this technology around the
world and therefore we had no preconceptions and no standards against which to judge
them. So we thought what we would do was to run restricted trials, put them in and see
what happens to establish a kind of baseline, if you like. We would measure them in terms of
transaction times, performance accuracy, ease of use, that kind of thing to try to establish a
baseline”.
7.4.3 Strategies Pursued and Significant Events
This sub-section describes the strategies pursued by the programme and the significant events
that took place during the programme.
The terms experiment, proof of concept, trial, pilot and prototype were used interchangeably
by our interviewees and the exact status of the deployment appeared to have caused much
confusion, not only amongst our interviewees involved directly in the programme, but also
those interviewees involved externally, such as the eGates manufacturers. Irrespective of
their declared deployment status, the eGates deployments were actually operating in a live
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production environment in that they were integrated into the existing systems’ infrastructure
and being used by passengers. The eGates were authenticating real ePassports and were
capturing passengers’ biometric features.
The strategies pursued and the significant events that occurred during the programme are as
follows:
A. Stakeholders’ Objectives Not Documented We found that the programme did not docu-
ment the stakeholders’ objectives for the eGates. Benchmark performance objectives,
however, were set during the two initial proof of concept deployments.
B. Collaboration between Stakeholder Organisations A collaboration agreement was es-
tablished between the border control police authority and the two airport authorities
around month three to explore the use of eGates for automatic passenger inspections.
C. Airport Authorities’ Business Case The two airport authorities established a joint busi-
ness case to fund the two initial eGates’ proof of concept deployments for the border
control police authority. The programme reached an agreement with a technology
consortia, including an eGates manufacturer, to deploy the eGates at two airport
terminals.
D. First eGates Deployment The first eGate deployment commenced around month 8. The
objectives of the initial eGates proof of concept deployment differed between our
interviewees. Interviewee C claimed that “the purpose of the trial was to look at the
viability of technology to replace immigration officers to offer an alternative route
across the border for passengers”. Interviewee B claimed that “the proof of concept
focused on consistency of security and passenger throughput rates”.
E. Second eGates Deployment We found that the second deployment in month 10 was
not planned by the programme team. A second technology consortium offered to
install their eGates solution at an alternative airport terminal. Whether a fortuitous
coincidence or an engineered opportunity, it allowed the programme to run two ‘proof
of concept’ deployments in parallel with two different eGates configurations.
F. Performance Benchmark Testing The programme created a variety of metrics in order
to establish an understanding of the baseline performance of the eGates in an oper-
ating environment. From the iterative evaluations, the eGates were reconfigured on
several occasions in order to improve the passenger throughput rates. The programme
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employed usability specialists, security specialists and operational management con-
sultants in order to establish a set of baseline performance benchmarks.
H. Evaluation Report from Initial Deployments An evaluation report was produced by
the programme, mainly covering the technical performance of the eGates. It recomm-
ended the deployment of eGates with specific caveats on the eligibility of suitable
passengers. We found that this evaluation report was produced hurriedly and we
explain the reasons shortly in Point J.
I. Technical Specifications and Operational Constraints During the production of the
evaluation report, the programme was also engaged in producing technical specif-
ications and operational constraints documentation for the various components. A list
of over 200 specifications was produced, some of which were classified as mandatory
features and the remaining as desirable features. Our data suggests that these docu-
ments were completed hurriedly by the programme team because the MOI announced,
unexpectedly to the programme team, that further eGates were to be installed at other
airport terminals within ten weeks by the end of month 21. These hurriedly completed
specifications formed the basis of the RFPs issued, for several of the eGates systems’
sub-components, which were published in procurement journals.
J. MOI Announces Fast Track eGates Pilot Deployments We found that the programme
team members were under the impression that the two initial deployments were to
last for at least another six months followed by a period of evaluation in order to
produce the evaluation report and also technical specifications. The justification for
the fast track pilot deployments was never explained by the MOI to the members of
the programme team.
K. Pilot Deployments through System Integrators The fast track deployment plan to in-
stall a further eight eGates in other airport terminals, commenced in month 19 to meet
the month 21 deadline set by the MOI. The programme used the existing supplier
framework contracts with system integrators because this strategy was considered to
be the most expedient way to procure the eGates systems’ sub-components.
L. Erroneous RFP Specifications The programme produced the RFP specification docu-
mentation hurriedly in response to the minister’s deployment deadline. According
to Interviewee Y “those RFP documents contained many errors and omissions in
comparison to the two pilot eGates deployments [that were in operation]”.
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M. Programme Governance Complexities The governance structure and responsibilities
for deploying the eGates at specific ports appears to have been complex and subject to
different managerial influences and personal opinions. The programme used Prince2
qualified project managers who controlled the programme using risk registers, issue
logs and project plans in line with the Prince2 Programme Methodology. Interviewee
B stated, however, ” that border control management changed and altered deliverables
without those amendments being discussed or recorded [with the programme team]”.
N. Officer Resistance to Deployment of eGates The border control police officers, as oper-
ators, were opposed the introduction of eGates. Interviewee A confirmed that “the
officers’ concerns over job security as the main reason behind the border control
police officers’ opposition to supervise the eGates”.
O. Sporadic Availability of the eGates There were many occasions when the eGates were
not available to passengers. We found there were two main causes: firstly, border
control police officer resistance to operating and supervising the eGates; and secondly,
the eGates’ subsystems failed frequently as there was a lack of operational support
resources to monitor the operation of the eGates’ systems. The investment required
to support these deployments was due to outstanding contractual issues between the
border control police authority and the airports authorities to support the eGates.
P. Uncertainty over eGates’ Funding The uncertainty surrounding the future funding of
the eGates hampered the programme to establish support arrangements for the two
initial proof of concept deployments and the eight additional fast track eGates deploy-
ments. This uncertainty resulted in programme delays and difficulties in respect of
decisions relating to purchasing equipment and resolving system failures.
Q. Limited Consultation with Stakeholders Our data suggests that consultation took place
on a regular basis between the programme and its main stakeholders, i.e. the border
control police management and the two airport authorities. Also the two initial deploy-
ments provided the programme team with the opportunity to consult with passengers,
as subjects, about their experiences of using eGates. The consultation between the pro-
gramme and the border control police officers and their two unions, however, appeared
to have been inadequate to resolve the police officers’ concerns about job security.
R. Organisational Restructures and Changing Business Drivers We found that the bor-
der control police authority’s organisation was restructured on several occasions during
the programme. These organisational restructures resulted in the business drivers for
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eGates being revised regularly due to personnel changes in the senior management
positions of the border control police authority.
S. Deployments of Convenience We found that the eGates were not deployed at airport
terminals that would derive most business benefit. The eGates were installed at those
airports which agreed to accommodate the eGates within the imposed deployment
deadlines.
T. Parallel ABC Pilot Deployments The biometric identification system pilot deployments
and the eGates deployments continued to be available to passengers at different
terminals and airports. We found that the parallel operation of both types of automated
border control crossing systems caused confusion amongst the passengers using these
systems.
U. Contributions to Standardisation Activities Several individuals in the programme team
contributed towards the standardisation efforts to establish usability and digital certifi-
cate management interoperability guidelines for eGates.
V. Post Deployment Enhancements Following the deployment of the eight fast track eGates
the border control police authority then made several requests, through the programme
team, to the eGates’ suppliers to improve the passenger inspection throughput rates.
W. Lack of Public Awareness We found that the border control police authority’s strategy
to minimise the publicity and educational material on the deployment of eGates
impacted the passenger usage of the eGates.
7.4.4 Programme Outcomes
This sub-section describes the outcomes of the eGates Programme, as provided by our inter-
viewees, and our analysis of the documentary data. We include plausible causal explanations,
where appropriate, in the following list of programme outcomes.
1. Passenger Confusion with Identification Systems We found that passengers were con-
fused as to which type of ABC system they were using at an airport terminal and how
to operate each system.
2. Stakeholders’ Learnings We found that the border control police authority and the
airport authorities gained much technical and operational know-how about deploying
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biometrics solutions. They also gained understanding on the commercial feasibility
and performance capabilities of operating eGates at airport terminals.
3. Learnings for eGates Manufacturers The eGates’ manufacturers to the programme
gained the opportunity to validate and refine their products, using passengers with
authentic ePassports, in production environments.
4. Outstanding Officer Job Security Issue We found that the border control police auth-
ority’s management had not resolved the job security issue with the unions for border
control police officers. As a result the eGates were often unavailable to passengers.
We discuss the consequences of the programme’s lack of consultation with the border
control police officers, as eGates stakeholder users, later in Section 7.5.
5. Passenger Eligibility Issue We found that passengers were unaware that they were el-
igible to use the eGates. Passenger misunderstandings were caused by the lack of
public awareness of ePassports and their capabilities. A contributory factor was the
complexity of the passenger eligibility criteria to use eGates which were specified in
the eGates evaluation report.
6. Outstanding Usability Issues Interviewee B conceded that there were outstanding us-
ability issues with the eGates. We found three main explanations relating to the
outstanding usability issues despite usability experts being engaged in the programme.
Firstly, infrequent usage appeared to be an important factor because many passengers
used the eGates only once or twice a year and forgot how to use the eGates. Secondly,
the eGates’ passenger interactions were not uniform across the deployments which
caused passenger confusion. We found that the eGates’ Human Computer Interface
(HCI) not only differed between the various manufacturers of eGates but also both
eGates’ manufacturers had deployed slightly different configurations of their eGates
as they continued to refine their products. Thirdly, the system feedback to passengers
was either non-uniform, in part was non-existent or was not integrated so as to provide
a coherent experience for passengers.
7. Low Utilisation of eGates We found that passenger utilisation of the eGates was gen-
erally low despite the programme having introduced several measures to encourage
passengers’ to use the eGates. We also found that some eGate deployments were
operating below capacity at several locations whereas at other locations the eGates
struggled on some occasions to respond to peak demand.
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8. Passenger Privacy Issues Interviewee N expressed concerns relating to “the border
control police authority storing and forwarding biographical and biometric data to
other government departments”. None of the programme interviewees or the supplier’s
interviewees commented on issues surrounding the subsequent usage of passengers’
data gathered from eGates passenger inspections or the need to protect the acquired
biometric data.
9. Status of eGate Deployments Remained Unclear We found that the interviewee mem-
bers of the programme team and also the suppliers were unclear as to the status of the
eGate deployments throughout the programme and as at the end of our case study.
10. Outstanding eGates Availability Issue We found that the sporadic availability of the
eGates remained an outstanding issue. This issue was due to unresolved technical
problems because of the absence of a support contract. Additionally, the manning of
the eGates remained unresolved between the border control police authority and with
police officers because of the latter’s concerns over job security.
7.4.5 Methodological Insights
We now provide retrospective insights from our interviewees, excluding the passenger
interviewees, on whether the approach pursued by the programme was efficacious for the
eGates deployments.
The purpose of our questions were designed acquire data in order to identify method-
ological proficiencies and deficiencies and also learnings from the approach pursued by
the programme. We then compare their responses with documentary evidence acquired on
methodological efficacy.
7.4.5.1 Iterative Deployment Approach
We found that our interviewees had mixed views on the merits of the programme’s iterative
deployment approach and there was general agreement that some activities could have been
improved.
Interviewee B summed up the programme’s approach: “I don’t think the way that we did
it was a good way. I think the lessons learned review exercise highlighted the various
problems”.
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7.4.5.2 Inability to Determine the Utility of Deployed eGates
We found that the programme team were unable to determine whether their performance ob-
jective for the eGates deployments had been fulfilled. The performance objective established
appears to have been flawed due to impracticalities of measuring the accuracy decisions on
passenger identity verification processes.
The programme established a passenger throughput rate objective which stated that one
eGate inspection should equate to five police officer inspections, in the same time frame,
without diminishing the existing security controls. Our data shows that the programme did
not, and, perhaps, could not gather all the relevant performance data to determine the actual
utility of the eGates against the manual inspections. We found that while throughput timings
were gathered by the programme team the data relating to the accuracy of the passenger
verification decisions, whether executed by the eGates or performed by police officers, were
not acquired.
Interviewee A described the theoretical basis upon which the prime objective was originally
set: “Humans [border control police officers] you know do make mistakes - they can look
at a photograph and fail to match it against the real live face and then machines are great.
But it also depends on the quality of the technology and now if we can get these accuracy
percentages up then, I think, probably you could say that they [eGates] are slightly better
than people [border control police officer] at that kind of thing. Where it comes to such
things as making qualitative judgments about people [passengers] then that is more difficult.
A more complex logical operation is when you are looking at somebody that says this person
is this gender, of this age, from this country, they have travelled by this route - what does that
suggest to the border control police officer? So, yes, I think, on balance I’d say it probably
made us [border control police authority] better at things because the donkey work has been
taken away from the officers and left them with the more complex assessments”.
These insights suggest that a methodology for selecting an APIM should incorporate pro-
cesses for validating performance objectives set by stakeholders. Moreover, these processes
should include considerations as to how the data are to be collected in order to enable the
utility of an APIM to be evaluated objectively.
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7.4.5.3 Multi-Disciplinary Programme Team
We found that the programme adopted collaborative working arrangements with a variety of
discipline experts from each stakeholder organisation.
The range of experts covered disciplines such as legal and compliance, health and safety reg-
ulations, ergonomics, operational research, physical security, information security, usability,
functional and system performance testing, security accreditation, biometrics and procure-
ment. The multi-disciplinary team enabled the programme to evaluate the deployments from
several disciplinary perspectives and identified operational constraints, e.g. health and safety
regulations, which resulted in the refinement of the eGates’ specifications.
From these findings, it would appear that a methodology to select an APIM would benefit by
adopting a multi-disciplinary approach to assist decisions on APIM deployments.
7.4.5.4 Articulation of Stakeholders’ Objectives and Business Requirements
We found that the programme team focused their attention on producing documentation that
described the eGates solution rather than documenting stakeholders’ objectives or business
requirements for the eGates. The specifications for the eGates included operational passenger
throughput rates, identification threshold rates and descriptions of operational constraints;
however, there were very few statements in terms of business objectives and requirements.
Interviewee Y described the impact of the programme’s focus to produce technical specif-
ications for eGates rather than articulating their business requirements on the deployments:
“From my experience working on other bids in other countries focusing on technical specif-
ications rather than business requirements restricts supplier ingenuity and increases the cost
of proposals. Border authorities still seem to be listing extensive technical specifications
which makes each tender distinct from each other, meaning that an ‘off the shelf’ product
offering impossible. By putting a larger emphasis on business objectives and requirements
rather than technical specifications, you allow suppliers to propose different technologies
and some freedom to design the solution. Suppliers, generally, have greater expertise on the
technology and being restrictive with the technical specifications serves to increase the cost
of proposals”.
These insights suggest that a methodology for selecting an APIM should include processes
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for documenting stakeholders’ objectives and their business requirements, as recommended
by Hull et al. [138] for all information systems.
7.4.5.5 Methods for Establishing Business Requirements
We found that there were benefits in using a proof of concept eGates deployment in a
production environment because it assisted the programme to assess the capabilities of
identification technologies of fulfilling stakeholders’ objectives.
The two proof of concept eGate deployments in different production environments served
as valuable tools which enabled the programme to set achievable performance objectives.
The deployments also helped to identify the capital and operational cost elements associated
with the eGates, which would have formed part of the input into the financial feasibility of
introducing and maintaining the eGates. Those deployments were not, however, used by the
programme to establish the business requirements for the eGates.
The method of establishing technical specifications adopted by the programme relied upon
the border control police authority’s ability to control the eGates’ deployments in the airport
terminals. There may, however, be some application contexts where stakeholders may not
have the same degree of control over the environment to pursue this approach in order to
gather their requirements for an APIM.
These insights suggest that a methodology should determine the methods for gathering the
business requirements for the APIM at the outset. A proof of concept deployment, if the
application context permits, appears to be an efficacious method for identifying and setting
performance objectives for an APIM.
7.4.5.6 Specifying Performance Tests and Testing Methods
We found that the programme had to specify the performance tests and invent their own
testing methods to evaluate the eGate deployments.
While there are standards, such as ISO/IEC 19795-1:2006 [161], for the evaluation of
biometric systems, which principally cover testing for error rates, setting thresholds together
with identification and verification acceptance rates. Interviewee A claimed that “the
programme had to devise their own tests and methods for testing eGates”. As Wayman et
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al. conclude [312] most performance testing methods generate technology test metrics and
do not incorporate operational environment factors or human behaviour factors. Our data
suggests that the programme spent considerable effort in devising tests that were appropriate
to their key throughput performance objective.
These insights suggest that a methodology to select an APIM should include processes to
define the performance tests in order to determine whether performance objectives for the
APIM can be and have been achieved. A methodology should also include processes for
establishing the appropriate data acquisition methods, relevant to the application context, to
enable the objective evaluation of an APIM’s performance.
7.4.5.7 Consultation with the Users
We found that the cooperation of border control police officers, as the eGates’ users, were
vital to the operation of the eGates.
The programme’s inadequate management of the consultation processes with the police
officers to address their concerns over job security was a plausible explanation to the police
officers’ reluctance to supervise the eGates. Conversely, we found that the consultations and
collaborations between the two main stakeholders, the supplier consortia, and the consultation
with passengers, as subjects, appears to have worked satisfactorily.
Well-structured consultation processes, as recommended by Hemmati [128], had the potential
to help the programme to address and possibly resolve police officers’ concerns, which could
have avoided or reduced the impacts relating to the police officers’ reluctance to operate
the eGates. Even if the programme’s consultation processes had been proficient, there was
another plausible reason regarding the police officers’ reluctance to supervise the eGates.
There had been a series of industrial disputes, relating to enforced redundancies, between the
border control police authority and the police officers. The introduction of eGates was seen
by the police officers and their unions to be another threat to their job security.
Our data suggests that the programme did not handle this sensitive issue proficiently, despite
the potential consequences of police officers jeopardising the operation of the eGates. There
may be some circumstances where stakeholders are unable to resolve their conflicting
objectives. We conclude from these insights that investments for an APIM would, in such
cases, appear to be unwise until major conflicts are reconciled or the impacts of conflicting
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stakeholders’ objectives are minimised sufficiently.
These insights suggest that a methodology to select an APIM should seek to reconcile
conflicts in stakeholders’ objectives, particularly users of the APIM, in the early stages of a
programme.
7.4.5.8 Purpose of Deployment Stages
We found that the programme team and also the supplier consortia were not only unclear
as to the status of each eGate deployment, but also there was confusion regarding each
deployment’s purpose.
Interviewee Y described the approach pursued by the programme team and compared it
to his experiences of deploying eGates in other states: “Overseas we are seeing a lot of
implementations now who follow a similar deployment model [as our case study], which is
to have a proof of concept, then a pilot and then a roll-out. What they [our case study] did in
some ways was to have the proof of concept which was more like pilot and the pilot which
was more like a roll-out”.
These insights suggest that a methodology to select and configure an APIM should define
the purpose and status of each deployment.
7.4.5.9 Evaluation Factor Check List
Three of the programme interviewees stated that they would have benefited from having
worked with a a factor check list to help them to identify and consider the various aspects
relating to the deployment of eGates.
Each interviewee explained their insights behind the need for a factor check list in the
following comments:
• Interviewee A stated “At the time there was very little in the way of standards for
implementing biometric systems and there was very, very little experience within
border control authorities on how these things work”.
• Interviewee B stated “It would have been useful because at least we would have had
something else external to fall back on to say ‘yes, that this is the accepted process’
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and ‘we haven’t done that’. So in that way it’s a bit of reassurance”.
• Interviewee C stated “We would then have been able to have produced a document
saying ‘yes that we’ve done these ones [considered these factors] but we haven’t done
these ones and this is why’ and that document doesn’t exist”.
These insights suggest that a methodology containing a factor check list could be beneficial
to programmes to enable the evaluation of a range of factors prior to the selection of an
APIM for their application context.
7.4.5.10 Clarity of Stakeholders’ Objectives and Commitments
Interviewees A and B made similar statements in that the programme lacked direction
because the border control police authority did not make clear its objectives or confirm its
commitment for deploying the eGates to members of the programme team and also to other
stakeholders, including the supplier consortia.
Our interviewees also claimed that there was insufficient transparency as to the border control
police management’s primary objective for introducing the eGates into airport terminals. The
political motives for the fast track eGates deployments were not made clear to the programme
team. The suspected MOI’s underlying motives, as intimated by our interviewees, inhibited
the programme’s decisions as to where to install the eGates and also the eGates deployment
configurations.
These insights suggest that a methodology for selecting and configuring an APIM should
encourage stakeholders to clarify their objectives and their commitment to a programme at
the outset.
7.5 Methodological Learnings
This section describes the methodological learnings from the patterns that we recognised in
our case study data relating to the iterative deployment approach adopted by the programme.
We also reflect on the efficacy of the programme’s approach to select the optimal APIM.
While we were unable to ascertain the underlying political motives behind the MOI’s
insistence on the fast track eGates deployments the programme’s approach was sufficiently
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flexible and agile to deliver the additional eGates in the required timescales. The rapid eGates
deployments, however, attracted a variety of issues. The deployed eGates possessed usability
design flaws which impacted the passenger throughput rates. The eGates were under-utilised
in some airport terminals and some eGates deployments had restricted capacity.
Notwithstanding the political influences on the eGate deployment timescales, an iterative
deployment appears to be an efficacious methodology to select an APIM when there is a
need to be flexible and responsive to the demands of an evolving application context.
7.5.1 Iterative Deployment Approach
We provide explanations from our case study data to support our aforementioned statement
on methodological efficacy, by classifying the patterns in our data on the methodological
proficiencies and deficiencies of an iterative deployment approach for the selection and
deployment of eGates at border control crossings.
7.5.1.1 Methodological Proficiencies
From our analysis of our case study data we found that the iterative deployment approach was
efficacious because the programme needed to deploy the eGates rapidly into an ever changing
border control crossing environment which needed to increase the number of passenger
inspections and also respond to the threats posed by terrorists and human traffickers.
The approach pursued by the programme was based on the opportunity to test the eGates in
a controlled production environment with passengers. The iterative deployment approach
appeared to have been beneficial to the programme team in helping them to refine their
specifications after gaining knowledge and experience from operating the eGates. Manufac-
turers of the eGates were able to validate and refine their eGate products in response to the
passenger utilisation data acquired during live operation.
We found that the use of a range of discipline experts assisted the programme significantly in
producing and refining the technical specifications for the eGates. The iterative deployment
approach had the potential flexibility to develop a business requirements document. The
planned activities for producing the latter document were unexpectedly truncated.
An iterative deployment approach appears efficacious when there is an opportunity to validate
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the proposed identification technologies in a production environment. The approach also
appears efficacious when the circumstances dictate that the introduction or enhancement of
identification technologies is required to be deployed rapidly.
7.5.1.2 Methodological Deficiencies
We found the main deficiency of this iterative approach related to the programme’s inability to
determine whether the eGates achieved the stakeholders’ business objectives. The programme
did not attempt to acquire the relevant data in order to determine whether the deployed eGates
actually fulfilled the stakeholders’ primary objective to increase passenger border control
inspections within specific decision accuracy constraints. Our data also shows that this
primary objective appeared to have been diluted during the programme.
The lack of documented stakeholders’ objectives and business requirements in this approach
meant that the programme team had no foundations upon which to develop tests for the
eGates, i.e. acceptance tests. Also, there appeared to have been no effort to gather the relevant
data in order to demonstrate that the MOI investments in the eGates had been worthwhile.
The programme’s focus was primarily on increasing passenger throughput rates which meant
that significant effort was afforded on improving the usability of the eGates. We found,
however, there remained outstanding usability design flaws in the passenger interactions with
the eGates’ various components. The existence of usability design flaws is explained by the
approach pursued by the programme as follows:
• The passenger eGates interactions differed between the eGates deployed in terminals
of other airports in the EU state and also in other states. The programme did not appear
to attempt to standardise these interactions in the EU state.
• Some of the components, such as the ePassport RFID readers, were intended to be
used by border control police on a regular basis and were not designed to be used
by passengers sporadically. The programme did not request manufactures to design
components which were compatible for passenger self-service interactions.
• The absence of guidance on the capabilities of ePassports and the operation of eGates
for the travelling public not only had an impact on passengers’ willingness to use the
eGates, but also influenced those passengers who attempted to use the eGates.
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We found that willing passengers’ mental model of how the eGates actually operated differed
considerably to the actual interaction model. Interviewees M and N encountered difficulties
in using the eGates initially and both stated that the eGates’ design “was not intuitive”.
The border control police authority’s strategy to rely on passengers to familiarise themselves
with the eGates through frequent usage to overcome these usability design flaws appeared to
have failed. Also the authority’s strategy to limit educational material in the public domain
did not appear to have been an appropriate marketing approach because passenger utilisation
of the eGates remained low as at the end of our case study period. The authority’s eGates
awareness strategy, however, should not be construed as a deficiency of the programme’s
iterative approach.
While the programme team was comprised of many discipline experts, we found that issues
relating to the protection of passengers’ private data were overlooked by the programme.
Our passenger interviewees expressed their concerns regarding the EU state’s use of their
private data, used for eGates inspections, which could be used for other unknown purposes.
Our data suggests that a list of factors for evaluation APIMs and other methodological tools
could have eased the reliance on the discipline experts in the programme.
Our data also suggests that tools which assist with the articulation of business requirements
and techniques which aid the consultation processes, particularly where stakeholders possess
conflicting objectives, could be valuable during the conceptualisation and requirements
gathering phases of a programme.
7.5.2 Our Reflections on Methodological Efficacy
Our reflections on methodological efficacy concentrate on the accuracy of the decision for
the eGates and the lapsed time taken by the programme to execute their iterative deployment
approach.
Our discussions on accuracy should be based upon the eGates deployments’ ability to fulfil
the main stakeholders’ primary objectives; however, these objectives were not documented
and were diluted during the programme. The programme was also unable to acquire the
relevant data to substantiate whether the selected APIM solution was optimal, in terms of
meeting the stated performance objectives. Consequently, our reflections on the method-
ological accuracy of an iterative deployment approach are founded upon the outcome of the
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programme.
We found that the programme’s iterative deployment approach resulted in the optimal ABC
system being selected; however, the configuration of the technologies resulted in usability
design flaws. Our data suggests that these design flaws were an indirect consequence of
deploying pilot eGates before the programme team and the usability specialists had completed
their task on the configuration of the passenger dialogue with the eGates’ components.
The programmes’s approach enabled the eGates to be deployed expeditiously, possibly, to
counter rising public concern regarding the effectiveness of the state’s manual border control
operations. Efforts to eradicate some of the identified usability design flaws were curtailed
by the programme because there was insufficient funding and time remaining within the
minister’s imposed deployment deadline.
Additionally, as Interviewee Y stated, “if the programme team had spent more effort on
articulating their business requirements rather than producing technical specifications for the
eGates then the suppliers would have had the opportunity to use their expertise to configure
the eGates to meet those stated objectives and business requirements”.
We found that the selection of eGates, using an internationally issued and recognised secure
document, i.e. an ePassport, operating in biometric verification mode was preferred by the
border control police authority to the biometric identification system operating in biometric
identification mode. We found that there were several key considerations which influenced
the authority’s decision.
The key decision related to the size of the subject population in that there were more pas-
sengers with ePassports than passengers who had registered or with the state’s biometric
identification system. A secondary deciding factor was that the state had invested consid-
erably in issuing ePassports and most of the infrastructure had already been put in place
for the border control police authority to electronically inspect passengers’ ePassports. The
introduction of eGates to allow passengers to carry out self-inspections was an extension to
these existing capabilities.
As with many iterative development approaches, it is a problem to decide when the iterations
should cease and the implementation deployed into the production environment [34]. Our
data suggests that the programme team were close to completing the eGates passenger
interaction designs in order to reduce the usability design issues encountered. At that point,
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in month 19, there could have been a reasonable argument made by the programme to delay
the pilot installation until the usability experts and the manufacturers had completed their
interactive design work. Our interviewees confirmed that their work was truncated abruptly
because of impending budgetary constraints and the decision was made to install the eGates
on a more aggressive timescale.
We conclude that an iterative deployment approach appears to be efficacious when there
is a need for the programme to be flexible and responsive to the demands of an evolving
application context. Our data suggests that stakeholders, however, need to be able to control
the application environment in order to allow different APIMs and their configurations to be
evaluated in a live production environment.
7.6 Cross-Case Analysis of Programmes’ Approaches
This section compares the methodological learnings from our two retrospective case studies
in order to develop our initial theories on methodological efficacy for selecting APIMs.
Our most important finding in our two case study data sets is that neither programme assessed
whether the APIM that had been deployed actually fulfilled the respective stakeholders’
objectives. Our data sets also suggest that an APIM needs to be evaluated in terms of its
ability to fulfil stakeholders’ objectives in order to demonstrate that the investments in the
programme and the APIM deployed have been worthwhile.
We also found that neither programme used a systematic methodology, and relied on dis-
cipline experts to select and configure the APIM. Nevertheless, our interviewees, some of
whom were discipline experts, conceded that there is a need for methodological tools to assist
in the complex processes of selecting and configuring an APIM. The need for methodological
tools, such as a DSS, concurs with the IdM experts’ views reported in Royer’s research
[257].
We also found that both programmes spent more effort on articulating technological specif-
ications of solutions rather than establishing stakeholders’ objectives and business require-
ments for an APIM. An iterative deployment approach appears to be methodologically
advantageous when the programme needs flexibility and agility to respond to an evolving
application context.
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The eGates Programme was able to control the eGates operating environment to examine
the technologies; however, some programmes may not be afforded such opportunities to re-
peatedly test their APIM designs. The eID Card Programme’s approach, which concentrated
initially on the distribution of eID cards to its citizens, had to develop new technologies and
enhance existing technologies to enable the eID card to function in the intended application
context.
While the two programmes’ approaches differed significantly, we found that both programmes
encountered difficulties in encouraging their intended subject communities to use the respec-
tive APIM. The data from both our case studies revealed that there was low utilisation of the
respective APIMs. A plausible explanation for these low utilisations could lie in the inability
of the programmes to convey the benefits of their respective APIMs, and the advantages of
the underling services, to their user communities.
An alternative plausible explanation for the low utilisations is that both programmes failed
to adequately consult with the respective user communities on their requirements for the
APIM. Designs and specifications for the respective APIMs were produced or the APIM was
deployed without the programmes engaging with the respective user communities. We found
that usability design flaws also have a significant influence on users’ willingness to use new
APIMs.
The methodological learnings identified in the data from our two case studies are summarised
in the following list:
• Proactively manage stakeholder consultation processes;
• Determine the benefits of an APIM to stakeholders, including the user community;
• Reconcile stakeholders’ objectives and commitments;
• Improve the production of business requirements;
• Track the programme’s progress;
• Use a factor check list for evaluating APIMs;
• Investigate programme assumptions;
• Anticipate evolving subject attitudes;
• Define tests and testing methods during the conceptualisation phase of a programme;
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• Validate proposed technologies in the application context, where opportunities permit;
• Define the purposes of each deployment phase; and
• Engage a multi-disciplinary team.
These methodological learnings, based on current practices, suggests our supposition that a
systematic methodology may be efficacious in selecting the optimal APIM in circumstances
which differ to those conditions surrounding the programmes in our two retrospective case
studies.
7.7 Conclusions from the Case Study
In this section we describe our conclusions of our efforts to validate our factors for evaluating
APIMs. From our qualitative analysis of our case study data sets we have identified several
methodological learnings which may be incorporated into a systematic methodology to select
an APIM for a given application context.
7.7.1 Efforts to Validate Our Factors
Our conclusions from this case study are that our identified factors have been validated with
a few exceptions. Further validations of these factors, however, are dependent upon gaining
access to the relevant data and the generation of the relevant data.
We have validated our factors using data from case studies which we have classified as
being of heterogeneous and federated identification types. We believe that the use of our
factors, embedded in our systematic methodology, applied to a real-world application context,
provides a better opportunity to support our efforts to further validate our factors.
7.7.2 Methodological Efficacy
We conclude that an iterative deployment approach is efficacious for programmes to select
the optimal APIM when there are demands to introduce the APIM rapidly and the objectives
and requirements for an APIM have not be articulated.
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The absence of documented stakeholders’ objectives and business requirements, however,
hampers assessments to determine an APIM’s fitness for its intended purpose in the applica-
tion context. Importantly, we discovered that stakeholders’ political and commercial motives,
not expressed in the form of objectives, impact the decisions relating to the configuration of
an APIM’s deployment.
From our cross-case analysis of our findings, we consider that sufficient methodological
learnings have been identified in our two data sets to support our exploration into the efficacy
of a systematic methodology as an alternative approach to select APIMs. In the next chapter,
we describe our efforts to validate our methodology and our assessment of its efficacy by
gathering data from its use to select the optimal APIM in a real-world application context.
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This chapter describes our efforts to assess the efficacy of the ASMSA Methodology. We
begin by developing criteria to assess the efficacy of a methodology to select an APIM. We
then describe the Corporation X’s Two Factor Authentication (2FA) Project in which we
used the ASMSA Methodology and also the data acquired in this case study. We describe
and discuss the results of our efforts to validate the ASMSA Methodology’s components,
including its factors, using data from this case study. For our main unit of analysis, we
then assess the efficacy of the ASMSA Methodology, as a systematic methodology, using our
proposed efficacy criteria and the data acquired in this case study. We identify patterns of
methodological efficacy from our cross-case analysis of our three case study data sets. From
the patterns identified, we develop our initial theory on the efficacy of methodologies to select
an APIM. Finally, we draw conclusions on our two units of analysis from this case study.
8.1 Criteria to Assess the Efficacy of a Methodology
This section describes the development of assessment criteria in order to assess the efficacy
of methodologies to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. The criteria
established in this section address our third research question relating to how the efficacy of
a methodology to select an APIM itself be assessed. We describe the criteria at this juncture
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so that our assessment of ASMSA’s efficacy from its inaugural use in Corporation X’s 2FA
Project and the results of our assessment, described Section 8.6, may be understood.
Given the alternative ways to select an APIM for an application context, there is a need to
establish criteria in order to assess the efficacy of different methodologies or approaches
to select APIMs. In particular, while we have established the ASMSA Methodology as
a systematic way to select an APIM for an application context, we need to validate the
methodology and, importantly, assess the extent of its efficacy to select the optimal APIM.
We believe that an assessment of a methodology’s efficacy to select an APIM is not valid
unless there are criteria established upon which to conduct such assessments. Equally, the
relevant data needs to be gathered in order to assess the methodology’s efficacy against such
established criteria.
The results from these efficacy assessments may then indicate as to when a particular type
of methodology could be more efficacious than other approaches based upon the circum-
stances surrounding the application context. Decision authorities and their programmes
may then benefit by possessing knowledge on the proficiencies and limitations of different
methodologies to enable them to pursue a particular approach for their application context.
From our review of the literature on decision-making methods [173, 294, 77, 316], we
considered that Lai and Hwang’s criteria [179], designed for assessing fuzzy decision-
making methods, provided a suitable foundation upon which to develop our criteria to
address our third research question. Their criteria involve the following considerations:
• the method’s execution time;
• the size of the considered problem;
• the accuracy of the selected solution with respect to optimal decision variables and/or
objective function and constraints;
• the method’s simplicity of use;
• the simplicity of computer program to execute the method’s algorithm; and
• the method’s applicability to real-world (large-scale) problems.
Lai and Hwang’s six criteria for assessing the efficacy of decision methods formed the basis
of our efforts to develop criteria for assessing methodologies for selecting an APIM, in order
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to address our third research question. We believe that the nature of the selection problem to
select an APIM is complex, particularly as it involves many factors and stakeholders with
differing perspectives. We adapt Lai and Hwang’s criteria [179] for assessing the efficacy of
our methodology in an assessment model founded on Jayaratna’s Normative Information
Model-based Systems Analysis and Design (NIMSAD) Framework [165]. We describe and
explain our reasons for using Jayaratna’s (NIMSAD) Framework [165] later in Section 8.1.7.
We now develop our criteria for assessing a methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal
APIM based upon Lai and Hwang’s criteria [179].
8.1.1 Methodology’s Execution Effort
We interpret execution time not as the elapsed time for using the method for the selecting the
APIM but the actual endeavour expended in using the methodology.
Data relating to effort expended by individuals in a programme, in carrying out the method-
ology’s tasks, needs to be gathered during the life time of the programme and possibly
post-deployment of the APIM. Historical data contained in project plans and contractor’s
time-sheets and other similar sources may provide the means to quantify effort expended. It
may be difficult on occasions, however, to differentiate between employees’ effort involved
in using a methodology and their core activities of their job functions, e.g. performing risk
assessments.
In summary, we propose that a methodology’s execution effort is assessed by measuring
the man-day resources in a programme or project to introduce or revise an APIM using that
methodology.
8.1.2 Size of Application Context’s Problem
We interpret this criterion to assess the application context’s problem in terms of its size,
both dimensionality and proportionality.
We define proportionality for our purposes as the extent to which the selection of the
APIM impacts the stakeholders’ assets and resources, either favourably or deleteriously.
Dimensionality is defined as relating to the number of different types of stakeholders and the
complexity of their relationships involved in the application context.
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We propose a classification, based upon calibrated estimations as defined by Hubbard [136],
in order to assess the size, in terms of dimensionality and proportionality, of the methodology
in relation to application context’s problem. We use qualitative indicators because of the
complexities of measuring intangible impacts upon organisations with precision.
In summary, the proportionality of the application context’s problem is assessed in terms
of whether the impact is ‘minimal’, ‘moderate ’ or ‘significant’ to the direct or indirect
stakeholders. The dimensionality of the application context’s problem is assessed in terms of
whether the relationships between the stakeholders are ‘simple’, ‘average’ or ‘complicated’.
8.1.3 Accuracy of Methodology’s Selection
Our criterion to assess the accuracy of a methodology to select the APIM differs depending
upon whether the assessment is for theoretical purposes or alternatively for practical reasons
to assist decision-makers in choosing the appropriate selection methodology.
Avison and Fitzgerald contend [18] that the practical problems of creating exactly the same
environment in an organisation to compare information systems developed by different
methodologies are insurmountable. They argue that, in practice, there is a lack of ability
to demonstrate methodological repeatability and also highlight the difficulty in the repro-
ducibility of results. They argue that the tighter, more specific the methodology, the more
reproducible are the results, particularly if the methodology specifies the exact techniques
and tools to be employed under each circumstance.
We consider that their arguments apply equally to employing two methodologies in parallel
for selecting the optimal APIM for a given application context. Therefore, for assessing
methodological accuracy, we propose the use of key decision variables for theoretical
comparison tests of methodological accuracy. For conducting real-world comparisons, we
propose that the efficacy of the methodology is determined by assessing the uncertainties
surrounding an application context and also the characteristics of a methodology.
Theoretical Accuracy For the purposes of comparing the theoretical accuracy of method-
ologies we propose that an assessment should use key decision variables relating to annual
loss expectancy, financial impact on productivity, financial impact on regulatory compliance,
and financial impact of changes in utilisation.
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The assessment is conducted by comparing the financial implications to stakeholders of each
methodology using a test scenario case where a current state is to be transformed to a desired
state. We consider, however, that comparing the degree of closeness of measurements of a
quantitative result to an object’s actual true value is not apposite for our purposes.
Mont et al.’s analysis [207] of organisation decision-makers’ concerns identified the following
core strategic outcomes of relevance in the identification and authentication space:
• security risks with metrics from data breaches and incidents;
• productivity impacts with metrics from correctly granting access rights;
• compliance to regulations with metrics from audit failures; and
• costs incurred with metrics from fixed and operational budgets.
The introduction of an APIM or the revision of a deployed APIM may impact stakeholders’
security risks, productivity, and ability to comply with regulation. All of our proposed
variables are measured quantitatively in financial terms using calibrated estimations [136].
The impact of a subject’s privacy being compromised and the possible emotional stress,
however, cannot be measured in pure financial terms [35]. Some subjects may avoid or
refuse to use an APIM in a particular application context. The costs associated with users
opting to use other services, e.g. loss of customers’ business, may be calculated in financial
terms. Conversely, users may be attracted to use a service because the APIM’s level of
assurance has been enhanced. We propose, therefore, to include utilisation with Mont et al.’s
key outcomes for measuring Theoretical Accuracy (TA) of a selection methodology.
Based upon the assumption that each methodology selects a different APIM for the test
scenario case we calculate the theoretical accuracy of a selection methodology using the
following formula:
TA = STATEwithoutINVESTMENTinAPIM –
(STATEwithINVESTMENTinAPIM + CostsOfINVESTMENTinAPIM)
Where STATE includes the addition of key decision variables consisting of:
1. Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE);
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2. Financial Impact on Productivity (FIP);
3. Financial Impact on Regulatory Compliance (FIRC); and
4. Financial Impact on Changes in Utilisation (FICU).
We define the variable utilisation as the financial impact of a subject’s change of usage of the
related information system. This utilisation variable, however, may not always be relevant to
all test case scenarios because the test may include an assumption that users do not have the
freedom to avoid the use of the APIM.
We propose that theoretical accuracy is measured by comparing different methodologies’
values, using our proposed formula, based on extrapolating the financial estimations in
the key decision variables. The methodology with the highest value is deemed to be the
most accurate, theoretically, for selecting the APIM. The investment in an APIM selected
by a methodology may bring positive or negative impacts to these key decision variables.
Theoretically, it is possible that different methodologies select the same APIM; however, the
comparison of the key decision variables should help to identify inconsistencies and also
help to validate the hypothetical calibrated estimations.
Real-world Accuracy According to Jaquith [164] security return on investment calcula-
tions, based upon the inaccuracies and assumptions of ALEs, are inadequate for practical
usage.
While there may be many strategic decision-makers in an organisation, possibly with different
priorities, decisions within an organisation are often made by empowered committees or
decision authorities, on behalf of the organisation’s executive or board of directors. Simi-
larly, where there are several stakeholders involved in a programme, a steering committee,
consisting of empowered representatives, is often mandated to make decisions in respect of
the appropriate development methodology for the application context. We assume, therefore,
that decision-makers seek appropriate methodologies which provide the required accuracy
by assessing the circumstances surrounding the application context.
Jayaratna and Holt advocate [166] that selection criteria for methodologies should include
the consideration of the methodology user, the available time, the client, the human resources,
the financial resources, and the culture of an organisation together with the characteristics of
the methodology as a problem solving process.
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Property Criteria to Assess an Application Context’s Situation
1. Programme’s Are the programme’s objectives vague, not agreed, considered unrealistic and
Objectives have not been formulated or set?
2. Problem Are the problems in the application context well understood and are the causes
Definition well appreciated?
3. Attitudes Are the stakeholders’ attitudes uncooperative and non-flexible?
4. Boundary Are the boundary conditions for the application context vague, which includes
Conditions the description of the application context and the subject community?
5. Communications How reliable and effective are the communications between the stakeholders?
6. Relationships How complex and political are the relationships between the stakeholders?
Table 8.1: Criteria to Assess an Application Context’s Situation [165]
Property Criteria to Assess the Characteristics of a Methodology
1. Repeatability Is the methodology documented so that its processes are repeatable by evaluators?
2. Granularity Are the stages and tasks in the methodology well-defined and specific so that it is
capable of reproducible results or are the descriptions of the methodology’s
tasks vague?
3. Outputs What are the outputs of the methodology during its decision processes?
4. Control and To what extent does the use of the methodology improve programme control and
Productivity productivity in producing decision process outputs?
5. Tools Does the methodology include tools and tool sets with educational material for
the evaluator?
Table 8.2: Criteria to Assess the Characteristics of a Methodology based on Avison and
Fitzgerald’s Recommendations [18]
We adopt Jayaratna’s selection criteria [165] on ill-structured situations, as shown in Table
8.1, to assess the circumstances surrounding an application context. We also used criteria
based on Avison and Fitzgerald’s methodological recommendations [18], as shown in Table
8.2, to assess the characteristics of a methodology to select an APIM.
8.1.4 Methodological Simplicity
We interpret the simplicity of using a methodology to select an APIM for a given application
context in terms of the knowledge and the skills necessary for the competent use of the
methodology.
We define methodological simplicity for our efficacy assessment as the ease of learning a new
methodology by a competent practitioner or group of practitioners. We assume that discipline
practitioners would be involved in using such a methodology rather than non-experts who
may possess knowledge about the application context. This learning criterion includes the
processes to develop a practitioner’s competency to use the methodology through training
and the provision of educational materials.
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We propose to assess methodological simplicity by eliciting practitioner’s views in respect
of effort involved to learn and use the methodology. Practitioner feedback containing various
data types that is unstructured suggests a qualitative indicator is more relevant for this efficacy
criterion.
Therefore, we propose to elicit feedback from practitioners using the classification of ‘intu-
itive’, ‘tolerable’, and ‘arduous’ to gauge a methodology’s simplicity.
8.1.5 Executable as a Computer Program
We interpret this criterion to mean whether a methodology to select an APIM can be
implemented as a computer program, to execute its processes and algorithms, and the
effort required to learn to use the computer program. We assume that methodological
processes which are expressed in the form of a computer program offer more structure and
methodological rigour than a paper oriented approach. A paper oriented approach relies upon
human involvement to ensure that the methodological processes contained in a document are
executed.
Some methodologies and some of their processes may not translate easily into a computer
program, particularly the processes for acquiring the data from the application context.
Similarly, processes used by discipline experts may not translate easily into an application
program.
Turban and Watson advise [294] that expert systems are designed to mimic human experts
and are used to:
• give advice on complicated, specialised issues;
• teach or train the non-expert;
• provide timely consultation or offer second opinion; and
• explain how a conclusion is reached or why additional information is needed.
While the difficulty and the effort to build a computer application program which mirrors
a methodology may be significant, we propose that this criterion is based upon the degree
to which the methodology’s computations and processes can be automated in a program.
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We exclude data input processes because we assume that the entry of subject data into the
program would involve some form of human intervention.
In summary, we propose two forms of measurement for this assessment criterion. The number
of executable processes in a computer program representing a methodology is expressed as
a percentage of the methodology’s total processes. Also, we propose the classification of
‘negligible’, ‘moderate’, and ‘significant’ to indicate the effort required to learn and use the
methodology’s computer application program.
8.1.6 Capability of Methodology to Address Real-World Problems
We interpret this criterion to assess the extent to which a methodology to select an APIM is
capable of being applied to real-world automated personal identification problems.
We define capability as the ability to use the methodology, with its actions and processes,
in order to achieve certain actions or outcomes through a set of controllable and measur-
able faculties, features, functions, processes, or services applied within the limits of the
application context. The question of application to real-world problems also highlights the
issue of accountability of evidence-based decision-making versus the reliance, possibly full
dependency, of expert practitioners’ recommendations.
The breadth and depth of analysis in theoretical research may not always provide sufficient
evidence concerning a methodology’s practical use in a real-world application context.
Empirical validation, however, helps to give an indication of the credibility of research
behind the methodology and its capability of being applied to real-world problems.
We believe that the capability of a methodology for use in the real-world should be based
upon practitioners’ feedback from using the methodology. The inaugural use of the ASMSA
Methodology in the Corporation X Case Study enabled us to generate relevant empirical data
in respect of its applicability to address a large-scale, real-world problem.
For this criterion, we propose that the degree of a methodology’s capability of being applied to
a real-world automated personal identification problem, is to be based on the methodology’s
proficiency classification of ‘ineffective’, ‘acceptable’, and ‘effective’ to produce an APIM
selection outcome.
318
8.1 Criteria to Assess the Efficacy of a Methodology
Figure 8.1: Jayaratna’s NIMSAD Methodology Evaluation Framework [165]
8.1.7 A Framework for Assessing the Efficacy of a Methodology
We propose to use our six criteria to assess the efficacy of a methodology, to select the
optimal APIM for a given context, within Jayaratna’s NIMSAD Framework.
Jayaratna explains [165] that the role of methodologies is to offer different ways, through
their philosophy, structure, steps, and ways of performing the steps, of undertaking processes
in order to achieve an aim. We use Jayaratna’s NIMSAD Framework, shown in Figure 8.1,
representing the problem situation, the intended problem solver, and the problem solving
process elements as our framework to assess the efficacy of a methodology to select the
optimal APIM using our proposed efficacy criteria. We use Jayaratna’s NIMSAD Framework
to concentrate our efforts to assess the efficacy of our methodology, as a problem solving
process, in various application contexts rather than assessing the capabilities of the problem
solver. We assume that problem solvers are expert practitioners in this discipline with varying
knowledge and competencies; however, the impact of the problem solver, as a variable, needs
to be accommodated, as Fle´chais et al. acknowledge [102], in a methodological assessment.
We justify our adoption of Jayaratna’s NIMSAD Framework as our model to assess the
efficacy of our methodology because we were unable to locate models in the literature which
evaluated the utility of different classes of methodologies on a generic basis. We believe
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that Jayaratna’s seminal work [165], which focuses on the assessment of information system
development methodologies, is sufficiently generic to be used as a model to assess the
efficacy of our methodology. His work on assessing methodologies is highly cited and the
principles of NIMSAD appear in a variety of text books on the evaluation of information
system development methodologies, e.g. Avison and Fitzgerald [18].
Data for conducting efficacy assessment, based on our proposed criteria, need to be acquired
during the use of the methodology. Efficacy assessments, using these acquired data may then
be assessed by applying the efficacy criteria after the use of the methodology (and possibly
the deployment of the APIM). A post-deployment methodological efficacy assessment may
present little practical value to stakeholders’ decision authorities because it may not be
possible for stakeholders to reverse decisions made on an APIM deployment easily. In
practice the assessment of a candidate methodology or approach may be more beneficial
to decision-makers before the programme commences or possibly during a programme. A
post-deployment methodological efficacy assessment may help to researchers to identify
methodological learnings.
We used the ASMSA Methodology in the Corporation X Case Study in order to generate
empirical data to assess its validity and to assess the extent of its efficacy for selecting
an APIM in a real-world enterprise application context. We also aimed to identify those
circumstances as to when a systematic methodology may be efficacious. We describe the
results of our case study research and our assessment of the ASMSA Methodology’s efficacy
in the succeeding sections of this chapter.
8.2 Background on the Corporation X 2FA Project
This section describes the background of this project without revealing details about Corpo-
ration X, supplier organisations or individuals involved in the research. This section builds
upon the information provided in Section 4.3.3.
We anonymise the subjects and the organisation in order to protect their interests, in accor-
dance with a non-disclosure agreement established between Corporation X and us dated 1st
October 2010. Therefore, we provide a general description about subjects and objects rather
than specific names. We are also unable to provide output reports containing information
about Corporation X and its operations which were generated while using the ASMSA
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Methodology. Our case study period commences at the inception of the project in September
2010 until April 2013.
8.2.1 Objectives of Corporation X’s 2FA Project
The main business objective for Corporation X to commence this project was to seek options
to deploy a 2FA APIM originated from the need to comply with the financial regulatory
authorities’ security requirements on the protection of on-line financial transactions.
Corporation X’s Group Head Office (GHO) had formulated a policy to deploy smart cards
across all Corporation X’s worldwide businesses in order to meet financial regulatory
authorities’ security requirements for 2FA. The DoR for the Asia Region was of the opinion
that this policy and the smart card 2FA solution was not suitable for many of Corporation
X’s business entities in Asia.
A secondary objective for the project was that the additional authentication factor should not
dilute the effectiveness of the current user factor authentication mechanism. The DoR’s aim
was not necessarily to improve identity assurance because Corporation X had no evidence to
suggest that such risk mitigation improvements were necessary.
8.2.2 Corporation X’s Application Context
The 2FA capability was needed to supplement Corporation X’s user identifier and pass-
word user authentication systems for peripatetic executives, employees and over 400,000
insurance agents. The necessity to introduce 2FA was driven by the financial regulatory
authorities in Asia, primarily the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). The regulators
had issued (or were imminent) security specifications which mandated the use of two factors
for authenticating users’ on-line financial transactions.
Corporation X’s peripatetic executives, irrespective of their location, required access to
commercially sensitive corporate information. Employees, mainly based in local Corporation
X office premises, required access to information systems containing details about clients
and their policies, insurance products and other corporate resources.
Peripatetic insurance agents required to access Corporation X’s information systems in order
to submit their insurance policy sales transactions which included their clients’ personal
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data. Agents also required access to Corporation X’s sales work-flow tracking system, which
included details about commissions allocated to their sales. These insurance agents were not
Corporation X employees but were agents (either independent or employed by brokerage
firms) operating in different regions and countries of Asia. Most of these insurance agents
were individuals operating as independent sole traders. Some of the agents used Corporation
X’s sales source automation tool, which incorporated user authentication functionality, using
identifiers and passwords.
Corporation X employees attended induction training sessions which included guidance
on their responsibilities to comply with the company’s security policies. The roles and
responsibilities of employees were incorporated into the corporation’s standard employment
contract. Corporation X’s security policies specified how employees were to use and protect
their passwords to enable them to access company systems. Employees received regular
communications regarding security awareness and reminders about managing their passwords
securely. Similar reminders to executives regarding their responsibilities were intermittent.
Agents signed agency agreements with Corporation X which detailed their responsibilities
for managing identifiers and passwords to access Corporation X’s information systems.
Agents, typically, used their own devices, e.g. laptops and mobile phones, to conduct their
business service interactions with existing and potential clients and the Corporation X did
not wish to change that operating model.
8.2.3 Research Collaboration Protocol
We agreed a project plan with the DoR that used the processes in the ASMSA Selection
Method to drive the project’s activities. The DoR performed the Multiple Stakeholder
Processes (MSPs) technique by managing all the interactions with the three user groups, Cor-
poration X’s internal departments in Asia and with London GHO. All our communications
with Corporation X were conducted via the DoR in accordance with the terms of the consent
agreement.
Our criteria questions, represented in the ASMSA-DSS, were used to acquire data relating to
Corporation X’s application context and the data describing the requirements for introducing
2FA for its users. The acquired data stored in the ASMSA-DSS were used to generate a
Request for Information (RFI) which was sent to five short-listed 2FA supplier companies.
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Corporation X opted for a One-time Authentication Code (OTAC) as the second user authen-
tication credential. The code was delivered to the user’s mobile device using the SMS. For
brevity, we label this 2FA solution as (OTAC-SMS). The user was required to enter their
user identifier, their password and the additional OTAC during the interaction sessions with
Corporation X’s information systems.
We were unable to utilise the ASMSA Methodology in the third stage of our method (to
evaluate candidate options) due to unforeseen events, which we explain in Section 8.5.3. We
describe the prevailing conditions surrounding the project, the events that occurred during
the use of the ASMSA Methodology, the outcomes of Corporation X’s 2FA Project, and the
DoR’s methodological efficacy insights in Section 8.5.4. Next we describe the data that we
acquired during the use of the ASMSA Methodology in this case study.
8.3 Data Gathered
The majority of data acquired were gathered using structured and semi-structured interviews
with Corporation X’s DoR. These data included email exchanges of correspondence with
Corporation X’s DoR. All interviews were recorded, transcribed by us, and the transcriptions
subsequently reviewed by the DoR. Thus the availability of the DoR to participate in these
activities was essential to our research in this case study.
We also depended upon his experience as a senior information security practitioner for our
research. The DoR had worked in information security, mainly in the finance industry, for
nearly 25 years, at various levels from technical systems operation to his then current DoR
position, which involved managing information risk across a large Asian organisation with
26 business entities in 13 countries. He outlined his experience: “So the security work I have
done in that time - I’ve managed technology; I’ve reviewed technology and implemented tech-
nology; I’ve implemented, written, directed and implemented policy; directed implemented
in managed procedures and processes; and managed teams”.
The DoR explained his rationale for using the ASMSA Methodology and engaging with us
in our research for his 2FA Project: “ The objective I have is to be able to go back to Group
Head Office, who are dictating policy, and say that we have looked at this [problem] and this
[our preference] is the position. What I want to have is the ability to be able to demonstrate,
in a qualitative and quantitative fashion, that we have taken account of their desires, for two
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factor authentication and we have a defence, that is a document that describes the reasons
why in one country you might do it and in another country you might not. That’s why I
am doing the exercise [using the ASMSA Methodology] with you, to understand objectively
rather than subjectively, to provide the evidence behind our decision”.
The DoR assumed the responsibility, as part of his job description, to create and to manage
Corporation X’s2FA Project and also to perform its tasks, with support from some of the
staff in his unit.
8.3.1 Interviews
The interviews were either structured interviews conducted face-to-face or semi-structured
conducted remotely using the Skype conferencing system.
The first two structured interviews were used in conjunction with the ASMSA-DSS to gather
data relating to the application context. We conducted a semi-structured interview that
focused upon clarifying the requirements statements for the generation of the RFI document.
In the final part of the case study period, as our prime research objective, we also conducted
three semi-structured interviews with the DoR to gather data on his insights on ASMSA’s
methodological efficacy and its impact upon Corporation X’s efforts to select the optimal
2FA mechanism.
We used the ASMSA-DSS to structure and drive the interview dialogue to acquire data
relating to the first two stages of the ASMSA Selection Method. We posed the criteria
questions to the DoR and the DoR’s replies were recorded and transcribed. The transcribed
text replies were then assigned to the corresponding factors in the ASMSA-DSS. Reports
were generated from the ASMSA-DSS and sent to the DoR for his review. Any amendments
or additional information requested by the DoR were added to the data contained in the
ASMSA-DSS. The DoR also ensured accuracy, completeness and consistency of the data
maintained in the ASMSA-DSS relating to the application context.
The semi-structured interviews also focused on the clarification of utterances made by the
DoR in previous interviews or to clarify points contained in email exchanges. Additionally,
we used these semi-structured interviews to confirm our progress through the steps of the
ASMSA Selection Method and also to agree the interview arrangements to proceed with the
next steps of our method. We used semi-structured interviews with the DoR to validate the
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factors and the associated criteria questions in Stage 3 of the ASMSA Selection Method.
The DoR, in one of the latter semi-structured interviews, announced that his responsibilities
on Corporation X’s 2FA Project had changed and the decision to select the 2FA solution
would now be managed by the Head of IT Operations (HoITP). This unforeseen event meant
that it was necessary to terminate the use of the ASMSA Methodology because the HoITP
requested a technology supplier to provide their recommendations on a 2FA selection. Our
research, however, did not end at this point because we were able to conduct interviews
regarding methodological efficacy after the OTAC-SMS solution had been deployed in an
Asian state.
The DoR’s activities were curtailed during the latter stages of Corporation X’s 2FA Project,
after the RFI responses had been gathered from the short-listed 2FA solution suppliers but
before the selection of the OTAC-SMS solution. The HoITP, who was now responsible for the
2FA Project, used the RFI produced by the ASMSA-DSS, to engage with discussions with a
preferred supplier. This supplier was also in consultation with the HoITP to provide network
monitoring capabilities to Corporation X in Asia. The HoITP selected the OTAC-SMS from
this supplier and not the original short-listed 2FA suppliers that responded to the RFI.
Despite these unforeseen events, and most important to our research aims, the DoR particip-
ated in further interviews to furnish us with his insights on the efficacy of the ASMSA
Methodology and the eventual outcomes of Corporation X’s 2FA Project.
8.3.2 Documentary Evidence
The security requirements specification from the MAS was the only external item of doc-
umentary evidence acquired. We were not given access to Corporation X’s information
systems or corporate documentation with the exception of their standard RFI template.
Data acquired and reviewed in the first two stages of the ASMSA Selection Method was
used to produce Corporation X’s RFI document. We extracted data from the ASMSA-DSS
which was then inserted into Corporation X’s standard RFI template. We are unable to use
the information contained in the supplier responses to Corporation X’s RFI for our research
purposes, although the DoR made all the specialist 2FA supplier responses available to us.
These data were excluded from our analysis because we had not gained consent from these
suppliers to use their data for our research. As we explain in Section 8.4.1.3, Corporation X
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chose not to seek their consent in the covering letter that accompanied the RFI document
that was sent to the short-listed 2FA suppliers.
Also, we were not given access, for commercial reasons, to the RFI response documentation
from the supplier that was awarded the contract to provide the technologies for OTAC-SMS
to Corporation X. The DoR confirmed, however, that all the short-listed 2FA suppliers
had provided details of their OTAC-SMS solution in their RFI response as well as other
alternatives which included the use of smart cards. The DoR considered that from his
evaluation of the short-listed supplier RFI responses he believed that the OTAC-SMS was
the optimal 2FA solution for their application context.
8.3.3 Our Observation Memos and Reflective Notes
We produced 20 observation memos from our interview sessions with the DoR. We also
generated 15 reflective notes, during our analysis of the data acquired during the interview
sessions.
We produced our observation memos immediately after each interview with the DoR and
also after changes requested by him following his review of the interview transcripts. These
memos helped us to gain an understanding of the DoR’s perspective of the tasks involved
in selecting a 2FA mechanism. It also enabled us to gain an understanding of his attitude
towards using a systematic methodology for assisting with the decision processes.
We also produced 15 reflective notes during the quantitative analysis of our data. Our analysis
included comparisons of the key statements made by the DoR in the interview transcripts
and the documentary data contained in his email exchanges. These reflective notes were
created and stored within the Atlas.ti application program.
8.3.4 Reports Generated
We generated several reports, using the acquired data contained in the ASMSA-DSS, for
the DoR during the case study. The RFI document was sent to several potential technology
suppliers with identity management product offerings.
From the data acquired we generated a report from the ASMSA-DSS which described
Corporation X’s objectives and requirements for a second factor authentication mechanism.
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A second report was generated that showed the reconciliation of Corporation X’s objectives
with their stated requirements. All these reports were reviewed by the DoR in terms of
their completeness, accuracy and consistency. Commercially sensitive information, e.g.
Corporation X’s budget, was removed from the RFI by the DoR.
8.4 Validation of the ASMSA Methodology and its Compo-
nents
This section describes the results, at Stage 12 of the research implementation plan, as
represented in Figure 4.3 on page 124, of our efforts to validate the ASMSA Methodology
consisting of its selection method and its factors for evaluating APIMs, associated criteria
questions and factor explanations.
Stage 12 represents the final step in our research implementation plan to validate the ASMSA
Methodology and to assess its efficacy by using data acquired from using it in a real-world
case study. Our efforts to assess the efficacy of the ASMSA Methodology using the data
acquired from the Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study and our efficacy criteria established
in Section 8.1 are described in Section 8.6.
8.4.1 Validation of the ASMSA Selection Method
We followed the systematic processes in the ASMSA Selection Method, as described in
Section 5.6, to acquire data from the application context for all three perspectives in the
ASMSA Evaluation Framework. We used the criteria questions in our structured interviews
with the DoR to acquire subject data for each factor.
From the agreed interview transcripts, the data acquired using the criteria questions were
inserted against the respective factors into the ASMSA-DSS’s database. At the end of each
stage of the method, we produced a summary report for the DoR to review which showed his
verbal responses to the respective criteria questions. Following his review of the report the
data in the ASMSA-DSS were amended accordingly.
We used this cyclical data acquisition and validation processes with the DoR in all three
stages of our method.
327
8.4 Validation of the ASMSA Methodology and its Components
8.4.1.1 ASMSA Selection Method Stage 1
The first structured interview session concentrated acquiring subject data for the factors
relating to the Understanding Perspective.
We then conducted a second interview with the DoR to ascertain the objectives for the
revision to Corporation X’s user authentication mechanism. Data on the objectives were
inserted into the ASMSA-DSS’s database.
8.4.1.2 ASMSA Selection Method Stage 2
In the next interview session we used the criteria questions to ascertain Corporation X’s
requirements for the second factor authentication mechanism.
A report showing the DoR responses to the criteria questions in the Effectiveness Perspective
was reviewed by the DoR to review and the ASMSA-DSS’s database was subsequently
updated.
The next interview with the DoR concentrated on reconciling the stipulated requirements to
the articulated objectives for the APIM. Again we used the ASMSA-DSS to assist us with
this task involving the DoR. At this juncture we had now completed the first two stages of the
ASMSA Selection Method. The DoR requested us to extract data from the ASMSA-DSS’s
database and insert that data into Corporation X’s standard RFI template in order to produce
a RFI document. This document sought 2FA product information and indicative pricing from
several specialist suppliers in Asia.
8.4.1.3 Suppliers’ Responses to Corporation X’s RFI
The covering letter that accompanied the RFI document did not seek to gain consent from
these suppliers in respect of using their responses for our research purposes. This omission
was not erroneous. Corporation X considered that it would be unsuitable to put such a request
into their covering letter because the DoR was of the opinion that the suppliers would not
respond in a meaningful manner or at all.
The DoR furnished us with four supplier RFI responses. The absence of a supplier’s consent,
however, meant that the data contained in the RFI response correspondence could not be
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used by us to validate the factors in ASMSA’s Efficiency Perspective. We describe how we
overcame this problem in Section 8.4.1.5.
8.4.1.4 Corporation X’s HoITP’s Initiative
During the period while Corporation X was waiting for the suppliers’ responses Corporation
X’s HoITP in Asia also handed the RFI to another supplier. This supplier was in discus-
sions with Corporation X to supply network infrastructure monitoring services to its Asian
businesses.
Corporation X’s HoITP decided to select a one-time authentication code, delivered by short
messaging service, (OTAC-SMS) 2FA solution from this network infrastructure supplier
rather than the solutions proposed by the short-listed suppliers. It should be noted that
three of the short-listed suppliers had OTAC-SMS solution offerings described in their RFI
responses.
That supplier’s OTAC-SMS solution was piloted by Corporation X in Singapore for around 6
to 9 months and there were no significant issues encountered with this deployment, according
to the DoR.
8.4.1.5 ASMSA Selection Method Stage 3
The DoR agreed to take part in a further structured interview to validate the factors in the
Efficiency Perspective based on his knowledge of Corporation X’s OTAC-SMS deployment.
In this interview he agreed to confirm the relevance of the criteria questions in ASMSA’s
Efficiency Perspective to the 2FA solution that was deployed in Singapore. He was only
able to provide brief statements as he was restricted, claiming commercial sensitivities, from
providing much of the detail relating to the 2FA deployment. The main omissions related
to specific details surrounding security testing and identity assurance results and also the
precise costs of selected solution.
We then produced a final report detailing the DoR’s responses for all of ASMSA’s pers-
pectives for the DoR to review. Following final amendments, we used these data to conduct
our validation of our factors for evaluating APIMs.
329
8.4 Validation of the ASMSA Methodology and its Components
In conclusion, we had utilised the ASMSA Methodology with the DoR in order to select the
optimal 2FA solution for Corporation X’s application context. Despite the fact that we were
unable to use data provided by the suppliers in order to compare the attributes of different
solutions to the stipulated requirements, we nevertheless were able to validate our method’s
systematic processes.
We acknowledge that the ASMSA Selection Method needs to be further validated with
different application contexts, possibly using alternative research methodologies. We consider
that the ASMSA Selection Method does not require enhancement at this stage of our research
because its usage was incomplete in our case study. We believe that it would be unwise
to enhance the ASMSA Selection Method based upon our validation from its incomplete
inaugural use in a real-world application context. Therefore, we refrain from amending
any of ASMSA Selection Method’s processes until we have acquired additional relevant
empirical data from using our methodology in other application contexts.
8.4.2 Discussion on Factors Validation Assessment Results
Despite the absence of documentary evidence, we were able to validate nearly all our
identified factors, i.e. 99%, using the interview data acquired in this case study. Table 8.3
shows the number of factors for evaluation as at Stage 9 of our research implementation plan,
at the top of the table, and the status of the factors and criteria questions post case study as at
Stage 12, at the foot of the table.
We also identified 21 new factors in this case study data. Some factors were merged resulting
in an overall reduction of nine factors. Our results also show that 33 factors, about 14%,
required their label to be more descriptive, which is a significant reduction from 35% as we
found in the results of our factor validation effort using the data from the eGates Case Study.
Also, there was a significant decrease in the need to revise the criteria questions.
The results of our efforts to validate our identified factors are detailed in the next three
sub-sections.
8.4.2.1 Factor Identifier Labels
We found that 33 out of our 234 factors, i.e. 14%, required their factor label to be more
descriptive. Our results also show that at least 26% of our criteria questions still required
330
8.4 Validation of the ASMSA Methodology and its Components
Factors For Understanding Effectiveness Efficiency Row
Evaluating APIMs Perspective Perspective Perspective Totals
Pre-Case Study
Stage 9 60 factors 70 factors 104 factors 234 factors
Evaluation Themes 7 factor themes 9 factor themes 9 factor themes 25 factor themes
Grounded
Factors 66 (98%) 76 (99%) 101 (99%) 243 (99%)
Deduced
Factors 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Not-grounded
Factors 1 (2%) 1(1%) 1 (1%) 3 (1%)
Relabelled
Factors 17 10 6 33
Revised
Criteria 22 15 25 62
Questions
Deleted
Factors 4 0 5 9
New Factors
Identified 11 7 3 21
Factor
Explanations 26 14 24 64
Revisions
Factor Theme
Name Change 0 0 1 1
Post Case Study
Status of Factors 67 factors 77 factors 102 factors 246 factors
Evaluation Themes 7 factor themes 9 factor themes 9 factor themes 25 factor themes
Table 8.3: Factor Validation Results using the Corporation X’s 2FA Project Case Study Data
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further enhancement. Our first result is broken down into 7%, 4%, and 3% for the Under-
standing, Effectiveness and Efficiency Perspectives respectively. The second result is broken
down into 10%, 6%, and 10% respectively.
The first result shows that the factors description labels are more accurate according to the
depth of granularity of the data related to the factor. This trend falls in line with the results
of our eGates validation efforts. We describe other patterns in our results from our cross-case
analysis of our evaluation efforts in Section 8.4.3.
Our second result shows a significant reduction in the number of criteria questions that needed
refinement. The results from our validation efforts show that the number of criteria questions
requiring revisions were similar across our evaluation framework’s perspectives. We were
unable to recognise patterns in the factor explanation revisions across our framework’s
perspectives.
The reduction of factor labels and criteria questions revisions can be explained by the fact
that we have only included those factor labels, criteria questions and factor explanations
where there is a material change required rather than cosmetic or grammatical improvement
as in our previous validation efforts. Also these reductions in revisions may be explained by
our efforts to refine factors and criteria question during each validation iteration.
The DoR encountered difficulties in acquiring data for some of the criteria questions because
the criteria questions, as phrased, did not appear to be relevant to the application context.
The DoR suggested that the criteria questions could be better structured by using a concise
leading question which is then supplemented with subordinate criteria questions rather than
posing long and complex questions. He suggested that “this structuring could assist in
overcoming the narrowness of some of the criteria questions and it would also help to
improve the alignment to the factor label and also the factor explanation”.
Additionally, the DoR commented that the terminology of some factor labels still needed
improvement to aid clarity, which should then improve the understanding of their relevancy
to the application context.
8.4.2.2 Relevancy of Our Factors
The high availability of relevant data in this case study enabled us to directly ground 99% of
our identified factors. All factors were grounded in the data as relevant except three factors,
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one in each perspective. The DoR’s direct response to each criterion question also enabled us
to avoid the need for us to use our own interpretations and deductions to validate a factor’s
existence in our data.
The factors identified in the literature which were Not-grounded in this case study data are:
1. Subject Duress Policy factor (A.17.8.) in the Policies Evaluation Theme (see Table F.7
in Appendix F);
2. Privacy Controls Erosion factor (A.8.10.) in the Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme
(see Table F.9 in Appendix F); and
3. Device Calibration factor (A.16.14.) in the Manageability Evaluation Theme (see
Table F.21 in Appendix F).
We comment on these three remaining factors and the impact of the data gathering method
on our results in Section 8.4.3.
These results show that the increased availability of the relevant data improved our validation
efforts to ground the factors. Conducting our research using an individual who was directly
involved in a project enabled us to acquire a richer set of relevant data for the validation of
our factors.
8.4.2.3 Consistency of Our Factors
We found that the introduction of factor explanations assisted in the identification of inconsist-
encies amongst our factor labels, and criteria questions and also between the factors them-
selves.
Our results indicate that the factor explanations themselves also required refinement so as
to better align with the descriptive label of the factor and the associated criteria questions.
Generally, we found that we needed to improve the factor explanations on the same criteria
questions because the criteria question was often not adequately posed to acquire the relevant
data relating to its corresponding factor.
We also found during our validation effort that some of our factors needed to be merged. This
meant that the merged factors then required new generalised factor labels, criteria questions
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and factor explanations to be created. For example, the merging of whether the data upon
which a user may be authenticated may use knowledge data, biometric data, data generated
by an artefact, or a combination of these elements. For the purposes of evaluation, these
data can be represented by a single factor entitled ‘Subject Signal Data’ (A.12.8.) which is
located in the Security Architecture Evaluation Theme, as shown in Table F.17 of Appendix
F.
The need to revise the title of only one evaluation theme from ‘Technology’ to ‘Manageability’
suggests that our evaluation themes are consistent in relation to the ASMSA Evaluation
Framework and also align with the data acquired from our case studies.
8.4.2.4 Completeness of Our Factors
From our validation assessment we identified 21 new factors, which were mainly in the
Understanding Perspective.
Our results suggest that the improvement gaining access to the relevant data in this case study
to data acquired in the eID Card Case Study played an important part in our efforts to identify
new evaluation criteria. We consider, however, that we have not reached the saturation
point where we could claim that the factors for evaluation are in any way complete. Indeed,
our results suggest that further factors for evaluation may be found using a participative
research methodology, such as the action research methodology, in other application contexts.
Additionally, a range of application contexts with different types of automated identification
problems may also reveal further factors for evaluation.
The deletions that are shown in Table 8.3 were due to the merging of factors rather than
the deletion of the factor for relevancy reasons. The DoR suggested that the ASMSA
Methodology, and the ASMSA-DSS, should allow for supplemental factors to be added to
the evaluation in order to provide flexibility in the evaluation of the application context to
accommodate different types of organisations and cultures.
We conclude that it may be difficult to determine whether the factors for evaluating APIMs
could ever be complete. We believe, however, that through our efforts to validate the factors
using data from our case studies we have established an adequate set of factors, classified into
evaluation themes, in an evaluation framework to enable the inaugural use of the ASMSA
Methodology for evaluating an APIM to be applied in a real-world application context.
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8.4.3 Patterns Recognised in Our Factor Validation Efforts
Our cross-case analysis of our efforts to validate our identified factors shows that there has
been a progressive improvement in our results.
As can be seen in Table 8.3 there was a significant improvement in the number of factors
validated using the data from this case study. There was, however, only slight improvement in
validation between the initial validation using the eID Card Case Study data and the second
validation using the eGates Case Study data.
The Duress Policy factor was the only factor identified in our review of the literature which
was Not-grounded in the data in any of the three case studies. We acknowledge that a duress
policy for an application context may rarely be necessary for an APIM. These results also
suggest that the data gathering method was a key factor in acquiring a comprehensive data
set upon which to validate the factors. The eID Card Case Study and the eGates Case Study
used data that were acquired and used retrospectively. In this case study the factors contained
in the ASMSA-DSS were used as a check list by the DoR. He conceded that “I’ve evaluated
many more factors than I would have done without such a list”.
The use of the ASMSA Methodology in this case study helped the DoR to focus on artic-
ulating the objectives for the APIM and also setting the measurements for assessing the
effectiveness and efficiency of proposed candidate APIMs. These elements formed the
majority of the new 21 factors identified in this case study.
Our results demonstrate that the use of the ASMSA-DSS as a tool, in a participative approach,
to gather the relevant data to validate the factors has been far more productive than our
attempts to validate the factors using data from retrospective case studies. We consider that
the improvements in our validation efforts were probably a combined effect of the improved
method to acquire the necessary data and also the employment of the ASMSA Methodology
in this case study.
We conclude that further factors for evaluation may be identified by using our methodology
in other application contexts.
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Figure 8.2: Our Revised ASMSA Evaluation Framework
8.4.4 Validation of the ASMSA Evaluation Framework
The ASMSA Evaluation Framework has been further developed from our analysis of the
factors in the three case study data sets acquired which resulted in the introduction and
amendment of evaluation themes.
Our revisions are represented in Figure 8.2, which now reflects how a particular evaluation
theme impacts upon succeeding perspectives. The changes in evaluation themes and the
repositioning of the evaluation themes represent the main amendments to our original
evaluation framework, as shown in Figure 5.1 on page 188.
The other amendments to the ASMSA Evaluation Framework relate to the changes made to
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our factor identifier labels, our criteria questions and our factor explanations following our
analysis of our three case study data sets.
The ASMSA-DSS tool was updated to reflect the revisions in our evaluation themes, our
factors and our criteria questions which are integral elements of the ASMSA Methodology.
We believe that enhancements may be necessary to ASMSA’s Methodology by further
validating its usage, in a range of application contexts. Similarly, feedback on its usage by a
range of discipline experts may assist in identifying methodological enhancements.
8.5 Methodological Observations from Using ASMSA
This section describes the prevailing conditions at the inception of the 2FA Project, the use
of the ASMSA Methodology during the project, the outcomes of the project, and the DoR’s
methodological insights.
Figure 8.3 is a representation of the 2FA Project which has been generated from the Atlas.ti
CAQDAS tool following our qualitative coding of the data gathered. Figure 8.3 is designed
to show the sequential progression of the project from its inception, the use of the ASMSA
Methodology through to the outcomes as at the end of our case study period. Figure 8.3
should not be construed as a causal network as our data are insufficient to identify direct
causal effects throughout the project.
The antecedent variables representing the conditions prevailing at the time of the project’s
inception are shown in the boxes in the left column and the outcome variables are shown in
the boxes in the right column of Figure 8.3. The boxes in between the antecedent variables
and the project outcomes columns, i.e. the intervening variables, represent the stages and
steps of the ASMSA Selection Method and the significant events that occurred during the
project.
8.5.1 Prevailing Conditions
We provide a list of the conditions prevailing at the time of Corporation X’s 2FA Project’s
inception with supporting descriptions.
1. Regulatory Compliance The MAS was the only financial regulator in Asia, at that time,
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Figure 8.3: Approach Pursued by Corporation X’s 2FA Project
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to have issued a requirement for financial institutions to introduce 2FA solutions for
their employees and insurance agents.
2. No specific budget for 2FA Project The responsibility for the 2FA Project fell to the
DoR as part of his role and responsibilities for information risk for Corporation X’s
Asia Region. There was no specific budget allocated to engage external discipline
experts and the project tasks would be undertaken by the DoR and his InfoSec team.
The DoR acted as the sponsor and the 2FA Project Coordinator.
3. No Internal Identity Management Skills Corporation X had no internal identity man-
agement specialists employed at that time; however, there were information security
specialists that reported to the DoR. The DoR managed the region’s security gover-
nance framework comprising of risk accountabilities, security policies and security
operations that were maintained by his team. The DoR was also the architect of
Corporation X’s security governance framework. His role meant that he consulted
with Corporation X’s Asian business executives to manage business risks on a regular
basis.
4. No Methodology for Risks Based Projects Corporation X did not have a methodology
for selecting an APIM and they did not use a methodology for selecting other security
related technologies. His InfoSec team members, however, often used a risk assessment
methodology to assist Corporation X’s business operations to identify risks and to
determine the concomitant security controls.
5. Competitive Insurance Market Corporation X’s main income was expected to come
from its Asian business operations and the introduction of 2FA was viewed as a poten-
tial obstacle on their agents’ productivity to achieve their sales targets. Corporation
X’s insurance business competitors, however, would also need to introduce a 2FA
solution for their respective employees and insurance agents or brokers. The DoR
explained that “Singapore was a mature market and insurance agents, typically, did
not like having anything interfering with their liaison with their customer or potential
customer. The competition to recruit insurance agents in Asia was incredibly intense
between insurance companies”.
6. Group Policy for 2FA in Corporation X Corporation X’s GHO in London mandated
the use of smart card tokens to achieve 2FA regulatory compliance. The Regional Head
Office (RHO) in Hong Kong had some degree of autonomy in that it could challenge
the GHO policy decisions provided that evidence could be gathered to demonstrate an
339
8.5 Methodological Observations from Using ASMSA
adverse impact on local business operations or that such policy decisions contradicted
local regulations or social norms of the indigenous cultures.
7. No Restrictions on 2FA Solutions Corporation X was leading the way for the insurance
industry in Asia to comply with the regulatory authorities’ security requirements to
introduce a 2FA APIM for user access control. The main focus of the 2FA Project
was to explore alternative 2FA candidate solutions, including the use of biometrics,
and select the 2FA solution that would best match Corporation X’s operating business
model. The solution, however, needed to incorporate Corporation X’s current identifier
and password authentication method.
8. Local Businesses Required Regional Assistance The compliance to 2FA regulation was
regarded by Corporation X’s local business entities as a regional issue rather than a
single company business issue. Many of the local businesses sought guidance from
regional office to investigate complex issues surrounding technology. Corporation X’s
local businesses relied on the regional office to operate their systems and infrastructure
because the technical expertise was not available locally.
9. Differences in Risk Perception Corporation X’s perception was that there were no incre-
ased risks associated with conducting on-line insurance transactions which differed to
the financial regulatory authorities’ risks perceptions.
10. Internal Power Blocks The conditions within the regional offices were not always
conducive for collaborative working as some senior executives were keen to exploit
the fuzzy responsibility boundaries relating to information risk management, secu-
rity operations, and technology and infrastructure operations to build their personal
influence.
11. Inability to Measure Authentication Effectiveness Corporation X was unable to deter-
mine the effectiveness of its current user identifier and password authentication mecha-
nism. The metrics for establishing such effectiveness had not been defined. The audit
logs, generated by the different computer systems, the security incidents reported, and
the statistics on password reset requests together with other relevant data were not
amalgamated in order to provide an indicative measurement of effectiveness of the
current authentication system.
The DoR stated that the 2FA Project was not one of Corporation X’s highest priority projects
at that time. Nevertheless, an early start to investigate the possibility for ascertaining the
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optimal 2FA solution was regarded as advantageous as it would enable Corporation X to
work at a reasonable pace in order to select and deploy the selected 2FA solution to each
business in Asia at the appropriate juncture.
8.5.2 Significant Events in Corporation X’s 2FA Project
This sub-section describes the significant events that took place during Corporation X’s use
of the ASMSA Methodology to steer the 2FA Project. The DoR and his team followed the
ASMSA Selection Method’s processes during Stage 1 and Stage 2; however, the planned use
of Stage 3 of the method was superseded by an unexpected event.
We provide a list of the significant events which occurred during the 2FA Project.
A. Stakeholders’ Objectives Documented The stakeholders’ objectives for introducing
2FA were established during Stage 1 of the selection method within the constraints
imposed by the regulatory authorities’ security requirements.
B. DoR Consultation with Stakeholders During Stage 1 the DoR liaised with business
units and also with the three user communities to ascertain their objectives for 2FA.
C. Requirements Specified The processes in Stage 2 enabled the DoR to establish a base-
line set of requirements for the 2FA.
D. Objectives and Requirements Reconciled The DoR used the ASMSA-DSS to match
the requirements to the stated objectives, which identified some irregularities and
inconsistencies. Following his review, some of the objectives and requirements were
revised; however, there were no redundant requirements identified. Some objectives
were merged and generalised by the DoR.
E. Data Extracted for RFI Data in the ASMSA-DSS was extracted and imported into
Corporation X’s standard RFI template. Some data were removed, e.g. total budget
allocated to project and its deployment for commercial reasons.
F. RFI Distributed to Short-Listed Suppliers We carried out investigations on behalf of
the DoR to identify specialist providers of identity management products based upon
criteria provided by the DoR. The supplier had to demonstrate significant presence and
experience of operating in Asia. The DoR wanted to ensure that the 2FA systems were
capable of being maintained by a financially stable supplier with a track record for
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supporting their products over a protracted period. A short-list of suppliers was agreed
with the DoR and the RFI was emailed to these chosen suppliers requesting them to
respond within six weeks. Despite the covering letter that accompanied the RFI stating
that the suppliers could seek further clarification on Corporation X’s requirements
none of them chose to do so.
G. RFI Handed to a Network Infrastructure Supplier Corporation X’s HoITP handed
the RFI to the network infrastructure supplier during negotiations relating to the
provision of network monitoring services.
H. Suppliers’ RFI Responses Received Five RFI supplier responses were received by Cor-
poration X within the stated deadline. The DoR conducted an evaluation of these
RFI responses and concluded that he had sufficient evidence to demonstrate that an
OTAC-SMS solution was preferable to the smart card solution recommended by GHO.
His evaluation report to the GHO which was endorsed by the regional executive board
was not made available to us.
I. Changes in Responsibilities The HoITP assumed responsibility for the 2FA Project from
the DoR.
J. HoITP Selects OTAC-SMS Solution The HoITP selected the OTAC-SMS solution from
the network infrastructure supplier rather than from one of the short-listed suppliers.
The regional board of directors confirmed their agreement to the HoITP’s selection
recommendation.
K. Pilot Deployment Commences A pilot deployment of the selected OTAC-SMS 2FA
solution commenced in Singapore with a limited number of insurance agents.
L. Singapore Government Introduces Privacy Legislation During Corporation X’s pilot
deployment of the OTAC-SMS solution, with its Singaporean insurance agents, the
Singapore Government introduced the Personal Data Protection Act 2012. This
law required businesses to protect citizens’ private information. For Corporation
X the scope of the legislation included their insurance agents’ biographical details,
particularly their mobile telephone number, and also Corporation X’s customers’
private data.
The outcomes of the 2FA Project are described in the next sub-section.
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8.5.3 Outcomes from Corporation X’s 2FA Project
The DoR considered Corporation X’s 2FA Project to be successful during an interview at the
end of our period of study.
We found that Corporation X’s 2FA Project was perceived as successful because the deploy-
ment of the OTAC-SMS solution allowed Corporation X to claim compliance to the Singapore
Authorities’ security requirements without adversely impacting its business operations. The
DoR expressed the view that ‘the use of the ASMSA Methodology has been beneficial to
achieving Corporation X’s main objective of rejecting Group Head Office’s recommended
smart card 2FA solution’.
We found the following project outcomes in our data:
1. Selected 2FA Deployment Only in Singapore The selected OTAC-SMS solution had
been deployed in Corporation X’s businesses in Singapore; however, it had not been
introduced across to any of their businesses in different countries in the region. Singa-
pore was the only country that had published a regulatory requirement for 2FA. The
number of insurance agents currently using the 2FA solution at that time was less than
five percent because the local Corporation X’s businesses had been reluctant to deploy
the solution due to local market sensitivities and competitive forces.
2. Mixed 2FA Deployments in Singapore Some insurance agents were still using the orig-
inal smart card 2FA solution. The local businesses in Singapore, however, were
considering migrating from the smart card solution to the OTAC-SMS solution. The
local business units were reluctant to migrate because they had invested and had
committed to furnishing their agents with the smart card solution. The local business
units had gone ahead with the GHO mandated smart card solution without considering
the regional head office’s recommended 2FA solution. The local business units had
received feedback from agents complaining how difficult and how unusable they found
using a smartcard and to have to carry the reader equipment with them as well as their
mobile phones and laptop devices.
3. 2FA Deployed to Agents Only Insurance agents in Singapore were the only users of
the OTAC-SMS solution. A number of initiatives which affected the agents use
of Corporation X’s systems had commenced in the other countries, such as Hong
Kong. GHO was also looking at authentication mechanisms on mobile devices for its
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executives rather than smart cards.
4. Manageability of 2FA Solution The OTAC-SMS solution was found to be easier for
Corporation X’s internal technology resources to manage than the smart card solution.
Corporation X wanted to avoid the management of software code executing on their
insurance agents’ devices. The DoR stated that agents had a range of ageing hardware
and software: “So I’ve seen agents that are using Windows 95 still on battered
old laptops. If we started introducing software into the agents’ devices we will
almost certainly have run into problems with compatibility across different platforms,
capabilities of different machines etc.”.
5. Outstanding Usability Issues Corporation X’s insurance agents in Singapore had comp-
lained that both of Corporation X’s 2FA solutions were complicated to operate. The
DoR stated that “there was a feeling, expressed by them, that particularly the smart
card solution, but also even the OTAC-SMS solution, was interfering with their cus-
tomer interaction”.
6. Status of Competitor’s 2FA Deployments Some insurance companies had deployed a
smart card solution and some had opted to deploy a similar OTAC-SMS solution. Only
one insurance company deployed a biometric solution where the agent’s fingerprint
was captured by the laptop which was supplied by that competitor. According to
the DoR, the deployed solutions appeared to reflect the way that each competitor
managed their agents. Where companies supplied equipment to their agents then
these competitors opted for a more intrusive 2FA solution with software managed on
supplied devices. Smaller competitive companies had selected OTAC-SMS solutions.
7. Agents’ Opposition to Data Protection Responsibilities Corporation X’s businesses in
Malaysia, scheduled as the next country to deploy the 2FA solution, encountered resis-
tance from their agents. Their agents were opposed to fulfilling their data protection
responsibilities in order to comply with the Malaysian Privacy Laws. The DoR com-
mented that “some of them [agents] were, at various times, demonstrating outside
of Corporation X’s branches stating they didn’t accept their new contract because it
contained additional clauses specifying their new responsibilities to keep customers’
information confidential”.
8. Fulfilment of Corporation X’s Compliance Objective The MAS had not yet confirmed
that Corporation X’s OTAC-SMS solution complied with their security requirements.
While the regulator had not given any guidance on the expected solution’s capabilities
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they retained the right to inspect the deployed 2FA solution. The regulators in Singa-
pore would, according to the DoR, normally suggest that improvements in the controls
were needed to a deployed solution. The DoR considered, however, it unlikely that the
regulators would request companies to invest in a totally new solution.
9. OTAC-SMS Solution Within Budget The costs of deploying the OTAC-SMS solution
in Singapore did not exceed the original budget. According to the DoR, the budget was
set originally for a smart card solution and that amount was deliberately over-budgeted.
10. Privacy Issues Impact The 2FA Project had also highlighted the need to undertake
further work to ensure that Corporation X’s processes align with the privacy laws
in which its companies operate. The Singapore Data Protection Law contained a
requirement in respect of companies’ mandatory use of a ‘Do Not Call Register’
indicator. The law prohibits companies from sending SMS messages to persons unless
they have obtained their prior consent. Corporation X’s legal team in Singapore was
testing that statutory requirement for use of SMS messages with their agents and the
OTAC-SMS solution.
11. Vulnerabilities of OTAC-SMS Solution Corporation X had identified a number of vul-
nerabilities associated with the OTAC-SMS solution. Corporation X planned to
introduce other counter measures to improve the availability of the access codes to
the agents and also introduce further controls relating to the protection of agents’ data,
e.g. agents’ mobile telephone numbers. Corporation X found it difficult to conduct
an assessment of the effectiveness of their 2FA solution. Since the introduction of
the 2FA Project the DoR had embarked on a separate work stream to improve the
reporting of security breaches. His team had reviewed security incidents over the last
five years and found that the information relating to the reported security incidents to
be of insufficient depth to assign breaches to specific authentication failures.
12. Decision Audit Trail Corporation X had produced a decision audit trail by using the
ASMSA Methodology to investigate the options for a 2FA solution. The DoR stated
that “there are benefits in having such a trail because it could be used, having arrived
at their selection, that Corporation X could demonstrate, from the output from the
methodology, that we followed a structured process”. He also stated that “regulators
are quite often more interested in the process of how the control is determined rather
than in the actual practical implementation of the solution. The audit trail acts as
evidence to show a regulator that we evaluated several different 2FA solutions from
345
8.5 Methodological Observations from Using ASMSA
alternative suppliers and our reasons for the eventual OTAC-SMS selection”.
We now provide methodological insights from the DoR following his use of the ASMSA
Methodology in Corporation X’s 2FA Project and a description of current decision-making
processes on security issues in Corporation X.
8.5.4 Methodological Insights
Generally, the DoR thought that the ASMSA Methodology, aided by the ASMSA-DSS tool,
was of reasonable assistance to Corporation X’s 2FA Project. He said that it helped him to
produce evidence, in the form of a decision audit trail, to demonstrate the reasons behind
the selection of the OTAC-SMS solution rather than the recommended smart card solution.
The DoR claimed that he had never used a methodology or a structured approach such as
ASMSA.
He stated that “the key thing for me was the structured approach. So it did make us, make me,
consider all the different aspects - you know things that you might not have thought about
were driven out by going through those structured questions and answers approach. So, I
think, that was quite important as it did highlight some things that hadn’t occurred to us. I
think then again, as we said before, that having that output available [from the ASMSA-DSS
tool] helped us to create a fairly comprehensive RFI”.
He continued by stating that “it was useful to be able to present back to some of the regional
[executives] and particular regional information technology risk committee, bear in mind
that some of these people are not a technology people, they are not security people, but they
understand operational risk. It allowed us to present that sort of audience and say look here
guys these are the things that we thought about. Audit in particular, obviously, will audit an
implementation. So having had that background from the methodology it does help when
they do an audit because they have that background there, they know why we ended up with
that solution. That makes it easy for them. And then finally, obviously, you have the audit
trail available to demonstrate to regulators, or anybody else that comes in and asks, of the
processes that we went through, and our thoughts and the way we developed them is also
very useful”.
The DoR considered that our methodology was suitable for projects which had to evaluate
long-term solutions with significant investments. He explained that “where you’re consid-
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ering putting in something that essentially is the foundation of how you manage to control
access to systems and data or devices, so anything that can identify the individual accurately
would benefit from that level of rigour”. He thought that our methodology was inappropriate
for situations where a decision needed to be made quickly; he quoted “in two days”.
The DoR explained Corporation X’s current approach for decision-making, which included
the use of weightings against the particular factors: “We would normally form a number
of perspectives on a solution, from a technology, an information security and a business
view point. A working group in a specific meeting would evaluate all the options and assess
them based on the different perspectives of those different audiences. Once the decision
is made we then move to essentially a financial approval process that also includes within
it assessments of non-financial benefits that could be meeting of regulatory requirements
or satisfying a particular business requirement which isn’t financial or a financially based
requirement”.
He explained how our methodology and the ASMSA-DSS tool could assist Corporation X’s
current decision processes: “The initial assessment would be to get the facts together so the
output from the tool gives us essential information and then it would be an examination that
would look at both the quantitative and qualitative factors. The quantitative evaluation would
be typically around the cost issue but then we would factor in more subjective views like on
the qualitative aspects of usability and manageability that are particularly important”.
He confirmed that “we might do a weighting against those factors and if we found say that
one solution was affected significantly by the higher cost, but had higher level of satisfaction
with some of the less more qualitative aspects then we might look at that solution and choose
it over cheaper solution that scored a better score, just because of the low cost. So we try
to factor in the different perspectives to make sure that were not just choosing the cheapest
option but choosing the right option regardless of cost, accepting that there might be a higher
price”.
He concluded that Corporation X’s decision processes are seeking optimal solutions; however,
there are occasions where the decision, even with the weightings, is not clear-cut. He
explained that on such occasions “there is a discussion process and ensuring that there is
an understanding within the working group (and the working group composition will vary
depending upon what the solution is) that ensures as to why a decision has been made,
which factors have been more influential in making a decision and the reasons behind that
particular factor, whatever it might be, outweighing any other factor”.
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His comments suggest that the ASMSA Methodology is reasonably efficacious when the
APIM is of significant importance to the stakeholders. The structure of the methodology
and the production of a decision audit trail appear to complement Corporation X’s current
decision-making processes.
8.6 Assessment of the ASMSA Methodology’s Efficacy
We describe the results of our assessment of the ASMSA Methodology’s efficacy using our
criteria, described in Section 8.1, and the data acquired from this case study. In this section,
we also briefly describe the results of our cross-case assessment of methodological efficacy
using the data sets from our three case studies.
8.6.1 Effort to Use the ASMSA Methodology
Our assessment involves the comparison of the effort expended by the DoR to use the ASMSA
Methodology during Corporation X’s 2FA Project against his normal project activities. The
DoR continued his normal daily responsibilities while undertaking the tasks in the project.
The DoR claimed that he had spent about 40 man hours on using our methodology, repres-
enting roughly 10% of his total daily effort during the first two stages of the 2FA Project.
He claimed that the effort increased to around 30% to 40% of his daily effort during his
involvement with production of the RFI and his evaluation of the RFI responses, from the
identity management technology suppliers, which took place over a ten week period. As the
DoR did not use Stage 3 of our method our estimate of his execution effort was approximated
at 225 man hours in total, assuming a 10 hour working day. We acknowledge that our
estimate may be understated.
In respect of his effort on using the ASMSA Methodology the DoR commented that “having
an overhead of 30% to 40%, if you call it an overhead, is not a bad thing. It gives us, by
using a methodology that has structure behind it and a visible audit trail behind it, more
confidence in our decisions as opposed to a more ad hoc type review where people would
come up with ratings and import these and do it on a spreadsheet. Yes, it’s [the methodology]
probably added some time to it [the decision process] but I think its added more confidence
to the end decision and, to me, that is probably worth the extra effort”.
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In summary, the use of the ASMSA Methodology requires supplementary effort of ap-
proximately 30% to 40% to those activities in a project to select an APIM. The use of a
systematic methodology, however, appears to bring the benefit of additional confidence into
the decision-making processes.
8.6.2 Size of Application Context’s Problem
This section describes the results of our assessment of ASMSA Methodology’s efficacy in
terms of its proportionality and dimensionality to the application context’s problem.
We assess the impact of the business problem on Corporation X to be of ‘moderate’ proportion
because the potential loss of insurance agents to competitors, through an inappropriate 2FA
solution, could reduce Corporation X’s new income streams.
The DoR provided an affirmative response that use of the methodology was proportionate to
the size of their business problem. He explained the reasons behind his affirmative response:
“This is something that is all about managing what is potentially a significant risk for us. And
if we don’t get that right then we end up exposing ourselves to a greater level of risk or even
regulatory sanction or failures in the solution that could cost significantly more”.
He also provided further explanation on the proportionality aspects of using a systematic
methodology from a general perspective: “If we were looking at a short-term fix to a solution
then probably not. But if you are looking at something in our case which is going to be a
long-term solution with the significant costs involved and then making the investment. You
need to make sure you have the right solution because in the end having the right solution is
probably going to save you significant sums of money. I’ve seen a number of instances where
less rigorous processes are being followed and after a couple years, or even less, then, if you
find your solution doesn’t meet your requirements you’re back to square one. You can then
incur costs to take out the old solution, find a new one and then re-implement. So, yes, it is
proportionate on something like this”.
We assess the dimensionality of the problem in respect of the relationships between the
stakeholders involved in the 2FA Project as ‘complex’.
The DoR explained his assessment regarding complexity of the relationships relating to the
Corporation X’s business problem in Asia: “We have a very complex environment. We’ve
got 26 operations in 13 countries, multiple different types of user from employees at lower
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levels, to senior management, to the agents, who are not our employees, and will be using
their own technologies. So having the tool and the methodology there to work through that
process systematically was useful certainly and gave me the chance to think more about
those different aspects of use then I would have done probably otherwise”.
In summary, our assessment of the acquired data suggests that the use of the ASMSA
Methodology is reasonably efficacious when the size of problem has a moderate impact upon
the stakeholders’ business operations and the relationships of the entities in the application
context are complex.
8.6.3 Accuracy of APIM Selection
We assess the accuracy of the ASMSA Methodology using our criteria to evaluate the
application context’s situation and the characteristics of the methodology.
The project’s objectives were clear to the DoR; however, the objectives and requirements for
the 2FA deployment were not known at the project’s inception. The problems associated
with improving user authentication were not fully appreciated by the DoR, particularly the
strength of opposition from the insurance agents in respect of adding further demands on their
time. The DoR, however, had a sound appreciation for some of the causes of those parts of
the problem that he did understand, particularly in respect of managing security controls. The
stakeholders in Corporation X appeared to cooperate and communicate frequently; however,
we identified tensions between the regional office and the local business units. There appears
to have been some friction between the DoR and the HoITP in terms of the responsibility
for selecting a 2FA solution. The DoR claimed that the relationships in the application
context were complex, particularly Corporation X’s relationships with their insurance broker
companies and their agents, as employees or independent contractors.
We assess the ASMSA Methodology to be repeatable in that its processes are documented
to a reasonable granularity and, therefore, we consider the methodology is usable by other
evaluators to produce similar results. The outputs from using the ASMSA Methodology are
a categorisation of the data acquired to aid the evaluator in considering many interrelated
factors and the production of due diligence evidence in a decision audit trail. According
to the DoR, the methodology’s systematic processes gave structure and control to the 2FA
Project so as to improve its productivity, particularly for the generation of the RFI document.
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From these data we consider that the methodology was reasonably accurate in its use to
select the optimal 2FA for this application context. Our assessment here is supported by the
evidence that similar insurance companies in Asia selected an OTAC-SMS solution, although
these companies, as far as the DoR was aware, did not use a systematic methodology.
In our final interview the DoR admitted that he was unsure as to the effectiveness of the
deployed 2FA solution: “Okay, there isn’t an easy answer to that. A lot of what we are
trying to build at the moment is a picture using log data and questionnaires. We have a six
year of history of incidents in a database. So what we are doing with that, in particular,
at the moment, is that we are trying to build a view that says what’s the most frequent
cause of incidents, what is the trend on each of those incidents, and where do they come
from? So that the type of thing we’re trying to work on and its not yet fully there but that’s
where this [Methodology] could come in if we could then demonstrate that by using the
two factor authentication we have less losses of data through failures in identification and
authentication”.
We have incorporated criteria questions into the relevant evaluation themes of the ASMSA
Evaluation Framework so that organisations are encouraged to define, at the outset, metrics
upon which to evaluate the utility of their APIM and also to define the methods for gathering
the relevant data in order to conduct utility appraisals.
In the absence of attempts by Corporation X to assess the effectiveness and efficiency
of its current and the deployed 2FA solution we are unable to make further claims on
methodological accuracy and whether the solution chosen was indeed optimal for this
application context. Corporation X had not defined metrics to measure the effectiveness
and efficiency of their authentication systems. We consider that the defining of such metrics
should be based upon the objectives and requirements for deploying the APIM in the
application context. The DoR recognised that the collation of appropriate data are essential
to determine the effectiveness of their security controls.
We conclude that the accuracy of an approach to select the optimal APIM cannot be assessed
realistically unless pertinent metrics are defined and the relevant data are acquired from that
application context. Our case study results confirm Jaquith’s argument [164] of the need for
organisations to quantify their security goals.
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8.6.4 Methodological Simplicity
This section describes the results of our assessment of ASMSA Methodology’s efficacy, in
terms of its methodological simplicity, as defined by our criterion in Section 8.1.
We assess the methodology’s simplicity of use as ‘tolerable’ based upon the DoR’s following
comments: “Relatively simple - but I think the tool [ASMSA-DSS] is very wide-ranging
and very broad and, therefore, while of itself its not difficult, I think the scope that it tries
to cover makes it difficult, on occasions, to complete all the required requests [Answer all
the criteria questions]. In a way it has a sort of benefit in as much that it makes you think
through everything - the drawback is that it makes you think through everything!”.
He also added that “one things that was quite good was having a more structured way of
thinking [stressed] about what it is you are trying to do’. We also questioned the DoR as to
whether our methodology, including our DSS tool, should be used by a generalist aided by a
discipline specialist or a mixture of discipline experts. He considered that ‘it would need
a specialist of some description to lead. I don’t think you could have a generalist doing it
other than facilitating and project management possibly. There has to be a specialist in there
who has an understanding of information security, information risk, not necessarily a deep
understanding of technology, but at least a familiarity with the terms. Somebody needs to
understand the meaning of false positives and all these things. That would tend to say the
generalist would not be able to it without a significant amount of [learning] work on their
part”.
In summary, our assessment suggests that the methodology’s efficacy, in respect of its
simplicity of use, is tolerable for an identity management discipline expert.
8.6.5 Executable as a Program
This section describes the results of our assessment of ASMSA Methodology’s efficacy in
terms of whether it can be represented by an executable program.
From our assessment, we consider that about 85% of ASMSA Methodology’s processes
are represented as an executable program in the ASMSA’s DSS. This assessment includes
the functionality for data input, data transformation and data reconciliation activities by an
evaluator.
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The MSP technique is not incorporated into the ASMSA-DSS implementation because we
consider that many of its processes require human to human interaction. Human involvement
is also needed to transform and reconcile the data in the ASMSA-DSS. Our DSS is not
designed to select the optimal APIM automatically but to manage the large volume of data to
support the selection processes. Human intervention is also required to score the attributes
of candidate APIMs against the stipulated requirements.
Based upon the DoR’s comments we assess the effort required to learn and use ASMSA’s
DSS, as designed, is ‘moderate’. The DoR concluded that “the structure and the method and
the approach [ASMSA-DSS] seems to fit logically what you would do in establishing what
your objectives are, you map and develop your requirements, and map the two together. Its
like a standard type of business analysis type of approach. So the logic is not an issue at all.
It works fine”.
In summary, our assessment suggests that the majority, around 85%, of the methodology’s
processes are executable as a program within a DSS, which requires user intervention to
carry out data input and manipulation tasks. We assess the effort required to learn and use
ASMSA’s DSS is moderate; however, we acknowledge that the ASMSA-DSS might benefit
from some functional and usability enhancements to make it easier to learn and use.
8.6.6 Capability of the ASMSA Methodology to Address Real-world Prob-
lems
This section describes our assessment regarding ASMSA Methodology’s capability to address
real-world problems.
Although our methodology was not used entirely in the 2FA Project, we assess the ASMSA
Methodology as having an acceptable capability of being applied to address real-world
problems.
We base our assessment on the DoR’s retrospective insights: “Okay, I think where we are
now is, given the amount of time that has gone into this, we started off with a sort of nebulous
statement from our Group Head Office that said, you have to put in two factor authentication.
The chosen solution in Group Head Office (GHO) was a smart card [vendor’s product
named], which works for GHO, which is about 600 people in one location. They might travel
a lot but they are based in one single office. The difficulty that we face in Asia is that we have
in excess of, well around 400,000 to 500,000 people, in a variety of locations and not all of
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them are in our offices. So, for us, the GHO recommended solution was going to be a very
difficult implementation problem and ongoing management problem. So, from my perspective
having some structure and some sort of logic behind the way we approached this meant
that I could get myself in a position where I can go back to the GHO people and say we
have looked at this [recommendation] and smart card [vendor product] and it isn’t practical
for us in Asia. I know it isn’t but I haven’t got any evidence behind it [his unsubstantiated
conclusions]. What this [methodology] gives me a demonstrable and repeatable processes
with evidence of what has been looked at, why have we looked at it, and what we are trying
to achieve with it”.
He explained the benefit of using the ASMSA Methodology for his real-world problem:
“So for me the big benefit is having that record of the considerations that go into that. The
evidence behind that and the ability to say, if someone comes along and says why did you
make that decision? You can go back into the output of the tool and say this is where
that came from [audit for justification]. A lot of the work that I do, with other areas of
information risk, is around building up the evidence to support that fact that we need to
make an investment in either people, process or technology. This is another tool, a powerful
tool, what is for probably, arguably, one of the more significant information security or risk
investments that we would have to make”.
In our final interview with the DoR, in response to our question on the methodologies’
applicability in the real-world, he commented: “I see no reason why not from what I have
seen”. In response to our question as to whether he would use the methodology again he
replied that “we probably would. One of things we have to be conscious of is that, and I use
Singapore and Cambodia as two contrasting examples. Singapore is a mature market for us.
Its got access to skills and knowledge that allow it to manage its infrastructure quite tightly.
Cambodia, on the other hand, is a very immature market for us. The skills in Cambodia,
not just Cambodia but also in other countries to manage a complex technology like this, do
not exist. So, it is entirely possible that if we were looking to do a roll-out in Cambodia,
for instance, we might well run through the process again using the previous inputs just
to validate that they fit for that particular country. The issue is complex and we do not
have internal expertise to support us in making investment decisions on the technology and
solutions or to consider fully the management and support options involved in the long-term.
Use of the tool helped guide those decisions”.
In summary, our data suggests that the ASMSA Methodology’s has an ‘acceptable’ capability
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of being applied to select APIM in order to address personal automated identification
problems in real-world application contexts. Our methodology has been used in a single
application context and we acknowledge that further empirical research is needed to assess
its efficacy in other types of application contexts.
8.6.7 Cross-Case Assessment of Methodological Efficacy
While we recognise that there are benefits, both theoretical and for practical purposes, in
performing cross-case comparisons of methodological efficacy, using the data from our three
case studies, we refrain from conducting a full assessment because our data from our two
retrospective case studies are incomplete.
We were unable to acquire the relevant data relating to the effort expended by discipline
experts in these programmes, although we believe the effort was considerable taking into
account the range of experts engaged in the programmes and the programmes’ duration
over several years. We were also unable to acquire data in order to assess methodological
accuracy because the data was not produced, as far as we could ascertain.
Crucially, we found in all of our case studies that the APIM organisations, as system owner
stakeholders, did not define metrics in order to measure the utility of the deployed APIM
for their application context. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the deployed
APIMs were optimal solutions for their application contexts and, in turn, the extent of the
methodology’s efficacy used to select the respective solutions.
We found in all three case studies that APIM system owners had little understanding of the
utility of the deployed APIM because in each case the programmes experienced difficulty in
establishing ‘ground truth’ as to whether the claimed digital identity related to a transaction
was invoked by the genuine person. An assessment on the accuracy of the methodologies to
select the optimal APIM in real-world application contexts, therefore, relies upon improve-
ments in acquiring the relevant data so that the utility of the deployment may be ascertained.
Once the utility of APIM deployment and data related to other key factors are acquired an
assessment on the methodological accuracy may be conducted objectively.
These three data sets suggest that the problems relating to the selection of APIMs are of
significant or moderate importance to the stakeholders involved in the application context. It
may also suggest that our selection of case studies is biased towards application contexts
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where the impacts upon stakeholders are moderate or significant. Our data from all of our
three case studies, however, highlights the complexities of the relationships between the
stakeholders and the intricacies of selecting, configuring and operating APIMs.
We found that expert-led approaches for selecting APIMs relied upon practitioners’ capabil-
ities and intuition. The programmes’ processes in the two retrospective case studies were
not documented; therefore, another evaluator may find the respective approaches difficult to
repeat. Conversely, the ASMSA Methodology, with its systematic processes and rigour is
assessed as being capable of reproducing similar results. From the DoR comments in our
third case study, we assess that the methodology was ‘reasonably efficacious’ based on the
circumstances surrounding the particular 2FA Project.
The circumstances of some application contexts may be more conducive to a flexible expert-
led approach and there may be occasions when the rigour of a systematic approach may be
more efficacious. In the next section, we describe the extent of the ASMSA Methodology’s
efficacy by assessing the circumstances surrounding the application contexts of our three
case studies so as to explain when a systematic methodology might be efficacious.
8.7 Circumstances when Using a Systematic Methodology
may be Efficacious
This section answers our fourth research question on the extent to which a systematic
methodology is efficacious for selecting an APIM and if so, under which circumstances, with
explanatory reasons.
8.7.1 Clear-cut Decision Versus Comprehensive Evaluation
A systematic methodology appears to be efficacious when a programme is required to
evaluate the application context thoroughly and consider a range of candidate APIMs in
order to fulfil articulated stakeholders’ objectives and requirements.
The circumstances surrounding Corporation X’s 2FA Project fulfilled the majority of Ja-
yaratna’s criteria [165] to be considered as an ill-structured situation. We found that there
were no defined objectives or requirements for introducing 2FA. A feasibility and cost
estimations for introducing 2FA had not been researched. Similarly, the problems involved
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with remote user authentication were not fully understood and the insurance agents’ strong
opposition to introduce 2FA had been underestimated by Corporation X.
The communication dialogues between the 2FA Project with Corporation X’s business
units appeared to be well-developed. We found, however, that the DoR and the HoITP’s
vaguely defined responsibilities in respect of dealing with the problem seemed to cause
friction and their working relationship appeared strained. Also, the processes for decision-
making amongst executives were complex and appeared to be influenced by both political
and personal motives. The DoR needed compelling evidence, based on a comprehensive
approach, to counter the smart card solution mandated by GHO in London.
The DoR in recognition of his uncertainty of the suitability of the mandated smart card
solution persuaded Corporation X’s executives in their Hong Kong RHO to establish the
2FA Project in order to:
• ascertain firm objectives for introducing a 2FA mechanism in order to validate GHO’s
vaguely defined aims;
• gain an understanding of the problems to introduce a 2FA solution from different
stakeholder perspectives; and
• produce detailed arguments based upon local conditions to challenge GHO mandate to
utilise smart cards as a 2FA mechanism for Corporation X’s operations in Asia.
Conversely, from our review of our data in the two retrospective case studies, an expert-led
approach and an iterative deployment approach appear to be efficacious when there an
obvious solution is apparent. We found that such decisions on solution designs were made
early within a programme. We found in the data of our retrospective case studies, however,
that in neither case did the programmes establish stakeholders’ objectives or specify the
requirements for the APIM.
The programmes’ objectives and the application contexts’ problems appeared to be well
understood and the underlying causes of the problems were sufficiently appreciated so
that these two programme’s concentrated on designing the solution rather than producing
requirements documentation, based upon an evaluation of the application context.
From the initial use of the ASMSA Methodology a systematic methodology appears to
be more efficacious than an expert-led approach when there is little understanding of the
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application context’s problem, there is doubt about the suitability of the recommended
APIM, and there is a desire to establish stakeholders’ objectives and requirements in order to
evaluate various candidate APIMs.
8.7.2 Experts’ Capabilities Versus Systematic Processes
A systematic methodology appears to be more efficacious than an expert-led approach when
a decision-maker places more reliance upon repeatable systematic processes than on the
capabilities of their discipline experts to select an APIM.
We found that the approaches in the retrospective case studies relied heavily upon the
capabilities of discipline experts when evaluating the selection and configuration of an APIM.
We also found that both programmes in these retrospective case studies did not follow a
systematic plan of activities. We also identified that some processes were overlooked by the
programme or insufficient time was afforded to discipline experts to complete their tasks
satisfactorily.
The data in the retrospective case studies suggests that there were gaps in the knowledge
and skills within the programme team in specific disciplines, for example the eID Card
Programme lacked a usability specialist. We found that discipline experts’ advice was often
ignored or discarded by the programmes’ senior management. The consequences of these
actions by the programmes’ senior managers, or by the decision authorities, may explain the
unavoidable vulnerabilities and issues, particularly usability deficiencies, in the deployed
APIMs.
In Corporation X’s 2FA Project, the DoR, who was not a discipline expert, used our factors
as a check list and followed the systematic processes in the ASMSA Selection Method to
evaluate a range of factors that influenced Corporation X’s eventual selection. The outcome
of Corporation X’s 2FA Project was the rejection of the original mandated 2FA solution.
The systematic methodology provided supporting evidence, from the evaluations of several
candidate solutions against objectives and requirements, so that the project was able to
recommend and justify an alternative solution.
Our data also suggests that the selection of an APIM requires the engagement of identity
management discipline experts in addition to other specialists in a programme. The impor-
tance and the complexity of some application contexts in some ill-structured situations may
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demand the use of a systematic methodology and the engagement of a range of discipline
experts.
8.7.3 The Need for a Decision Audit Trail
A systematic methodology appears to be more efficacious than an expert-led approach when a
decision audit trail is required to provide comprehensive evidence of the systematic processes
performed in the programme and that the data acquired may be used to justify the APIM
selected.
Our data in Corporation X’s 2FA Project suggests that there were benefits in producing a
decision audit trail which could be used to demonstrate to internal decision authorities and to
external parties, e.g. regulatory authorities, the systematic processes that were performed in
order to justify Corporation X’s selection. Our data shows, however, that additional effort is
required to use a systematic methodology.
The main benefit of using a systematic methodology appears to be that it engenders confi-
dence in the final decision because of the structure and the rigour enforced by the approach.
The methodology ensured that assumptions were challenged by the DoR and that a compre-
hensive range of factors were evaluated, even if the impact of some of those factors on the
final decision was negligible.
We did not identify the presence of a decision audit trail in our data sets from our two retro-
spective case studies. Additionally, we found in the data of both retrospective case studies
that many assumptions were unresolved despite the acknowledged risks to deliverables in
the respective programmes.
8.7.4 Stakeholder Consultation Impact
The ASMSA Methodology, incorporating the MSP technique, appeared in the Corporation
X 2FA Case Study to have had little impact upon resolving users’ concerns relating to the
selection of the APIM. Despite the DoR consulting with insurance agents’ representatives,
through several interviews, the 2FA solution chosen was not acceptable to these users because
it added additional tasks to Corporation X’s sales processes.
Our data does not fully support the supposition that proficient stakeholder consultation
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processes necessarily result in the optimal APIM being selected by a programme. We
assumed that an MSP technique would enable Corporation X to select a 2FA solution which
would resolve of users’ objectives. We identified data in the Corporation X 2FA Project
Case Study that issues surrounding usability deficiencies and data privacy protection issues
were not addressed adequately by the project. Our data suggests that users were seeking
transparent authentication utilising techniques, as described in Clarke’s survey [54], and the
project did not appreciate this factor adequately. Corporation X dismissed the supplier’s
proposal for a keystroke dynamics 2FA solution on the grounds that the technology was
immature and that Corporation X would be dependent upon the product specialists for its
maintenance.
We found in our eID Card Case Study that insufficient effort was afforded to consultation by
the programme with citizens and commercial organisations that could potentially use the eID
card for authenticating citizens in respect of their on-line services. While some stakeholder
groups erected technical or privacy obstacles, as perceived by our interviewees, the exclusion
of stakeholder representatives from specific industries was, according to Interviewee S, “a
misguided strategy” because that industry sector had the potential to supply services that
would be beneficial to citizens. Interviewee F concluded that “proper consultation with
stakeholders and the resolution of citizens’ requirements and privacy issues play an important
role in respect of the acceptance of on-line services, whether provided by government or by
the commercial sector”.
We found similar consultation deficiencies in the eGates Case Study where the programme
did not consult with the border control police officers or their union representatives. The
outcome of that strategy was that border control police officers did not always supervise the
eGates during their operation, which, as a consequence, meant that the eGates were often
closed to passengers.
Our data suggests that the inadequate consultation processes in both programmes were
contributory factors only to the configuration deficiencies of the respective APIMs, which led
to the under-utilisation of the respective APIMs. We were unable to locate data that directly
correlated the cause of the under-utilisation to the lack of consultation with intended user
communities or the acceptability of the proposed APIMs in the respective case studies.
We found in our Corporation X 2FA Project that despite the DoR using the MSP technique to
consult with the various user communities, primarily with the insurance agents, the proposed
2FA deployment was not entirely acceptable to a large majority of the insurance agents.
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From the insurance agents’ perspective the OTAC-SMS solution burdened them with an
additional task, which impacted their sales productivity.
Participative design has the potential to explore mutually convenient solutions; however,
our data in this case study shows that an optimal solution, as far as its acceptability to the
insurance agents was concerned, eluded Corporation X. The MSP consultation processes in
the ASMSA Methodology, however, enabled Corporation X to identify a more suitable 2FA
solution than the original smart card solution mandated by their Group Head Office.
In view of our inconclusive findings, we consider that further research is necessary to
establish the causal effects of using MSPs or similar techniques to engage in consultations
with stakeholders, particularly subjects, and the acceptability of the deployed APIM to the
subject community.
8.8 Our Initial Theory on Methodological Efficacy
From the patterns recognised in our three data sets, as described in the previous section,
we now develop our arguments to support our initial theory on methodological efficacy for
selecting an APIM. Our data sets suggest that a systematic methodology is reasonably effica-
cious for selecting the optimal APIM when there is a need for a comprehensive evaluation;
particularly for application contexts where the surrounding circumstances are ill-structured.
Methodological efficacy assessments can only provide indicative accuracy results on op-
timality because such assessments are restricted, in practice, due to incomplete data sets.
Organisations appear to be reluctant to divulge sensitive data on the reliability and perform-
ance of APIMs. Additionally, until organisations define their specific metrics, to measure
the utility of the deployed APIM, and actually gather the relevant data in order to assess its
optimality for the application context, we believe that research on methodological efficacy is
limited to presenting indicative results and tentative theories.
Therefore, there are limitations on our efforts to develop an initial theory on methodological
efficacy due to:
• the restrictions placed on accessing sensitive data; and
• the absence of relevant data.
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Nevertheless, we identified sufficient patterns in our data sets to enable us to provide some
general trends in respect of methodological efficacy. The limitations of conducting empirical
research, using a systematic methodology, together with the restrictions on the release of
sensitive authentication data by organisations mean that we adopt a cautious stance on
developing theories about methodological efficacy for selecting APIMs.
We conclude from our research, but we do not prove irrefutably, that a systematic method-
ology is reasonably efficacious when the range of circumstances surrounding the application
context dictates that a programme requires to conduct a comprehensive evaluation in order
to select the optimal APIM. The extent of that efficacy, for such comprehensive evaluation,
includes ill-structured circumstances when a programme requires to:
• consider a range of candidate APIMs in order to fulfil stakeholders’ objectives and
requirements;
• place dependence on repeatable systematic processes in order to reduce reliance on
the capabilities of discipline experts; and
• produce a decision audit trail as comprehensive evidence of the processes executed in
the programme in order to justify the APIM selected.
These circumstance exemplars, however, are not exhaustive and additional circumstances
and supplementary explanations may be revealed from further empirical research.
8.9 Summary of Chapter
In this section we describe our conclusions on our efforts to validate our identified factors
using data from this case study which involved the use of the ASMSA Methodology in
Corporation X’s 2FA Project. We also summarise our conclusions on the methodological
efficacy of using our systematic methodology to select the optimal APIM for an application
context.
8.9.1 Efforts to Validate the ASMSA Methodology
We conclude that our factors are relevant to evaluate a real-world application context in order
to select the optimal APIM. We have also initially validated the ASMSA Selection Method
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and ASMSA Evaluation Framework, using data acquired from a real-world application
context. We acknowledge, however, that further empirical research is necessary to refine
our methodology’s components, particularly the terminology of our criteria questions and to
enhance our factor explanations.
We have validated that our factors for evaluation are consistent within the ASMSA Evaluation
Framework and that our criteria questions are sufficiently general, to acquire data from the
application context. We recognise that our identified factors, their descriptive labels, the
criteria questions and the factor explanations would benefit from further refinement using
alternative empirical research methodologies and also in a diversity of application contexts.
Based upon our data acquired and our validation assessments, we consider that our 25
evaluation themes provide a solid foundation upon which to conduct further evaluations in
other real-world application contexts.
Our cross-case analysis of our factor validation assessment results revealed that the avail-
ability of data played a key role in our efforts to validate our factors and to enhance our
criteria questions and factor explanations. We also conclude that we have not reached a
saturation point for identifying all the relevant factors for evaluating APIMs for every type
of application context. We consider, however, that claims that factors for evaluating all
application contexts are complete could be difficult to substantiate.
We regard our efforts in this case study to have initially validated the ASMSA Methodology
and to have corroborated the coherence of its constituent components. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge that the ASMSA Methodology requires further validation through usage in
other application contexts. Further use of the ASMSA Methodology may also assist in
identifying enhancements to augment its methodological efficacy.
8.9.2 Methodological Efficacy
We have ascertained that the extent of the ASMSA Methodology, as a systematic method-
ology, is reasonably efficacious in certain circumstances which surround the application
context.
Data from our three case studies confirmed our supposition that the selection of the optimal
APIM is more than a technological problem. We found that decision-making is problematical
because of stakeholders’ difficulties in articulating the nature of the problem which exist
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in ill-structured situations, the diversity of varying stakeholder views of that problem and
their objectives for the APIM together with the absence of a method to evaluate proposed
solutions objectively. The difficulties in articulating the objectives and requirements for an
APIM in these situations, in turn, impact the decisions on selecting the optimal APIM. The
selection processes need to consider a wide range of factors; however, such decisions are
based upon incomplete data, many assumptions, conflicting stakeholder objectives, poorly
articulated requirements and evolving attitudes towards business processes and users’ views
on identification technologies.
The methodological insights from our initial use of the ASMSA Methodology and the
data acquired enabled us to identify three circumstances for conducting a comprehensive
evaluation. We found that these circumstances had a significant influence on the extent of
our systematic methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal APIM.
We conclude, but we do not prove irrefutably, that an organisation should conduct a compre-
hensive evaluation when the circumstances surrounding the application context necessitates
that its programme needs to:
• establish objectives and requirements for an APIM in order to evaluate a range of
candidate APIMs;
• employ repeatable systematic processes in order to reduce their reliance on the capa-
bilities of discipline experts; and/or
• produce an audit trail of the programme’s method which may be used as evidence to
justify the APIM selected.
Our initial theory is that systematic methodologies, for selecting the optimal APIM, are
reasonably efficacious when the circumstances surrounding the application context are such
that an organisation needs to conduct a comprehensive evaluation.
In the final chapter we summarise our achievements from conducting our empirical inquiries,
describe the limitations of our research and provide our recommendations for future research.
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This final chapter presents a summary of our research achievements, including our justified
contributions to the body of knowledge, and the limitations of our research efforts. We
conclude by recommending avenues for further research.
9.1 Summary of our Research Achievements
We provide a summary of our research achievements resulting from our efforts to address
our research problem and our four research questions. We compare our achievements to the
knowledge in the literature in order to justify the originality of our contributions.
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We designed four research questions in order to address our research problem. Our first
research question was designed to identify and validate a range of factors which need to
be evaluated in order for decision-makers to select the optimal APIM. Our second research
question was designed to establish a means of representing the systematic processes necessary
to acquire data about the application context so that the optimal candidate APIM may be
identified. Our third research question was designed to identify criteria upon which to assess
the efficacy of a methodology to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. The
fourth research question was designed to assess the extent to which a systematic methodology
is efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM, and if so, under which circumstances with
validated reasons, and if not, with corroborated explanations.
From our research efforts to address these four research questions our achievements and
contributions to knowledge are:
• the identification and validation of factors which require evaluation in order to select the
optimal Automated Personal Identification Mechanism (APIM) for a given application
context;
• the development of a systematic methodology, entitled Approach for Selecting the
Most Suitable APIM, designed to select the optimal APIM for a given application
context. We developed the ASMSA Decision Support System (ASMSA-DSS) as a
tool to support the usage of the ASMSA Methodology;
• the identification of criteria to assess the efficacy of a methodology to select the optimal
APIM for a given application context; and, most important to our research problem,
• that a systematic methodology is reasonably efficacious when the range of circum-
stances surrounding the application context dictates that a programme requires to
conduct a comprehensive evaluation in order to select the optimal APIM
In the next four sub-sections, we justify our claim of each achievement against the respective
research question.
9.1.1 Identification and Validation of Factors to Evaluate APIMs
We summarise our efforts to identify and validate factors which should be evaluated in order
to select the optimal APIM for a given application context.
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From our review of the literature we identified that there are many diverse factors which
should be evaluated in order to select the optimal APIM. The factors appear in a diversity of
literature sources with varying perspectives; however, there is an absence of a consolidated
list which incorporates factors from all perspectives.
Through our empirical research, we consolidated and validated 91 percent of the 201 factors
which we found scattered across the literature. Our empirical research also enabled us
to identify a further 26 factors, 15 factors and 21 factors in the data from our eID Card
Programme Case Study, our eGates Programme Case Study and our Corporation X 2FA
Project Case Study, respectively.
We have validated 243 out of 246 identified factors which should be evaluated in order
to select the optimal APIM for a given application context. We have also classified these
identified factors into 25 evaluation themes, as shown in the tables of Appendix F. In
turn, these evaluation themes are incorporated into the ASMSA Evaluation Framework, as
described in Section 5.5, to model the APIM selection problem from the Understanding,
Effectiveness and Efficiency Perspectives.
We found, through the use of ASMSA Methodology in the Corporation X 2FA Project Case
Study, that we were able to validate 99 percent of our identified factors. We acknowledge,
however, in Section 8.4.2.4, that it may be difficult to substantiate claims that the list of
factors for evaluation could ever be complete.
There are several publications [157, 38, 295] which discuss the issues surrounding some of
these factors and their impact upon the selection of APIMs. These publications do not place
these factors within an evaluation framework or model; however, Royer’s contribution [257]
is an exception. Royer lists [257] six high-level factors for quantitative analysis without
providing specific definitions of these factors, how the related concepts are to be interpreted
in the application context, or how the data acquired is analysed by his Decision Support
System (DSS). Our efforts differs from Royer’s contribution [257] because our factors are
supplemented with explanations, contain criteria questions to acquire the relevant subject
data and are classified into 25 evaluation themes, which are integrated into a qualitative
evaluation framework.
A strict interpretation of our research efforts to address our first research question limits
our contribution to the body of knowledge to the identification and validation of 62 new
factors for evaluation. Our efforts, however, also concentrated on the collation of factors in
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the literature and those identified in our empirical inquiry into a consolidated list. In turn
we classified our validated factors into evaluation themes which are placed in an evaluation
framework. Our list of factors may be used by a programme as an aide-me´moire to serve a
reminder that all our factors require evaluation in order to select the optimal APIM.
We justify our claim of making an original contribution to the body of knowledge because a
consolidated list of factors from different perspectives in an evaluation framework did not
previously exist in the body of knowledge.
9.1.2 Development a Systematic Methodology to Select an APIM
We summarise our efforts to ascertain how information pertaining to an application context
can be acquired and evaluated by developing a systematic methodology so as to determine
the optimal APIM.
From our review of the methodological tools in the body of knowledge we identified that
there is a scarcity of systematic methodologies to conduct evaluations in order to select the
optimal APIM. We ascertained that most tools focus on the quantitative evaluation of the
different types of solutions, e.g. biometric identification systems, without giving sufficient
consideration to the characteristics of the typical application contexts in which they are
designed to be deployed.
Ashbourn’s approach [15], with its associated Pentakis software tool, is limited to evaluating
biometric solutions. Royer developed [257] the Enterprise IdM Decision Support System
to focus on the evaluation of identity management systems in enterprises. The main aim
of Royer’s research [257] was to develop a DSS, using mathematical modelling, rather
than creating a methodology. The heuristic approaches in the literature do not include any
methods containing discrete steps and are limited in their scope to evaluating solution types,
e.g. biometrics, or certain application context types, e.g. an enterprise context.
The absence of detailed methods in heuristic approaches in the literature [101, 228, 303] do
not enable the approaches’ processes to be repeated by different evaluators. These approaches
rely on the capabilities of discipline experts and their interpretation to select optimal security
controls for the application context. In contrast, our inquiry involved the development of a
systematic methodology, with a detailed method, capable of repetition, so that the optimal
APIM may be identified, with consistency, for a given application context.
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We designed our second research question so that a systematic methodology could be
considered as a potential approach to acquire information pertaining to a given application
context in order to support the selection of the optimal APIM for that context. Expert-led
and iterative deployment approaches, as we described in our two retrospective case studies
in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively, represent alternative selection methodologies.
In contrast, we specifically designed the ASMSA Selection Method with its discrete steps,
incorporated into three stages, in order for an evaluator to use its processes to acquire data, in
a systematic fashion, for all types of application contexts. Equally, the ASMSA Methodology
is designed to acquire data about all types of solutions so that candidate APIMs may be
evaluated against the stipulated requirements for the APIM. Our methodology pursues a
‘fitness for purpose’ philosophy by encouraging an IS development programme to describe
the requirements for an APIM related to its intended application context. This strategy
then enables an evaluator to assess candidate APIMs’ capabilities to fulfil the stipulated
requirements.
Our criteria questions, as defined in Section 5.2.4 and represented in the tables of Appendix
F, are designed to acquire subject data systematically, using the ASMSA Selection Method,
from primary data sources. These data sources may be assessments in respect of the
application context, e.g. risks assessment, conducted by an IS development programme or
documents produced by external parties, e.g. suppliers’ technical product specifications.
While there may be commercial methodologies in existence, we justify our claim of making
an original contribution to the body of knowledge because these methodologies have not been
published, as far as we can ascertain, to enable scientific review. We specifically developed
the ASMSA Methodology to address the absence in the body of knowledge of a systematic
methodology to select an APIM.
We developed the ASMSA-DSS as a by-product of our research efforts to meet our need to
represent the ASMSA Methodology’s processes and to manage the large volumes of data
acquired from our empirical research. We did not, however, originally set out to develop a
Decision Support System tool.
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9.1.3 Creation of Criteria to Assess a Methodology’s Efficacy
We summarise our efforts to establish how the efficacy of a methodology to select an APIM
can itself be assessed. We identified and developed criteria in order to assess the efficacy of
methodologies to select the optimal APIM for a given context.
We attempted to assess the efficacy of the approaches which were used in each of our
two retrospective case studies using our efficacy criteria. We identified proficiencies and
deficiencies of each approach; however, we encountered unexpected problems surrounding
the absence of relevant data in order to perform an assessment of the approaches’ selection
accuracy.
In our efforts to assess the accuracy of the methodologies used in all of our case studies,
we found that none of the organisations defined metrics in order to evaluate the utility of a
deployed APIM. Additionally, we found that organisations have difficulty in determining
‘ground truth’ relating to accuracy of APIMs’ decisions to identify or authenticate genuine
subjects. Therefore, we were not able to assess these methodologies’ accuracy in their
selection of the optimal APIM in any of our three case studies due to the absence of relevant
data.
In our Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study we found that organisations utilised readily
available data from system logs and also conducted specific tests, e.g. password quality
checks. The Director of Risks (DoR) acknowledged, however, that the measurement of the
utility of security controls in Corporation X needed to be improved generally. The data (and
absence of data) from our empirical inquiry provides further evidence to support Jaquith’s
claims [164] that organisations are relying upon incomplete data in order to determine the
utility of their security controls.
Therefore, the accuracy of a methodology to select the optimal APIM for a given application
context is difficult to assess, in practice, until such times as organisations define their
utility metrics and the data needed to conduct an accuracy assessment are acquired from
the application context. We have created, however, an accuracy criterion for conducting
methodological comparisons, which is defined in Section 8.1.3.
From our research efforts, we conclude that an assessment of a methodology’s efficacy should
be based upon the following six criteria, which are defined in Section 8.1:
370
9.1 Summary of our Research Achievements
1. the methodology’s execution effort;
2. the size (dimensionality and proportionality) of the application context’s problem;
3. the accuracy of methodology’s selection;
4. the methodology’s simplicity;
5. the extent to which the methodology is executable as a computer program; and
6. the capability of the methodology to address real-world problems.
Our third research question was framed so as to address the identified gap in the body of
knowledge to determine the efficacy of a methodology or approach to select the optimal
APIM. We justify our claim of making an original contribution to the body of knowledge
in that we have identified and developed criteria, to be employed within an assessment
framework as detailed in Section 8.1.7, to assess the efficacy of a methodology to select the
optimal APIM for a given application context.
9.1.4 When to Use a Systematic Methodology for Selecting an APIM
We summarise our efforts to determine when a systematic methodology may be efficacious
for selecting an APIM.
We framed our research problem so as to determine the extent to which a systematic method-
ology, as a tool, may be efficacious for selecting an APIM rather than simply determining its
viability alone. Our research strategy was based upon our supposition that such a systematic
methodology would be efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM for some application
contexts but not conducive for every application context.
Our inquiry into the extent of the systematic methodology’s efficacy aimed at identifying
those circumstances surrounding an application context which favour the use of such an
approach. From the identification of these circumstances we would then be able to explain
the extent of its efficacy and develop initial theories regarding the usage of systematic
methodologies in different types of application context.
We conclude that a systematic methodology may be reasonably efficacious when the char-
acteristics of the application context are such that an organisation needs to conduct a
comprehensive evaluation in order to select the optimal APIM.
371
9.1 Summary of our Research Achievements
Our conclusion is based upon our assessment using our efficacy criteria and the data ac-
quired from the initial use of the ASMSA Methodology and also data acquired from two
retrospective case studies.
Our initial theory on methodological efficacy is founded upon three explanations as a
result of our data analysis. We found that an organisation should conduct a comprehensive
evaluation when the circumstances surrounding the application context necessitates that its
IS programme needs to:
• establish objectives and requirements for an APIM in order to evaluate a range of
candidate APIMs;
• employ repeatable systematic processes in order to reduce reliance on the capabilities
of discipline experts; and/or
• produce an audit trail of the programme’s activities which may be used as evidence to
justify the APIM selected.
We believe, however, that further research will reveal additional explanations. We also
established in our Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study that the use of our systematic
methodology appears to engender confidence in the final decision because of the structure
and the rigour enforced by a systematic methodology with its well-defined processes.
In contrast, from our cross-case analysis of our data sets from our two retrospective case
studies, we ascertained that an expert-led approach is efficacious when the characteristics of
the situation, classified as a federated governance framework type, are such that:
• a programme determines that there is an obvious optimal APIM for the application
context and there is no need to establish stakeholders’ objectives and requirements for
the APIM or consider alternative solutions; and
• a programme’s decision-making on deploying an APIM relies solely on the capabilities
of discipline experts and their recommendations.
Additionally, we ascertained that an iterative development approach is efficacious when the
characteristics of the situation, classified as an heterogeneous framework type, are such that:
• there are demands on a programme to introduce an APIM rapidly; and
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• the objectives and requirements for an APIM have not been articulated by the pro-
gramme.
We conclude that a systematic methodology may not be efficacious when the characteristics
of the situation, irrespective of governance framework type, are such that an organisation
does not need to carry out a comprehensive evaluation because there is an apparent obvious
optimal APIM. Therefore, there appears to be no valid reason for organisations to establish
stakeholders’ objectives and requirements in order to evaluate a range of candidate APIMs.
Additionally, our data suggests that a programme which requires a flexible and rapid approach
to decision-making on an APIM, relying on the capabilities of discipline experts rather than
repeatable methodological processes, should not utilise a systematic methodology.
We found, however, that the methodological deficiencies identified in the data of our two
retrospective case studies do not support Siponen’s argument [266] that InfoSec tools for
selecting APIMs should be rigorously developed in alignment with practices. Our retrospec-
tive case study data suggests that while expert-led and iterative deployment approaches offer
flexibility to a programme, the practices and processes pursued by discipline experts were
not documented and, thus, would be difficult to repeat. The methodological deficiencies
identified in our two retrospective case studies also suggest that a systematic methodology
may enhance the efficacy of current approaches by introducing structure into the approaches’
processes.
We conclude, however, that a comprehensive evaluation, utilising a systematic methodology,
which produces documented stakeholders’ objectives and requirements for an APIM assists
efforts to ascertain whether an APIM is optimal for its application context. Conversely, the
absence of stakeholders’ objectives and requirements for an APIM hampers such assessments
because there is an absence of defined utility metrics upon which to conduct an evaluation of
a deployed APIM.
We regard our claim of making an original contribution to the body of knowledge with a
fair degree of scepticism. Nevertheless, we believe that while our contributions in regard to
this specific research question are modest, they do represent an initial venture towards the
understanding of a complex phenomenon. We adopt a cautious stance in respect of creating
an initial theory on the extent of a systematic methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal
APIM for an application context due to the boundaries on our research efforts. Moreover, the
limitations of our results from the single use of the ASMSA Methodology and our incomplete
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efficacy assessment places constraints on the creation of our initial theory.
Therefore, our conclusions and our tentative theory are formulated cognisant of the limitations
of our empirical research, the efficacy of the ASMSA Methodology, and the data acquired
from our three case studies.
9.2 Limitations of our Research Efforts
While we have addressed our research problem by investigating the extent of a systematic
methodology’s efficacy to select the optimal APIM for a given application context, there are
limitations of our research efforts which impact our results and conclusions. The limitations
identified relate to the access to sensitive data, the absence of relevant data, the incomplete
usage of the ASMSA Methodology in the Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study, our case
study sampling strategy, the influence of the problem-solver variable, and the restrictions of
the case study research methodology.
Although we have established an initial theory on the efficacy of a systematic methodology,
we conclude that it would be unwise to make any claims of generalisability due to the
limitations of our research efforts.
9.2.1 Access to Sensitive Data
Organisational control on the release of sensitive data was a major consideration in the
selection of our three case studies. These control restrictions became ever more apparent
during the progress of our research, particularly the importance on acquiring data regarding
the reliability and usability of deployed APIMs.
The availability of data from the three case studies played a significant part in our efforts
to validate our identified factors for evaluating APIMs and also to assess the optimality of
the deployed APIM. We recognised that it was necessary to gain an understanding of the
application context, which would not only influence data gathered from using the systematic
methodology but, most importantly, affect the observed outcomes.
The data acquired from the two retrospective case studies were used to validate factors
located in the literature and, most importantly, to identify the proficiencies and deficiencies
of current approaches. These two cases did not provide an opportunity to use our systematic
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methodology as an intervention mechanism, mainly because the selection of the respective
APIMs had already been made by stakeholders. These case studies were beneficial in ac-
quiring data on approaches pursued by programmes and the identification of methodological
proficiencies and deficiencies by discipline expert practitioners.
Our strategy to ascertain that a factor was evaluated, e.g. budget, without the need to obtain
the exact amount assisted our efforts to validate our factors. There may be other strategies
which may acquire adequate data for research purposes; however, organisations may be
reluctant to reveal sensitive information about the severity and costs associated with security
breaches caused by a malfunctioning or compromised APIM.
Overcoming the barriers relating to organisations’ sensitivity in releasing data in respect of
the vulnerabilities and issues surrounding a deployed APIMs is crucial to ascertain whether
the selected APIM is indeed optimal for a given application context.
9.2.2 Absence of Relevant Data
Crucially, we found that organisations do not use metrics upon which to conduct an assess-
ment of the utility of a deployed APIM. Equally, in the absence of defined utility metrics
organisations do not generate relevant data for assessment purposes.
Organisations in our case studies appeared to analyse data that is readily available rather than
collect the relevant data in order to assess it against predefined utility assessment criteria.
Consequently, our methodological efficacy assessment was incomplete because we were
unable to gather the relevant data for these application contexts in order to determine the
accuracy of the respective approaches to determine the optimal APIM.
In the absence of the relevant data in the Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study, as discussed
in Section 8.6.3, our assessment of our systematic methodology’s efficacy, in terms of its
accuracy to select the optimal APIM, was incomplete. Similarly, we were unable to complete
an assessment of the approaches pursued by the programmes in our two retrospective case
studies due to the absence of stipulated utility metrics and also the absence of relevant
data. We acknowledge, therefore, that further research is necessary to assess the efficacy,
particularly the accuracy, of a systematic methodology (and of other approaches) on the basis
that the relevant data on the deployed APIM can be acquired from the application context.
Irrespective of the methodology pursued, our research highlights the need for organisations to
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introduce policies to define their utility metrics for deployed APIMs and to acquire relevant
data in order to ascertain whether the deployed APIM is optimal. Current practices are
limited in the extent to which organisations can conduct such evaluations due to incomplete
data sets.
We have incorporated effectiveness and efficiency factors, together with relevant criteria
questions into the ASMSA Methodology to assist stakeholders to define pertinent utility
metrics for their application context. We have also produced a criterion to measure a
methodology’s accuracy in determining the optimal APIM.
We conclude that the absence of defined utility metrics and the relevant data generated from
the use of APIMs in practice makes empirical research to understand the efficacy of different
methodologies problematic.
9.2.3 Incomplete Usage of the ASMSA Methodology
The initial use of the ASMSA Methodology with the Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study
enabled us to identify some of the circumstances in which a systematic methodology appears
to be efficacious.
Our conclusions regarding methodological efficacy can only be cautious because the Cor-
poration X 2FA Project did not use the ASMSA Methodology in its entirety. We did not
foresee the changes of project responsibility in Corporation X, which had an impact on the
use of the ASMSA Methodology in this case study. We were, however, ever conscious of
the risks of conducting such empirical research, cognisant of Silverman’s warnings [265] of
employing a participative research methodology.
We believe that the complete use of our ASMSA Methodology in a real-world situation
should provide further understandings on the efficacy of systematic methodologies to select
the optimal APIM for a given application context.
9.2.4 Case Study Theoretical Sampling Strategy
We conclude from our research, but we do not prove irrefutably, that a systematic method-
ology is reasonably efficacious for selecting the optimal APIM, when applied to the APIM
enterprise governance framework type, as defined in Section 2.4.4. Our conclusions on
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methodological efficacy and initial theory may, however, not apply to all types of application
contexts.
We designated the Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study as an APIM enterprise governance
framework type. While we selected other case studies which were classified as federated and
heterogeneous governance framework types in line with our case study sampling strategy
stated in Section 4.1.9.1, our results show that our case study theoretical sampling strategy
was defective.
Our theoretical case study sampling strategy, based upon governance framework types,
appeared to have had a negligible impact on our methodological efficacy findings. From our
research efforts we consider that a future case study theoretical sampling strategy should be
based upon the characteristics surrounding the application context.
We conclude that further research is required using our ASMSA Methodology to establish the
extent of its efficacy when the characteristics of the application context are considered to be
well-structured or ill-structured situations. We believe that this sampling strategy may yield
the relevant data to further develop the generalisation of our initial theory on methodological
efficacy.
From using our systematic methodology, in these differing situations, the inquiry should
aim not only to identify the circumstances when the methodology is efficacious but also
explanations to support claims of efficacy.
9.2.5 Impact of the Problem-Solver Variable
While we have begun to address our methodological efficacy research problem we concede
that discipline experts’ skills and knowledge and their practices may influence the use of a
methodology.
Jayaratna’s NIMSAD framework, shown in Figure 8.1 on page 319, identifies the problem
situation, the problem solving process and the intended problem-solver as the three main
variables for assessing a methodology. Our research concentrated upon the efficacy of the
systematic methodology as our main unit of analysis; however, we acknowledge that the
effects of the problem-solver variable should not be ignored.
The knowledge, skills and competencies of the discipline experts and the extent to which
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their assessments influenced the selection of the APIM, irrespective of approach pursued, was
a recurring issue encountered throughout our research. Fle´chais et al. recognises [102] the
importance of the facilitator’s knowledge when utilising AEGIS approach and the training
required to use that methodological tool. As we recognised in Section 8.7.2, there may be
advantages in amalgamating the skills and knowledge of identity management specialists
and channelling those capabilities into formalised systematic processes.
We ascertained in our Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study that a discipline expert prac-
titioner is required to use the ASMSA Methodology because it relies upon the skills and
capabilities of discipline experts to interpret the criteria questions against the acquired subject
data from the application context. The results from our single use of the ASMSA Method-
ology, in the Corporation X 2FA Project Case Study, provides preliminary evidence on the
nature of problem-solver’s skills and capabilities required to use our systematic methodology.
We found from our analysis of data from our two retrospective case studies that discipline
expert-led approaches possess methodological deficiencies. Our retrospective case study
data, however, suggests that discipline experts may benefit from improving their practices by
using tools to manage the large volumes of acquired data during a programme. These tools
would assist them in evaluating complex interrelated factors in order to select the optimal
APIM.
We conclude that further research is needed to understand discipline experts’ skills and
their practices and how, as a problem-solver, they may influence the efficacy of a systematic
methodology.
9.2.6 Boundaries of the Case Study Research Methodology
This section discusses the issues encountered during our use of the case study research
methodology and identifies the restrictions imposed on our efforts to address our research
problem.
We defend our choice of the case study research methodology despite the difficulties encoun-
tered in obtaining formal consent from organisations and commitment from individuals in
the first instance to participate in our research. Introducing the criterion that the cases were
to be of similar mechanism type, e.g. facial biometric system, would have restricted our case
study options and would have contradicted our theoretical sampling strategy of researching
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cases from each of the governance framework types, as defined in Section 2.4.4.
Investigating the same type of problem, in different case studies, may enhance cross-case
analysis by removing the variables associated with the application context type. Conversely,
investigating different automated identification problems may ensure the acquisition of a rich
data set because of the diversity offered by each case study.
From our research efforts we discovered that it is imperative to gain consent to access
sensitive data otherwise partial data sets may impede research efforts to understand the
efficacy of different approaches to select an APIM. Equally, the relevant data needs to be
generated by organisations in order to assess the utility of a deployed APIM.
We recommend that further empirical research involving the use of our ASMSA Methodology
should not use the case study research methodology. We believe that the action research
methodology is appropriate to acquire relevant data relating to methodological efficacy. The
risks of using action research methodology, however, warrants the formulation of contingency
arrangements to minimise deleterious impacts upon the research implementation plan should
unexpected events occur or the objectives of the research become blurred to the researcher or
organisation.
We also recommend, from our research experiences, that it is vital to consider the issues
surrounding empirical inquiry thoroughly and design the research protocols meticulously,
given the importance of gaining access to sensitive data.
9.3 Recommendations for Further Research
Following our conclusions and identified limitations, we now provide three main recom-
mendations on further research avenues to improve the understanding of the efficacy of
methodologies to select the optimal APIM for a given application context.
9.3.1 Recommended Minimum List of Factors
From our efforts to identify and validate the factors for evaluating an APIM we believe that
future research should focus on establishing a recommended minimum list of factors for
evaluating APIMs.
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Our results from using the ASMSA Methodology in a single application context suggests
that there is a need for further empirical research to identify other pertinent factors in order
to establish such a recommended minimum list. Also, as we proposed in Section 7.3.3 and
Section 8.4.2.4, that future inquiry should use the action research methodology so that the
researcher, from their direct participation, may gain insights into the complexity of an IS
programme with its underlying stakeholder’s motivations, its discipline experts’ practices
and its methods used to select the optimal APIM.
We believe that research effort to establish a recommended minimum list of factors for
evaluating APIMs would be a reasonable and worthy theoretical aim which could also be
beneficial to organisations by informing practice and policy.
9.3.2 Enhancement of ASMSA Methodology
We conclude, based the results of the inaugural use of the ASMSA Methodology, that
our methodology needs to be enhanced and that the ASMSA Decision Support System
(ASMSA-DSS) requires refinement.
We acknowledge that some of our criteria questions, factor labels and factor explanations
need enhancement based upon the results of their use in the Corporation X Case Study.
Firstly, we need to generalise the phrasing of several criteria questions so as to make them
relevant to all types of application context. Secondly, we need to improve the clarity of
each criterion question to enable the methodology user to acquire the relevant data. Thirdly,
although we did not originally plan to create an explanation for each factor, we consider that
many factors’ explanations should be more precise. The aim of this last improvement is to
clarify why the factor should be evaluated in order to acquire the relevant subject data, from
the application context’s primary data, in order to answer the associated criterion question.
We believe that the ASMSA Methodology provides a reasonable methodological foundation
upon which to conduct evaluations in the real-world which could generate relevant data
to assist with the refinement of our methodology. Similarly, we believe that use of the
ASMSA-DSS, as a tool, could assist organisations with the selection of an APIM for an
application context in the real-world. We also believe that the use of the ASMSA-DSS by
other discipline expert practitioners in ill-structured situations may generate relevant data to
enable us to refine the functionality, and the usability, of our decision support tool.
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9.3.3 Efficacy of Alternative Methodologies
We believe that in the future some of the commercial methodologies to select APIMs may
become publicly available and other methodologies on selecting APIM may be published
enabling them to be scientifically reviewed.
We believe that further research should concentrate on the development of other APIM
selection methodologies so that theoretical comparisons on methodological efficacy may be
conducted. We recognise the need to use the ASMSA Methodology in alternative application
contexts in order to develop our initial theory on a systematic methodology’s efficacy. We
believe, however, that the use of another approach used in parallel in the same investigation is
unlikely to be acceptable to an organisation and such a research strategy may be impractical.
As we assumed in Section 1.6, that there are impracticalities of comparing two methodolo-
gies simultaneously in the real-world. Alternative empirical research designs need to be
considered sagaciously in order to gain further understandings regarding methodological
efficacy. The opportunities, however, to investigate methodological efficacy in the real-world
may be limited. We conclude, therefore, that theoretical comparisons of methodological
efficacy have the potential to contribute further understanding to the body of knowledge.
Innovations in identification technologies continue unabated, ever widening the diversity of
identification systems and authentication systems and their configurations. In the meantime,
we anticipate that the scrutiny of current approaches will intensify as governments, businesses
and societies increasingly depend on effective and efficient systems for the automated
identification of persons.
We have established a systematic methodology and we believe that comparable methodolo-
gies will be developed in order to assist organisations’ discipline experts with the complexities
of evaluating and selecting APIMs. We believe that it is essential to further understanding of
the extent of these methodologies’ efficacy and the circumstances which favour their usage.
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Appendix A – Evaluation Themes and
Factors Identified (Stage A)
This appendix contains 18 evaluation theme tables relating to the factors for evaluating an
APIM, which we identified from our review of the literature, as at Stage A of our factor
evaluation effort, representing Step 3 of our Research Implementation Plan.
We assign an identifier to a factor, e.g. A.1.1. (denoting stage created, evaluation theme
and factor reference number) to enable each factor and its criterion question to be tracked
through each subsequent validation.
The tables in this appendix contain the following evaluation themes: The tables in this
appendix contain the following evaluation themes:
Table A.1 Strategic Issues Evaluation Theme;
Table A.2 Risks Assessment Evaluation Theme;
Table A.3 Social Acceptability Evaluation Theme;
Table A.4 Risks Controls Evaluation Theme;
Table A.5 Business Case Evaluation Theme;
Table A.6 Functionality Evaluation Theme;
Table A.7 Community and Usability Evaluation Theme;
Table A.8 Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme;
Table A.9 Credential Registration Evaluation Theme;
Table A.10 Controls’ Performance Evaluation Theme;
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Table A.11 Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table A.12 Security Architecture Evaluation Theme;
Table A.13 Identifier Credential Evaluation Theme;
Table A.14 Reliability Testing Evaluation Theme;
Table A.15 Usability Testing Evaluation Theme;
Table A.16 Technology Evaluation Theme;
Table A.17 User Accessibility Evaluation Theme; and
Table A.18 Owners’ Costs Evaluation Theme Evaluation Theme.
Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Security What are the business objectives of the system owner entity in [252]
Rationale respect of the considered need to protect assets or instigate a change (A.1.1.)
in protection? Is this aim to review the security of assets the result
of a risk assessment or the impact from a major security incident
leading to the formation of a change programme for the APIM?
Security Will the APIM be used to protect data and/or assets belonging to [118]
Benefits one or many entities? What are the types of entities, e.g. corporate (A.1.2.)
or government, involved with the application context? Has
consultation with entities been made with reference to a state
or corporate policy for the appropriate security assurance?
Costs What are the system owner’s estimated programme costs for the APIM? [238]
Forecasted Have these forecasts been based upon similar protection needs over a (A.1.3.)
specified period? Do estimated costs draw on information from similar
implementations, from initial system designs, from vendors’ estimates
or from suppliers’ tender submissions?
Political What political or economic matters may hinder or support organisational [252]
Considerations change? How does this impact upon the APIM selection? (A.1.4.)
Corporate What commercial or competitive or organisational issues could hinder or [118]
Dynamics support the entity’s change programme (fraud, industry regulation (A.1.5.)
alignment, staff privacy, data access etc.)? How do these issues affect
entities, e.g. profitability?
Regulatory What legislation will affect the data that the entity may store for the [56]
Constraints intended user population, e.g. Data Protection Acts, Privacy Laws? (A.1.6.)
Legal What legal issues could hinder or support a change programme (privacy, [56]
Imperatives data access etc.) to deploy an APIM? (A.1.7)
Expert Has the entity’s application been discussed with knowledgeable and [295]
Opinion independent members of respected information security professional (A.1.8.)
groups?
Table A.1: Strategic Issues Evaluation Theme
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Attack and What is the likelihood of a compromise event occurring? Does this [171]
Compromise projection incorporate an analysis of historical attacks and changes in (A.2.1.)
Probability threat intelligence?
Impact What is the estimated impact value or severity score on the assets being [171]
Value protected if stolen or destroyed or modified? Does this estimate include (A.2.2.)
Rating losses, administrative costs as a result of a compromise and the indirect
financial consequences of the entity’s reputation being adversely affected?
Vulnerabilities What are the known exploitable weaknesses in existing (or potentially in [247]
new) operations or APIMs that protect assets including technology, people (A.2.3.)
and process controls and their integration?
Assurance What evidence is required to demonstrate the APIM’s ability to meet the [247]
Effectiveness security assurance requirements set? (A.2.4.)
Environment Where will the APIM operate? Will it be in public spaces, physically [295]
Characteristics controlled environments, restricted networks or open networks? What are (A.2.5.)
the physical conditions, devices, artefacts or other intelligent processing
resources available? Does this description also include physical and social
measures or conditions that limit or restrict access to information
resources?
Operational What are the operational circumstances where the user is engaged with the [95]
Context APIM to perform tasks to access an asset and/or service? Who are the (A.2.6.)
parties involved and what role do they perform with respect to the
transactions or access to the asset? For the APIM’s owner will the parties
involved be employees (private), business partners/customers
(commercially confidential), state citizens (private) or a combination
of these entities in a heterogeneous application?
Threat What are the underlying stimuli or goals that may lead to attacks to [95]
Motivation compromise the APIM? Do these motives include financial fraud, (A.2.7.)
corporate espionage, intellectual challenge, error, state espionage
or terrorism?
Risks How does the organisation want to address the risks identified to provide [171]
Mitigation access or entitlement to the intended user population? Do the options for (A.2.8.)
risk mitigation include risk alleviation, e.g. by introducing or revising
controls; risk transference, e.g. by taking out insurance against potential
losses; risk avoidance, e.g. by terminating, user access or limiting
some of the functionality; risk assumption, e.g. by performing due
diligence in formally accepting the risks and monitoring the exposure or
impact levels? Do the organisation’s operating rules mandate an agreed
approach to Risk Management within a cyclical framework to evaluate
assets and their protection periodically?
Table A.2: Risks Assessment Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
User What is the relationship of the user to the APIM’s owner, e.g. service [1]
Population provider, employer etc and any intermediaries e.g. infrastructure (A.3.1.)
Relationship provider?
User Will potential users be required to provide their consent or acceptance to [1]
Obligations responsibilities or liabilities? To what extent do these obligations (A.3.2.)
negate the benefits of the customer proposition for potential users?
Social What is the attitude of the intended user communities towards APIMs [295]
Attitudes that address similar business or social problems? What are the (A.3.3.)
social problems with these existing APIMs? To what degree does the
existing method or intended way of identifying users cause difficulties?
Do these issues include user perceptions which may restrict the use
of an APIM to capturing biometric data that may be private and
believed to be intrusive? Would an APIM be, or be perceived as,
endangering health, safety or welfare (including Inclusivity) of the user?
Has consideration been given to the following issues which may
influence the options for an APIM: user privacy concerns; user/public
perception of intrusiveness; target population characteristics including
physiological, cognitive and behavioural traits; and user difficulties, e.g.
disabilities in capturing specific types of biometric data or use of devices
or artefacts?
Community Will the system and APIM be openly available to all parties? Are there [295]
Membership membership restrictions or conditions for the intended user community? (A.3.4.)
Users’ To what extent will the user community firmly believe in the competency [250]
Trust of the APIM’s system owner to act dependably, securely and reliably (A.3.5.)
within the specified operational context?
Users’ What are the potential costs and/or effort for each party involved in their [250]
Costs use of the APIM that includes hardware and software, its compatibility (A.3.6.)
with the user’s processes and the need for supporting infrastructure?
Table A.3: Social Acceptability Evaluation Theme
Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Policy What is the method chosen to achieve the entity’s change programme’s [300]
Implementation objectives? Does the policy include the minimising of risks (A.4.1.)
by introducing or revising controls given the operation context and
strategic considerations?
Risks What are the entity’s (and possibly user) risks that are to be [171]
controlled (potentially minimised) by the APIM? (A.4.2.)
Budget What funds have been allocated by the organisation to minimise [300]
unacceptable risks? Do the aims include countermeasures to reduce (A.4.3.)
direct financial losses and associated administrative costs as a result of a
personal identification mechanism compromise, if sole or main
control mechanism?
Security What are the aims of the intended courses of action to protect [300]
Policy information assets and resources ? Does this protection or change in (A.4.4.)
protection fulfil a stated business target or goal?
Privacy What are the aims of the intended courses of action to protect user’s [300]
Policy private data? Does the protection or change in protection of a user’s (A.4.5.)
personal information fulfil a stated goal?
Table A.4: Risks Controls Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Business Is the personal identification problem fully understood and defined in [295]
Problem terms of requirements and not solutions? To what degree are the (A.5.1.)
existing mechanisms actually effective?
Business Case Is the requirements analysis supported with a business case and [295]
Sponsorship justification for expenditure? (A.5.2.)
Requirements How will the requirements for the APIM be established? Will this [103]
Gathering process involve prototyping or will they be established through formal (A.5.3.)
Methodology requirements capturing procedures? Is the choice governed by the
organisation’s preferred system development methodology or restricted
by tendering processes? How will the users be involved in stating their
requirements (if at all)?
Constraints What external or internal organisational issues (employee rights, privacy, [295]
etc.) could hinder a change programme or project’s efforts to introduce (A.5.4.)
or revise an APIM?
Standards What standards impact the choice of an APIM, its use and or processes? [238]
Which information Security controls for user authentication, the use of (A.5.5.)
cryptography or biometrics are required to be complied with?
Signal Will there be a need to exchange user signal data between other [98]
Data organisations with similar mechanisms utilising the same user signal data (A.5.6.)
Exchange or human characteristic? Do interoperability specifications exist?
External Have there been any performance or security tests or evaluations of [295]
Performance biometric or authentication mechanisms similar to the intended (A.5.7.)
Benchmarks application context and business problem? What are the learning
outcomes?
Table A.5: Business Case Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Positive or Will the APIM be used for positive identification (proving a person is [295]
Negative already enrolled) or negative identification (proving a person is not (A.6.1.)
Identification enrolled) or a consolidation of both to meet one or more
requirements?
Overt or Does the requirement entail the user being aware of the APIM? [295]
Covert What legal issues and technical consideration apply if the (A.6.2.)
Identification requirement is for a covert APIM?
Credential How will the enrolled user be uniquely recognised? Will the user [247]
Identifier require anonymity? Is there a need for pseudonymity, where the (A.6.3.)
identifier masks the user’s true identity?
Alternatives Has there been an investigation into the alternatives to the biometric or [295]
Investigated user authentication mechanisms to address the identification problem? (A.6.4.)
Fundamentally, are biometrics really needed or desirable?
Multiple If both positive and negative identification are required, is there a [247]
User requirement to use same authentication or identification data, or (A.6.5.)
Input is there potential for the combining of two or more separate user
Signals input signals, e.g. fingerprint and voice, face and voice, personal
identification number, digital certificates and passwords etc?
Task Is the APIM to operate as a sub-process for the user as part of an [103]
Dynamics overall task, e.g. cash machine transaction, or does it constitute the (A.6.6.)
entire task, e.g. inspecting an ePassport? Where is the position of the
identification process within the interaction to fulfil a user’s task?
User Is the user’s interaction with the biometric device or other input device [295]
Supervision watched by authorised personnel or is it self-service and unobserved? (A.6.7.)
Environmental To what degree does the operating environments, including remote sites, [65]
Control enable the APIM’s owners (and user population) to control the (A.6.8.)
technology processes and, where relevant, to monitor user behaviour?
Compromise What types of deceptive user scenarios can be foreseen? [63]
Scenarios (A.6.9.)
Table A.6: Functionality Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
User What is known about the user population and the entities that operate [295]
Attitude the APIM? Has the user population been surveyed to determine their (A.7.1.)
attitude towards using a biometric or authentication mechanism? Does
a strong negative response indicate a need to reformulate plans
or possibly the instigation of a proactive education programme?
User Is the user population likely to resist educational material supplied to [295]
Population assist in the introduction of a new or revised APIM? Has consideration (A.7.2.)
Education been given to educating the users to allay their doubts/fears
about utilizing a specific authentication or biometric mechanism?
Multiplicity What are the number and similarity in operation to other APIMs used [8]
Impact by the intended user population, i.e. multiple credentials (e.g. User (A.7.3.)
Accounts and passwords)? Does the APIM require differentiation
from other similar APIMs to avoid possible user confusion?
Population Does the majority of the target user population have characteristics [295]
Traits that could pose disadvantages or advantages for the possible APIM (A.7.4.)
design options being considered? What is the particular mix of users
with respect to impact upon the success of any APIM, in terms of:
population demographics–age, ethnic origin, gender, occupation;
user physiology–facial hair, disabilities, height, iris colour, skin tone;
user behaviour–dialect accent, expression, intonation, facial
expressions, written language, movement pose, prior activity, stress,
tension or mood; and user appearance–bandages, clothing, contact
lenses, cosmetics, glasses, hairstyle, hair-colour, rings and tattoos?
Task What is the position of the APIM function within the user’s task to [329]
Sequence achieve the desired goal? What impact could the potential APIM have (A.7.5.)
upon the user in achieving the overall task including speed and
accuracy? What outcomes need to be avoided from poor HCI design?
User Technical To what extent would the user population have the capacity [327]
Expertise to acquire specific skills, if required? (A.7.6.)
Frequency Will the expected usage frequency or patterns of APIM usage lead to [295]
of Use users becoming habituated or remaining non-habituated? (A.7.7.)
Trust Does trust between the APIM’s owner or organisation and the various [1]
Between supporting parties exist and could that lead (potentially) to a degree of (A.7.8.)
Subjects reliance for users to operate the APIM as intended?
Impact What are the likely consequences to the user if the APIM failed to [1]
Upon detect unauthorised access relating to a specific user or if failed to (A.7.9.)
Users verify or identify an authorised user?
Security What incentives could be employed to encourage appropriate use of [250]
Motivation of the APIM? What are the possible disadvantages or liabilities that (A.7.10.)
Authorised Users would apply if authorised users were found or proven to be negligent?
User Is it correct to assume that authorised users will cooperate fully? [295]
Cooperation (A.7.11.)
Table A.7: Community and Usability Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Privacy What directives, international conventions, international and local laws [247]
Laws and regulations are applicable to the private data that could impact (A.8.1.)
and the requirements for an APIM? Is the credential to indicate the
Privacy users name? Are there guidelines on what is considered to be private
Policies data and how it is to be protected?
Privacy Laws Has an individual within the organisation, possibly in its corporate [295]
Compliance governance function, been assigned responsibility to ensure (A.8.2.)
privacy compliance?
Privacy Impact Has an impact assessment been made and documented in respect of the [283]
Assessment privacy issues that may impinge upon the requirements for the APIM? (A.8.3.)
Privacy What processes need to be put into place to write, publish, and maintain [98]
Asset a clear and comprehensive document listing the types of information (A.8.4.)
Register that may be collected, e.g. transactional information, personal data
in an identifiable form? Does the document state the purpose of data
collection, the data that may be disclosed to whom during the life of the
credential, how the information will be protected, and the complete set
of uses of the credential and related information at the department or
agency? Are applicants to be provided full disclosure of the intended uses
of the credential and the related privacy implications?
Privacy Asset What appeals procedures are to be maintained for those applicants [98]
Appeals who are denied a credential or for those authorised users whose (A.8.5.)
Procedure credentials are revoked without explanation?
Privacy What processes are to be in place to ensure that only personnel with a [247]
Asset legitimate need to access the privacy information, used within the (A.8.6.)
Access APIM, are authorised? Does this safeguard include handling disputes
Control relating to personal data stored and data maintained for purposes of
applicant registration and credential issuance?
Privacy What processes are required to be in place to coordinate with approved [247]
Asset entity, authority or agency officials to define consequences for the (A.8.7.)
Compromise APIM or other systems violating privacy policies?
Privacy What assurance is required to show that the technologies used in the [98]
Assurance implementation of the APIM allow for continuous auditing of (A.8.8.)
compliance within stated privacy policies and practices governing
the collection, use, and distribution of private information?
Privacy What are the security controls to be applied to accomplish privacy goals, [98]
Security where applicable? Is the management of the private data under the (A.8.9.)
Controls immediate control of the APIM owner or the individual? What are the
technologies and infrastructures available to support these requirements?
Privacy What assurance is required to show that the technologies and controls [247]
Security used to implement the APIM does not erode privacy protections relating (A.8.10.)
Controls to the use, collection, and disclosure of private data in an identifiable
Erosion form? Does this requirement include the protection against unauthorised
access to users’ private data or credential data stored on artefacts?
Table A.8: Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme
389
Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Identity What organisations have been approved to supply an identifier or [98]
Approval/ credential or provide authorisation against identity evidence (A.9.1.)
Authorisation submitted by the potential user, i.e. applicant seeking to
obtain a user account and a credential?
Identity How will the identity knowledge or documentary evidence presented [98]
Clearance by the user be verified? (A.9.2.)
Unacceptable What are the unacceptable identity source documents as determined [98]
Identity Evidence by policy and visual/electronic identity inspection procedures? (A.9.3.)
Unacceptable What does the policy stipulate in determining acceptable applicants [98]
Users as potential users? (A.9.4.)
Identity What are the identity registration processes and will interpretation [98]
Proofing Rules guidance be made available for operatives? (A.9.5.)
Approved Which entities are to receive delegated powers to approve the [98]
Authorities issuance of an identifier and a credential to an applicant? (A.9.6.)
Identity What is the process to examine source identity evidence furnished by [98]
Proofing and the applicant before issuing or using the APIM’s credential? (A.9.7.)
Registration
Remote or Is the applicant to appear in-person as part of the registration process [98]
Local or is this process to be undertaken remotely with other controls? (A.9.8.)
Application
Acceptable What are the acceptable identity source documents as determined by [98]
Identity policy? During identity proving, what evidence is the applicant (A.9.9.)
Evidence required to provide in terms of forms of identity evidence in original
Sources form? Will operatives and applicants be provided with a list of
acceptable issuing bodies identity source documents and the means to
recognise or verify the authenticity of identity documents presented
or identity data gathered?
Identity Do risks dictate that the identity proving, registration and issuance [98]
Proofing process need to adhere to the principle of separation of duties to (A.9.10.)
Compromise ensure that no single administrator has the capability to issue an APIM
identifier or credential without the authorised cooperation of another
authorised administrator?
Identity Proofing Does the identity proofing and registration processes used to verify [98]
and Registration the claimed identity of the applicant require accreditation? (A.9.11.)
Accreditation
Accreditation Which entities do the identity proofing and registration processes [98]
Processes accreditation rules apply to? (A.9.12.)
Applicability
Approved What authorisation is required before the adoption and use of [98]
Processes approved identity proofing and registration processes? (A.9.13.)
Adoption
Table A.9: Identifier Credential Management Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Operational Will the APIM operate in consistent conditions or various environments? [95]
Ergonomics What are the non-standard conditions which reveal APIM constraints? (A.10.1.)
User What are the constraints that would determine how the APIM captures the [295]
Signal user’s initial input signal? Is there an existing user enrolment policy? (A.10.2.)
Enrolment Is the user required to be present? What other user data,
e.g. autobiographical, are required?
Input During operational use, will the APIM be required to automatically flag [295]
Signal poor quality signal input data? How much of the input can be reasonably (A.10.3.)
Tolerations tolerated to be flagged as poor quality data?
Throughput What are the throughput rate requirements, i.e. timing maximums? [95]
Rates (A.10.4.)
Impostor Pass/ What is the acceptable decision threshold determined by the risks in the [177]
False Alarm application context? How are these rates to be determined? (A.10.5.)
Impostor What is the acceptable probability to the entities that an impostor user [295]
Probability input signal being accepted at least once in a given number of attempts? (A.10.6.)
User False How many false non-match errors would the organisation accept and the [57]
Non-match user population tolerate as acceptable rates for user input signal false (A.10.7.)
Toleration acceptance and false rejection?
Multiple In the case of a user input signal false non-match how many additional [177]
Attempts attempts for identification should the user be permitted? (A.10.8.)
Limit
Intervention What is the tolerable rate for false user input signal non-matches which [295]
Rate require intervention by trained staff, if applicable? (A.10.9.)
Impostor What is the acceptable probability that a false user input signal match [177]
Detection setting being sufficiently low enough to deter deliberate compromise? (A.10.10.)
Combining Would the acceptability of user input signal false matches or false [177]
Mechanisms acceptances become more palatable to the owner (or possibly the user) (A.10.11.)
by combining two or more user input signals for the operational context?
User What are the operational constraints that would determine how an APIM [15]
Equipment capture the user’s input signal during enrolment and live usage? (A.10.12.)
Enrolment Do security policies dictate that the enrolment process needs to be [295]
Supervision supervised in order to achieve the required user input signal quality? (A.10.13.)
Maximum What is the longest time permitted for successful user input signal [295]
Enrolment enrolment? (A.10.14.)
Time
Maximum How many attempts at signal enrolment should the user be allowed? [295]
Enrolment (A.10.15.)
Attempts
Alternative Are work-around measures required should a user be unable to provide a [295]
Arrangements valid input signal for enrolment, either temporarily or permanently? (A.10.16.)
Vendor What type of quality control and statistical evidence are vendors required [295]
Support to offer on the performance of the enrolment and identification processes? (A.10.17.)
Environment What are the environmental factors that may affect user input signal [295]
Variance enrolment and signal processing during live operation? (A.10.18.)
Template Are security controls required to protect the APIM’s input signal data, [295]
Protection e.g. authentication data, biometric images or template data? (A.10.19.)
Backwards Is backward compatibility required to separate APIMs in different [125]
Compatibility authorisation domains? (A.10.20.)
Flexibility What are the potential factors which may influence stating suitability [238]
measurements for the APIM? (A.10.21.)
Scalability What scalability is desired for the APIM? Is the user population [125]
forecasted to grow significantly during the APIM’s projected life? (A.10.22.)
Upgrade What are the acceptable disruption, for the APIM owner and its users, if [295]
Impact upgrades were to be possible to the APIM? (A.10.23.)
Table A.10: Controls’ Performance Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Attack What are the likely technology resources and/or social skills that will be [313]
Protection used to compromise the APIM (either its entirety or at user level)? Is the (A.11.1.)
APIM required to resist and detect attacks in order to protect information
assets? What are experiences of past attacks and does this intelligence
suggest changes in potential attacker’s motivation? How closely does this
assessment align with stated user signal performance to detect or deter an
impostor being falsely accepted at least once in a number of attempts?
Operational What test data are essential, as evidence, to assure the APIM’s design will [313]
Quality operate reliably, in line with the performance requirements? (A.11.2.)
Assurance
Documentation What information will be made available to evaluators and users, [202]
and Test Data including external or internal designs, to test assurance performance? (A.11.3.)
Availability Does the APIM design documentation need to be kept confidential?
Functional What is the desired reliability to ensure the APIM implementation [177]
Testing functions correctly? Is the implementation to be exposed only to (A.11.4.)
documented attacks and which it is designed to counter?
Is the implementation to be tested by external expertise? What are
behavioural expectations in response to each attack test on the APIM?
Audit What audit information is required to fulfil legal obligations and risk [295]
management functions? Does the audit information need to include any (A.11.5.)
or all of the following: the number of new biometric records accepted
or new credentials issued, amended or revoked; the number of records
verified, the number of users the APIM was unable to enrol; the quality
measurements for the captured user signal data; the amount of APIM
down time; the APIM errors by type; and the average enrolment
processing time on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis?
Performance What is the evaluation approach, e.g. Common Criteria Evaluation [63]
Assessment Methodology, to test and evaluate candidate APIMs’ performance in (A.11.6.)
Methodology order to make an objective assessment (and repeatable results) based
on the test data sets and substantiated results produced?
Assurance What are the tests required to prove the effectiveness of the APIM [238]
Test (holistic and within each component)? What is the test environment (A.11.7.)
Regime in which the evaluation will take place?
Resources What funds, personnel and tools will be committed to the change project [63]
Allocated or programme to design, implement, test, deploy and operate the APIM? (A.11.8.)
Table A.11: Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Identification/ To what extent does the solution design or vendor proposals meet the [171]
Authentication requirements for the APIM and have specifications with validated test (A.12.1.)
Model data been provided? Does the model align with policies and relevant
standards? How does it align with the infrastructure that is used
to implement the security policy in an organisation? Does it address
physical, procedural and IT security controls in a holistic way?
Credential Does the APIM require the user to possess and use an artefact, e.g. a [125]
Storage token, to store or to generate and protect users’ signal data? (A.12.2.)
User Input Is the user’s input signal data stored centrally or stored on an artefact [295]
Signal Storage or a combination of both? (A.12.3.)
Mechanism Will there be a centralised database or distributed storage medium, where [295]
Processing a user will be required to carry his/her biometric or authentication data (A.12.4.)
Location on a portable artefact to allow the APIM to operate universally?
Mechanism What are the network, systems, devices, software and processes required [295]
Processing to support the APIM design? To what degree will the APIM owner have (A.12.5.)
Infrastructure operational control over the components, e.g. the Internet, browser,
or public key infrastructure, devices, to support the processing locations?
Processing How will the user input signal captured be protected during acquisition [295]
Protection for either local processing or extracted and communicated for remote (A.12.6.)
processing? How will the result be communicated to users and what
preventative measures protect against compromising the result notified?
Alternative Will a biometric feature or a name or code act as a unique identifier? [247]
Identifier Is that feature compatible, in terms of degradation, with the expected (A.12.7.)
Types lifetime of the authorised access or recognition requirement?
Biometric Where user input signals are based upon biometric features are all the [295]
Modality elements, e.g. biometric modality template file size and storage (A.12.8.)
Selection medium elucidated in the detailed design?
Knowledge Where user input signals are knowledge based are all the [250]
Data elements, e.g. data composition and user’s cognitive actions, (A.12.9.)
Selection elucidated in the detailed design?
Mechanism Does the detailed design describe the tasks to support the APIM? How [295]
User are users added or deleted from the APIM? How are user’s data (A.12.10.)
Maintenance maintained? How is a user’s claimed identity verified?
Maintenance How easy and often is it necessary to change or reissue authentication [295]
Effort data, keys, tokens, and software or recapture of biometric samples? (A.12.11.)
Associated What associated user data are required to be stored, e.g. autobiographical [250]
User Data data, with the identifier and identification data? (A.12.12.)
Signal Does the detailed design describe the APIM’s functions, e.g. capturing [95]
Processing the user’s input signal, and how data are protected during all processes? (A.12.13.)
Combined Does the design use multiple input signals or templates or data types [95]
User Input related to each identifier? Will the user generate data from an artefact (A.12.14.)
Signals or token generation device or remote system?
Costs What factors in the security architecture are most likely to increase [95]
Influences or decrease costs of the APIM? (A.12.15.)
Database Is database backed-up and restore required if the identifiers and user [171]
Contingency template or data for the APIM are lost, amended or destroyed? (A.12.16.)
User Is user interaction with the APIM intuitive or based on familiar designs? [9]
Training Need Will users require training on how to use the APIM, as designed? (A.12.17.)
Performance Have there been any performance or evaluations of the APIM or similar [194]
Tests mechanisms in a comparable application context? (A.12.18.)
Practical What are the experiences from owners/users/administrators from using [295]
Experience this APIM in environment similar to the context application? (A.12.19.)
Vendor What is known about the potential vendors/integrators experience and [295]
Assessment capabilities for delivering the APIM to the proposed design? (A.12.20.)
Table A.12: Security Architecture Evaluation Theme
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Credential What is the intended life of the APIM’s identifier, credential and artefacts [98]
Lifetime to provide continued access or entitlement to the information asset? (A.13.1.)
Credential What are the rules for officials or administrators to undertake credential [98]
Authenticity issuance? Are these tasks automated? Is the verification of identity (A.13.2.)
evidence a separate task undertaken independently during the applicant
registration process?
Credential What are the rules for officials or administrators to undertake other [98]
Integrity credential management processes, e.g. issuing replacements or revoking (A.13.3.)
credentials? Are these tasks automated?
Credential What authorisation is required for entities and their officials to adopt and [98]
Maintenance operate credential maintenance processes? (A.13.4.)
Process
Adoption
Credential What are the processes for issuing and maintaining identification [98]
Maintenance credentials, including the processes for revocation and providing (A.13.5.)
Requirements justification for credential withdrawal reasons to former users, if
necessary?
Credential At the time of credential issuance, what are the processes to verify [98]
Delivery that the person to whom the credential is to be issued (and on (A.13.6.)
Verification whom the background verification was completed) is the same person
as the intended applicant/recipient as approved by the
authorised organisation during the person’s registration?
Credential Where will the processing of the initial user input signal to the related [98]
Use credential take place? What are the conditions for normal operational use (A.13.7.)
Location of the Identifier Credential?
Credential What processes are to be established to issue a credential and/or other [98]
Accreditation related devices to users from approved suppliers whose reliability has (A.13.8.)
been vetted by the APIM owner or agency and so approved or
authorised in writing, i.e. accredited?
Table A.13: Identifier Credential Evaluation Theme
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Factor Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Sampling Will the APIM use more than one instance of captured user signal or [177]
Normalisation biometric input data to create the enrolment template? (A.14.1.)
Signal Is there sufficient inherent variation or randomness in the user’s input [95]
Entropy signal to avoid candidate identification collisions? (A.14.2.)
Threshold Does the accuracy of the APIM comparison results meet the required [238]
Performance Impostor Pass/False Alarm decision threshold? What is the impact (A.14.3.)
upon performance from the adjustment of the threshold setting?
Deceit What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and resources, to synthesise [177]
Resistance an unauthorised entity of generating valid/correct user input signals? (A.14.4.)
Artefact What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and resources, to deceive [177]
Counterfeiting an APIM by producing a counterfeit copy of an artefact? (A.14.5.)
Circumvention What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and resources, to [177]
Susceptibility circumvent the APIM, without the need to deceive the processing logic? (A.14.6.)
Identification What is the time to: activate the sensing device; capture user [238]
Time input signals; extract signal parameters; retrieve files and other (A.14.7.)
ancillary processing; compare the input signals against those stored;
communicate between the various APIM components; and effect
notification of acceptance or rejection or other results?
What are the possibilities to shorten the overall processing timescales?
Device What is the probability that an APIM related device will perform its [177]
Maintainability intended function over a specified interval of operation? (A.14.8.)
Device Are supporting devices and artefacts functioning correctly for their [177]
Interfacing intended purposes in a way that meets the APIM’s requirements (A.14.9.)
which prevents them being disabled or the APIM being circumvented?
Is the installation to be tamper-evident with physical integrity and use
sensors to detect attempts at circumvention or possess similar controls?
Signal Is the APIM’s signal authentication data sufficiently disguised to [250]
Predictability prevent strangers, friends and family etc. from determining it? (A.14.10.)
Signal What is the APIM’s number of possible user input signal or signal [250]
Abundance extraction permutations or total key space? (A.14.11.)
Signal Is the APIM’s authentication or key or verification data easy to record [250]
Disclosure or transfer, easily observed at entry or almost impossible to disclose? (A.14.12.)
Signal Does the APIM’s signal data capture device withstand various known [250]
Robustness attacks, e.g. keyboard loggers, brute force attacks, theoretical attacks? (A.14.13.)
Signal Does the APIM’s signal data contain the user’s private details, e.g. iris? [250]
Privacy Does the user approve the use of this private data and its protection? (A.14.14.)
Signal Is the signal data revealed during entry or transmission, in full, partially [250]
Confidentiality or not at all? (A.14.15.)
Technical What are the known exploitable weaknesses in existing operations [271]
Vulnerabilities (processes, technology and people together with their integration) to (A.14.16.)
protect assets?
Failure to Average number of users in the test case that are unable to provide an [288]
Enrol Rate input signal of sufficient quality for identification or authentication? (A.14.17.)
Assurance What evidence demonstrates the APIM’s ability to meet the assurance [57]
Evidence requirements set? (A.14.18.)
Average Time Time to detect impostor attempts, including repeated tries [288]
of Impostor Try averaged, regardless of successful verification over all impostor attempts? (A.14.19.)
Average Time Time to achieve correct user verification including repeat attempts [288]
of Verification Try averaged over all attempts and tests? (A.14.20.)
Average Number Number of failures in capturing user signal data averaged over all [288]
of Impostor impostors’ attempts? (A.14.21.)
Capture Failures
Average Number Number of failures in capturing signal data from genuine subjects [288]
of Genuine averaged over all genuine subjects‘ attempts? (A.14.22.)
Capture Failures
Table A.14: Reliability Testing Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Interface What data have been generated from the APIM’s usability tests? [288]
Use Do the results provide evidence that both the authorised users and the (A.15.1.)
APIM’s administrators usage of the APIM’s Human Computer Interface,
artefacts, tokens or devices’ interactions are as intended? Are there
identified usability issues which introduce adverse or undesirable
user behaviour that may compromise the effectiveness of the APIM?
Convey Does the APIM’s human computer interface convey the available [167]
Security security features to the user? (A.15.2.)
Features
Visibility of Does the APIM’s human computer interface have the ability for the [167]
Mechanism user to observe the security status of internal operations? (A.15.3.)
Security Status
Intuitive To what extent is the APIM’s human computer interface comforting [167]
Interface and naturally easy to learn? (A.15.4.)
Aesthetic and Does the APIM’s human computer interface convey or display only [167]
Minimalist relevant security information? (A.15.5.)
Design
Error Reporting Does the APIM’s human computer interface show error messages that [167]
and Assistance are detailed and state, if necessary, where to obtain help? (A.15.6.)
User Does the APIM’s human computer interface aid the user in having a [288]
Satisfaction satisfactory experience with the APIM and other related components? (A.15.7.)
Depth of Does the user require cursory rehearsal, visual co-ordination, [250]
Cognitive cognitive activity or no effort in order to provide user signal data? (A.15.8.)
Processing at
Enrolment
Signal Is recall of the signal (authentication data) from the user’s memory to [250]
Retrieval use the APIM with or without cues or recognition focused? Does the (A.15.9.)
Strategy APIM support or prompt the user to recall their input signal data
supplied upon enrolment and the procedures for using the APIM’s
interactive design?
Signal Is the user signal used by the APIM system assigned, self-assigned [250]
Meaningfulness by the user, meaningful to the user or deducible only by the user? (A.15.10.)
Task Is the APIM likely to be operationally acceptable aligning with the [57]
Convenience user’s task or duties? Is the APIM easy to learn within that task? Do (A.15.11.)
the APIM’s interaction processes and signal data need to be
memorised? Are allowances made for human error or limitations?
User Signal What is the users’ preference for signal type? Is the biometric [288]
Preference modality chosen likely to be accepted against other modalities (A.15.12.)
which may be more familiar or less intrusive?
Privacy Does the use of the APIM affect user’s feelings or beliefs? [57]
Impact (A.15.13.)
Table A.15: Usability Testing Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
System What are the computer system and network resources envisioned to [295]
Resources support the overall APIM? (A.16.1.)
Mechanism What is the APIM’s predicted life expectancy? Will it be designed [295]
Anticipated to allow upgrade or migration or replacement of the APIM? How (A.16.2.)
Life do these aspects impact upon the choice of using different user
input signals or vendor’s proposals?
System Has full consideration been given to all functions and components [295]
Functionality to support the APIM? Does this description include: (A.16.3.)
user data collection; user input signal data capture and
parameter extraction; data transmission; data translation;
signal processing; template or image storage; and user
security management features and training information?
Technology What is the impact of the proposed APIM in terms of hardware, [295]
Impact software, personnel and training upon existing infrastructure? (A.16.4.)
Existing Is there a list of the available hardware and software to support the [295]
Technologies APIM? (A.16.5.)
Interoperability Will interoperability of the APIM with other existing, possibly [160]
alternative APIMs, in the intended application context be an issue? (A.16.6.)
Processing What is the processing power and media storage needed to support [295]
Capacity the APIM locally and/or a server at a central location? (A.16.7.)
Back-up What are the back-up procedures should the APIM fail totally or [295]
Methods partially in resulting in the total or temporary unavailability of all (A.16.8.)
users’ signal data?
Criticality of Is there an appropriate contingency plan and disaster recovery [295]
Contingency policy to ensure continued operations in the event of an APIM (A.16.9.)
Plan failure, partially or totally?
Repair What are the proposed repair response times and the planned [295]
Response delivery of replacement parts? Is this acceptable to the system (A.16.10.)
Times owner and the user community?
Roles What are the roles and responsibilities for the various parties [295]
Assignment involved with the APIM? Has an operational role been assigned (A.16.11.)
for a security officer, security operator, an auditor, an administrator,
an APIM manager, a standard user, and privileged users?
Personnel Are technical support personnel, or substitutes, critical to the [15]
Support operation of the APIM available? (A.16.12.)
Continual What are the training requirements for users and the administrators, [15]
Training of the APIM for the initial usage also for ongoing operations? (A.16.13.)
Device Are the user input signal capture devices capable of performing [15]
Calibration automatic self-diagnostic and calibration tasks continually? (A.16.14.)
Lockout/ How does the APIM support a lockout or threshold for excessive [295]
Thresholds invalid access attempts by authorised users? How are these (A.16.15.)
Maintenance lockouts and thresholds changed securely?
Subject What competencies and involvement are acceptable for [295]
Supervision administrators to supervise subject enrolment? (A.16.16.)
Enrolment Is it required that a supervisor has the ability to intervene in the [295]
Process Support enrolment process to improve the quality of the user’s signals? (A.16.17.)
Tamper Are there tamper deterrent and tamper indicative technologies [295]
Protection available to notify errors in the APIM? (A.16.18.)
Template Will the audit trail flag changes to data relating to an enrolled [295]
Update template; or the template itself; or any changes in user (A.16.19.)
Notifications access rights as safeguards to detect unauthorised tampering?
Data What technological safeguards have been implemented to [295]
Protection safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of the user signal and privacy (A.16.20.)
data the APIM captures, stores, processes and transmits?
Table A.16: Technology Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Operational Does the user require any special technical expertise, particular artefacts [250]
Enablers or devices, special software or hardware devices to use or access the (A.17.1.)
APIM?
Inclusivity – Are there any sensory, physical, cognitive skills that would prohibit or [250]
Disabilities restrict impaired users from using the APIM as designed? (A.17.2.)
Device What is the time and effort spent in fulfilling these following tasks: [177]
Usage –application and enrolment processes (A.17.3.)
Effort –authentication processes
–replacement of authentication data or keys
–securing of authentication data or keys
–other administrative functions?
Use What are the likely users effort involved with managing: [177]
Maintenance –APIM and associated devices or artefacts; (A.17.4.)
Effort –back-ups and expiration or retraction of authentication access; or
–loss of authentication data or keys?
Use Is the user’s time consumed at replacement, enrolment and operational [250]
Convenience access together with maintenance functions convenient in relation to the (A.17.5.)
Comparison importance or responsibilities or liabilities in performing their task?
Device Does the APIM operate using commonly available technology or are the [95]
Provisioning components specialised dedicated to that APIM or underlying service? (A.17.6.)
Is processing performed centrally and shared with ubiquitous devices?
Does device provisioning, and contributions made by the owner, aid user
accessibility or introduce barriers, including operating costs, to users?
User To what extent will the User hold the firm belief that the APIM will protect [327]
Confidence their interests, e.g. privacy, safety within the specified operational context? (A.17.7.)
Does the APIM demonstrate:
–explicit authorisation (The system does not become unsafe automatically);
–visibility (The system reports the security status);
–revocability (The user may undertake tasks to change the security status);
–path of least resistance (The user does not inadvertently choose to make
the security status unsafe);
–expected ability (The user should be aware of all the systems’ abilities);
–appropriate boundaries (The user should be able to distinguish what
aspects are relevant);
–expressiveness (The user should be able to instruct the system what tasks
are to be performed);
–clarity (The user should understand the all the system’s tasks); and
–dependability (The system protects the user from being fooled)?
User Does the context warrant the inclusion of a feature in the APIM [247]
Duress to indicate that the user is being forced or coerced to act involuntarily? (A.17.8.)
Would the inclusion of a surreptitious “panic button”
instrument likely to cause harm to the user or potentially be
exploited or is it unnecessary for the application context?
Table A.17: User Accessibility Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Source/Identifier
Implementation What are the total APIM project fulfilment costs? Does this estimate [252]
Costs include installing devices computer, networks, software etc and new or (A.18.1.)
changes to deployed infrastructure? To what extent might a modular
approach, particularly the application interface design, control
expenditure?
Maintenance What are the actual operational and support costs in relationship to the [238]
Costs business case’s estimations? Do these costs include support costs of (A.18.2.)
hardware; software; maintenance processes; personnel; and training
costs? What is the cost impact to change existing procedures?
Cost of What is the unit cost of signal input device including firmware and [238]
Input its protection, in the event it was stolen or to prevent its internal (A.18.3.)
Devices operation from being examined?
Cost of What is the unit cost of the artefact, e.g. an integrated circuit card and [177]
Artefacts its protection, if it was stolen, or in order to prevent its internal (A.18.4.)
operation from being examined?
Management What are the estimated costs for distributing and logistical support for [238]
Costs for Input any devices and/or artefacts associated with the APIM? (A.18.5.)
Devices or
Artefacts
Infrastructure What is the cost of the proposed solution for introduction of new or [238]
Processing integrating the APIM technology into existing infrastructure in terms (A.18.6.)
Costs of network, hardware, software, support, personnel and training?
Costs What are the likely costs for making the APIM mandatory to all users [238]
Recovery in the community, as opposed to making the use of the APIM optional? (A.18.7.)
Is there capacity to recover some costs?
Other What are the total costs and/or effort for each party involved, excluding [238]
Parties’ users’ costs, in the use of the APIM, including hardware and software, (A.18.8.)
Costs to ensure its compatibility with the users’ processes and the need to
revise supporting infrastructures?
Table A.18: Owners’ Costs Evaluation Theme
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Appendix B
Appendix B – EU State’s eID Card
Programme Case Study: Questions
for Interviewees
This appendix contains the interview questions posed to the interviewees involved in the EU
State’s eID Card Programme.
Interview Questions Interview Questions for Interviewees Involved with eID Card Programme
in the EU state.
1. What was the approach adopted within the ID Card Programme to determine the most
suitable mechanism to identify citizens? Please describe it.
2. If there was not a formal approach, please outline or describe the methods or devel-
opment approach employed within the Programme that addressed the problems of
meeting the objectives of the programme with any social, organisational and techno-
logical issues. This may also include any usability or user accessibility and handling
of biographical and biometric data.
3. How were stakeholders identified in the Programme and their objectives accommo-
dated?
4. Were there clear objectives for the ID Card at the outset?
5. What was the method used to gather the requirements of the APIM?
6. What were the main factors that affected the requirements documented and how well
did these map to the objectives?
7. What were the critical factors that affected the selection of the identification mechanism
(biometric modality and or user authentication mechanism)?
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8. In retrospect, what characteristics of the Programme would you choose now to include
in your requirements?
9. In hindsight how could your approach have identified these requirements?
10. In retrospect, what characteristics of the implemented mechanism would you change?
11. In retrospect, what factors at the strategic level or stakeholder objectives were not fully
researched or understood?
12. How did these factors impact upon the decisions made at the time in terms of the
requirements documented and decisions made on the identification mechanism actually
selected?
13. If a formal approach was available as a decision-tool would this have been of benefit
or likely to have changed any of the decisions made?
14. What characteristics would you expect to be included in such a decision-tool for
selecting identification mechanisms?
July 2009
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Appendix C
Appendix C – Evaluation Themes and
Factors (Stage B)
This appendix contains 25 evaluation theme tables relating to the factors for evaluating
an APIM as at Stage B of our factor validation effort, representing Step 6 of our research
implementation plan.
The tables show the status of our factors following our validation efforts using the data from
our EU State eID Card Programme Case Study. The status also indicates which evaluation
factors were grounded, deduced and Not-grounded in our data. We show relabelled factors
as ‘RF’ and criteria questions which required amendment as ‘AQ’.
We assign an identifier to a new factor identified in Stage B, e.g. B.4.1, to denote stage
created, evaluation theme and factor reference number, to enable each factor and its criterion
question to be tracked through each subsequent validation.
The tables in this appendix contain the following evaluation themes:
Table C.1 Stakeholders’ Objectives Evaluation Theme (formerly Strategic Issues Evaluation
Theme);
Table C.2 Stakeholders’ Risks Evaluation Theme (formerly Risks Assessment Evaluation
Theme);
Table C.3 Community’s Characteristics Evaluation Theme (formerly Social Acceptability
Evaluation Theme);
Table C.4 Task Environment Evaluation Theme (transferred from Effectiveness Perspec-
tive);
Table C.5 Constraints Evaluation Theme (new);
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Table C.6 Polices Evaluation Theme (formerly Risks Controls Evaluation Theme);
Table C.7 Business Case Evaluation Theme;
Table C.8 Functional Requirements Evaluation Theme (formerly Functionality Evaluation
Theme);
Table C.9 Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme ;
Table C.10 Registration and Enrolment Evaluation Theme (formerly Credential Registration
Evaluation Theme);
Table C.11 Performance Requirements Evaluation Theme (formerly Controls’ Performance
Evaluation Theme);
Table C.12 Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table C.13 Task Dialogue Evaluation Theme (new);
Table C.14 Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme (new);
Table C.15 Envisaged Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme (new);
Table C.16 Forecasted Costs Evaluation Theme (new);
Table C.17 Security Architecture Evaluation Theme;
Table C.18 Identifier Management Evaluation Theme;
Table C.19 Reliability Results Evaluation Theme (formerly Reliability Testing Evaluation
Theme);
Table C.20 Usability Results Evaluation Theme (formerly Usability Testing Evaluation
Theme);
Table C.21 Technology Evaluation Theme;
Table C.22 Accessibility Results Evaluation Theme (formerly User Accessibility Evaluation
Theme);
Table C.23 Solution’s Issues Evaluation Theme (new);
Table C.24 Solution’s Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme (new);
Table C.25 Stakeholders’ Costs Evaluation Theme (formerly Owners’ Costs Evaluation
Theme).
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
User What arguments support user acceptability or consent in terms of their grounded
Acceptability responsibilities or liabilities to facilitate utilisation? What are the security RF AQ (A.3.2.)
Rationale controls to accomplish user privacy objectives? Do these controls
negate the benefits of the customer proposition for potential users?
Is the management of the users’ private data under the immediate
control of the APIM owner or that individual?
Privacy What are the aims of the intended courses of action to protect user’s grounded
Aims private data? Does the protection or change in protection of a user’s RF AQ (A.4.5.)
personal information fulfil a stated goal? Is the aim
to retain Anonymity so that a user is not identifiable within a community?
Is the aim to retain ‘Undetectability’ of an item of interest (IOI) so that an
attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether it exists or not?
Is the aim to retain ‘Unlinkability’ of two or more IOIs, e.g., subjects,
messages, actions, etc.) so that an attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish
whether these IOIs are related?
Is the aim to retain ‘Unobservability’ of an item of interest (IOI) so that
the
undetectability of the IOI against all subjects uninvolved in is preserved
and the anonymity of the users involved in the IOI even against the other
subject(s) involved in that IOI cannot sufficiently distinguish by an
attacker? Do these aims suggest the use of a pseudonym as an identifier
of a user other than one of the individual’s real names?
Business What are the aims of the intended courses of action to protect deduced
Aims information assets and resources ? Does this protection or change in RF AQ (A.4.4.)
protection fulfil a stated business target or goal which has been
allocated a budget?
Business What arguments support the business aims of the Stakeholders, grounded
Rationale including the system owner, in respect of the considered need to AQ (A.1.1.)
instigate a change in protection of assets or facilitate a change
to revise or introduce new business processes or delivery channels?
Do the arguments incorporate the interests of all organisational
entities, e.g. relying parties, trust service providers, which may
rely on the APIM or may provide APIM related services?
Security Will the APIM be used to protect data and/or assets belonging to Factor Deleted
Benefits one or many entities? What are the types of entities, e.g. corporate (A.1.2.)
or government, involved with the application context? Has Duplicate of
consultation with entities been made with reference to a state (A.1.1.)
or corporate policy for the appropriate security assurance?
Control What are the proposed counter-measures, including the APIM, to grounded
Objectives minimise identified business risks and to achieve other business aims? (B.1.1.)
Table C.1: Stakeholders’ Objectives Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Trust What is the trust relationship between the APIM’s owner or organisation grounded
Between and various supporting entities and could that lead, potentially, to a RF AQ (A.7.8.)
Stakeholders degree of reliance for users to operate an APIM as intended?
Misfeasors’ What are the underlying stimuli or goals that may lead to attacks to grounded
Threat compromise the APIM? Do these motives include financial fraud, RF (A.2.7.)
Motivation corporate espionage, intellectual challenge, error, state espionage
or terrorism?
Attack and What is the likelihood of an attack or compromise event occurring? Not-grounded
Compromise Does this projection incorporate an analysis of historical attacks and/or (A.2.1.)
Probability changes in threat intelligence?
Are the probabilities foreseen confined to the system owner or do they
include compromises relating to other stakeholders, including users?
Impact What is the estimated impact value or severity score on the assets being grounded
Value protected if stolen or destroyed or modified? Does this estimate include (A.2.2.)
Rating losses, administrative costs as a result of a compromise and the indirect
financial consequences of the entity’s reputation being adversely affected?
Acknowledged What are the known exploitable weaknesses in existing operations or grounded
Vulnerabilities conceptual vulnerabilities which have been explicitly accepted by RF AQ (A.2.3.)
stakeholders? Are these vulnerabilities published in the public domain?
Compromise What types of deceptive user scenarios can be foreseen? grounded
Scenarios (A.6.9.)
Impact on What are the likely consequences to all stakeholders, including users, if deduced
Upon the APIM failed to detect unauthorised access or failed to verify or (A.7.9.)
Stakeholders identify authorised users or subjects?
Privacy Impact Has an impact assessment been made and documented in respect of the Not-grounded
Assessment privacy issues that may impinge upon the requirements for the APIM? (A.8.3.)
Users’ What are the expectations that all individuals will cooperate voluntarily grounded
Cooperation with an automated identification process? How have these expectation (A.7.11.)
levels, in terms of legality, percentage coverage and utility, been
substantiated?
Table C.2: Stakeholders’ Risks Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Population Does the majority of the target user population have characteristics grounded
Traits that could pose disadvantages or advantages for the possible APIM (A.7.4.)
design options being considered? What is the particular mix of users
with respect to impact upon the success of any APIM?
Privacy What assurance is required to show that the technologies used in the grounded
Assurance implementation of the APIM allow for continuous auditing of (A.8.8.)
compliance within stated privacy policies and practices governing
the collection, use, and distribution of private information?
User Is the user population likely to resist educational material supplied to grounded
Population assist in the introduction of a new or revised APIM? Has consideration (A.7.2.)
Education been given to educating the users to allay their doubts/fears
about utilizing a specific authentication or biometric mechanism?
User Will potential users be required to provide their consent or acceptance grounded
Obligations to responsibilities or liabilities? To what extent do these obligations negate (B.3.1.)
the benefits of the customer proposition for potential users?
Users’ What is the relationship of the user to the APIM’s owner, e.g. service grounded
Relationship provider, employer etc and any intermediaries, e.g. infrastructure RF AQ (A.3.1.)
with provider, and could this trust lead to reliance on users
Stakeholders to operate an APIM as intended?
User What is known about the user population and the entities that operate Factor Deleted
Attitudes the APIM? Has the user population been surveyed to determine their (A.7.1.)
attitude towards using a biometric or authentication mechanism? Does Duplicate to
a strong negative response indicate a need to reformulate plans (A.3.3.)
or possibly the instigation of a proactive education programme?
Social What is the attitude of the intended user communities towards APIMs Not-grounded
Attitudes that address similar business or social problems? What are the RF (A.3.3.)
social problems with these existing APIMs? To what degree does the
existing method or intended way of identifying users cause difficulties?
Do these issues include user perceptions which may restrict the use
of an APIM to capturing biometric data that may be private and
believed to be intrusive? Would an APIM be, or be perceived as,
endangering health, safety or welfare (including inclusivity) of the user?
Community Will the system and APIM be openly available to all parties? Are there grounded
Membership membership restrictions or conditions for the intended user community? (A.3.4.)
Users’ To what extent will the user community firmly believe in the competency grounded
Trust of the APIM’s system owner to act dependably, securely and reliably (A.3.5.)
within the specified operational context?
Table C.3: Community’s Characteristics Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Logical What are the applications and operational circumstances where the user grounded
Usage is engaged with the APIM to perform tasks to access an asset and/or (B.4.1.)
Contexts service? Who are the parties involved and what role do they
perform with respect to the transactions or access to the asset?
Will use involve parties in an enterprise only context, e.g. em-
ployer/employees?
Will use involve parties in federated context - e.g. business partners/
customers/citizens? Will use involve parties in a heterogeneous
context - e.g. State’s citizens, Payment Cards? Have Use Cases
been developed to aid in the scope and types of logical usage?
Have scheme rules been established for the contexts involving
multiple entities?
Physical Will the APIM also be used in applications for physical, e.g. visual grounded
Usage inspection, identification purposes such as controlling access (B.4.2.)
Contexts to a building or site, border crossing or to prove physical presence?
Have use cases been developed to demonstrate physical usage?
Environment Where will the APIM operate? Will it be in public spaces, physically grounded
Characteristics controlled environments, restricted networks or open networks? What are (A.2.5.)
the physical conditions, devices, artefacts or other intelligent processing
resources available? Does this description also include physical and social
measures or conditions that limit or restrict access to information
resources?
Operational What are the operational circumstances where the user is engaged with the Factor Deleted
Context APIM to perform tasks to access an asset and/or service? Who are the (A.2.6.)
parties involved and what role do they perform with respect to the Split into (B.4.1.)
transactions or access to the asset? For the APIM’s owner will the parties and (B.4.2.)
involved be employees (private), business partners/customers
(commercially confidential), state citizens (private) or a combination
of these entities in a heterogeneous application?
Operational How will the user operate devices or artefacts in the grounded
Logistics envisaged physical environments? Is the purpose of the APIM to (B.4.3.)
identify the user controlling the APIM equipment, e.g. personal
laptop computer, or will other individuals, e.g. police authority,
use the artefacts to verify the subject and holder of the artefact?
Technical To what degree does the operating environments, including remote sites, grounded
Control enable the APIM’s owners (and user population) to control the RF AQ (A.6.8.)
technology processes and, where relevant, to monitor user behaviour?
Table C.4: Task Environment Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Signal Will there be a need to exchange user signal data between other grounded
Data organisations with similar mechanisms utilising the same user signal data (A.5.6.)
Exchange or human characteristic? Do interoperability specifications exist?
External Have there been any performance or security tests or evaluations of grounded
Performance biometric or authentication mechanisms similar to the intended (A.5.7.)
Benchmarks application context and business problem? What are the learning
outcomes?
Users’ What are the constraints that would determine how the APIM captures the grounded
Signal user’s initial input signal? Is there an existing user enrolment policy? AQ (A.10.2.)
Enrolment Is the user required to be present, undertake the process remotely
or are the processes combined? What other user data,
e.g. autobiographical, are required at enrolment?
Regulatory What legislation will affect the data that the entity may store for the grounded
Constraints intended user population, e.g. Data Protection Acts, Privacy Laws? (A.1.6.)
Legal What legal issues could hinder or support a change programme (privacy, grounded
Imperatives data access etc.) to deploy an APIM? (A.1.7.)
Contextual What existing technical constraints or social norms or internal grounded
Legacies organisational issues (employee rights, privacy, etc.) could hinder a change RF AQ (A.5.4.)
programme or project to introduce or revise an APIM? Are there any
legacy systems or commonly established procedures or adopted
rules that could place restrictions on the requirements to
introduce or revise an APIM?
Users’ What are the potential costs and/or effort for each party involved in their grounded
Costs use of the APIM that includes hardware and software, its compatibility (A.3.6.)
with the user’s processes and the need for supporting infrastructure?
Budget What funds have been allocated by the organisations to minimise grounded
unacceptable risks? Do the aims include countermeasures to reduce (A.4.3.)
direct financial losses and associated administrative costs as a result of a
personal identification mechanism compromise, if sole or main
control mechanism?
Standards What standards impact the choice of an APIM, its use and or processes? grounded
Which information Security controls for user authentication, the use of (A.5.5.)
cryptography or biometrics are required to be complied with?
Stakeholder What commercial or competitive or organisational issues could hinder or grounded
Dynamics support a stakeholder’s change programme (fraud, industry regulation RF (A.1.5.)
alignment, staff privacy, data access etc.)? How do these issues affect
entities’ risks, e.g. profitability?
Compromise What relationships exist (if any) between the users in the grounded
Recovery community and the APIM systems owner (e.g. service (B.5.1.)
provider, employer etc..) and any intermediaries, e.g. infrastructure
providers, to recover from occurrences where one or many
individuals’ mechanisms have been compromised? Are there
procedures or scheme rules that enable the user to seek
recourse for any damages or losses incurred?
Table C.5: Constraints Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Archiving What is the data retention period and retention rules for user grounded
Signal Data signal data stored and used for authentication or identification? (B.6.1.)
Recognised What are the identified issues (if any) that have been grounded
Issues explicitly accepted by Stakeholders, including users? (B.6.2.)
Are these issues discussed in the public domain?
Authorised Which entity is empowered to provide policy on the acceptable grounded
Identity identity proof, sources and types of evidence, as part (B.6.3.)
Evidence of the identity verification processes? Does the registration process
Sources dictate that the applicant is required to provide proof of identity?
Will operatives and applicants be provided with a list of bodies
that are considered as acceptable identity sources and the means to
verify such evidence as valid seed identification documents?
Sanctions What are the impositions of criminal or civil penalties or grounded
disciplinary reprisals for improper use of the APIM for authorised users? (B.6.4.)
What are the criminal or civil consequences for misfeasors
perpetrating violation acts to compromise the APIM or
steal a person’s digital identity
Requirements How will the requirements for the APIM be established? Will this Not-grounded
Gathering process involve prototyping or will they be established through formal (A.5.3.)
Methodology requirements capturing procedures? Is the choice governed by the
organisation’s preferred system development methodology or restricted
by tendering processes? How will the users be involved in stating their
requirements (if at all)?
Privacy Has an individual within the organisation, possibly a corporate grounded
Laws governance function, been assigned responsibility to ensure privacy (A.8.2.)
Compliance laws compliance? Do the legislative and regulatory
aspects differ in each relevant jurisdiction?
Due What is the means of settling or litigating disputes between grounded
Process the authorised users and the stakeholders as proprietors (B.6.5.)
or custodians of information about those users?
User Does the context warrant the inclusion of a feature in the APIM Not-grounded
Duress to indicate that the user is being forced or coerced to act involuntarily? RF (A.17.8.)
Policy Would the inclusion of a surreptitious “panic button”
instrument likely to cause harm to the user or potentially be
exploited or is it unnecessary for the application context?
Policy What is the strategy chosen to achieve the stakeholders’ change deduced
Implementation programme objectives? Does the policy include the minimising of risks RF AQ (A.4.1.)
Strategy by introducing or revising controls given the operation context and
strategic considerations?
Privacy Laws Which directives, international conventions, international and local grounded
and Privacy laws and regulations are applicable to subjects’ private data (A.8.1.)
Policies which could influence the requirements for an APIM?
Are artefacts or credentials to indicate the subject’s name?
Are there guidelines on what is considered to be private data
and how it is to be protected?
Table C.6: Policies Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Identity Which organisations have been approved to supply an identifier or grounded
Approval/ credential or provide authorisation against identity evidence (A.9.1.)
Authorisation submitted by the potential user, i.e. applicant seeking to
obtain a user account and a credential?
APIM’s Why is the APIM being introduced or revised? Have goals been grounded
Scope and documented (e.g. Feasibility Study) which are set in terms of priority (B.7.1.)
Purpose values of aspiration to be obtained from APIM’s intended use?
Stakeholders’ Will the APIM be used to protect data belonging to one or many entities? grounded
Benefits Is the proposed APIM regarded as a business enabler to facilitate (B.7.2.)
new service delivery channels e.g. eGovernment? What are the types
of stakeholder organisation, e.g. Government or corporate entity, are
involved?
Has consultation been made with reference to the national policy
or corporate policy for the appropriate security assurance?
Political What political or economic matters may hinder or support organisational deduced
and Economic change? How does this impact upon the APIM selection? RF (A.1.4.)
Considerations
Security What incentives could be employed to encourage appropriate use of deduced
Motivation of the APIM? What are the possible disadvantages or liabilities that (A.7.10.)
Authorised Users would apply if authorised users were found or proven to be negligent?
Expert Have the entities’ applications been discussed with knowledgeable and grounded
Feasibility independent members of respected information security professional RF AQ (A.1.8.)
Opinion group to assess technical feasibility.
Programme What entities have authority for the decisions or authorisation processes grounded
Governance relating to the selection of the APIM? Has a Steering Committee (B.7.3.)
been formed to involve Multiple Stakeholders (Multiple Stakeholder
Processes) with a consultation framework?
Alternatives Has there been an investigation into the alternatives to the biometric or Not-grounded
Investigated user authentication mechanisms to address the identification problem? (A.6.4.)
Fundamentally, are biometrics really needed or desirable?
Defined Is the personal identification problem fully understood and defined in grounded
Business terms of requirements and not solutions? To what degree are the RF AQ (A.5.1.)
Problem existing mechanisms actually effective?
Project Is the APIM project initiation supported with a business case deduced
Sponsorship with a justification for expenditure by stakeholders? RF AQ (A.5.2.)
Identified What are the stakeholder’ and possibly user risks that are to be grounded
Risks controlled (potentially minimised) by the APIM? RF AQ (A.4.2.)
Risks How does the organisation want to address the risks identified to provide deduced
Management access or entitlement to the intended user population? Do the options for RF (A.2.8.)
risk mitigation include risk alleviation, e.g. by introducing or revising
controls; risk transference, e.g. by taking out insurance against potential
losses; risk avoidance, e.g. by terminating, user access or limiting
some of the functionality; risk assumption, e.g. by performing due
diligence in formally accepting the risks and monitoring the exposure or
impact levels? Do the organisation’s operating rules mandate an agreed
approach to Risk Management within a cyclical framework to evaluate
assets and their protection periodically?
Assurance What evidence is required to demonstrate the APIM’s ability to meet the Not-grounded
Effectiveness security assurance requirements set by stakeholders? RF AQ (A.2.4)
Evidence
Table C.7: Business Case Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Positive or Will the APIM be used for positive identification (proving a person is grounded
Negative already enrolled) or negative identification (proving a person is not (A.6.1.)
Identification enrolled) or a consolidation of both to meet one or more
requirements?
Overt or Does the requirement entail the user being aware of the APIM? grounded
Covert What legal issues and technical consideration apply if the (A.6.2.)
Identification requirement is for a covert APIM?
Multiple If both positive and negative identification are required, is there a grounded
User requirement to use same authentication or identification data, or (A.6.5.)
Input is there potential for the combining of two or more separate user
Signals input signals, e.g. fingerprint and voice, face and voice, personal
identification number, digital certificates and passwords etc?
Authorisation What attributes need to be captured and passed to the access control grounded
Attributes system to enable verified users to have authorised permission to resources? (B.8.1.)
User In what format should the APIM store the user’s input signals for grounded
Signal identification or verification purposes? Will data need to (B.8.2.)
Storage be converted into a format using a specific algorithm or protected
Format using a cryptographic algorithm? How are the user’s input
signals to be captured to compare against those stored in the
formatted or protected form? Does the solution require the identification
data to be centralised in a database or involve an artefact, e.g. eID Card?
What are security controls required to protect the storage and use
of the user signal data in the proposed format?
Signal Are user signal capturing devices ubiquitous, e.g. keyboards, or are grounded
Capturing bespoke user signal reading devices and software required (B.8.3.)
Device to support universal use with a range of user equipment,
Interoperability e.g. PDA, PC etc, or bespoke devices?
Table C.8: Functional Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Privacy What processes need to be put into place to write, publish, and maintain grounded
Asset a clear and comprehensive document listing the types of information (A.8.4.)
Register that may be collected, e.g. transactional information, personal data
in an identifiable form? Does the document state the purpose of data
collection, the data that may be disclosed to whom during the life of the
credential, how the information will be protected, and the complete set
of uses of the credential and related information at the department or
agency? Are applicants to be provided full disclosure of the intended uses
of the credential and the related privacy implications?
Privacy Asset What appeals procedures are to be maintained for those applicants grounded
Appeals who are denied a credential or for those authorised users whose (A.8.5.)
Procedure credentials are revoked without explanation?
Privacy What processes are to be in place to ensure that only personnel with a grounded
Asset legitimate need to access the privacy information, used within the (A.8.6.)
Access APIM, are authorised? Does this safeguard include handling disputes
Control relating to personal data stored and data maintained for purposes of
applicant registration and credential issuance?
Privacy What processes are required to be in place to coordinate with approved grounded
Asset entity, authority or agency officials to define consequences for the (A.8.7.)
Compromise APIM or other systems violating privacy policies?
Privacy What are the security controls to be applied to accomplish privacy goals, grounded
Security where applicable? Is the management of the private data under the (A.8.9.)
Controls immediate control of the APIM owner or the individual? What are the
technologies and infrastructures available to support these requirements?
Privacy What assurance is required to show that the technologies and controls grounded
Security used to implement the APIM does not erode privacy protections relating (A.8.10.)
Controls to the use, collection, and disclosure of private data in an identifiable
Erosion form? Does this requirement include the protection against unauthorised
access to users’ private data or credential data stored on artefacts?
Table C.9: Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Proofing How will the identity knowledge or documentary evidence presented grounded
Clearance by the user be verified? RF (A.9.2.)
Unacceptable What are the unacceptable identity source documents as determined Factor Deleted
Identity Evidence by policy and visual/electronic identity inspection procedures? (A.9.3.)
Duplicate of
(A.9.9)
Acceptable What does the policy stipulate in determining acceptable applicants grounded
Users as potential users? RF (A.9.4.)
Identity What are the identity registration processes and will interpretation grounded
Proofing Rules guidance be made available for operatives? (A.9.5.)
Approved Which entities are to receive delegated powers to approve the grounded
Registration issuance of an identifier and a credential to an applicant? (A.9.6.)
Agencies
Identity What is the registration process so that a credential can be issued grounded
Proofing and to the genuine applicant, which has been assigned an identifier? AQ (A.9.7.)
Registration How are artefacts containing credentials delivered to
the genuine applicant?
Remote or Is the applicant to appear in-person as part of the application and grounded
Local registration processes or are these processes to be undertaken separately? AQ (A.9.8.)
Registration Can any of these processes be performed remotely with other controls?
Acceptable What are the acceptable identity source documents as determined by grounded
Identity policy? During identity proving, what evidence is the applicant (A.9.9.)
Evidence required to provide in terms of forms of identity evidence in original
form? Will operatives and applicants be provided with a list of
acceptable issuing bodies identity source documents and the means to
recognise or verify the authenticity of identity documents presented
or identity data gathered?
Identity Do risks dictate that the identity proving, registration and issuance grounded
Proofing process need to adhere to the principle of separation of duties to (A.9.10.)
Compromise ensure that no single administrator has the capability to issue an APIM
identifier or credential without the authorised cooperation of another
authorised administrator?
Identity Proofing Does the identity proofing and registration processes used to verify grounded
and Registration the claimed identity of the applicant require accreditation? (A.9.11.)
Accreditation
Accreditation Which entities do the identity proofing and registration processes Not-grounded
Processes accreditation rules apply to? (A.9.12.)
Applicability
Approved What authorisation is required before the adoption and use of grounded
Processes approved identity proofing and registration processes? (A.9.13.)
Adoption
Credential How will the enrolled user be uniquely recognised? Will the user grounded
Identifier require anonymity? Is there a need for pseudonymity, where the (A.6.3.)
identifier masks the user’s true identity?
Table C.10: Registration and Enrolment Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Operational Will the APIM operate in consistent conditions or various environments? grounded
Ergonomics What are the non-standard conditions which reveal APIM constraints? (A.10.1.)
Input During operational use, will the APIM be required to automatically flag Not-grounded
Signal poor quality signal input data? How much of the input can be reasonably (A.10.3.)
Tolerations tolerated to be flagged as poor quality data?
Throughput What are the throughput rate requirements, i.e. timing maximums? Not-grounded
Rates (A.10.4.)
User False How many false non-match errors would the organisation accept and the grounded
Non-match user population tolerate as acceptable rates for user input signal false (A.10.7.)
Toleration acceptance and false rejection?
Intervention What is the tolerable rate for false user input signal non-matches which Not-grounded
Rate require intervention by trained staff, if applicable? (A.10.9.)
Impostor What is the acceptable probability that a false user input signal match grounded
Detection setting being sufficiently low enough to deter deliberate compromise? (A.10.10.)
Combining Would the acceptability of user input signal false matches or false grounded
Mechanisms acceptances become more palatable to the owner (or possibly the user) (A.10.11.)
by combining two or more user input signals for the operational context?
Maximum What is the longest time permitted for successful user input signal grounded
Enrolment enrolment? (A.10.14.)
Time
Maximum How many attempts at signal enrolment should the user be allowed? grounded
Enrolment (A.10.15.)
Attempts
Template Are security controls required to protect the APIM’s input signal data, grounded
Protection e.g. authentication data, biometric images or template data? (A.10.19.)
Table C.11: Performance Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Attack What are the likely technology resources and/or social skills that will be deduced
Protection used to compromise the APIM (either its entirety or at user level)? Is the AQ (A.11.1.)
and APIM required to resist and detect attacks in order to protect information
Detection assets? What are experiences of past attacks and does this intelligence
suggest changes in potential attacker’s motivation? How closely does this
assessment align with stated user signal performance to detect or deter an
impostor being falsely accepted at least once in a number of attempts?
Operational What test data are essential, as evidence, to assure the APIM’s design will grounded
Quality operate reliably, in line with the performance requirements? (A.11.2.)
Assurance What are the operational qualities sought?
Documentation What information are to made available to testers, including grounded
and Test Data external or internal designs, to test assurance performance? AQ (A.11.3.)
Availability Does the APIM design documentation need to be kept confidential?
Functional What is the desired reliability to ensure the APIM implementation grounded
Testing functions correctly? Is the implementation to be exposed only to (A.11.4.)
documented attacks and which it is designed to counter?
Is the implementation to be tested by external expertise? What are
behavioural expectations in response to each attack test on the APIM?
Audit What audit information is required to fulfil legal obligations and risk Not-grounded
Logs management functions? Does the audit information need to include any RF (A.11.5.)
or all of the following: the number of new biometric records accepted
or new credentials issued, amended or revoked; the number of records
verified, the number of users the APIM was unable to enrol; the quality
measurements for the captured user signal data; the amount of APIM
down time; the APIM errors by type; and the average enrolment
processing time on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis?
Performance What is the evaluation approach, e.g. Common Criteria Evaluation deduced
Assessment Methodology, to test and evaluate candidate APIMs’ performance in (A.11.6.)
Methodology order to make an objective assessment (and repeatable results) based
on the test data sets and substantiated results produced?
Assurance What are the tests required to prove the effectiveness of the APIM Not-grounded
Test (holistic and within each component)? What is the test environment (A.11.7.)
Regime in which the evaluation will take place?
Table C.12: Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Interaction Is the APIM to operate as a sub-process for the user as part of an grounded
Dynamics overall task, e.g. cash machine transaction, or does it constitute the (A.6.6.)
entire task, e.g. inspecting an ePassport? Where is the position of the
identification process within the interaction to fulfil a user’s task?
User Is the user’s interaction with the biometric device or other input device grounded
Supervision watched by authorised personnel or is it self-service and unobserved? (A.6.7.)
Multiplicity What are the number and similarity in operation to other APIMs used grounded
Impact by the intended user population, i.e. multiple credentials (e.g. User (A.7.3.)
Accounts and passwords)? Does the APIM require differentiation
from other similar APIMs to avoid possible user confusion?
Task What is the position of the APIM function within the user’s task to deduced
Sequence achieve the desired goal? What impact could the potential APIM have (A.7.5.)
upon the user in achieving the overall task including speed and
accuracy? What outcomes need to be avoided from poor HCI design?
User Technical To what extent would the user population have the capacity deduced
Expertise to acquire specific skills, if required? (A.7.6.)
Frequency Will the expected usage frequency or patterns of APIM usage lead to deduced
of Use users becoming habituated or remaining non-habituated? (A.7.7.)
Table C.13: Task Dialogue Evaluation Theme
Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Impostor Pass/ What is the acceptable decision threshold determined by the risks in the deduced
False Alarm application context? How are these rates to be determined? RF (A.10.5.)
Threshold
Multiple In the case of a user input signal false non-match how many additional grounded
Attempts attempts for identification should the user be permitted? (A.10.8.)
Limit
User What are the operational devices which determine how an APIM grounded
Equipment captures the user’s input signal during enrolment and live usage? AQ (A.10.12.)
Enrolment Do security policies dictate that the enrolment process needs to be grounded
Supervision supervised in order to achieve the required user input signal quality? (A.10.13.)
Enrolment What work-around measures are required should a user be unable to grounded
Failure provide a valid input signal for enrolment, either temporarily or RF AQ (A.10.16.)
Arrangements permanently?
Vendor What type of quality control and statistical evidence are vendors required grounded
Support to offer on the performance of the enrolment and identification processes? (A.10.17.)
Table C.14: Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme
Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Resources What funds, personnel and tools will be committed to the change project deduced
Allocated or programme to design, implement, test, deploy and operate the APIM? (A.11.8.)
Environment What are the environmental factors that may affect user input signal grounded
Variance enrolment and signal processing during live operation? (A.10.18.)
Impostor What is the acceptable rate that a user input signal match is deduced
Pass Rate accepted erroneously by the matching component, possibly as a RF AQ (A.10.6.)
result of the threshold setting being too low to detect
deliberate compromise, e.g. fraud attacks?
Table C.15: Envisaged Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Backwards Is backward compatibility required to separate APIMs in different grounded
Compatibility authorisation domains? (A.10.20.)
Application What are the potential factors which may influence stating suitability grounded
Flexibility measurements for the APIM? (A.10.21.)
Scalability What scalability is desired for the APIM? Is the user population grounded
forecasted to grow significantly during the APIM’s projected life? (A.10.22.)
Upgrade What are the acceptable disruption, for the APIM owner and its users, if deduced
Impact upgrades were to be possible to the APIM? (A.10.23.)
Costs What are the system owner’s and stakeholders’ estimated programme deduced
Envisaged costs? Have these forecasts been based upon similar protection needs RF AQ (A.1.3.)
over a specified period? Do estimated costs draw on information from
similar implementations, from initial system designs, from vendors’
estimates or from suppliers’ tender submissions?
Table C.16: Forecasted Costs Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Identification/ To what extent does the solution design or vendor proposals meet the grounded
Authentication requirements for the APIM and have specifications with validated test (A.12.1.)
Model data been provided? Does the model align with policies and relevant
standards? How does it align with the infrastructure that is used
to implement the security policy in an organisation? Does it address
physical, procedural and IT security controls in a holistic way?
Credential Where are the users’ credential data stored? grounded
Storage Does the APIM require the user to possess and use an artefact, AQ (A.12.2.)
e.g. a token, to store or to generate and protect users’ signal data?
User Input Is the user’s input signal data stored centrally or stored on an artefact grounded
Signal Storage or a combination of both? (A.12.3.)
Mechanism Will there be a centralised database or distributed storage medium, where grounded
Processing a user will be required to carry his/her biometric or authentication data (A.12.4.)
Location on a portable artefact to allow the APIM to operate universally?
Mechanism What are the network, systems, devices, software and processes required grounded
Processing to support the APIM design? To what degree will the APIM owner have (A.12.5.)
Infrastructure operational control over the components, e.g. the Internet, browser,
or public key infrastructure, devices, to support the processing locations?
Processing How will the user input signal captured be protected during acquisition grounded
Protection for either local processing or extracted and communicated for remote (A.12.6.)
processing? How will the result be communicated to users and what
preventative measures protect against compromising the result notified?
Alternative Will a biometric feature or a name or code act as a unique identifier? grounded
Identifier Is that feature compatible, in terms of degradation, with the expected (A.12.7.)
Types lifetime of the authorised access or recognition requirement?
Biometric Where user input signals are based upon biometric features are all the Not-grounded
Modality elements, e.g. biometric modality template file size and storage (A.12.8.)
Selection medium elucidated in the detailed design?
Knowledge Where user input signals are knowledge based are all the grounded
Data elements, e.g. data composition and user’s cognitive actions, (A.12.9.)
Selection elucidated in the detailed design?
Mechanism Does the detailed design describe the tasks to support the APIM? How grounded
Maintenance are users added or deleted from the APIM? How are user’s data (A.12.10.)
maintained? How is a user’s claimed identity verified?
Maintenance How easy and often is it necessary to change or reissue authentication grounded
Effort data, keys, tokens, and software or recapture of biometric samples? (A.12.11.)
Associated What associated user data are required to be stored, e.g. autobiographical grounded
User Data data, with the identifier and identification data? (A.12.12.)
Signal Does the detailed design describe the APIM’s functions, e.g. capturing grounded
Processing the user’s input signal, and how data are protected during all processes? (A.12.13.)
Combined Does the design use multiple input signals or templates or data types grounded
User Input related to each identifier? Will the user generate data from an artefact (A.12.14.)
Signals or token generation device or remote system?
Costs What factors in the security architecture are most likely to increase Not-grounded
Influences or decrease costs of the APIM? (A.12.15.)
Security Is user interaction with the APIM intuitive or based on familiar designs? grounded
Training Will users require training on how to use the APIM, as designed? RF AQ (A.12.17.)
Needs Is there a help desk facility for users?
Performance Have there been any performance or evaluations of the APIM or similar grounded
Tests mechanisms in a comparable application context? (A.12.18.)
Table C.17: Security Architecture Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Credential What is the intended life of the APIM’s identifier, credential and artefacts grounded
Lifetime to provide continued access or entitlement to the information asset? AQ (A.13.1.)
Credential What are the rules for officials or administrators to undertake credential grounded
Authenticity issuance? Are these tasks automated? Is the verification of identity (A.13.2.)
evidence a separate task undertaken independently during the applicant
registration process?
Credential What are the rules for officials or administrators to undertake other grounded
Integrity credential management processes, e.g. issuing replacements or revoking (A.13.3.)
credentials? Are these tasks automated?
Credential What authorisation is required for entities and their officials to adopt and grounded
Maintenance operate credential maintenance processes? (A.13.4.)
Process
Adoption
Credential What are the processes for issuing and maintaining identification grounded
Maintenance credentials, including the processes for revocation and providing RF (A.13.5.)
Tasks justification for credential withdrawal reasons to former users, if
necessary?
Credential At the time of credential issuance, what are the processes to verify grounded
Delivery that the person to whom the credential is to be issued (and on (A.13.6.)
Verification whom the background verification was completed) is the same person
as the intended applicant/recipient as approved by the
authorised organisation during the person’s registration?
Credential Where will the processing of the initial user input signal to the related grounded
Use credential take place? What are the conditions for normal operational use (A.13.7.)
Locations of the credential?
Table C.18: Identifier Management Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Sampling Will the APIM use more than one instance of captured user signal or Not-grounded
Normalisation biometric input data to create the enrolment template? (A.14.1.)
Signal Is there sufficient inherent variation or randomness in the user’s input Not-grounded
Entropy signal to avoid candidate identification collisions? (A.14.2.)
Threshold Does the accuracy of the APIM comparison results meet the required deduced
Performance Impostor Pass/False Alarm decision threshold? What is the impact (A.14.3.)
upon performance from the adjustment of the threshold setting?
Deceit What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and resources, to synthesise deduced
Resistance an unauthorised entity of generating valid/correct user input signals? (A.14.4.)
Artefact What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and resources, to deceive deduced
Counterfeiting an APIM by producing a counterfeit copy of an artefact? (A.14.5.)
Device What is the probability that an APIM related device will perform its grounded
Maintainability intended function over a specified interval of operation? (A.14.8.)
Device Are supporting devices and artefacts functioning correctly for their grounded
Interfacing intended purposes in a way that meets the APIM’s requirements (A.14.9.)
which prevents them being disabled or the APIM being circumvented?
Is the installation to be tamper-evident with physical integrity and use
sensors to detect attempts at circumvention or possess similar controls?
Signal Does the APIM’s signal data contain the user’s private details, e.g. iris? deduced
Privacy Does the user approve the use of this private data and its protection? (A.14.14.)
Signal What are the technological safeguards to protect the integrity and grounded
Data and confidentiality of the user’s signal data captured, RF AQ (A.14.15.)
Protection stored, processed and transmitted?
Failure to Average number of users in the test case that are unable to provide an Not-grounded
Enrol Rate input signal of sufficient quality for identification or authentication? (A.14.17.)
Average Time Time to detect impostor attempts, including repeated tries Not-grounded
of Impostor Try averaged, regardless of successful verification over all impostor attempts? (A.14.19.)
Average Time Time to achieve correct user verification including repeat attempts deduced
of Verification Try averaged over all attempts and tests? (A.14.20.)
Average Number Number of failures in capturing user signal data averaged over all deduced
of Impostor impostors’ attempts? AQ (A.14.21.)
Capture Failures
Average Number Number of failures in capturing signal data from genuine subjects Not-grounded
of Genuine averaged over all genuine subjects‘ attempts? (A.14.22.)
Capture Failures
Artefact What processes are to be established to issue an artefact and/or other grounded
Accreditation related devices to users from approved suppliers whose reliability has RF AQ (A.13.8.)
been vetted by the APIM owner or agency and so approved or
authorised in writing, i.e. accredited?
Tamper Are there tamper deterrent and tamper indicative technologies deduced
Protection available to notify errors in the APIM? (A.16.18.)
Template Will the audit trail flag changes to data relating to an enrolled Not-grounded
Update template; or the template itself; or any changes in user (A.16.19.)
Notifications access rights as safeguards to detect unauthorised tampering?
Table C.19: Reliability Results Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Interface What data have been generated from the APIM’s usability tests? Not-grounded
Use Do the results provide evidence that both the authorised users and the (A.15.1.)
APIM’s administrators usage of the APIM’s Human Computer Interface,
artefacts, tokens or devices’ interactions are as intended? Are there
identified usability issues which introduce adverse or undesirable
user behaviour that may compromise the effectiveness of the APIM?
Convey Does the APIM’s human computer interface convey the available Not-grounded
Security security features to the user? (A.15.2.)
Features
Visibility of Does the APIM’s human computer interface have the ability for the Not-grounded
Mechanism user to observe the security status of internal operations? (A.15.3.)
Security Status
Intuitive To what extent is the APIM’s human computer interface comforting Not-grounded
Interface and naturally easy to learn? (A.15.4.)
Aesthetic and Does the APIM’s human computer interface convey or display only Not-grounded
Minimalist relevant security information? (A.15.5.)
Design
Error Reporting Does the APIM’s human computer interface show error messages that Not-grounded
and Assistance are detailed and state, if necessary, where to obtain help? (A.15.6.)
User Does the APIM’s human computer interface aid the user in having a Not-grounded
Satisfaction satisfactory experience with the APIM and other related components? (A.15.7.)
Depth of Does the user require cursory rehearsal, visual co-ordination, deduced
Cognitive cognitive activity or no effort in order to provide user signal data? (A.15.8.)
Processing at
Enrolment
Signal Is recall of the signal (authentication data) from the user’s memory to Not-grounded
Retrieval use the APIM with or without cues or recognition focused? Does the (A.15.9.)
Strategy APIM support or prompt the user to recall their input signal data
supplied upon enrolment and the procedures for using the APIM’s
interactive design?
Signal Is the user signal used by the APIM system assigned, self-assigned Not-grounded
Meaningfulness by the user, meaningful to the user or deducible only by the user? (A.15.10.)
Task Is the APIM likely to be operationally acceptable aligning with the Not-grounded
Convenience user’s task or duties? Is the APIM easy to learn within that task? Do (A.15.11.)
the APIM’s interaction processes and signal data need to be
memorised? Are allowances made for human error or limitations?
User Signal What is the users’ preference for signal type? Is the biometric Not-grounded
Preference modality chosen likely to be accepted against other modalities (A.15.12.)
which may be more familiar or less intrusive?
User Do users require training on how to use the APIM properly? Is the grounded
Training APIM supported by tools, e.g. wizards? Is the interaction intuitive? (B.20.1.)
Table C.20: Usability Results Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Database Is database backed-up and restore required if the identifiers and user Not-grounded
Contingency template or data for the APIM are lost, amended or destroyed? (A.12.16.)
System What are the computer system and network resources envisioned to Not-grounded
Resources support the overall APIM? (A.16.1.)
System Has full consideration been given to all functions and components deduced
Functionality to support the APIM? Does this description include: (A.16.3.)
user data collection; user input signal data capture and
parameter extraction; data transmission; data translation;
signal processing; template or image storage;and user
security management features and training information?
Technology What is the impact of the proposed APIM in terms of hardware, deduced
Impact software, personnel and training upon existing infrastructure? (A.16.4.)
Existing Is there a list of the available hardware and software in the architectural deduced
Technologies designs to support the APIM? To what extent does the design RF AQ (A.16.5.)
Utilisation utilise existing legacy systems and infrastructure?
Technical Will interoperability of the APIM with other existing, possibly Not-grounded
Interoperability alternative APIMs, in the intended application context be an issue? RF (A.16.6.)
Processing What is the processing power and media storage needed to support Not-grounded
Capacity the APIM locally and/or a server at a central location? (A.16.7.)
Back-up What are the back-up procedures should the APIM fail totally or Not-grounded
Methods partially in resulting in the total or temporary unavailability of all (A.16.8.)
users’ signal data?
Roles What are the roles and responsibilities for the various parties grounded
Assignment involved with the APIM? Has an operational role been assigned (A.16.11.)
for a security officer, security operator, an auditor, an administrator,
an APIM manager, a standard user, and privileged users?
Personnel Are technical support personnel, or substitutes, critical to the Not-grounded
Support operation of the APIM available? (A.16.12.)
Continual What are the training requirements for users and the administrators, deduced
Training of the APIM for the initial usage also for ongoing operations? (A.16.13.)
Device Are the user input signal capture devices capable of performing Not-grounded
Calibration automatic self-diagnostic and calibration tasks continually? (A.16.14.)
Lockout/ How does the APIM support a lockout or threshold for excessive grounded
Thresholds invalid access attempts by authorised users? How are these (A.16.15.)
Maintenance lockouts and thresholds changed securely?
Subject What competencies and involvement are acceptable for Not-grounded
Supervision administrators to supervise subject enrolment? (A.16.16.)
Enrolment Is it required that a supervisor has the ability to intervene in the Not-grounded
Process Support enrolment process to improve the quality of the user’s signals? (A.16.17.)
Data What technological safeguards have been implemented to deduced
Protection safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of the user signal and privacy (A.16.20.)
data the APIM captures, stores, processes and transmits?
Table C.21: Technology Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Operational Does the user require any special technical expertise, particular artefacts grounded
Enablers or devices, special software or hardware devices to use or access the (A.17.1.)
APIM?
Subject Are there any sensory, physical, cognitive disabilities that prohibit or grounded
Inclusiveness restrict impaired users from using the APIM as designed? RF AQ (A.17.2.)
Maintainability What is the time and effort spent in fulfilling these following tasks: deduced
Effort –application and enrolment processes AQ (A.17.3.)
–authentication processes
–replacement of authentication data
–replacement of keys and X.509.3 certificates
–securing of authentication data or keys
– biometric template updates
–other administrative functions relating to hardware or software?
Use What are the likely users effort involved with managing: deduced
Maintenance –APIM and associated devices or artefacts; (A.17.4.)
Effort –back-ups and expiration or retraction of authentication access; or
–loss of authentication data or keys?
Use Is the user’s time consumed at replacement, enrolment and operational Not-grounded
Convenience use together with maintenance functions commensurate to the (A.17.5.)
Comparison importance, responsibilities or liabilities, of users performing their task?
Technology Does the APIM operate using commonly available technology or are the grounded
Provisioning components specialised dedicated to that APIM or underlying service? RF (A.17.6.)
Is processing performed centrally and shared with ubiquitous devices?
Does device provisioning, and contributions made by the owner, aid user
accessibility or introduce barriers, including operating costs, to users?
Table C.22: Accessibility Results Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Privacy Does the use of the APIM affect user’s feelings or beliefs? grounded
Impact (A.15.13.)
Assurance What evidence demonstrates the APIM’s ability to meet the assurance Not-grounded
Evidence requirements set? (A.14.18.)
Costs What are the likely costs for making the APIM mandatory to all users grounded
Recovery in the community, as opposed to making the use of the APIM optional? (A.18.7.)
Is there capacity to recover some of these costs?
Identification What is the time to: activate the sensing device; capture user grounded
Time input signals; extract signal parameters; retrieve files and other (A.14.7.)
ancillary processing; compare the input signals against those stored;
communicate between the various APIM components; and effect
notification of acceptance or rejection or other results?
What are the possibilities to shorten the overall processing timescales?
to improve the acceptability for users and other stakeholders?
Practical What are the experiences from owners/users/administrators from using grounded
Experience this APIM in environment similar to the context application? (A.12.19.)
User To what extent will the user hold the firm belief that the APIM will protect Not-grounded
Confidence their interests, e.g. privacy, safety within the specified operational context? (A.17.7.)
Does the APIM demonstrate:
–explicit authorisation (The system does not become unsafe automatically);
–visibility (The system reports the security status);
–revocability (The user may undertake tasks to change the security status);
–path of least resistance (The user does not inadvertently choose to make
the security status unsafe);
–expected ability (The user should be aware of all the systems’ abilities);
–appropriate boundaries (The user should be able to distinguish what
aspects are relevant);
–expressiveness (The user should be able to instruct the system what tasks
are to be performed);
–clarity (The user should understand the all the system’s tasks); and
–dependability (The system protects the user from being fooled)?
Criticality of Is there an appropriate contingency plan and disaster recovery Not-grounded
Contingency policy to ensure continued operations in the event of an APIM (A.16.9.)
Plan failure, partially or totally?
Repair What are the proposed repair response times and the planned deduced
Response delivery of replacement parts? Is this acceptable to the system (A.16.10.)
Times owner and the user community?
Liabilities and Are the APIM’s stakeholder responsibilities clearly defined and grounded
Responsibilities delineated so that stakeholders may determine their respective liabilities? (B.23.1)
Table C.23: Solution’s Issues Evaluation Theme
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Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Components Are devices and/or artefacts, hardware and software components, grounded
Integration integrated to function correctly, as designed, in a manner that meets the (B.24.1.)
APIM’s requirements?
Circumvention What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and resources, to grounded
Susceptibility circumvent the APIM, without the need to deceive the processing logic? (A.14.6.)
Signal Is the APIM’s signal authentication data sufficiently disguised to Not-grounded
Predictability prevent strangers, friends and family etc. from determining it? (A.14.10.)
Signal What is the APIM’s number of possible user input signal or signal grounded
Abundance extraction permutations or total key space? (A.14.11.)
Signal Is the APIM’s authentication or key or verification data easy to record grounded
Disclosure or transfer, easily observed at entry or almost impossible to disclose? (A.14.12.)
Signal Does the APIM’s signal data capture device withstand various known grounded
Robustness attacks, e.g. keyboard loggers, brute force attacks, theoretical attacks? (A.14.13.)
Exploitable What are the known exploitable weaknesses in deployed or grounded
Vulnerabilities candidate APIMs? RF AQ (A.14.16.)
Vendor What is known about the potential vendors/integrators experience and grounded
Assessment capabilities for delivering the APIM to the proposed design? (A.12.20.)
Table C.24: Solution’s Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme
Factors Criteria Questions Status/Identifier
Implementation What are the total APIM project fulfilment costs? Does this estimate deduced
Costs include installing devices computer, networks, software etc and new or (A.18.1.)
changes to deployed infrastructure? To what extent might a modular
approach, particularly the application interface design, control
expenditure?
Maintenance What are the actual operational and support costs in relationship to the Not-grounded
Costs business case’s estimations? Do these costs include support costs of (A.18.2.)
hardware; software; maintenance processes; personnel; and training
costs? What is the cost impact to change existing procedures?
Mechanism What is the APIM’s and its components predicted life expectancy? Not-grounded
Anticipated Will it allow upgrade or migration or replacement of the APIM? RF AQ (A.16.2.)
Lifespan How do these aspects impact upon the costs of using different
user input signals or vendors?
Cost of What is the unit cost of signal input device including firmware and deduced
Input its protection, in the event it was stolen or to prevent its internal (A.18.3.)
Devices operation from being examined?
Cost of What is the unit cost of the artefact, e.g. an integrated circuit card and grounded
Artefacts its protection, if it was stolen, or in order to prevent its internal (A.18.4.)
operation from being examined?
Management What are the estimated costs for distributing and logistical support for Factor Deleted
Costs for Input any devices and/or artefacts associated with the APIM? (A.18.5.)
Devices or Merged
Artefacts with (A.18.2.)
Infrastructure What is the cost of the proposed solution for introduction of new or Not-grounded
Processing integrating the APIM technology into existing infrastructure in terms (A.18.6.)
Costs of network, hardware, software, support, personnel and training?
Other What are the total costs and/or effort for each party involved, excluding Not-grounded
Stakeholders’ users’ costs, in the use of the APIM, including hardware and software, RF AQ (A.18.8.)
Costs to ensure its compatibility with the users’ processes and the need to
revise supporting infrastructures?
Table C.25: Stakeholders’ Costs Evaluation Theme
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Appendix D
Appendix D – EU State’s eGates Pro-
gramme Case Study: Questions for
Interviewees
This appendix contains the questions posed to the interviewees involved in the EU State’s
Airport eGates Programme.
Interview Questions for Interviewees Involved with eGates Programme for Airports in the
EU state.
The inquiry into Automated Personal Identification is building a theory(ies) regarding when
a project should adopt a systematic methodology to select the optimum human recognition
system or alternatively use an unstructured, yet flexible approach.
The research questions for this case study, therefore, focus on the approach as to how eGates
were selected for the various airports, which assumes that an evaluation of many different
factors was undertaken during the project. The research is not an assessment or judgment of
the actual eGates that were selected or criticism of the processes involved in the selection;
however, it seeks to gain insight into the way the eGates were considered and eventually
selected.
The following questions will be used in an open interview and it is acknowledged that as
an interviewee you may have contributed with limited knowledge of certain aspects of the
projects.
1. When did you first become involved with the eGates projects and please describe your
role?
2. Please describe the approach adopted to select the eGates?
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3. How were the following project deliverables formulated or achieved:
4. objectives for the eGates?
5. operational requirements?
6. constraints and any policy directives, e.g. budget, health and safety regulations
respectively?
7. key performance indicators upon which to base an assessment?
8. the suppliers and their solution together with its configuration chosen?
9. the results of the pilot exercises assessed?
10. Are there outstanding issues relating to eGates, in respect of cost implications, vulner-
abilities and operational issues, e.g. usability, accessibility, reliability?;
11. In retrospect, is there any part of the approach adopted that you would recommend
doing differently? Why?
The research seeks to gather information about your contribution or knowledge of how the
project deliverables were established. Information on the deliverables is not required: the
research concentrates on the decision processes only.
June 2011
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Appendix E
Appendix E – Evaluation Themes and
Factors (Stage C)
This appendix contains 25 evaluation theme tables showing the factors for evaluating an
APIM as at Stage C of our factor validation effort, representing Step 9 of our research
implementation plan.
The tables show the status of the evaluation factors following our validation efforts using the
data from our EU State’s eGates Programme Case Study. The status also indicates which
evaluation factors were Grounded (G), Deduced (D) and Not-grounded (N) in our data. We
show relabelled factors as ‘RF’ and criteria questions which required amendment as ‘AQ’.
We assign an identifier to a new factor identified in Stage C, e.g. C.8.1., to denote stage
created, evaluation theme and factor reference number, to enable each factor and its criterion
question to be tracked through each subsequent validation.
The tables in this appendix contain the following evaluation themes:
Table E.1 Business Case Evaluation Theme;
Table E.2 Stakeholders’ Objectives Evaluation Theme;
Table E.3 Stakeholders’ Risks Evaluation Theme;
Table E.4 Community’s Characteristics Evaluation Theme;
Table E.5 Usage Environment Evaluation Theme (formerly Task Environment Evaluation
Theme);
Table E.6 Constraints Evaluation Theme;
Table E.7 Policies Evaluation Theme;
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Table E.8 Functional Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table E.9 Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme;
Table E.10 Registration and Enrolment Evaluation Theme;
Table E.11 Performance Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table E.12 Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table E.13 Task Dialogue Evaluation Theme;
Table E.14 Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme;
Table E.15 Envisaged Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme;
Table E.16 Predicted Costs Evaluation Themes (formerly Forecasted Costs Evaluation
Theme);
Table E.17 Security Architecture Evaluation Theme;
Table E.18 Identifier Management Evaluation Theme;
Table E.19 Reliability Results Evaluation Theme;
Table E.20 Usability Results Evaluation Theme;
Table E.21 Technology Management Evaluation Theme (formerly Technology Evaluation
Theme);
Table E.22 Accessibility Results Evaluation Theme;
Table E.23 APIM’s Issues Evaluation Theme (formerly Solution’s Issues Evaluation Theme);
Table E.24 APIM’s Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme (formerly Solution’s Vulnerabilities
Evaluation Theme); and
Table E.25 Stakeholders’ Costs Evaluation Theme.
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Feasibility The likelihood of an APIM fulfilling its Are there similar deployments precedents, a
Outlook purpose from a business, legal, conceptual prototype or independent expert
(A.1.8.) D RF operational and technological standpoints opinion that could provide indications on the
should be ascertained at the outset. potential of an APIM fulfilling its purpose?
Risks Stakeholder risks need to identified, What are the stakeholders’ business risks which
Identified understood and articulated in order require control? What vulnerabilities and threats
(A.4.2.) D AQ to determine the mitigating controls have been identified which may impact the
provided by the APIM. assurance sought from the deployed?
Defined If the business problem is not fully Is the personal identification problem fully
Business understood and resolution objectives understood and expressed as a high-level
Problem articulated then solution cannot be problem description and not attributes
(A.5.1.) D evaluated for its utility to resolve from potential solutions? How effective
that stated business problem. and efficient are existing mechanisms?
Project The basis for the approved investment Is the business analysis of stakeholders’
Sponsorship for effort to introduce or revise an APIM objectives for an APIM supported by a
(A.5.2.) N AF AQ needs to be stated at the outset. business case with justification for expenditure?
Alternatives Previous investigations should reveal the What are the learnings from investigations
Investigated issues and costs related to resolving the of possible solutions, including biometrics,
(A.6.4.) D AQ business problem. Using biometrics or or similar APIM deployments to address
hardware tokens need due consideration. the human identification problems?
Security The authorised subjects may not derive What are the incentives to encourage
Motivation of benefits for using the APIM. The subjects to use the APIM as designed?
Authorised incentives or penalties that should What are the disadvantages or liabilities
Subjects persuade subjects to manage credentials that may apply for inappropriate subject
(A.7.10.) G in an acceptable way need to be stated. behaviour or neglect?
Entity Stakeholders interact in through informal What is the relationship between the
Relationships arrangements or through scheme rules APIM’s issuing authority and relying party
(A.7.8.) G RF AQ to ensure the APIM provides an entities and other stakeholders, including
acceptable and viable proposition the subjects themselves. Is a formal usage
to resolve a stated business problem. agreement or contract in place?
Identity A description of the direct and indirect Who are the stakeholder entities involved
Authorisation stakeholder entities, including the with the application context? Which entities
Model subjects, in the application context helps may use subject identifiers and/or
(A.9.1.) D RF AQ to establish the role of each entity credentials for identification or
and its relationships with other entities. authentication purposes?
Contextual The purpose of the APIM needs to be Why is the APIM being introduced or
Purpose fully understood and communicated in revised? What are the business goals that
(B.7.1.) G terms of desired outcomes or objectives describe the business problem or opportunity,
to direct effort to evaluate and select the priority values of aspiration to be achieved
optimal APIM. in the scope of the APIM’s intended usage?
Stakeholders’ The benefits, tangible and non-tangible, Will the APIM be used to protect data assets
Benefits to revise or introduce an APIM need to or enhance the operations of one or many
(B.7.2. ) G be stated at the outset. Some benefits stakeholders? What are the advantages to the
should be derived from investing direct and indirect stakeholders to introduce
resources to introduce or revise an APIM. or revise the APIM?
Programme The decisions processes between the What entity or group has the authority
Governance stakeholders need to be stated, particularly for decisions or authority to change
Framework the entity empowered to make changes processes to select an APIM? How does
(B.7.3.) G to consultation or decision processes or the governance framework operate for
representative body membership. decision-making amongst its stakeholders?
Assurance This factor is a replication of Assurance (A.2.4.) deleted
Effectiveness Results Evaluation Theme.
Table E.1: Business Case Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Subject Privacy Clarification is needed on how subjects’ What are the intended courses of action
Protection Aims private data are to be protected in line with to protect subject’s private information?
(A.4.5.) N RF AQ legal, contractual and ethical
obligations.
Sponsorship The sponsor’s goal or prime objectives What are the aims of the sponsor stakeholder
Aims need to be clear to introduce an APIM in terms of asset protection and business
(A.4.4.) G RF AQ or revise a deployed APIM, which may enhancements? How do these aims align with
align or conflict with other stakeholders’ the objectives of other stakeholders,
or subjects’ objectives. including subjects and users?
Stakeholders’ A description of stakeholders’ benefits is What arguments support stakeholders’ aims to
Business needed to support the introduction of an instigate the introduction of an APIM
Rationale APIM or changes to current protection. or changes to a deployed APIM? Are
(A.1.1.) D RF AQ all stakeholders interests included?
Subject / User The reasons for subjects and users What are the stakeholders’ arguments
Acceptability willingness to use the APIM in the that describe the reasons for subjects’
Rationale application context should be explained. acceptance an APIM for its intended usage?
(A.3.2.) N RF AQ
Control The impact on annual loss expectancy What are the desired risks control
Objectives by introducing or revising an APIM access outcomes sought by introducing or revising
(B.1.1.) G should be described as an aim. an APIM to the current situation?
Table E.2: Stakeholders’ Objectives Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Risks Stakeholders may have different risks What are the stakeholders’ risks management
Treatment and alternative risk appetites to manage strategies (alleviation, transference, avoidance,
Strategy identified risks and residual risks. acceptance) for treating identified risks and
(A.2.8.) D RF AQ the remaining residual risks?
Impact on The consequences of an APIM failure What are the likely consequences if an APIM
Stakeholders need to be determined for all failed, which includes unauthorised access
(A.7.9.) D stakeholders, including subjects. to an asset and the unavailability of an asset?
Compromise Social engineering attacks on subjects What types of APIM user deception attacks
Scenarios and technological based attacks can be foreseen? What are the known
(A.6.9.) N need to be articulated. technological or social based attacks?
Privacy Organisational stakeholders may have What is the impact on each stakeholder and
Impact legal and contractual obligations to related subjects if subjects’ private
Assessment protect subjects’ private data. data are compromised? how does this impact
(A.8.3.) D AQ influence the requirements for the APIM?
Attack and The probability of compromise helps to What is the likelihood of a deliberate
Compromise determine appropriate security controls attack on the APIM? Also what is the
Probabilities given the value of the assets and probability of errors occurring?
(A.2.1.) D AQ known vulnerabilities and threats. Do these projections include an analysis
of historical events from all stakeholders?
Vulnerabilities The known vulnerabilities help to What are the known exploitable weaknesses
Identified determine the current levels of assurance in existing operations or potential flaw in new
(A.2.3.) G RF in the application context and operations which may include technological,
also identifies the desired assurance operational and human error aspects?
of an APIM.
Impact The value of damages or consequences What are the estimated impact costs or impact
Value to business operations needs to be ratings if stakeholders’ assets and resources
Rating established in order to determine the were to be stolen, destroyed or modified
(A.2.2.) G AQ appropriate security controls, including in the event of an APIM failure?
the optimal APIM.
Threat The motivation behind the threats with What is underlying stimuli or goals of
Motivation the rewards and deterrent penalties miscreants that lead to attacks on the APIM?
(A.2.7.) G RF to miscreants help determine APIM’s Are deterrents proportionate to potential
objectives as countermeasure. rewards? What are attackers’ motives?
Table E.3: Stakeholders’ Risks Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Subject The general acceptance of an APIM type What are the stakeholders’ expectations relating
Proposition does not immediately validate its to subject community’s adoption of an APIM?
(A.3.1.) G RF AQ usage for a particular application Do subjects derive sufficient benefit to
context. encourage the proper use of an APIM?
Social The acceptability of an APIM for its What subject attitudes have been established
Attitudes intended purpose to the subject from surveys on similar APIM deployments?
(A.3.3.) G AQ community gives an indication on How do these surveyed responses
subjects’ motivation to use the support or negate effort to introduce or
APIM as designed. revise an APIM?
Community The categorisation of community Who are the subjects and/or users in the
Membership members informs the scope for the context’s community? Are the subjects
(A.3.4.) G AQ APIM. Membership characteristics direct operators of the APIM? Is community
provide differentiators and indications on membership open to all individuals
the nature of the community together or restricted and what are those restrictions?
with expansion or contraction rates.
Subjects’ The degree of reliance and acceptability What is trust relationship between the APIM’s
Trust of the APIM may be based upon existing issuing authority and the subject? Is it a new
(A.3.5.) D RF AQ relationships and perceptions of relationship? What is the trust relationship
trustworthiness of public and private between the relying party and the subject?
organisations. Without trust subjects Are there any issues that would enhance or
may not co-operate or use the APIM as limit existing relationships or inhibit
intended. Trust may also develop from relationships from developing?
a contractual agreement or legislation.
Subject The subject community’s capability and Is the subject community capable of
and User motivation to absorb technical and absorbing knowledge from educational
Training operational skills could help to widen the material supplied relating to the proper
(A.7.2.) G RF AQ options of credentials and/or other devices. usage of credentials or other devices?
Population The subjects’ characteristics are important What are the main characteristics of the
Traits to avoid exclusion from the community subject community, in terms of population
(A.7.4.) G and provides traits upon which demographics, physiology, behaviour,
requirements may be specified and appearance that pose disadvantages or create
designs may be evaluated. advantages for the APIM selection options?
Users’ The subject community which is to use What are the expectations that all individuals
Cooperation an APIM may impact, inadvertently, will cooperate voluntarily with an automated
(A.7.11.) D its effectiveness and efficiency. identification process in this application context?
Privacy Evidence is needed to substantiate claims What assurance is required to demonstrate
Assurance of compliance with privacy legislations anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability
(A.8.8.) D AQ and the commitments provided to the and anonymity compliance to data
subject community. privacy legislation and security policies?
User The disadvantages or liabilities of the What subject consent or acceptance is needed
Obligations usage terms for the APIM may outweigh for user and/or subjects to acknowledge their
(B.3.1.) G any potential benefit or proposition to responsibilities or liabilities for the APIM?
the subject or user. Some APIMs contain To what extent do these obligations negate
terms and conditions or are mandatory. their benefits of using the APIM?
Table E.4: Community Characteristics Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Environment The environment’s characteristics may How will the APIM operate in the intended
Ergonomics impact upon the ergonomic operation physical usage settings? Will it be required
(A.2.5.) G RF AQ of the APIM. to operate in consistent environments? What
attributes differentiate its usage in the envisaged
usage settings?
Technical Subjects’ control of technical Does the subject utilise a ubiquitous device or is
Control devices may impact the requirements technology supplied by the APIM issuing
(A.6.8.) G AQ for an APIM and may authority or relying party? What physical
influence the subject’s acceptance control should stakeholders have over the APIM
and usage of a device, particularly. and its components? To what extent should
if they are unfamiliar. users control devices’ logical operations?
Logical The information systems that the What are intended logical applications
Usage APIM supports need to be described for the APIM, the types of operating
Settings together with the supporting devices, devices and operating systems?
(B.4.1.) G infrastructure and operating systems.
Physical The physical location may adversely Where will the APIM operate?
Usage Settings impact or enhance the What are physical environmental characteristics
(B.4.2) G subject’s ability to use the APIM. of these locations?
Usage The usage scenarios for automated Will the APIM be used for physical
Logistics identification requires clarification to identification, logical identification or both?
(B.4.3.) G ensure the scope and purpose for the Have usage cases been developed?
APIM is articulated and understood.
Table E.5: Usage Environments Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Political The politics and economics relating to What political or economic matters may
Considerations the application context may influence hinder or support organisational change? How
(A.1.4.) G RF AQ the requirements for the APIM. does this change impact the APIM selection?
Stakeholder The relationships between the What commercial, organisational or political
Relationships stakeholders and subjects together stakeholder relationship issues hinder
(A.1.5.) G RF AQ with implicit understandings could or support a proposition to introduce an APIM
influence stakeholder collaboration. or revise an APIM deployment?
Regulatory Regulation may place restrictions How does legislation and industry guidelines
Imperatives or additional tasks on stakeholders to impact the stakeholder aims for an APIM in
(A.1.6.) G RF AQ comply and to demonstrate compliance. the proposed usage settings?
Budget The budgetary capital and operational What funds and resources have allocated
Allocated investments that stakeholders’ commit by stakeholders, to introduce an APIM
(A.4.3.) N RF AQ influence requirements and choices on or review / revise an APIM deployment,
APIM solution candidates. in order to minimise risk?
Contextual The restrictions of the application What external existing issues relating to
Legacies context influence the proposition the application context could impact the
(A.5.4.) G AQ for the APIM. It is assumed that stakeholders’ and subjects’ propositions, which
the APIM proposition does not start include organisational issues, current practices,
from a neutral historical state, whether social norms, existing infrastructures
technological or social norms. and deployed information systems?
Subject The application context may require What are the restrictions in terms of
Application that a subject’s application and the logistics or procedural activities
and Signal enrolment must be a face-to-face that dictate where and how subject
Enrolment interaction. Alternatively, either or both signals are acquired, generated
(A.10.2.) G RF activities are self-service or remote. and distributed?
External The reality of the environment What are the performance limitations
Performance influence the APIM’s performance of the usage settings in which the APIM
Benchmarks capabilities and reliability. is designed to operate? What are the
(A.5.7.) G AQ learnings from similar deployments?
Specifications Specifications for application contexts What specifications are applicable to the APIM
and Information are designed to ensure technical to ensure interoperability and requisite quality
Technology and procedural interoperability and in the application context? Which standards
Standards are also a claim to a specific quality. are these specifications based upon?
(A.5.5.) G RF AQ
Users’ The APIM’s design may utilise What are the potential costs for users to use
Costs ubiquitous or special devices and costs the APIM, in terms of hardware,
(A.3.6.) G AQ to ensure compatibility may be incurred software, infrastructure service purchases
by subjects rather than stakeholders. and compatibility with users’ processes?
Signal Data Data may need to be exchanged Is there a need to exchange subjects’ signal data
Exchange between relying party stakeholders and or other attributes with other organisational
Interoperability credential issuing authorities. entities for the APIM’s application context?
(A.5.6.) G RF AQ Do interoperability specifications exist?
Auditing The periodicity and measures for using What is the retention period and archive storage
Subject and storing signal data may impact rules for data used by the APIM to automatically
Data Usage potential investigations or efforts identify a subject and what are the legal and
(A.1.7.) N RF AQ to comply with legal or contractual risks associated auditing requirements for
obligations. these data?
Compromise The obstacles which may affect How will stakeholders recover the APIM
Recovery recovery of an APIM should be in the event of failure? Are there technology,
Inhibitors articulated. procedures or scheme rules which inhibit
(B.5.1.) G RF AQ recovery actions?
Table E.6: Constraints Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Archiving The stakeholder policy on data or audit What are the stakeholders’ policies on retaining
Data log retention may differ to that required and archiving data generally? How do these
Policies by privacy regulation or rules of the policies relate to the APIM subject signal and
(B.6.1.) G RF context in which the APIM operates. other private data in usage transactions?
Organisational The stakeholder organisational policies How do stakeholder organisation policies,
Policies may give direction on issues including privacy policies, impact the automated
(A.8.1.) G RF relating to an organisation’s governance. identification of employees, customers,
agents or partners?
Recognised Contextual issues should be articulated Are there issues relating to the application
Issues and researched as knowledge of context explicitly accepted by stakeholders,
(B.6.2.) G AQ their impact may affect the including users?
requirements for an APIM. Are these issues discussed in the public domain?
Authorised The stakeholders must provide direction Which entities are empowered to provide
Identity as to which entity or group determines the policy on acceptable proof of identity
Evidence Sources policies on the proof identity evidence, evidence, registration and enrolment?
(B.6.3.) G registration and enrolment processes.
Privacy The individual or accountable group Have stakeholders assigned the responsibility
Laws assigned with the responsibility of of complying with privacy laws
Compliance compliance with legislation needs to a specific entity with responsibility to
(A.8.2.) N AQ to provide direction on privacy issues. manage this corporate governance issue?
Programme How does each stakeholder go What is the stakeholders’ strategy and
Implementation about implementing agreed governance framework to implement
(A.4.1.) D RF AQ organisational change policies? organisational changes?
Requirements The methodology used by stakeholders How will the development programme gather
Gathering programme may influence the and articulate their business requirements
Methodology requirements for the APIM. for an APIM?
(A.5.3.) D AQ
Stakeholders’ Stakeholders should have the means What are the stakeholders’ policies for settling
Resolution and procedures for settling disputes with disputes with partners, customers and other
Processes other stakeholders and subjects. entities and also subjects?
(B.6.5.) G RF
Subject The context may dictate that subjects Does the application context warrant the
Duress should be able to use a ‘panic button’ to inclusion of a notification alarm to indicate
(A.17.8.) N RF notify duress while using the APIM. coercion of a subject while using the APIM?
Imposing Stakeholders may choose to seek What is the stakeholder policy for dealing
Sanctions criminal damages for miscreants with miscreants or authorised
(B.6.4.) G or impose disciplinary reprisals. users which improperly use the APIM?
Table E.7: Policies Evaluation Theme
436
Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Subject The processes to enrol subjects’ signals What functions are required to capture
Signals must be specified. Some subjects’ subjects’ signals or generate authentication
Enrolment signals may be acquired remotely data during local or remote enrolment?
(C.8.1.) G or generated remotely.
User The user authorisation model What entities are involved with the
Authorisation between the user and stakeholder identification or entification? What are
Model entities need to be understood. their roles within the automatic identification
(C.8.2.) G and authorisation processes?
Administration The entity assigned with responsibility What are the required processes
Processes of administering the APIM must to enable administration personnel to
(C.8.3.) G have access to the required perform duties to fulfil all the life-cycle
system functionalities in order to tasks to support the APIM and its users?
execute their tasks. What safeguards are required to prevent
access to private data and processes?
Signal The devices for the APIM may be bespoke What specifications are the
Capturing or ubiquitous and may also need devices and software required to
Device enhancement to comply with adhere to? What is required to
Interoperability interoperability specifications. ensure these devices operate universally?
(B.8.3.) G
User Identification and authentication may What attributes need to be captured
Authentication be linked to access control mechanisms, from the APIM to enable verified
Attributes which may require attribute data users to have access to functions and data
(B.8.1.) G from the APIM to function properly. in the user authorisation model?
Identification Positive identification proves Is the purpose of the APIM to positively
Mode that a subject is enrolled whereas identify an enrolled subject or to ensure
(A.6.1.) G RF AQ negative identification proves that a that a person is not enrolled? Is there a
subject is not enrolled or known. need to consolidate both functions?
Multiple The assurance requirement based upon Do the risks and assurance requirements
Subject risks dictate whether a single signal is suggest the use of a single subject signal
Signals adequate or that fusion of biometrics, or necessitate the fusion of multiple subject
(A.6.5.) G RF AQ knowledge based or computed signals possibly using calculated data from
signals using an ICC are required. artefacts or generated by other sources?
Identification Covert identification rules out Does the requirement entail the subject being
Transparency some APIM types, particularly based unaware of the APIM? If so, what are
(A.6.2.) G RF AQ user knowledge. Most APIMs require the legal and technological
overt subject participation. An constraints that apply to a covert APIM?
application context may permit both Does the requirement allow for covert
covert and overt verification. and overt flexibility of transparency?
Subject The requirement for the signal’s format(s), What format will the subject signal be
Signal its storage location(s) and its required stored for identification or entification?
Storage protection dictates how the identification Where should that data be stored?
(B.8.2.) G or entification processes are to operate. How should that stored data be protected?
Table E.8: Functional Requirements Evaluation Theme
437
Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Approved The entities that are authorised to verify What entities have been delegated powers
Privacy and maintain subjects’ private data in to acquire subjects’ private data, store,
Asset a repository. This function may differ to maintain and use it and possible to issue
Registrars registration authorities and enrolment credentials? Does this agency gain approval to
(A.8.4.) G RF AQ agencies or identity service providers. register, to enrol subjects and to issue
credentials?
Privacy The stakeholders may be required to deal What procedures are to be put in place
Assets with events where subjects’ may not for those applicants who are denied access
Appeals be entitled to access an asset or to an information system or have their access
Procedure may not be able to produce the required revoked, either legitimately or erroneously?
(A.8.5.) N biometric feature or may dispute
stakeholder claims of improper usage.
Privacy Asset Private data are assets belonging to What documentation describes the processes
Access subjects that are maintained by a to ensure that only authorised users may
Controls custodian or approved entities that collect, use, maintain, disclose and protect
(A.8.6.) D RF AQ comply with privacy legal requirements. subjects’ private data for the APIM?
Privacy Stakeholders should have the What processes are required to co-ordinate
Asset processes and necessary resources to with authorised entities, responses to
Compromise manage privacy compromise incidents. notifications of suspected privacy violations?
(A.8.7.) G
Privacy Auditors or government bodies What processes need to be put into place
Asset may require to ensure that data are to allow inspection of the privacy asset
Inspection held in compliance to law and register generally which also allows subjects to
(A.8.9.) N contractual obligations. access to their personal information held?
Privacy Stakeholders need to demonstrate What processes are necessary to prevent the
Controls that controls to maintain subjects’ private existing controls on maintaining subjects’
Erosion data continue to be effective. private data from being eroded? Should these
(A.8.10.) N AQ
processes include subject data held on an arte-
fact?
Table E.9: Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme
438
Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identity The methods by which administrative How should the identity knowledge or
Proofing personnel verify presented documentary evidence presented by the
Methods evidence are important to applicant be verified as authentic for
(A.9.2.) G RF AQ detect fraudulent identity applications. the genuine subject?
Identity These rules determine who is entitled What are the identity verification processes and
Proofing to be a community member, the the required evidence and authorisation which
Rules evidence to support that entitlement entitles a subject access to a resource or asset?
(A.9.5.) G AQ and the authorising entity What attributes entitle or prohibit a user
empowering that entitlement. from being a subject member of the community?
Approved The entities authorised to check subjects’ What entities have been delegated powers
Registration entitlement to assets, which performs the to register, issue identifiers, acquire subjects’
Agencies verification of seed identification signal data and issue and maintain credentials
(A.9.6.) G evidence, subject’s application data, for the APIM? Does this entity also have
issuing identifiers and delivering creden-
tials.
authority to store and use subjects’ data?
Application The entity to perform the registration of What are the application, registration and
and Registration an authorised subject and the rules enrolment processes for authorised subjects.
Processes that govern the registration processes What are the complete end-to-end
(A.9.7.) G RF AQ require articulation. processes, including artefacts to subjects?
Identity The may be a requirement for the identity Does the identity proofing and registration
Proofing and verification and registration processes processes require accreditation
Registration to be independently scrutinised to address by an independent body?
Accreditation risks identified or to control access to
(A.9.11.) N subjects’ private data.
Accredited The accreditation is to ensure that an What entities provide the identity verification
Processes identity checking service provider’s functionality and is there a requirement for
Applicability processes meet a particular specification their processes to be accredited? Does
(A.9.12.) D AQ to offer an accredited identity the provider also register individuals or
checking service. carry out enrolment tasks?
Approved The approval relates to whether the What authorisation is required before the
Processes identification checking service has to adoption and operation of an approved
Adoption obtain the necessary authorisation identity verification service operates on behalf
(A.9.13.) D AQ to perform and provide such services. of stakeholder entities, including relying parties?
Credential The requirement to link the identification Is a unique identifier assigned to authenticate
Identifier or process to a unique identifier impacts the the subject or entification using the subject’s
Entifier APIM mode of operation. An identifier attributes? Is there a need for subject
(A.6.3.) G RF AQ enables 1–1 authentication. Entification anonymity or the use of a pseudonym to
involves 1–many searching. mask the subject’s declared identity?
Acceptable The rules to implement the policy What does the policies stipulate in terms of
Subjects for distinguishing between subjects determining acceptable members or acceptable
(A.9.4.) G RF AQ entitled to access assets or resources characteristics of the subject community?
and those individuals that are not Are there differing interpretations to the rules
authorised. which constitutes stakeholders acceptability?
Enrolment Registered subject’s signals upon which What are the processes to capture the subjects’
and Credential subjects will be entified or authenticated signals for the APIM? Does this process
Issuance must be captured, generated and require the subject to attend an enrolment
(A.9.8.) G RF AQ distributed securely. Signals may need facility or generate initial authentication
captured directly from the subject data remotely or is the data generated by
and generated to a specific standard. other entities and sent to the subject?
Acceptable The seed documentation and its sources What are the acceptable identification source
Identity validate the veracity of the claimed evidence for proof of identity processes? How
Evidence identity. Issuing authorities and is that evidence itself validated or
(A.9.9.) G AQ relying parties rely on this evidence. cross-referenced?
Table E.10: Registration and Enrolment Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Maximum Limiting the number of user attempts may How many attempts are users allowed to
Identification reduce demands on system resources and identify or to entify a subject ? What is the
Attempts Limit may limit replay attacks at the expense of maximum attempts before access is disabled?
(C.11.1.) denying genuine users access to assets.
Maximum The identification transaction time may What is the maximum time permitted for
Identification need to be responsive to operational tasks each subject identification or entification attempt
Time Limit and risks? before another try may be attempted?
(C.11.2.)
Operational The nature of the environments impacts Is the APIM to operate in consistent conditions
Ergonomics the ability of an APIM to operate or variable environments? What are the variable
(A.10.1.) G AQ consistently, e.g. lighting variations. conditions which may impact performance?
Subjects’ This rate focuses on the input devices Will the APIM need to flag poor quality subject
Signal and the need for calibration, both signals captured? What is the toleration
Tolerations initially and continually. rate before further subject signals
(A.10.3.) G AQ or additional data are acquired?
Subject The timing impacts usability and What are the required throughput rate
Throughput security and vulnerabilities stemming requirements expressed in terms of minimum
Rates from repeated attempts or long numbers in a specific time? What is the
(A.10.4.) G feedback response times. maximum queuing timescales?
Subject The requirements of the application How many false non-match errors are
False context may necessitate that genuine tolerable or acceptable for subject signals, i.e.
Non-match subjects are rejected at the expense false accept rates and false reject rates,
Tolerations of detecting impostors, or vice versa. which are commensurate to the risks of the
(A.10.7.) G application context.
Intervention The subjects may need assistance and What is tolerable error rate before assistance to
Rate interventions may improve unsupervised a subject is offered by a trained operative?
(A.10.9.) G throughput over a period of time. Does this rate allow for user familiarisation of
the APIM?
Impostor The risks in the application context In respect of the risks identified, what is
Detection determine the rate at which an APIM the acceptable probability that an APIM
Rate is required to perform to detect an fails to detect an impostor?
(A.10.10.) G impostor.
Maximum The enrolment time should not be What is the maximum time permitted for
Enrolment protracted in respect of the context each subject’s signal enrolment
Time its risks and assurance requirements. attempt?
(A.10.14.) G
Maximum The number of enrolment attempts may How many attempts is a subject allowed
Enrolment inadvertently reduce the size of the subject to enrol their signals? Would supervision
Attempts community. increase or reduce the number of attempts?
(A.10.15.) G AQ
Signals and The data upon which identification and/or What are the security controls required
Template authentication decisions take place must to protect the subject’s signal data
Protection be reliable. so that these data may be used for
(A.10.19.) G identification and/or authentication purposes?
Table E.11: Performance Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Attack The resources and skills to successfully What are the technology resources and
Protection compromise an APIM should be skills needed to successfully attack an APIM?
and Detection significant in order to deter Are attacks to be detected?
(A.11.1.) G misfeasance.
Assurance The required tools and utilities need What tools and facilities are required to
Test Tools description to enable assessors to carry perform functional and assurance tests
and Methods out the tests and evaluate result data. described in the testing plan?
(A.11.2.) G
Documentation Lack of documentation should make it What information are to be made available
and Test Data harder for attackers to acquire the to assessors to test the APIM? What
Availability relevant knowledge to attack the APIM. documentation will remain confidential and
(A.11.3.) G Evaluators either test the APIM which elements will be in the public domain
with or without this knowledge. for attackers to interrogate?
Functional These statements inform potential What is the desired reliability to ensure
Testing suppliers and developers of APIMs on the APIM functions correctly? Are assurance
(A.11.4.) G the various types of attacks envisaged tests to be performed on documented attacks
and how the APIM should respond and/or tested by external expertise? What
to each type of attack. are the behavioural expectations in
response to each type of attack?
Audit Data are required to demonstrate What data are required to meet regulatory
Logs compliance but also assist in gaining an reporting and risk management functions?
(A.11.5.) D understanding on performance and to Are assurance data required for operational
investigate security breaches. management and investigation purposes?
Assurance The way the assessment is performed What is the assessment framework to
Assessment should be objective, repeatable and test the APIM? Has a testing plan
Methodology auditable based upon substantiated and test resources been allocated
(A.11.6.) G result data and a testing plan. to carry out assurance assessments?
Assurance The requirements for proposed devices What are the operational qualities for any
Tests and artefacts need to be described required physical devices or artefacts that
(A.11.7.) D AQ together with the test data needed in subjects may need to use? How are these
order to test for assurance. artefacts to be protected? What
The tests may be incorporate functionality test data are required, as evidence, on
from internal or external designs. the devices’ assured operation?
Combining The fusion of two or more subject signals Do risks dictate the requirement for two or more
Signals may improve the identification or subject signals to improve the identification
(A.10.11.) G RF AQ authentication of the genuine subject. or authentication of the genuine subject?
Table E.12: Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Interaction The usage settings will determine Is the APIM interaction to operate as a
Dynamics how the subjects’ signals are to sub-process in a subjects’ system usage task?
(A.6.6.) G AQ be captured, through the types of device, Does the interaction use ubiquitous devices? Do
which may be operationally conducive. these devices need to work in particular
A poorly HCI design may be ergonomic, physical or logical conditions?
a disincentive to potential users. What outcomes need to be avoided from poor
HCI design?
Interaction The degree of subject supervision or Do the signal input devices require subject
Supervision control needed to ensure the involvement, subject supervision or should the
(A.6.7.) G RF AQ subjects’ signals are sensed properly. APIM be designed for self-service?
Multiple The similarity of input devices What are the input devices normally adopted
Credential may lead to user confusion, errors for the types of usage settings envisaged?
Impact or undesired behaviour. Multiple APIMs Does the proposed APIM need differentiate itself
(A.7.3.) G RF AQ in similar usage settings may introduce from other similar types of APIMs to
usability difficulties and errors. avoid user confusion, error or behaviour?
Task The APIM interaction may appear at Does the APIM interaction comprise entire
Sequence the start of the users’ task, during and/or user’s task or it is part of a transaction?
(A.7.5.) G at the completion of the transaction. What is the position(s) of the APIM interaction
The logic of where to place the in the overall transaction? What usability
APIM interaction is dictated by impact should the APIM interaction avoid in
how the user would habitually relation to the user’s successful completion
complete the task. of the overall transaction?
User The extent to which a subject What skills do the subjects or users need to
Technical population is able or willing to learn to use the input device to record
Expertise use a new device or process may subjects’ signals? Does the subject
(A.7.6.) D AQ impact the types of input devices and population have the capability and
the nature of the APIM interaction. motivation to acquire such skills?
Usage The regular usage of an APIM may What is the expected subject usage pattern
Frequency reinforce subjects’ habits. for the APIM and could this pattern lead
(A.7.7.) D Irregular usage may suggest that to habitual usage? Does this usage pattern apply
subject learning should be minimised. right across the subject population?
Table E.13: Task Dialogue Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Impostor Pass/ The setting of the threshold depends upon What is the acceptable identification
False Alarm the risks of the application context. The decision threshold as determined by
Threshold method to establish the acceptable the risks in the application context?
(A.10.5.) D rate should be articulated. How is this rate to be determined?
Multiple A genuine subject may receive a In the case of subject signal false non-match for
Attempts false rejection erroneously. The a subject how many additional attempts for
Limit increase in number of attempts, however, identification should the subject be
(A.10.8.) G AQ gives opportunities for impostors. permitted before an action is instigated?
User The costs and effort for users to set up What equipment, including costs, and effort
Equipment the APIM may not be commensurate is required by users to set up the APIM in
Needed to users’ potential benefits. comparison to users’ potential benefits?
(A.10.12.) G RF AQ
Enrolment The quality of data required may What quality do the subjects’ initial signals need
Supervision necessitate intervention to ensure that to meet for automated identification
(A.10.13.) G AQ signals are sufficient for intended purpose. before invoking operative intervention?
Enrolment Some subjects may be excluded and What measures are required should subjects
Failure alternative measures may be needed be unable to produce the signals to
Arrangements to enable accessibility. Some subjects the required quality, either temporary
(A.10.16.) G subject may try to exploit exemptions. or permanently?
Vendor Data showing a track record provides What type of evidence is required from
Capabilities an indication on a supplier’s potential suppliers that shows they can supply
Evidence potential to deliver and perform to the APIM provided in their proposals? Do
(A.10.17.) G RF AQ the terms of a contract. Financial they need to supply references to deployments
standing and local representation may also in similar application contexts or
have a bearing on acceptability. geographic locations?
Table E.14: Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identity There should be the means to detect What are the processes that detect
Proofing fraudulent identity claims and fraudulent identity claims or false registration?
Comprise prevent false registration applications. Do the risks dictate that the identity verification,
(A.9.10.) G A credential could be issued to registration and enrolment require
an individual who is not entitled the segregation of operatives’ duties?
erroneously or unwittingly.
Genuine The impact of the failure of an APIM What is the impact of an APIM failure
Failure to correctly identify a subject needs to correctly identify genuine subjects?
Impact to be understood and quantified.
(C.15.1.)
Acknowledged The requirements acquisition processes What are the conceptual vulnerabilities that
Conceptual should reveal vulnerabilities that cannot have been accepted by stakeholders in terms
Vulnerabilities be resolved. Data are required of partial or total failure or compromise?
(C.15.2.) required as an explicit acknowledgment.
Availability The availability of the APIM What are the availability requirements
Goals is critical to support the business for the APIM? Are there peak processing
(C.15.3.) operations. Slack periods may allow periods or time slots when maintenance
maintenance tasks to be performed. may be carried out?
Resource Insufficient resources, technical What personnel, facilities and infrastructure
Limitations competencies and available infrastructure are committed to design, test, deploy
(A.11.8.) D RF may restrict the choice of APIM. and operate the APIM?
Receiver Each point on the ROC curve defines What are the acceptable vulnerabilities of false
Operating the acceptable vulnerabilities of the rejects to false acceptance across all operating
Characteristics APIM. It is an acknowledgment points? What influences the variations of
and Influences of these vulnerabilities and influences. these points across the threshold curve?
(A.10.18.) G RF AQ
Impostor The impact of the failure of an APIM What is the impact of an APIM’s failure
Pass or its circumvention due vulnerabilities to correctly identify impostors, particularly
Impact needs to be understood and quantified. setting the rate too low to detect
(A.10.6.) D RF deliberate attacks?
Table E.15: Envisaged Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Expected The stakeholders expectations What is the expected lifetime usefulness
Lifetime regarding the return on investments of the APIM for the application context
(C.16.1.) G need to be ascertained. based on Return of Investment (ROI)
calculations?
Backward The reuse of existing infrastructure Is backward compatibility required to
Compatibility existing procedures necessitate existing APIMs or accepted operating norms or
(A.10.20.) G AQ accommodating existing capabilities. existing capabilities or infrastructures?
Usage The costs associated with a single Is the APIM designed for a single
Flexibility purpose may not bring sufficient purpose or is it ubiquitous in design to
(A.10.21.) G AQ returns on stakeholders’ investments. be used for a number of approved applications?
Scalability The take up of services and an APIM What scalability is required in terms of
(A.10.22.) G RF AQ may be difficult to predict. responding to population growth or decrease?
All projections should be validated How quickly should a response be required
as over or under capacity may in terms of numbers and timescales to
impact costs and performance. ensure sufficient capacity?
Systems While it may be desirable to upgrade What are the acceptable disruption, for the
Upgrade an APIM’s components the effort, APIM owner, stakeholders and its users, and
Impact disruption and costs of revising deployed infrastructure, if upgrades were possible, to a
(A.10.23.) D RF systems needs to be estimated. deployed APIM?
Programme The programme costs need to be What are the predicted sponsor entity costs?
Costs ascertained, which may include Are stakeholders’ costs based upon similar
(A.1.3.) G RF AQ many assumptions and calibrated requirements and application contexts? Have
predictions. any initial designs been produced to facilitate
cost comparisons with similar deployments?
Table E.16: Predicted Costs Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identification/ A diagrammatic representation assists How does the APIM integrate into the
Authentication in determining the extent to which the overall security architecture? What are
Model security architecture, including the the controls for interactions between
(A.12.1.) G AQ APIM, maps to articulated requirements. technology, processes and people?
Subject Signal The locations where the identifier Where are the identifier and subject’s signals
Storage Locations and credentials determine how that be stored? Are the data for usage stored
data may be used by the APIM. centrally, on a distributed artefact or on
(A.12.2.) G RF a device or at other locations?
Subject Signal The data may be stored in its original How are the subject signal data stored?
Storage Format form or in a transformed state. Are all data stored in the same format?
(A.12.3.) G e.g. template. The cryptographic What are the size of the data signals
protection needs description. and how are data protected?
Mechanism The comparison of the subject’s On what device does the signals matching take
Processing identifier and /or credentials may place and where do those data reside? What
Locations take place locally, remotely or hybrid are the roles of each physical device
(A.12.4.) G AQ solution. and application software in the APIM?
Mechanism The comparison of the subject’s Is there a centralised database on-line or
Processing identifier and /or credentials may distributed storage medium, e.g. smart card,
Infrastructure take place locally, remotely or hybrid which require network connectivity?
(A.12.5.) G solution. What are the networks, systems and software?
Processing The confidentiality of subject’s How are the subject’s signals and
Protection signals are paramount to minimise data protected during usage?
(A.12.6.) G AQ replay attacks.
Subject Signal The signals that are used by the What subject signals, from biometric
Data matching processor to entify or modalities or user knowledge or certificates
(A.12.8.) G AF AQ verify the subject together with a or device identifiers or other data, are
Merger of (A.12.8.) description of the device used to used to entify or identify the subject?
and (A.12.9.) capture subject’s signals or data from Does it involve the use of an identifier?
other devices. A description of how these How are various data elements fused? What
signals are captured and processes devices and processes are used to capture
is fundamental for evaluation. signal data and other related data ?
Mechanism The effort involved to distribute How easy and how often is it necessary
Maintenance components or revise subject’s signals to change or reissue data, devices, artefacts
Effort and as portrayed by APIM’s design, subject signals associated with the APIM?
Reactivation or in the event of error, compromise Does this reinstatement involve the subject
(A.12.10.) D RF AQ or faulty devices. seeking assistance from a support team?
Artefacts The credential data may be revised How are credential data on artefacts updated,
Maintenance by the subject, the administrator or replaced or replenished in normal,
(A.12.11.) D RF AQ automatically. compromise or failure states?
Subject The process to capture the subject’s What are the processes to capture,
Signals signal to entify or identify must transform, compare captured signals
Processing be described. and outputs results to the subject
(A.12.13.) D AQ and intermediary devices and systems?
Combined The processes to capture multiple subject’s Does the design capture multiple subject
User Input and fuse these signal to entify or identify signals and how are these signals fused
Signals must be described. within the authentication model, which should
(A.12.14.) G AQ
explain the use of intermediary devices and sys-
tems?
Mechanism The subjects may need guidance on How are subjects’ trained to use the
Training and how to use, maintain the credentials. the APIM and its devices or artefacts?
Awareness Advice facilitates desired behaviour. Are users provided with security
(A.12.17.) D AQ awareness information regularly?
Table E.17: Security Architecture Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identity The processes to check the subjects’ What are the processes for the authorised
Proofing proof of identity evidence must be entities in order to check identification evidence
Processes validated. The acceptable breeder gathered or supplied by the subject applicant?
(C.18.1.) G documents and/or identity attributes How do these processes merge with the
need to be stated in order to enable registration and enrolment processes?
the registration of an applicant.
Prime A unique identifier enables the APIM What is the identifier or entifier assigned to the
Identifier to link to the genuine subject in subject for authentication or entification
Data the community of subjects. purposes? Are subject identifiers assigned or
(C.18.2.) G randomly generated?
Credential The life expectancy of the APIM and What is the intended life expectancy of the
Life its components determines the APIM including infrastructure components,
Expectancy replacement strategy, which may devices or artefacts, e.g. ICC, or
(A.13.1.) G RF impact costs and performance. data persistence, e.g. biometric?
Credential The provision of identifiers and/or What are the rules for issuing identifiers and/or
Authenticity credentials should be undertaken with credentials, whether processes automatically,
(A.13.2.) G controls to ensure the genuine subject or through officials or administrators?
receives their identifier data or artefact.
Credential The integrity of the entifier and How are the integrity of identifiers and/or
Integrity identifier data and the credentials form subject credential data protected by
(A.13.3.) G the basis of the APIM’s assurance. issuing authorities and by relying parties?
Credential The maintenance of the credentials may Do entities require authorisation to entitle them
Maintenance need to be authorised entities to to operate credential maintenance, replacement
Empowerment carry out these functions. or destruction processes of identification data?
(A.13.4.) G RF AQ Does this include the revoking of credentials?
Identifier and The life-cycle management of the What are the processes for the issuance,
Credential identifiers and entifiers and/or maintenance and destruction of data relating
Maintenance credentials need to be stated for to entifiers, to identifiers and/or credentials?
Tasks assurance purposes. entifiers, to identifiers and/or credentials? Is
(A.13.5.) G RF AQ justification needed to revoke subjects’
credentials?
Credential The issuer of the identifier and/or the Is the acknowledgment of the receipt of an
Delivery credential needs to know that the identifier and /or credentials by the subject
Verification genuine user has received these items. reconciled and what is the verification process?
(A.13.6.) G
Credential The method to enrol the initial subject How will the initial and subsequent subject
Creation signal or to generate subsequent signals signals be captured or generated?
Locations need to be described. Are these signals What are the conditions for delivering artefacts
(A.13.7.) D RF system generated in whole or in part? to the genuine subject?
Alternative The use of other forms of identifiers or Are there alternative identifiers or entifiers
Identifiers pseudonyms may be required for to protect or mask the identity of the subject?
(A.12.7.) N anonymity or privacy purposes.
Subject Additional data relating to the person What associated subject data are
Autobiographical may be used for out of bounds stored with the identifier and subject signal
Data identification purposes. Does its purpose identification data? Why is it necessary to
(A.12.12.) G align with privacy legislation? acquire this additional data?
Table E.18: Identifier Management Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Sampling The signals should be of sufficient How many instances of subject signals are
Normalisation quality to meet performance accuracy captured at enrolment and during usage to
(A.14.1) D AQ and speed requirements. create signals templates or to update profiles?
Signal Entropy The differentiation of signals enables Is there sufficient inherent variation or
(A.14.2.) G accurate entification of subjects. randomness in subjects’ signals to avoid
identification collisions?
Performance The False Acceptance Rates and the Does the accuracy of the comparison meet
Indications False Rejection Rates should be stated entification and identification
(A.14.3.) D RF AQ compared to accuracy requirements requirements? What is the impact on timings
and impact upon throughput. from adjusting configured threshold settings?
Deceit The extent of the deceit resistance What is the difficulty, in required knowledge
Resistance on theoretical and practical and resources, for an attacker to deceive an
(A.14.4.) G AQ exploitation informs vulnerability and APIM? How well does the APIM withstand
liability considerations. brute force attacks?
Artefact or The theoretical or practical difficulty What is the difficulty, knowledge and resources,
Credential in producing a counterfeit artefact or to counterfeit an artefact or credential
Counterfeiting credential informs vulnerability and to ascertain subjects’ signals or
(A.14.5.) G RF liability considerations. extracted parameters?
Signal Revealing subjects’ signals may Are subjects’ signals exposed during capture,
Confidentiality enable attackers to gather transformation, transmission or in comparison
(A.14.14.) G RF AQ data to perform replay attacks. processing in full or partially?
Signal Data Changing subjects’ signals may What are the technological safeguards to
Protection enable attackers to gather data to protect the integrity of the subject’s signal data
(A.14.15.) D launch denial of service attacks. captured, stored, processed and transmitted?
Average Predicting the percentage of subjects What is the predicted percentage of subjects
Failure to that may be unable to provide that are unable to provide signals of sufficient
Enrol Rate signals of sufficient quality informs quality at enrolment? How do these indications
(A.14.17.) D RF AQ accessibility considerations. compare with other subject communities?
Average Time The repeated attacks by impostors Time to detect impostor attempts, including
of Impostor Try may severely impact the repeated tries averaged, over all impostor
(A.14.19.) D APIM to perform correctly attempts, regardless of successful verification?
Average Time of The average time to entify or What is the time to achieve correct subject
Verification identify a subject in proportion entification or identification which includes
(A.14.20.) D to the users task impacts usability. repeat attempts averaged over all attempts?
Average Impostor The average number of impostor What is the impostor failure rate averaged
Failure Rate attempts before the APIM is rendered against all subject signals
(A.14.21.) D AQ invalid or obsolete informs reliability. which have failed?
Signal Capture Predicting the percentage of subjects What is the percentage of genuine subjects
Failure Rates that may be unable to provide which are unable to provide signals of sufficient
(A.14.22.) D signals of sufficient quality informs quality during usage? How do these indications
accessibility considerations. compare with other subject communities?
Artefact / Device The accreditation or approval by What processes are to be established
Accreditation an agency that credentials to issue credentials or devices from
(A.13.8.) G AQ and devices conform to specifications approved suppliers? Which agency
provides reliability assurance. accredits or approves these elements?
Tamper The capabilities of devices or Are there tamper deterrent or tamper
Protection software provides evidence of indicative technologies to notify parties of an
(A.16.18.) N unauthorised interference attempts. attack?
Template These activity logs enable the What log entries flag changes to an enrolled
Update detection or investigation of subject signal or template, user access rights
Notifications compromise attempts or changes or changes in user behaviour?
(A.16.19.) N AQ to subject’s signals.
Table E.19: Reliability Results Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Multiplicity Similar APIMs from other application Are there similar APIM deployments
Errors contexts may confuse subjects. that could confuse the subject
(C.20.1.) G in the community and cause errors?
Interface Test data may include timing What test data provides evidence that
Usage Data user tasks or video data using the that subjects’ usage of the APIM
(A.15.1.) G RF AQ APIM. are as intended?
Security Visible security features enables What features convey the available security
Features Conveyed the user to manage security tasks. features to the user?
(A.15.2.) G
Visibility of The interface should advise the user Does the APIM’s interface provide feedback
Security Status when they have made a mistake or to the user on the APIM’s security status?
(A.15.3.) D provide feedback on normal status.
Intuitive Awkward interfaces may make Is the APIM’s interface comforting
Interface the APIM difficult to learn and naturally easy to learn? Is the design
(A.15.4.) G and use. sufficiently intuitive to facilitate habitual usage?
Aesthetic and Too much information may Does the APIM’s interface convey
Minimalist Design confuse the user, which may or display only relevant security
(A.15.5.) G lead to errors. information?
Error The user should be notified of Does the APIM’s interface provide error
Reporting errors and given guidance on messages that are sufficiently detailed to advise
(A.15.6.) G how to rectify the error safely. users where to obtain help?
User An unsatisfactory experience may Does the APIM’s interface provide
Satisfaction may indicate HCI design flaws. a satisfactory experience?
(A.15.7.) G
Cognitive Enrolment processes may be complex Does the user require cursory rehearsal, visual
Activity and require significant focus co-ordination, in depth cognitive processing
(A.15.8.) D to ensure signal data, are of an in order to produce signal data of sufficient
adequate quality. quality for authentication or entification
purposes?
Signal Remembering random authentication What cues are provided to the user to
Retrieval data or methods may be overcome recall data or methods to use
Strategy by using visual or audio cues. the APIM as designed?
(A.15.9.) N AQ
Signal Letting subjects choose data that have Are subjects’ signal data assigned by a system,
Meaningfulness significant value to them may acquired automatically or created by the subject
(A.15.10.) N AQ assist their recall of authentication data. to make the signal deducible to the subject?
Tasks The APIM interaction should Does the APIM interaction align with
Alignment naturally fit at the appropriate point users’ mental models to perform the
(A.15.11.) G RF AQ in the users task and not be core underlying task? Is the user’s
an awkward adjunct to the task. It effort on the APIM interaction proportionally
should not be cumbersome to the task. convenient to the core operational task?
User / Subject Users may express a preference for What are user’s preferred signal type or
Preference a biometric modality or authentication APIM for this type of application context?
(A.15.12.) D AQ data that is habitual to them. Why is this preference more acceptable?
User The APIM may require users to What training do users need to use
Training learn how to use unfamiliar devices the APIM as designed? How is that
(B.20.1.) G or processes that are not intuitive. training delivered?
Table E.20: Usability Results Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Database The continuity of the APIM may What are the database contingency plans
Contingency be vital to stakeholders’ business for the identifiers and subject signal data
(A.12.16.) G operations and provision of services. should this data become compromised or
Security incidents may cause unavailable? How can recovery be
severe operating problems. achieved to match availability goals?
Systems’ The APIM’s processing needs to rely What network, systems, software, devices,
Resources on different infrastructures, which may form part of the APIM’s infrastructure?
(A.16.1.) G be under the stakeholders’ control. Does it involve a Public Key Infrastructure?
System Reviewing stakeholders’ systems What evidence demonstrates that
Functionality ensures the completeness of the APIM the APIM description is complete for all
Description and that interfaces are specified. functions and components?
(A.16.3.) D RF AQ
Legacy The introduction of systems and What is the impact of the proposed APIM, in
System processes may adversely impact terms of processing, on existing hardware,
Impact existing operations. Extra costs software, personnel, infrastructure and systems?
(A.16.4.) D RF and effort may be absorbed. What are the effects on current operations?
Legacy Reusing existing networks, systems To what extent can existing network,
System Reuse or operational procedures may assist information systems, infrastructure and
(A.16.5.) G RF AQ in containing costs and minimising processes be reused or enhanced for
impacts to operations and subjects. this candidate APIM?
Processing The processing capacity needed to What is the processing power needed to
Capacity operate the APIM, both centrally on support the APIM for stakeholder’s and
(A.16.7.) D AQ servers and on users’ devices users? To what extent are these computations
need to be quantified. processed on local devices or artefacts?
Back-up The reliability of these methods may What are the back-up procedures to respond
Methods impact stakeholders’ ability to a total or partial failure of the APIM, including
(A.16.8.) N to recover normal operations quickly. access to subjects signal data stored?
Administration The roles and tasks need to What are the roles and responsibilities of
Support Roles be clarified to ensure clarification the administration entities or staff
(A.16.11.) G RF AQ of authorised responsibilities. involved in supporting the APIM?
Expert The APIM may require specialist Are unique skills or competencies required
Support knowledge to perform core duties, to operate the APIM, in normal,
(A.16.12.) G RF AQ may increase reliance on suppliers. compromised or failure states?
Administration The competencies of existing personnel What are the training requirements for
Personnel Training may need to be enhanced continually administrative personnel, both initially
(A.16.13.) G RF AQ to support the APIM. and continually?
Device Some signal capture devices operate Does the user’s device need to be
Calibration discretely; however, some sensing calibrated regularly so that the APIM
(A.16.14.) G AQ devices may need periodic recalibration. functions and performs correctly?
Lockout/Threshold Some genuine users may exceed set How does the APIM support lockout
Maintenance retry limits. Users accounts thresholds on excessive invalid attempts? How
(A.16.15.) G should be reactivated securely. are user lockouts or thresholds reset securely?
Subject Supervision The need to supervise subjects Are subjects supervised during their
(A.16.16.) G may impact subject usage of the APIM. usage of the APIM?
Enrolment The skills required and the authority What are the competences required for
Supervision to perform such duties to reduce staff to supervise subject enrolment? How
(A.16.17.) G enrolment failures or inadequate data. are quality of captured data improved?
Processing The signal data must be protected What technological safeguards protect the
Protection to ensure validity of the identification integrity and confidentiality of subjects’ signal
(A.16.20.) D RF AQ or authentication processes. data captured, stored, processed and
the identification result transmitted?
Table E.21: Technology Management Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Subject Signal The strength of the binding may What is the strength of the binding
Linkage vary between weak password data between the subject and the signals
(C.22.1.) G and cryptographic computations. acquired for identification / authentication?
Operational The APIM should not be so complex Does the user need technical expertise or
Enablers as to require special skills, equipment to use the APIM or its associated
(A.17.1.) G which exclude some users. artefacts or credentials?
Subject Disabilities may exclude the Are there any sensory, physical or
Inclusiveness user from operating the APIM cognitive skills that would prohibit or
(A.17.2.) G as designed. limit users from operating the APIM?
User Some devices may require cleaning, What maintenance tasks does the user
Maintenance recalibration or software may require undertake to keep the APIM functioning
Tasks updates in order to function correctly. as designed? How will the user be notified or
(A.17.3.) D RF AQ The inability to perform these tasks become aware of malfunction or rendering
(A.17.3.) and may exclude some users. The interference the device vulnerable?
(A.17.4.) merged of some components may render
them ineffective.
Usage The amount of time and effort to What actions and effort are needed to use
Convenience use and maintain the APIM may be the APIM when compared with the user’s
(A.17.5.) D RF AQ disproportionate to that of the risks responsibilities and liabilities related to
and liabilities of the task. the underlying task?
Technology Some devices or software licences may be What technical components are required,
Provisioning prohibitively expensive to buy including devices, drivers, software to operate
(A.17.6.) G which may exclude some subjects. the APIM? Are these components ubiquitous?
Table E.22: Accessibility Results Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Availability The failure of the APIM function How often does the APIM suffer
Indicators may cause service delivery problems from partial or total outages?
(C.23.1.) G or other issues for relying parties. What are the recovery processes?
Assurance The basis of on which test data are What evidence demonstrates the APIM’s
Evidence acquired and its relevance to the live ability to meet assurance requirements? How
(A.14.18.) D environment informs assurance testing. was it produced and by which entity?
Practical Lessons from others entities using What is the experience of owners, users and
Experience this type of APIM to address administrators using this APIM or similar
(A.12.19.) G their problems are useful input. designs in the application context?
Identification Elapsed time may be more acceptable What is the possibility of reducing the overall
Time by re-engineering the signal sensing, entification or identification time? Have
Profile capturing, extraction, transformation timings on all sub-processes been ascertained
(A.14.7.) G RF AQ comparison and results processes. so as to consider re-engineering the logic?
Liabilities and Onerous responsibilities or What are the responsibilities and liabilities
Responsibilities disproportionate liabilities may outweigh associated with the APIM for each
(B.23.1.) G benefits, notwithstanding costs. stakeholder?
Privacy Revealing social acceptability issues What is the APIM’s effect upon subject’s
Impact may expose trust problems with feelings about their privacy and their risks?
(A.15.13.) G the technology and/or service provider.
Criticality of Business continuity and the What is the criticality of a contingency
Contingency Plan risks of disaster must be plan to ensure business as usual operations
(A.16.9.) D weighed against recovery plan costs. in the event of an APIM failure?
Repair The time to repair elements of the What is the proposed repair response times
Response Times APIM should be recorded and be for central servers and/or users’ devices?
(A.16.10.) G included in a Service Level Agreement. Are these timescales acceptable to all parties?
User A lack of trust in the devices may affect To what extent does the user community hold
Confidence the users’ usage of the APIM. the belief that the APIM will protect their
(A.17.7.) D interests? What evidence supports these
findings?
Stakeholder Stakeholders may consider the What is the possibility of subjects or users
Costs use of ubiquitous as a way absorbing APIM devices costs? Is
Recovery of reducing costs, which offer enabling ubiquitous device usage
(A.18.7.) D adequate protection and functionality. a viable strategy?
Ubiquity The APIM may need to operate Are the APIM’s components universal enabling
(A.16.6.) G RF AQ with an existing mechanisms interoperability with alternative APIMs,
or use ubiquitous components. in the intended application context?
Performance The performance results from other How does the indicative performance of this
Comparisons deployments may highlight APIM in this application context compare with
(A.12.18.) G RF performance discrepancies. similar deployments?
Table E.23: APIM’s Issues Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Components The integration of disparate components To what extent do the APIM’s components
Integration may introduce technical vulnerabilities integrate into a coherent solution to meet
(B.24.1.) G or usability deficiencies. the operational requirements?
Mechanisms’ Knowledge of the APIM’s capability What is the probability that an APIM
Consistency to perform reliably, without degradation, will perform its intended functions
(A.14.8.) D RF is essential to manage risks. over a specified interval of operation?
Device The integration of signal sensing Are supporting devices and artefacts functioning
Interfacing devices, their firmware and coherently for their intended purposes
(A.14.9.) G integration to the application should in a way that meets the
ensure that the security of the requirements for an APIM, in order to
APIM is not circumvented. detect attempts at circumvention?
Circumvention The probability of theoretical What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and
Susceptibility based attacks need to be clarified. resources, to circumvent the APIM without
(A.14.6.) N the need to deceive the processing logic?
Signal The unpredictability of a signal Are the subjects’ signals sufficiently disguised
Predictability reduces guessing attacks. to prevent attackers from determining these data
(A.14.10.) G AQ or succeeding signals?
Signal A significantly large key space should What is the APIM’s number of possible subjects’
Abundance deter impostors from brute force attacks signal permutations or total key space?
(A.14.11.) G and subject signal collisions. To what extent are subject signal collisions,
in entification mode, possible?
Subject Signal Safeguards are needed to ensure Is the subject’s signal data easy to
Exposure subjects’ signal data are not record or acquire during storage, capture,
(A.14.12.) G RF AQ exposed to unauthorised parties during transmission, extraction or identification
storage or during transactions. or authentication comparison processes?
Signal The clarification of these capabilities To what extent does the signal capture device
Robustness may necessitate other controls withstand known attacks or theoretical attacks?
(A.14.13.) G to counter identified vulnerabilities.
Exploitable Vulnerabilities should be declared What are the known exploitable weaknesses in
Vulnerabilities including those in the public domain the candidate APIM or in existing deployments?
(A.14.16.) G and those confidential to suppliers.
Vendor The stakeholders may gain What experience and capabilities does the
Track Record comfort that the supplier has candidate vendor have in deploying
(A.12.20.) G AQ previously delivered in this context. APIMs in this type of application context?
Table E.24: APIM’s Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Artefact The logistics for distributing various What are the estimated costs for distributing
Distribution elements securely may involve devices, artefacts, initial authentication
Costs internal or external distribution channels. or data to subjects?
(C.25.1.) G
Implementation The APIMs development costs What are the costs to develop or integrate
Costs need to be segregated from the candidate APIM, which includes software
(A.18.1.) G other types of costs. implementation, testing or costs associated
with obtaining accreditation?
Maintenance The introduction of new systems brings What are the operating and administrative
Costs capital costs and operating costs for supporting the APIM, which
(A.18.2.) G AQ support costs, which may be absorbed. includes costs of servers, networks, software,
partly into existing operations. personnel, and impact upon existing
operations?
Mechanism’s The anticipated life expectancy What is the life expectancy for the APIM,
Anticipated has implication on investments including sensors or ICC readers and/or
Life Expectancy over the APIM’s usefulness. ICCs or software? Does the APIM’s design
(A.16.2.) G RF AQ allow for device upgrade or migration?
Cost of The costs of bespoke devices to capture What is the cost of the signal input device
Input Devices subjects’ signals is a major capital including any firmware, the cost of tamper
(A.18.3.) G cost to be absorbed by stakeholders. detection, including the protection of its
internal logic from examination?
Cost of The costs of smart cards together with What is the unit cost of an artefact
Artefacts the issuing of certificates needs to be incorporating associated production and
(A.18.4.) G segregated. ICC personalisation or similar costs?
Infrastructure The infrastructure costs may be separated What are the costs associated with the
Processing Costs from other operating costs; however, trust supporting infrastructure, which includes
(A.18.6.) G AQ schemes may incur membership fees. communication networks or PKI based trust
schemes?
Other Parties’ The total cost to stakeholders What are the total costs for all stakeholders,
Costs should be ascertained to ensure that costs including hardware, software, devices,
(A.18.8.) G AQ do not exceed predicted benefits. artefacts to ensure its compatibility?
Costs The isolation of specific cost elements What elements are most likely to
Influences may assist in identifying alternative increase or decrease the APIM’s costs?
(A.12.15.) G technology configurations.
Table E.25: Stakeholders’ Costs Evaluation Theme
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Appendix F
Appendix F – Evaluation Themes and
Factors (Stage D)
This appendix contains 25 evaluation theme tables showing the factors for evaluating an
APIM as at Stage D of our factor validation effort, representing Step 12 of our research
implementation plan.
The tables show the status of the evaluation factors following our validation efforts using the
data from our EU State’s eGates Programme Case Study. The status also indicates which
evaluation factors were Grounded (G) and Not-grounded (N) in our data. We show relabelled
factors as ‘RF’, criteria questions which required amendment as ‘AQ’ and factor explanations
which required revision as ‘ER’.
We assign an identifier to a new factor identified in Stage D, e.g. (D.2.2.), to denote stage
created, evaluation theme and factor reference number, to enable each factor and its criterion
question to be tracked through each subsequent validation.
The tables in this appendix contain the following evaluation themes:
Table F.1 Business Case Evaluation Theme;
Table F.2 Stakeholders’ Objectives Evaluation Theme;
Table F.3 Stakeholders’ Risks Evaluation Theme;
Table F.4 Community’s Characteristics Evaluation Theme;
Table F.5 Usage Environment Evaluation Theme;
Table F.6 Constraints Evaluation Theme;
Table F.7 Polices Evaluation Theme;
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Table F.8 Functional Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table F.9 Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme;
Table F.10 Registration and Enrolment Evaluation Theme;
Table F.11 Performance Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table F.12 Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme;
Table F.13 Task Dialogue Evaluation Theme;
Table F.14 Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme;
Table F.15 Envisaged Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme;
Table F.16 Predicted Costs Evaluation Themes;
Table F.17 Security Architecture Evaluation Theme;
Table F.18 Identifier Management Evaluation Theme;
Table F.19 Reliability Results Evaluation Theme;
Table F.20 Usability Results Evaluation Theme;
Table F.21 Manageability Evaluation Theme (formerly Technology Management Evaluation
Theme);
Table F.22 Accessibility Results Evaluation Theme;
Table F.23 APIM’s Issues Evaluation Theme;
Table F.24 APIM’s Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme; and
Table F.25 Stakeholders’ Costs Evaluation Theme.
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Feasibility The likelihood of an APIM fulfilling its Are there similar deployments precedents, a
Outlook purpose from a business, legal, conceptual prototype or independent expert
(A.1.8.) G operational and technological standpoints opinion that could provide indications on the
should be ascertained at the outset. potential of an APIM fulfilling its purpose?
Risks Stakeholder risks need to identified, What are the stakeholders’ business risks which
Identified understood and articulated in order require control? What vulnerabilities and threats
(A.4.2.) G AQ to determine the mitigating controls relate to identification of persons,
provided by the APIM. e.g. employees, customers, partners?
Defined If the business problem is not fully Is the personal identification problem fully
Business understood and resolution objectives understood and expressed as a high-level
Problem articulated then solution cannot be problem description and not attributes from
(A.5.1.) G evaluated for its utility to resolve potential solutions? How effective and
that stated business problem. efficient are existing identification systems?
Project The basis for the approved investment Is the business analysis of stakeholders’
Sponsorship for effort to introduce or revise an APIM objectives for an APIM supported by a
(A.5.2.) G needs to be established at the outset. business case with justification for expenditure?
Alternative APIMs Previous investigations should reveal the Have alternative APIMs been investigated and
Investigated issues and costs related to resolving the what were the learnings. Which biometric
business problem. Using biometrics or solutions were considered? How do similar
(A.6.4.) G RF AQ hardware tokens need due consideration. application contexts address the same problem?
Security Motivation Factor deleted as covered by factor (A.3.2)
Authorised Subjects
(A.7.10.)
Entity Stakeholders interact in through informal What are the relationships between the direct
Relationships arrangements or through scheme rules and indirect stakeholder entities, particularly
(A.7.8.) G AQ to ensure the APIM provides an the subjects themselves and, where appropriate,
acceptable and viable proposition users of an identification system. Do
to resolve a stated business problem. contracts or rules exist between the entities?
Identity A description of the direct and indirect Who are the stakeholder entities involved
Authorisation stakeholder entities, including the with the application context? Which entities
Model subjects, in the application context helps may use subject identifiers and/or credentials,
(A.9.1.) G AQ ER to establish the role of each entity as relying parties, for person identification
and its relationships with other entities. or for person authentication purposes?
Contextual The purpose of the APIM needs to be Why is the APIM being introduced or revised
Purpose fully understood and communicated in for the application context? What are the
and Scope terms of desired outcomes or objectives business goals that describe the priority values
(B.7.1.) G RF AQ to direct effort to evaluate and select the of aspiration to be achieved? What criteria
ER optimal APIM. defines the scope of the APIM’s intended usage?
Stakeholders The benefits, tangible and non-tangible, Will the APIM be used to protect data assets
and Subjects’ to revise or introduce an APIM need to or enhance the operations of one or many
Benefits be stated at the outset. Some benefits stakeholders? What are the measurable
(B.7.2. ) G RF AQ should be derived from investing and intangible benefits to direct and indirect
resources to introduce or revise an APIM. stakeholders to introduce or revise the APIM?
Programme The decision processes between the What entity or group have the mandated
Governance stakeholders need to be understood, also authority to make decisions for specifying the
Framework the entity empowered to make changes requirements for APIM and its selection?
(B.7.3.) G AQ ER to an entity’s organisation. How does the governance framework operate for
decision-making amongst these stakeholders?
Table F.1: Business Case Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Subject Privacy Clarification is needed on how subjects’ What are the intended courses of action to
Protection Aims private data are to be protected in line with protect subject’s private data, biometric and
(A.4.5.) G AQ ER legal, contractual and ethical autobiographical information, to comply with
obligations and social norms. regulatory and organisation privacy policies?
Sponsorship The sponsor’s prime objectives should What are the aims of the sponsor stakeholder
Aims be clearly stated to introduce an APIM in terms of asset protection and business
(A.4.4.) G AQ ER or revise a deployed APIM, which may enhancements? How do these aims align with
align or conflict with other stakeholders’ the objectives of other stakeholders, including
or subjects’ objectives, in order subjects? How are conflicting stakeholders’
to gain stakeholders’ acceptance. aims addressed in the application context?
Stakeholders’ A description of stakeholders’ benefits is What arguments support stakeholders’ aims to
Business needed to support the introduction of an instigate the introduction of an APIM or changes
Rationale APIM or changes to a deployed to a deployed APIM? Have all stakeholders
(A.1.1.) G AQ ER APIM. been consulted and their interests included?
Subject / User The reasons for subjects and users What are the stakeholders’ arguments
Acceptability willingness to use the APIM in the that describe the reasons for subjects’
Rationale application context should be validated acceptance to introduce or to revise a
(A.3.2.) G AQ ER supported with explanations. deployed APIM?
Impact on The desired impact on assets by What are the desired business outcomes
Assets/Resources introducing or revising an APIM sought by stakeholders, from introducing or
(B.1.1.) G RF AQ should be understood. revising an APIM, on assets and resources?
ER
Impact on Factor deleted expanded in new factors
Stakeholders (D.2.1.), (D.2.2.), (D.2.3.), (D.2.4.)
(A.7.9.) and (D.2.5.)
Risks Controls The impact on annual loss expectancy What are the desired risks control outcomes
Outcomes by introducing or revising an APIM access sought by stakeholders, from introducing or
(D.2.1.) should be described as an aim. revising a deployed APIM?
Productivity The impact on subject or users’ tasks What are the desired productivity outcomes
Impact by introducing or revising an APIM sought by introducing or revising an APIM
(D.2.2.) should be described as an aim. to the current operational situation?
Regulatory The impact of an organisation’s ability to What are the desired regulatory compliance
Compliance comply with regulation by introducing or outcomes sought by introducing or revising
Impact revising an APIM should be described. an APIM to the current operational situation?
(D.2.3.)
Utilisation The expected utilisation of introducing What are the desired utilisation outcomes
Impact or revising an APIM should be described. sought by introducing or revising an APIM
(D.2.4.) to the current operational situation?
Investments The financial aims of investing to What are the desired financial outcomes
Impact introduce or revise an APIM should be sought by investing to introduce or revise an
(D.2.5.) stated. APIM to the current operational situation?
Table F.2: Stakeholders’ Objectives Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Risks Stakeholders may have different risks What are the stakeholders’ risks management
Treatment appetites and alternative risk management strategies (alleviation, transference, avoidance,
Strategy approaches to address identified risks, acceptance) for treating identified risks and any
(A.2.8.) G ER including residual risks. remaining residual risks?
Compromise Social engineering attacks on subjects What types of identification system attacks
Scenarios and technological based attacks on are envisaged and why? What are the known
(A.6.9.) G AQ ER systems should be researched in order technological or social based attacks in similar?
to feed into a risks assessment. application contexts?
Privacy Organisational stakeholders may have What is the impact on each stakeholder and
Impact legal and contractual obligations to related subjects if subjects’ private data
Assessment protect subjects’ private data. Personally Identifiable Information (PII) are
(A.8.3.) G AQ ER These data form input into compromised? How privacy risks influence the
a risks assessment. requirements for an identification system?
Attack and The probability of compromise helps to What is the likelihood of a deliberate attack
Compromise determine appropriate security controls, identification system? What is the likelihood
Probabilities given the value of the assets and that errors occur from subjects’ usage or
(A.2.1.) G AQ ER known vulnerabilities and threats, other events? Do these projections include
from a risks assessment. historical events analysis for all stakeholders?
Vulnerabilities The known vulnerabilities help to What are the known exploitable weaknesses
Identified determine the current levels of assurance in existing operations or potential flaw in new
(A.2.3.) G AQ ER in the application context and operations which may include technological,
also informs a risks assessment. procedural and human limitations?
Stakeholders’ The value of damages or consequences What are the estimated impact costs or impact
Impact Costs/ to business operations needs to be severity ratings to stakeholders’ (including
Value Ratings established in order to determine the users) if their assets/resources were to be stolen,
(A.2.2.) G RF AQ security controls, which includes destroyed or modified or unavailable in the
ER optimal APIM from a risk assessment. event of an APIM failure or compromise?
Threat The motivation behind the threats with What is underlying stimuli or goals of
Motivation the rewards and deterrent penalties miscreants that lead to attacks on the APIM?
(A.2.7.) G ER to miscreants help determine APIM’s Are deterrents proportionate to potential
countermeasures via a risks assessment. rewards? What are attackers’ motives?
Assets and The value of the assets needs What are the value of the assets or entitlement to
Resources Value to be established in order to resources to each stakeholder, including
(D.3.1.) determine security controls. subjects, which an APIM should protect?
Privacy Private data are assets belonging to What personal identity data are acquired
Data Assets subjects that are maintained by a from subjects and for what purposes?
(D.3.2.) custodian or approved entities that What are the processes to collect, use,
are tasked with the compliance to privacy maintain, disclose and protect subjects’ private
legislations. data utilised for personal identification?
Table F.3: Stakeholders’ Risks Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Social The acceptability of an APIM for its What subject attitudes have been established
Norms intended purpose to the subject from surveys on similar APIM deployments?
(A.3.3.) G RF ER community gives an indication on How do these surveyed responses support
subjects’ motivation to use the or negate stakeholders’ arguments to introduce
APIM in the application context. or revise an APIM?
Community The categorisation of community Who are the subjects and users in the application
Membership members informs the scope for the context? Are users, direct operators, the
(A.3.4.) G AQ APIM. Membership characteristics subject to be identified? Is the community
provide differentiators and indications on membership open to all individuals
the nature of the community together or restricted and what are those restrictions
with expansion or contraction rates. and how are they to be verified?
Subjects’ The degree of reliance and acceptability What is trust relationship between the APIM’s
Trust of the APIM may be based upon existing stakeholders and the subject/ users? Is it a new
(A.3.5.) G relationships and perceptions of relationship? What is the trust relationship
trustworthiness of public and private between potential relying parties and subjects?
organisations. Without trust subjects Are there any issues that would enhance or
may not co-operate or use the APIM as limit existing relationships or inhibit
intended. Trust may also develop from relationships from developing?
a contractual agreement or legislation.
Subject The subject community’s capability and Is the subject community capable of absorbing
and User motivation to absorb technical and knowledge of new identification devices from
Capabilities operational skills could help to widen the educational material to ensure the proper
(A.7.2.) G RF AQ options of credentials and/or other devices. usage of credentials or other devices?
Populations’ The subjects’ characteristics are important What are the distinguishing traits of the
Characteristics to avoid exclusion from the community subject community, in terms of population
(A.7.4.) G RF ER and may provide distinguishing features demographics, physiology, behaviour,
upon which designs may be evaluated. appearance that pose disadvantages or create
advantages for certain biometric modalities or
credentials?
Users’ The subject community which is to use What are the expectations that all individuals
Cooperation an APIM may impact, inadvertently, will cooperate voluntarily with an automated
(A.7.11.) G its effectiveness and efficiency. identification process in this application context?
Privacy Evidence is needed to substantiate claims What assurance is required to demonstrate
Assurance of compliance with privacy legislations anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability
Evidence and the commitments provided to the and anonymity compliance to data privacy
(A.8.8.) G RF ER subject community by stakeholders. legislation and security policies?
User The responsibilities and/or liabilities of the What subject consent or acceptance is needed
Obligations usage terms for the APIM may outweigh for user and/or subjects to acknowledge their
and Liabilities any potential benefit or proposition to responsibilities or liabilities to use an APIM?
(B.3.1.) G RF ER the subject or user. Some APIMs contain To what extent do these obligations negate
terms and conditions or are mandatory. their benefits of using the APIM?
Table F.4: Community Characteristics Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Environment The environment’s characteristics may How should the identification system operate in
Ergonomics impact upon the ergonomic operation the intended physical usage locations? Will the
(A.2.5.) G of the APIM. APIM be required to operate in variable
environments? What are the typical
characteristics of the envisaged usage settings?
Physical and Subjects’ control of technical Does the subject utilise a ubiquitous device or is
Logical Control devices may impact the requirements technology supplied by the artefact issuing
(A.6.8.) G RF for an APIM and may authority and/or relying parties? What physical
influence the subject’s acceptance control should stakeholders have over physical
and usage of a device, particularly. devices and logical components? Should users
if they are unfamiliar. manage the devices’ logical operations?
Logical The information systems that the What are intended logical applications
Usage APIM supports need to be described for the APIM, the types of operating devices
Settings together with the supporting devices, and operating systems?
(B.4.1.) G ER infrastructure and operating systems.
Physical Usage Physical usage locations may adversely Where will the APIM operate?
Settings impact or enhance the subject’s What are physical environmental characteristics
(B.4.2) G ER ability to use the APIM and a of these locations?
stakeholder’s ability to manage an APIM.
Physical and/or The usage scenarios for identification Will the identification system involve physical
Logical system requires clarification to identification or remote logical identification or
Identification explain the nature of the both? Have usage cases been developed?
(B.4.3.) G RF ER personal identification transaction.
Environmental The variability of a physical or logical What are the key environmental factors
Variances environment may impact upon the that may affect the quality, the integrity
(D.5.1.) capturing of the subjects’ signals and confidentiality of the captured signals?
possibly resulting in many false What impact could signal deterioration have
rejections. on required genuine accept rates?
Subject The physical location of the subject Where are subjects to be identified based?
Locale and the localities in which identification Are subjects to be authenticated remotely?
(D.5.2.) are required to take place may Are subjects to be physically present at
impact the requirements for an specified locations for logical authentication?
identification system. Is enrolment to be performed remotely?
Table F.5: Usage Environments Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Political and The politics and economics relating to What political agenda or economic matters may
Economic Concerns the application context may influence hinder or support organisational change? How
(A.1.4.) G RF the requirements for the APIM. does this change impact the requirements for
an identification system?
Stakeholder Existing relationships between the What commercial, organisational or political
Relationships stakeholders and subjects together stakeholder relationship issues hinder or
(A.1.5.) G ER with outstanding issues may support a proposition to introduce an APIM
hinder stakeholder collaboration. or revise an APIM deployment?
Regulatory Regulations may place restrictions How does legislation and industry guidelines
Imperatives or additional tasks on stakeholders to impact the stakeholder aims for an APIM in
(A.1.6.) G comply and to demonstrate compliance. the proposed usage settings?
Budget The budgetary capital and operational What funds and resources have allocated
Allocated investments that stakeholders’ commit by stakeholders, to introduce an APIM or
(A.4.3.) G AQ influence requirements and choices on review and possibly revise an APIM
APIM solution candidates. deployment, in order to minimise identified risk?
Contextual The restrictions of the application What existing and potential issues relating to the
Legacies context influence the proposition application context could impact the
(A.5.4.) G for the APIM. It is assumed that stakeholders’ aims and subjects’ propositions for
the APIM proposition does not start an APIM, which include organisational issues,
from a neutral historical state, whether current practices, existing infrastructures, social
technological or social norms. norms and deployed information systems?
Subject Application Factor deleted and replaced by factor (D.5.2.)
and Enrolment
(A.10.2.)
External Data acquired on other APIMs in What are the potential performance limitations
Performance similar application contexts help of the envisage usage settings in which
Benchmarks to guide stakeholders’ expectations the APIM should be designed to operate? What
(A.5.7.) G ER on fulfilling their objectives. are the learnings from similar deployments?
Specifications Specifications for application contexts What specifications are applicable to the APIM
and Information are designed to ensure technical and to ensure interoperability and requisite quality
Technology procedural interoperability together with a in the application context? Which standards
Standards means to also claim compliance to a are these specifications based upon?
(A.5.5.) G specific quality.
Users’ Costs Factor deleted as included in factor (A.3.1.)
(A.3.6.)
Signal Data Data may need to be exchanged regularly Is there a need to exchange subjects’ signal data
Exchange between relying party stakeholders and or other attributes with other stakeholders
Interoperability credential issuing authorities. in the application context? Do interoperability
(A.5.6.) G AQ specifications exist and how are they enforced?
Auditing The periodicity and measures for using What is the retention period and archive rules
Subject and storing signal data may impact for data to be used by the APIM to automatically
Data Usage potential investigations or efforts identify a subject? What are the legal and
(A.1.7.) G ER to comply with legal or contractual risks associated with auditing requirements for
obligations. retaining these data?
Subject The general acceptance of an APIM type What are the stakeholders’ expectations relating
Proposition does not immediately validate its usage to subject community’s adoption of an APIM?
(A.3.1.) G for a particular application context. Do subjects derive sufficient benefit to
outweigh expected costs and effort?
Compromise The obstacles which may affect the safe How will stakeholders recover the APIM
Recovery recovery of an APIM should be in the event of failure? Are there technology,
Methods articulated. procedures or scheme rules which inhibit or
(B.5.1.) G RF AQ facilitate recovery actions?
Table F.6: Constraints Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Data Archiving The stakeholder policy on data or audit What are the stakeholders’ policies on retaining
Policies log retention may differ to that required and archiving data generally? How do these
(B.6.1.) G by privacy regulation or rules of the policies relate to the APIM subject signal and
context in which the APIM operates. other private data in usage transactions?
Organisational The stakeholder organisational policies How do stakeholder organisation policies,
Policies may give direction on issues relating e.g. environmental policies, impact the
(A.8.1.) G to an organisation’s governance. requirements for an identification system for
employees, customers, agents or partners?
Policies on Existing Contextual issues should be articulated Are there issues relating to the application
Contextual and researched as knowledge of context explicitly accepted by stakeholders,
Issues their impact may affect the including users?
(B.6.2.) G RF requirements for an APIM. Are these issues discussed in the public domain?
Authorised The stakeholders must provide direction Which entities are empowered to provide
Identity as to which entity or group determines the policy on acceptable proof of identity
Evidence Sources policies on the proof identity evidence, evidence, registration and enrolment?
(B.6.3.) G registration and enrolment processes.
Privacy Laws The individual or accountable group Have stakeholders assigned the responsibility
Compliance assigned with the responsibility of of complying with privacy laws to a specific
Accountability compliance with legislation needs accountable entity with responsibility to
(A.8.2.) G RF to provide direction on privacy issues. manage this corporate governance issue?
Programme How does each stakeholder go What is the stakeholders’ strategy and
Implementation about implementing agreed governance framework to implement
(A.4.1.) G organisational change policies? organisational changes?
Requirements The methodology used by stakeholders How will the development programme gather
Gathering programme may influence the and articulate their business requirements
Methodology requirements for the APIM. for an APIM?
(A.5.3.) G
Stakeholders’ Stakeholders should have the means What are the stakeholders’ policies for settling
Dispute Resolution and procedures for settling disputes with disputes with partners, customers and other
Methods other stakeholders and subjects. entities and also subjects?
(B.6.5.) G RF
Subject The context may dictate that subjects Does the application context warrant the
Duress Policy should be able to use a ‘panic button’ to inclusion of a notification alarm to indicate
(A.17.8.) N notify duress while using the APIM. coercion of a subject while using the APIM?
Imposing Stakeholders may choose to seek What is the stakeholder policy for dealing
Sanctions criminal damages for miscreants with miscreants or authorised users who
(B.6.4.) G or impose disciplinary reprisals. use the APIM improperly?
Stakeholders’ These policies may help to inform What are the stakeholder’s security policies
Security stakeholders’ considerations regarding for identification and authentication?
Policies the appropriate assurance for the APIM. To what extent do they align with
(D.7.1.) the stakeholders’ objectives for the APIM?
Systems Stakeholders may employ a formal What is the development methodology, e.g.
Development approach to establish an architecture agile, for delivering integrated systems
Methodology to support their business operations. which are responsive to change and delivers the
(D.7.2.) business information technology strategy?
Table F.7: Policies Evaluation Theme
463
Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Subject Processes to capture subjects’ signals What functions are required to capture
Signals should be outlined enable identification subjects’ signals or generate authentication
Enrolment or authentication. Some subjects’ signals data during local or remote enrolment? Are
(C.8.1.) G ER may be acquired face-to-face or remotely. authentication data system generated?
Subject The acquisition of subjects’ signals may How are the subject’s signals to be captured
Signals be performed during face-to-face during usage transactions, from their physical
Acquisition interactions or remotely, through a presence or remotely or hybrid arrangement?
(D.8.1.) network connection or a combination.
User The user authorisation model between What entities are involved with the
Authorisation the user and stakeholder entities, identification or entification? What are
Model including intermediaries, should be their roles within the automatic identification
(C.8.2.) G articulated. or authorisation processes?
Administration The entities assigned with responsibility What are the required processes to enable
Processes of administering the APIM must have organisation’s administration personnel to
(C.8.3.) G ER access to the required system functionality perform duties to fulfil all the life-cycle
in order to execute their tasks. to support the APIM?
Some sensitive processes may require What safeguards are required to prevent
segregation of duties or dual control. access to private data and sensitive processes?
Subject Signal The devices for the APIM may be bespoke Are specifications for devices and software
Capturing Device or ubiquitous and may also need and system interfaces available? How should
Interoperability enhancement to comply with components be verified to operate with
(B.8.3.) G interoperability specifications. other stakeholders’ systems, e.g. relying party?
User Identification and authentication may What attributes need to be captured during
Authentication be linked to access control mechanisms, transactions with the APIM so as to enable
Attributes which may require attribute data verified users to have access to functions and
(B.8.1.) G from the APIM to function properly. data in the user authorisation model?
Identification Positive identification and authentication Is the purpose of the APIM to positively
Mode asserts that a subject is enrolled. identify an enrolled subject or to ensure
(A.6.1.) G ER Negative identification asserts that a that a person is not enrolled? Is there a
subject is not enrolled and not known. need to consolidate both functions?
Multiple The assurance requirement based upon Do the risks and assurance requirements
Subject risks dictate whether a single signal is suggest the use of a single subject signal
Signals adequate or that fusion of biometrics, or necessitate the fusion of multiple subject
(A.6.5.) G or knowledge based, e.g. 2FA, or signals possibly using calculated data from
computed data combination are required. artefacts or generated by other sources?
Identification Covert identification rules out Does the requirement entail the subject being
Transparency some APIM types, particularly based unaware or conscious of the identification
(A.6.2.) G AQ user knowledge. Most APIMs require process? What are the legal and technological
overt subject participation. An constraints that apply to covert identification?
application context may permit both Does the requirement need to allow for covert
covert and overt subject verification. and overt flexibility of transparency?
Subject The requirement for the signal’s format(s), What format should the subject signal be stored
Signal its storage location(s) and its required for the identification or entification processes?
Storage protection dictates how the identification Where should that data be stored?
(B.8.2.) G or entification processes are to operate. How should that stored data be protected?
Table F.8: Functional Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Approved The entities that are authorised to verify What entities have been delegated powers to
Privacy and maintain subjects’ private data in a acquire subjects’ private data, store, maintain
Asset central repository. This function may and to use it, and possibly, to issue artefacts
Registrars differ to registration authorities and or credentials? Does this agency need to gain
(A.8.4.) G AQ enrolment agencies or identity service approval to register, to enrol subjects and to
providers. issue artefacts and/or credentials?
Privacy The stakeholders may be required to deal What procedures are to be put in place for those
Assets with events where subjects’ may not be subject/user applicants who are denied access
Appeals entitled to access an asset or may not to an information system or have their access
Procedure be able to produce the proposed biometric revoked, either legitimately or erroneously?
(A.8.5.) G AQ modality data or may dispute stakeholder
claims of improper usage.
Privacy Asset Private data are assets belonging to What documentation describes the processes
Access subjects that are maintained by a to ensure that only authorised users may
Controls custodian or approved entities that collect, use, maintain, disclose and protect
(A.8.6.) G comply with privacy legal requirements. subjects’ private data for the APIM?
Privacy Stakeholders should establish their What processes are required to co-ordinate
Asset capabilities together with resources in with authorised entities, responses to
Compromise to order manage privacy compromise notifications of suspected privacy violations?
(A.8.7.) G incidents.
Privacy Auditors or government bodies may be What processes need to be put into place to
Asset required to ensure that data are held allow authorised inspection of the privacy asset
Inspection in compliance to law and contractual register generally which also allows subjects to
(A.8.9.) G AQ obligations. access to their personal information held?
Privacy Stakeholders need to demonstrate that What processes are necessary to prevent any
Controls controls to maintain subjects’ private proposed controls on maintaining subjects’
Erosion data continue to be effective. private data from being eroded? Should these
(A.8.10.) N processes also include subject’s data held on an
artefact?
Table F.9: Privacy Compliance Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identity The methods by which administrative How should the identity knowledge or
Proofing personnel verify presented data and documentary evidence presented by the subject
Methods documentary evidence are important to applicant be verified as authentic for the
(A.9.2.) G ER detect fraudulent identity applications. genuine subject?
Identity These rules determine who is entitled What are the identity verification processes and
Proofing to be a community member, the data and the required evidence and authorisation which
Rules evidence to support that entitlement entitles a subject access to a resource or asset?
(A.9.5.) G ER and the authorising entity empowering What attributes entitle or prohibit a user
that entitlement. from being a subject member of the community?
Approved The entities authorised to check subjects’ What entities have been delegated powers
Registration entitlement to assets, which performs to register, issue identifiers, acquire subjects’
Agencies the verification of seed identification signal data and issue and maintain credentials
(A.9.6.) G ER evidence, subject’s application data, for the APIM? Does this entity also have
issuing identifiers and credentials. authority to store and use subjects’ data?
Application, The entity to perform the registration of What are the application, registration and
Registration and an authorised subject and the rules enrolment processes for authorised subjects.
Enrolment that govern the registration processes What are the complete end-to-end processes,
Processes require articulation. including distribution of artefacts or credentials
(A.9.7.) G RF AQ to subjects or users?
Identity The may be a requirement for the identity What are the processes to detect fraudulent
Proofing verification and registration processes applicant identity claims during registration?
Detection to be independently scrutinised to address Do the registration processes need to be
(A.9.11.) G RF risks identified or to control access to approved by an authoritative body or
subjects’ private data. independent body or to a standard?
Accredited The accreditation is to ensure that an Which entities provide the identity verification
Processes identity checking service provider’s functionality and is there a requirement for their
Applicability processes meet a particular specification processes to be accredited? Does the
(A.9.12.) G AQ to offer an accredited identity identity service provider also register individuals
checking service. or carry out enrolment tasks?
Approved The approval relates to whether the What authorisation is required before the
Processes identification checking service has to adoption and operation of an approved
Adoption obtain the necessary authorisation identity verification service operates on behalf
(A.9.13.) G to perform and provide such services. of stakeholder entities, including relying parties?
Credential The requirement to link the identification Is a unique identifier assigned to authenticate
Identifier or process to a unique identifier impacts the the subject or entification using the subject’s
Entifier APIM mode of operation. An identifier attributes? Is there a need for subject
(A.6.3.) G enables 1–1 authentication. Entification anonymity or the use of a pseudonym to mask
involves 1–many searching. the subject’s declared identity?
Acceptable The rules to implement the policy What does the policies stipulate in terms of
Subjects for distinguishing between subjects determining acceptable members or acceptable
(A.9.4.) G entitled to access assets or resources characteristics of the subject community?
and those individuals that are not Are there differing interpretations to the rules
authorised. which constitutes stakeholders acceptability?
Enrolment Registered subject’s signals upon which What should the processes to capture subjects’
and Credential subjects will be entified or authenticated signals for the APIM entail? Do these processes
Issuance and must be captured, generated and require the subject to attend an enrolment
Delivery distributed securely. Signals may need facility or produce their initial authentication
(A.9.8.) G RF AQ captured directly from the subject data or is the data to be generated by other
ER and generated to a specific standard. entities and delivered securely to the subject?
Acceptable The seed documentation and its sources What are the acceptable identification source
Proof of Identity validate the veracity of the claimed evidence for proof of identity processes? How
Evidence identity. Issuing authorities and is that documentary or data evidence itself
(A.9.9.) G RF AQ relying parties rely on this evidence. verified or cross-referenced?
Table F.10: Registration and Enrolment Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Maximum Limiting the number of user attempts may How many attempts are users allowed to
Identification reduce demands on system resources and identify or to entify a subject ? What is the
Attempts Limit may limit replay attacks at the expense of maximum number of attempts before access
(C.11.1.) G ER denying genuine users access to assets. is disabled for that user?
Maximum The identification transaction time may What is the maximum time permitted for
Identification need to be responsive to operational tasks each subject identification or entification attempt
Time Limit and risks. The lack of time locks before another try may be attempted? Is a
(C.11.2.) G AQ on repeated attempts may increase timed lockout enforcement mechanism needed
ER the vulnerability of the APIM. to prevent brute force attacks?
Operational The nature of the environments impacts Is the APIM to operate in consistent conditions
Characteristics the ability of an APIM to operate or variable environments? What are the variable
(A.10.1.) G RF consistently, e.g. lighting variations. conditions which may impact performance?
Subjects’ This rate focuses on the input devices Will the APIM need to flag poor quality subject
Signal and the need for calibration, both signals captured? What is the toleration rate
Tolerations initially and continually. before further subject signals or additional
(A.10.3.) G data are acquired from the subject?
Subject The timing impacts usability and What are the required subject throughput rate
Throughput security and vulnerabilities stemming requirements expressed in terms of minimum
Rates from repeated attempts or long numbers in a specific time? What are the
(A.10.4.) G feedback response times. maximum queuing or delay timescales?
Subject The requirements of the application How many false non-match errors are deemed
False context may necessitate that genuine tolerable or acceptable for subject signals, i.e.
Non-match subjects are rejected at the expense false accept rates and false reject rates,
Tolerations of detecting impostors, or vice versa. which are commensurate to the risks of the
(A.10.7.) G application context.
Intervention The subjects may need assistance and What is tolerable error rate before assistance to
Rate interventions may improve unsupervised a subject is offered by a trained operative?
(A.10.9.) G throughput over a period of time. Does this rate allow for user familiarisation of
the APIM?
Impostor The risks in the application context In respect of the risks identified, what is the
Detection determine the rate at which an APIM acceptable probability that an APIM fails
Rate is required to perform to detect an to detect an impostor?
(A.10.10.) G impostor.
Maximum The enrolment time for a subject should What is the maximum time permitted for each
Enrolment not be protracted in respect of the context, subject’s signal enrolment attempt?
Time its risks and assurance requirements.
(A.10.14.) G
Maximum The number of enrolment attempts may How many attempts is a subject or user allowed
Enrolment inadvertently reduce the size of the subject in order to enrol their signals? Could
Attempts community. supervision reduce the number of enrolment
(A.10.15.) G AQ
AE
attempts or improve the quality?
Subject’s Signals The data upon which identification and/or What are the security controls required to
and Template authentication decisions take place must protect the subject’s signal data so that these
Protection be reliable. data may be used reliably for subject
(A.10.19.) G AQ identification and/or authentication purposes?
ER
Table F.11: Performance Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Attack The resources and skills to successfully What technology resources and skills
Protection compromise an APIM should be should be needed to protect the APIM?
and Detection significant in order to deter To what extent should attacks to be
(A.11.1.) G AQ ER misfeasance. detectable?
Assurance The required tools and utilities need What tools and facilities should be required to
Test Tools description to enable assessors to carry perform functional and assurance tests
and Methods out the tests and evaluate result data. described in a proposed testing plan
(A.11.2.) G to meet the required assurance levels?
Documentation Lack of documentation should make it What information are to be made available
and Test Data harder for attackers to acquire the to assessors to test the candidate APIM? What
Availability relevant knowledge to attack the APIM. documentation will remain confidential and
(A.11.3.) G Evaluators either test the APIM which elements will be in the public domain
with or without this knowledge. for attackers to interrogate?
Functional These statements inform candidate APIM What is the desired reliability to ensure
Outcome suppliers and developers of APIMs the APIM functions correctly? Are assurance
Behaviours on the types of attacks envisaged tests to be performed on documented attacks
(A.11.4.) G RF ER and how the APIM should respond and/or tested by external expertise? What
to each type of attack. are the behavioural expectations in response
to each type of attack?
Audit Data are required to demonstrate What data are required to meet regulatory
Logs compliance but also assist in gaining an reporting requirements and risk management
(A.11.5.) G understanding on performance and to functions? Are data required for operational
investigate security breaches. management and investigation purposes?
Assurance The way the assessment is performed How will candidate APIMs be tested? Has an
Assessment should be objective, repeatable and accredited assessment framework been adopted
Methodology auditable based upon substantiated to test candidate APIMs? How should the
(A.11.6.) G AQ result data and a testing plan. test plan be formulated for assurance
assessments?
Assurance The requirements for proposed devices What are the operational qualities for any
Tests and artefacts should be described required physical devices or artefacts that
(A.11.7.) G ER together with the test data needed in subjects may need to use? How are these
order to test for assurance. artefacts to be tested? What test data are
The tests may be incorporate functionality required, as evidence, on the devices’
from internal or external designs. assured operation?
Fusing Subject’s The fusion of two or more subject signals Do risks dictate the need to fuse two or more
Signals may improve the identification or subject biometric signals or credentials to
(A.10.11.) G RF AQ authentication, e.g. 2FA, of the genuine improve the identification of a genuine subject?
ER subject. Fusing biometric signals may At what performance point would additional
be required according to the operating subject signals be required to support
conditions, which may require additional the identification process? In which
identification or authentication assurance. circumstances would extra signals
or credential data be required?
Operational The application context may dictate Does the application context necessitate prior
Accreditation that some or all components gain formal accreditation of the APIM or its components
(D.12.1.) accreditation by independent assessors. to meet scheme rules or legislation?
Acceptable The scope of the tests need to be What is the usage scope limitations of the
Usage defined in terms of normal usage, candidate APIM assurance tests? Should the
Conditions likely attacks and possible APIM be constrained from use in
(D.12.2.) errors. unacceptable environments and conditions?
Table F.12: Assurance Requirements Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Interaction The usage settings will determine Is the APIM interaction to operate as a
Dynamics how the subjects’ signals are to sub-process in a subjects’ system usage task?
(A.6.6.) G be captured, through the types of device, Does the interaction use ubiquitous
which may be operationally conducive. components? Do these components need to
A poor HCI design may be operate in specific ergonomic, physical
a disincentive to potential users. or logical settings? What outcomes need
to be avoided from poor HCI design?
Interaction The degree of subject supervision or Do the signal input devices require subject
Supervision control needed to ensure the involvement, subject supervision or should the
(A.6.7.) G subjects’ signals are sensed properly. APIM be designed for self-service?
Multiple The similarity of input devices What are the input devices normally adopted
Credential may lead to user confusion, errors for the types of usage settings envisaged?
Impact or undesired behaviour. Multiple APIMs Does the proposed APIM need differentiate itself
(A.7.3.) G in similar usage settings may introduce from other similar types of APIMs to avoid
usability difficulties and errors. user confusion, error or behaviour?
Task The APIM interaction may appear at What is the position(s) of the identification
Sequence the start of the users’ task, during and/or transaction (s) in the user’s task dialogue?
(A.7.5.) G at the completion of the transaction. What usability design issues should be avoided
The logic of where to place the in order to enable a user’s successful completion
APIM interaction is dictated by of their task. Should the user confirm
how the user would habitually their consent for their private data to be released
complete the task. to other parties for an identification transaction?
User The extent to which a subject What skills do the subjects or users need to
Technical population is able or willing to learn learn to use the input device to record
Expertise and use a new device or process may subjects’ signals? Does the subject
(A.7.6.) G ER impact the types of input devices and population have the capability and motivation
the nature of the APIM interaction. to acquire such skills?
Usage The regular usage of an APIM may What is the expected subject usage pattern for
Frequency reinforce subjects’ habits. the APIM and could this pattern lead to
(A.7.7.) G Irregular usage may suggest that habitual usage? Does this usage pattern apply
subject learning should be minimised. right across the subject population?
Table F.13: Task Dialogue Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Impostor Pass/ The setting of the threshold depends upon What is the acceptable identification decision
False Alarm the risks of the application context. The threshold as determined by the risks and
Threshold method to establish the acceptable social norms of the application context?
(A.10.5.) G AQ rate should be articulated. How was this threshold rate determined?
Multiple A genuine subject may receive a In the case of subject signal false non-match for
Attempts false rejection erroneously. The a subject how many additional attempts for
Limit increase in number of attempts, however, identification should the subject be permitted
(A.10.8.) G gives opportunities for impostors. before an action is instigated?
User The costs and effort for users to set up What should the effort, including equipment and
Equipment the APIM may not be commensurate costs, be required by users to use the APIM in
Needed to users’ potential benefits. comparison to claimed benefits?
(A.10.12.) G
Enrolment The quality of data required may What quality should subjects’ signals need
Supervision necessitate intervention to ensure that to meet for automated identification before
(A.10.13.) G signals are sufficient for intended purpose. invoking operative intervention?
Enrolment Some subjects may be excluded and What measures are required should subjects
Failure alternative measures may be needed be unable to produce the signals to the required
Arrangements to enable accessibility. Some subjects quality, either temporary or permanently?
(A.10.16.) G subject may try to exploit exemptions.
Vendor Data showing a track record provides What type of evidence is required from
Capabilities an indication on a supplier’s candidate APIM suppliers that shows they
Evidence potential to deliver and perform to possess the capability to deploy and support their
(A.10.17.) G the terms of a contract. Financial APIM? Do vendors need to supply references
standing and local representation may also to deployments in similar application
have a bearing on acceptability. contexts or geographic locations?
Defined The qualitative data and quantitative How is effectiveness of the APIM defined and to
Effectiveness data that stakeholders require to be evaluated for the application context?
Metrics determine the APIM’s utility against What data are to be acquired in order to measure
(D.14.1.) their stated business objectives. and evaluate the APIM’s effectiveness?
Defined The qualitative data and quantitative How is efficiency of the APIM defined and to
Efficiency data that stakeholders require to be evaluated for the application context?
Metrics determine the APIM’s utility against What data are to be acquired in order to measure
(D.14.2.) their stated business objectives. and evaluate the APIM’s efficiency?
Table F.14: Envisaged Issues Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identity There should be the means to detect What are consequences of failures to detect
Theft fraudulent identity claims and fraudulent application identity claims or false
Detection prevent false registration applications. registrations? Do risks dictate that identity
Impact A credential could be issued to proofing, registration and enrolment processes
(A.9.10.) G RF an individual who is not entitled require the segregation of operatives’ duties
erroneously or unwittingly. and system privileges?
Genuine The impact of the failure of an APIM What is the impact of an APIM’s failure to
Failure to correctly identify a subject needs correctly identify or authenticate genuine
Impact to be understood and quantified. subjects?
(C.15.1.) G
Acknowledged The requirements acquisition processes What are the conceptual vulnerabilities that
Conceptual should reveal vulnerabilities that cannot have been accepted by stakeholders in terms
Vulnerabilities be resolved. Data are required of partial or total failure or compromise?
(C.15.2.) G required as an explicit acknowledgment.
Availability The availability of the APIM What are the availability requirements
Goals is critical to support the business for the APIM? Are there peak processing
(C.15.3.) G operations. Slack periods may allow periods or time slots when maintenance
maintenance tasks to be performed. may be carried out?
Manageability Insufficient resources, technical What personnel, facilities and infrastructure
Limitations competencies and available infrastructure are committed to design, test, deploy, operate
(A.11.8.) G may restrict the choice of APIM. and recover the APIM?
Receiver Each point on the ROC curve defines What are the acceptable vulnerabilities of false
Operating the acceptable vulnerabilities of the rejects to false acceptance across all operating
Characteristics APIM. It is an acknowledgment identification points? What influences the
and Influences of these vulnerabilities and influences. variations across the threshold curve?
(A.10.18.) G
Impostor The impact of the failure of an APIM What is the impact of an APIM’s failure
Pass or its circumvention due vulnerabilities to correctly identify impostors, particularly
Impact needs to be understood and quantified. setting the rate too low to detect deliberate
(A.10.6.) G attacks?
Upgrade The impact of migrating or What would be the acceptable disruption for
Migration upgrading an existing APIM stakeholders, users and subjects to migrate
Impact in terms of continuity and costs to a new APIM or upgrade a deployed APIM?
(A.10.23.) G may be prohibitive. How should any proposed migration counter
The migration may introduce temporary vulnerabilities?
some temporary vulnerabilities.
Availability The availability of the APIM What are the availability requirements for the
Goals is critical to support the business APIM? Are there peak identification processing
(D.15.1.) operations. Slack periods may periods or time slots when maintenance may
facilitate maintenance tasks. be carried out or is the APIM required to
operate continuously without degradation?
Table F.15: Envisaged Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Expected The stakeholders expectations What is the expected lifetime usefulness of the
Lifetime regarding the return on investments APIM for the application context based on
(C.16.1.) G need to be ascertained. Return of Investment (ROI) predictions or
other return, payback period on capital calcula-
tions?
Backward The reuse of existing infrastructure Is backward compatibility required to existing
Compatibility existing procedures necessitate APIMs or accepted operating norms or
(A.10.20.) G accommodating existing capabilities. existing capabilities or infrastructures?
Usage The costs associated with a single Should the APIM be limited to a dedicated
Flexibility purpose may not bring sufficient application or be ubiquitous in design to
(A.10.21.) G returns on stakeholders’ investments. allow usage with other approved applications?
Scalability The take up of services and an APIM What scalability is required in terms of
(A.10.22.) G may be difficult to predict. responding to population growth or decrease?
All projections should be validated How quickly should a response be required
as over or under capacity may in terms of numbers and timescales to ensure
impact costs and performance. sufficient processing capacity?
Estimated The programme costs need to be What are the sponsor’s predicted programme
Programme ascertained, which may include costs? Are all stakeholders’ costs based upon
Costs many assumptions and calibrated similar requirements and application contexts?
(A.1.3.) G RF AQ predictions. Have any initial designs been produced to
facilitate cost comparisons with similar APIMs?
Are predicted costs below budget allocated?
Estimated The operating costs need to be What are the predicted sponsor and
Operating ascertained, which may include stakeholders’ operating costs based upon similar
Costs many assumptions and calibrated requirements and application contexts?
(D.16.1.) predictions. A comparison Have any initial designs been compared with
with other similar application contexts budgets allocated for similar deployments over
may provide actual costs incurred. the anticipated lifetime for the APIM? How do
these predicted costs compare with current
operational budgets and expenditure constraints?
Table F.16: Predicted Costs Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identification/ A diagrammatic representation assists How does the APIM’s model fit stakeholders’
Authentication in determining the extent to which the overall security architectures? How well do
Model security architecture, including the candidate APIM’s technology and processes
(A.12.1.) G APIM, maps to articulated requirements. match existing capabilities?
Subject Signal The locations where the subject’s Where are the identifier and subject’s signals
Storage Locations enrolled signal data are stored be stored? Are the data for usage stored
(A.12.2.) G ER determine the processes which may centrally, on a distributed artefact or on
be used by the APIM. a device or at other locations?
Subject Signal The way the data is stored and its How are subjects’ signal data stored,
Storage Format form e.g. biometric template, hashed PIN, e.g. directory? Are all data stored in the same
(A.12.3.) G AQ determines the processes which may structure and format? What are the size (bytes)
ER be accessed and used by the APIM. of the data signals, credentials or templates?
Mechanism The comparison of the subject’s identifier What system performs the identification
Processing and /or credentials may take place decision and where does this system physically
Locale locally, remotely or distributed model. reside? What are the roles of each device
(A.12.4.) G RF AQ The intended usage locations and software components in the decision
ER should be described together with matching processes? Are the intended usage
restrictions placed upon its controlled locations different to the signals matching
usage by genuine users location? What prevents the APIM being applied
and detection of unauthorised usage. beyond its intended scope and purpose?
Mechanism The comparison of the subject’s Is there a centralised database on-line or
Processing identifier and /or credentials may distributed storage medium, e.g. smart card, or
Infrastructure take place over public networks and other components that require network access?
(A.12.5.) G AQ ER may require a public key infrastructure. Are all the APIM’s components detailed?
Processing The confidentiality and integrity of How are the subject’s signals, data and processes
Protection subject’s signals as data for identification protected during usage transactions and
(A.12.6.) G AQ ER are paramount for an APIM. template updates?
Subject Signal Data used by the matching decision What subject signals, from biometric modalities
Data process to entify or to verify the or user knowledge or certificates or device
(A.12.8.) G AQ subject or user forms the core identifiers or other relevant data, are used
ER basis of the APIM’s functionality. to entify or identify the subject? Are subject’s
data associated with an identifier or pseudonym?
Combined User The processes to capture multiple subject’s Does the design capture multiple subject
Input Signals signals and how these signals are signals and how are these signals fused in
(A.12.14.) G AQ fused to entify or identify the identification model, which explain
ER should be explained. the use of intermediary devices and systems?
Maintenance The effort involved to distribute How easy and how often is it necessary to
Effort and components or revise subject’s signals revise data and/or reissue data, devices, artefacts
Reactivation as part of the APIM’s normal operation, subject signals associated with the APIM?
(A.12.10.) G AQ or in the event of error, compromise Does this reinstatement involve the subject
ER or faulty devices. seeking assistance from a support team?
Credential The credential data may be revised How are credential data or artefacts updated,
Maintenance by the subject upon, an administrator to replaced or replenished in normal, compromise,
(A.12.11.) G AQ reset data or an automatic process. recovery or failure states?
Subject All processes to capture the subject’s What are the components which capture,
Signals signals, data parameter extraction and transform, compare captured subjects’ signals
Processing transformations to entify or identify a and output feedback, i.e. decision
(A.12.13.) G AQ subject should be explained. result, to the subject and intermediary systems?
Mechanism The subjects may need guidance on How are subjects’ trained to use the APIM and
Training how to use, maintain the credentials or its devices or artefacts? Are users to be given
(A.12.17.) G AQ to use sensing devices. training in a security awareness programme?
Table F.17: Security Architecture Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Identity The processes to verify the veracity of What are the processes for the authorised
Proofing subjects’ identity evidence should be entities in order to check identification evidence
Processes commensurate to the risks. validated. gathered or supplied by the subject applicant?
(C.18.1.) G ER Acceptable breeder documents and/or How do these processes merge with the
identity attributes should be stated in application, registration and enrolment
order to qualify the validity of the applica-
tion
processes?
and applicant for registration and enrol-
ment.
Identifier A unique identifier enables the APIM What is the identifier or entifier assigned to the
Data to link to the genuine subject in subject for authentication or entification
(C.18.2.) G AQ the community of subjects. purposes? Are subject identifiers user defined or
randomly generated? Does the identifier have
a defined structure, e.g. name@addess?
Are there alternative identifiers or entifiers to
mask the genuine identity of the subject?
Alternative Factor deleted included in factor (C.18.2.)
Identifiers
(A.12.7.)
Credential The life expectancy of the APIM and What is the intended life expectancy of the
Life Expectancy its components determines the APIM including infrastructure components,
and Persistence replacement strategy, which may devices or artefacts. How are data
(A.13.1.) G RF AQ impact costs and performance. persistence problems , if relevant, overcome?
Unique Identifiers The provision of identifiers and/or What are the rules for issuing identifiers and/or
and Credential credentials should be undertaken with credentials, whether processes automatically,
Authenticity controls to ensure the genuine subject or through officials or administrators?
(A.13.2.) G receives their identifier data or artefact.
Credential The integrity and the confidentiality of How are the integrity of identifiers and/or
Protection the identifier data and credential subject credential data protected by issuing
(A.13.3.) G AQ ER data form the basis of identity assurance. authorities, intermediaries and relying parties?
Credential The maintenance of the credentials may Do entities require authorisation to entitle them
Maintenance need to be authorised entities to to operate credential maintenance, replacement
Empowerment carry out these functions. or destruction processes of identification data?
(A.13.4.) G Does this include the revoking of credentials?
Identifier and The life-cycle management of the What are the processes for the issuance,
Credential identifiers and entifiers and/or maintenance and destruction of data relating
Maintenance Tasks credentials need to be stated for to entifiers, to identifiers to credentials,
(A.13.5.) G assurance purposes. including revocation of subjects’ certificates?
Credential Delivery The issuer of the identifier and/or the Is the acknowledgment of the receipt of an
Verification credential needs to know that the identifier and /or credentials by the subject
(A.13.6.) G genuine user has received these items. reconciled and what is the verification process?
Credential The entity and method to enrol subject How will the initial and subsequent subject
Creation signal or to generate subsequent signals signals be captured or credential be generated?
Locations need to be explained. These signals What are the processes and channels for
(A.13.7.) G RF AQ system may initiated by the subject delivering artefacts or data to the genuine
ER or computer generated. subject?
Subject Additional data relating to the person What associated subject data are stored with
Autobiographical may be used for identity proofing the subject’s identifier and subject signal data?
Data purposes. The purpose of using the Why is it necessary to acquire and retain
(A.12.12.) G AQ data should align with privacy laws. these additional data?
ER
Table F.18: Identifier Management Evaluation Theme
474
Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Sampling The subject’s signals should be of How many instances of subject signals are
Normalisation sufficient quality to meet stated decision captured at enrolment and during usage to
(A.14.1) G AQ accuracy and speed requirements. create and update subject signal templates?
Signal Entropy Significant differentiation of signals Is there sufficient inherent variation or
(A.14.2.) G ER improves the identification accuracy randomness in subjects’ signals to avoid
of genuine subjects and also impostors. identification collisions?
Deceit The extent of the deceit resistance What is the difficulty, in required skills and
Resistance on theoretical and practical resources, for an attacker to deceive an APIM?
(A.14.4.) G AQ exploitation informs vulnerability and How well does the APIM withstand brute
liability considerations. force and other common attack strategies?
Artefact or The theoretical or practical difficulty What is the difficulty, knowledge and resources,
Credential in producing a counterfeit artefact or to counterfeit an artefact or credential data or
Counterfeiting credential informs vulnerability and to ascertain subjects’ signal data or determine
(A.14.5.) G AQ liability considerations. extracted parameters?
Signal Factor deleted as included in factor (A.14.15.)
Confidentiality
(A.14.14.)
Signal Data Exposing subjects’ signal data may How are subjects signals’ authenticity, integrity
Protection enable attackers to gather data to and confidentiality protected during capture,
(A.14.15.) AQ ER launch denial of service attacks or encoding, transmission, and matching
to perform replay attacks. processes? How are the subject signal
comparison decision result data protected?
Average Predicting the percentage of subjects What is the predicted percentage of subjects
Failure to that may be unable to provide biometric that will be unable to provide signals of sufficient
Enrol Rate or data signals of sufficient quality informs quality at enrolment? How do these indications
(A.14.17.) G AQ accessibility and assurance evaluations. compare with other subject communities?
Average Time The repeated attacks by impostors Time to detect impostor attempts, including
of Impostor Try may severely impact the APIM to perform repeated tries averaged, over all impostor
(A.14.19.) G ER in terms of throughput speed. attempts, regardless of successful verification?
Average Time of The average time to entify or identify What is the time to achieve correct subject
Verification a subject in proportion to the user’s entification or identification which includes
(A.14.20.) G ER task may impact the APIM’s acceptability. repeat attempts averaged over all attempts?
Average Impostor The average number of impostor attempts What is the impostor failure rate averaged
Failure Rate before a subject’s access is rendered against all subject signals, including
(A.14.21.) G AQ invalid or obsolete informs reliability. genuine subjects, which decide incorrectly?
Signal Capture Predicting the percentage of subjects What is the percentage of genuine subjects
Failure Rates that may be unable to provide which are unable to provide signals of sufficient
(A.14.22.) G ER signals of sufficient quality informs quality during usage? How do these indications
accessibility and usability considerations. compare with other subject communities?
Artefact / Device The accreditation or approval by What processes are to be established to issue
Accreditation an agency that artefacts, credentials artefacts, credentials or devices from
(A.13.8.) G AQ and devices conform to specifications approved agencies? Which authority
provides reliability assurance. accredits or approves selected agencies?
Tamper The capabilities of artefacts, devices or Are there tamper deterrent or tamper
Protection software may provide evidence of indicative technologies to notify parties of an
(A.16.18.) G unauthorised interference attempts. attack?
Template Updates Activity logs enable the investigation and What log entries flag changes to an enrolled
(A.16.19.) G AQ detection compromise attempts which subject signal or template, user access rights or
ER may include changes to subject’s signals. modifications recognised in user behaviour?
Availability Data from potential suppliers should What data is provided to assess the potential
Evidence Submitted indicate the availability of the APIM availability of the APIM and its components?
(D.19.1.) including maintenance operations. When are maintenance tasks performed?
Table F.19: Reliability Results Evaluation Theme
475
Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Multiplicity Similar APIMs from other application Are there similar APIM deployments which may
Errors contexts may confuse subjects. confuse subjects and/or users that could
(C.20.1.) G lead to the erroneous usage of the APIM?
Interface Test data may include timing user What test data provides evidence that subjects’
Usage Data tasks or video data using the usage of the APIM are as designed?
(A.15.1.) G ER APIM.
Security Features Visible security features enables What features convey the available security
Conveyed the user to manage security tasks. features and guidance to the user?
(A.15.2.) G
Visibility of The interface should advise the user Does the APIM’s interface provide timely
Security Status when they have made a mistake or feedback to the user on the APIM’s security
(A.15.3.) G provide feedback on normal status. status?
Intuitive Awkward interfaces may make the Is the APIM’s user interface comforting and
Interface APIM difficult to learn and use. naturally easy to learn? Is the interface’s design
(A.15.4.) G AQ sufficiently intuitive to facilitate habitual usage?
Aesthetic and Excessive information communicated may Does the APIM’s interface convey or display
Minimalist Design confuse the user, which could lead to only relevant security information?
(A.15.5.) G ER errors or delayed user actions.
Error The user should be notified of errors Does the APIM’s interface provide error
Reporting and given guidance on how to rectify messages that are sufficiently detailed to advise
(A.15.6.) G the error safely. users where to obtain help?
User / Subject An unsatisfactory experience may Does the APIM’s interface provide a satisfactory
Acceptability may indicate HCI design flaws. usage experience?
(A.15.7.) G AQ ER Users may express a preference for What are user’s preferred signal type or
a biometric modality or authentication APIM for this type of application context?
method that is habitual to them. Why is this preferred method more acceptable?
User / Subject Factor deleted included in factor (A.15.7.)
Preference
(A.15.12.)
Cognitive Enrolment processes may be complex Does the user require cursory rehearsal, visual
Activity and require significant focus to ensure co-ordination, in depth cognitive processing in
(A.15.8.) G signal data, are of an adequate quality order to produce signal data of sufficient quality
for that candidate APIM. for authentication or entification purposes?
Credential Data Remembering random authentication What cues are provided to the user to recall
Retrieval Strategy data or methods may be overcome credential data or methods to use artefacts
(A.15.9.) G RF AQ by using visual or audio cues. or devices to capture subject signals data?
Signal Letting subjects choose data that have Are subjects’ signal data assigned by a system,
Meaningfulness significant value to them may acquired automatically or created by the subject
(A.15.10.) G assist their recall of authentication data. to make the signal deducible to the subject?
User Tasks The APIM interaction should Does the APIM interaction align with users’
Alignment naturally fit at the appropriate point mental models to perform the processes
(A.15.11.) G RF in the users task and not be associated with the user’s operational task? Is
an awkward adjunct to the task. It the user’s effort proportionally convenient
should not be cumbersome to the task. to complete the operational task?
User The APIM may require users to What knowledge do subjects need to acquire in
Knowledge learn how to use unfamiliar devices order to use the candidate APIM’s components?
(B.20.1.) G AQ or processes that are not intuitive. How is that knowledge to be acquired?
Table F.20: Usability Results Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Systems’ The APIM’s processing needs may rely What network, systems, software, devices,
Resources on different infrastructures, which may form part of the APIM’s infrastructure? Does it
(A.16.1.) G not be under the stakeholders’ control. utilise a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)?
System Reviewing stakeholders’ systems What evidence demonstrates that the description
Functionality ensures the completeness of the APIM of the APIM is complete for all functions and
Description and that interfaces are specified. components to enable performance and
(A.16.3.) G assurance assessments?
Legacy The introduction of new systems and new What is the impact of the proposed APIM, in
System processes may adversely impact existing terms of processing, on existing hardware,
Impact operations. Extra costs software, personnel, infrastructure and systems?
(A.16.4.) G may need to be absorbed by stakeholders. What are the effects on current operations?
Legacy Reusing existing networks, systems or To what extent can existing network,
System Reuse operational procedures may assist in information systems, infrastructure and
(A.16.5.) G containing costs and/or minimising processes be reused or enhanced for this
impacts to operations and subjects. candidate APIM?
Processing The processing capacity needed to What computer processing power is needed
Capacity operate the APIM, both centrally on to support the APIM for stakeholder’s and users?
(A.16.7.) G servers and on users’ devices and To what extent are these computations
systems need to be quantified. processed on local devices or artefacts?
Back-up The reliability of these methods may What are the back-up procedures to respond to
Methods impact stakeholders’ ability a total or partial failure of the APIM, including
(A.16.8.) G to recover normal operations quickly. access to stored subjects’ signal data ?
Administration The roles and tasks of staff need to What are the roles and responsibilities of the
Support Roles be clarified to ensure clarification administration entities or stakeholders’
(A.16.11.) G of authorised responsibilities. employees involved in supporting the APIM?
Expert The APIM may require specialist skills Are unique skills or competencies required
Support and knowledge to perform core duties, to operate the APIM, in normal, compromised
(A.16.12.) G which may increase reliance on suppliers. failure and contingency states?
Administration The competencies of existing personnel What are the training requirements for
Personnel Training may need to be enhanced continually administrative personnel, both initially and
(A.16.13.) G to support the APIM. continually?
Device Some signal capture devices operate Does the user’s device need to be
Calibration discretely; however, some sensing calibrated regularly so that the APIM
(A.16.14.) N devices may need periodic recalibration. functions and performs correctly?
Lockout/Threshold Some genuine users may exceed set How does the APIM support lockout
Maintenance retry limits. Users’ access should be thresholds on excessive invalid attempts? How
(A.16.15.) G ER reactivated by authorised personnel and/or are user lockouts or thresholds reset securely?
authorised/authenticated processes.
Subject Supervision The supervision of subjects may impact Are subjects supervised during their usage
(A.16.16.) G subject behaviour when using the APIM. of the APIM’s devices or applications?
Enrolment The skills required and the authority to What are the competences required for
Supervision perform enrolment duties to reduce subject staff to supervise subject enrolment? How
(A.16.17.) G signal data acquisition, if applicable. are quality of captured data improved?
Processing The signal data must be protected What technological safeguards protect the
Protection to ensure validity of the identification integrity and confidentiality of subjects’ signal
(A.16.20.) G or authentication processes. data captured, stored, processed and the
identification decision result transmitted?
Average Impact Continual brute force attacks may What is the impact upon systems processing
of Impostor adversely impact systems’ processing, from repeated impostor attacks and also its
Attempts which may degrade the APIM’s impact on performance to authenticate genuine
(D.21.1.) throughput to identify genuine subjects. subjects?
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Subject Signal The strength of the binding may vary What is the strength of the binding between
Linkage between weak password authentication the subject and the signals acquired
(C.22.1.) G data and cryptographic computations. for identification/authentication?
Operational The APIM should not be so complex Does the user need technical expertise or
Enablers as to require special skills, which may equipment to use the APIM or its associated
(A.17.1.) G exclude some users. artefacts or credentials?
Subject Disabilities may exclude the user from Are there any sensory, physical or cognitive
Inclusiveness using the APIM, via its devices or skills that would prohibit or limit
(A.17.2.) G artefacts, as designed. users from operating the APIM?
User Some devices may require cleaning, What maintenance tasks does the user
Maintenance recalibration or software may require undertake to keep the APIM functioning as
Tasks updates in order to function correctly. designed? How will the user be notified or
(A.17.3.) G The inability to perform these tasks may become aware of malfunction or rendering its
exclude some users. Interfering with some devices or artefacts vulnerable?
components may render them ineffective.
Usage The amount of time and effort to use and What actions and effort are needed to use
Convenience maintain devices associated with the the APIM when compared with the user’s
(A.17.5.) G APIM may be considered disproportionate responsibilities and liabilities related to
to the task’s risks and liabilities. the underlying task?
Technology Some devices or software licences may be What technical components are required,
Provisioning expensive to purchase or difficult including devices, drivers, software to operate
(A.17.6.) G to obtain, which may exclude some the APIM? Are the user’s components,
subjects in the community. e.g. keyboard, firmware and cryptographic
utilities, ubiquitous?
Table F.22: Accessibility Results Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Availability The failure of the APIM function may How often does the APIM suffer from partial
Indicators cause service delivery problems or total outages?
(C.23.1.) G or other issues for stakeholders. What are the tested recovery processes?
Assurance The basis of on which test data are What evidence demonstrates the APIM’s
Evidence acquired and its relevance to the live ability to meet assurance requirements? How
(A.14.18.) G environment informs assurance testing. was it produced and by which entity?
Performance The performance results from other How does the indicative performance of this
Comparisons similar deployments may highlight APIM in this application context compare with
(A.12.18.) G performance discrepancies. similar designs or deployments?
Practical Factor deleted as included in factor (A.12.20.)
Experience
(A.12.19.)
Identification Elapsed time may be more acceptable What is the possibility of reducing the overall
Time by re-engineering the signal sensing, entification or identification time? Have
Profile capturing, extraction, transformation timings on all sub-processes been ascertained
(A.14.7.) G comparison and results processes. so as to consider re-engineering the logic?
Liabilities and Onerous stakeholder responsibilities What are the responsibilities and liabilities
Responsibilities and/or disproportionate liabilities may associated with the APIM for each stakeholder,
(B.23.1.) G outweigh claimed benefits, including users and/or subjects?
notwithstanding costs.
Privacy Revealing social acceptability issues may What is the APIM’s effect upon subject’s
Impact potentially expose trust problems with feelings about their privacy and their risks
(A.15.13.) G the technology and/or service provider. being adequately protected?
Database Factor deleted included in factor (A.16.9.)
Contingency
(A.12.16.)
Business Business continuity and the risks of What is the criticality of a contingency plan
Continuity natural disasters must be weighed to recover operations to a normal state, in
(A.16.9.) G RF AQ against recovery plan costs. the event of an APIM failure?
The continuity of the APIM may What are the database contingency plans
be vital to stakeholders’ business for the identifiers and subject signal data should
operations and provision of services. this data become compromised or unavailable?
Security incidents may cause How can recovery be achieved to
severe operating problems. match availability goals?
Recovery The time to recover key elements of the What is the repair/recovery response times
Response Times APIM should be recorded and be included for central servers and/or users’ devices?
(A.16.10.) G in a Service Level Agreement (SLA). Are these timescales acceptable to all parties?
User A lack of trust in the devices and the To what extent does the user community hold
Confidence subject’ signal data used to identify the belief that the APIM will protect their
(A.17.7.) G or authenticate the subject may interests and private data? What evidence
impact the users’ habitual operation of supports subjects’ preference for a specific
the APIM’s devices. biometric modality or credential.
Stakeholder Stakeholders may consider the use of What is the possibility of subjects or users
Costs ubiquitous technologies as a way absorbing APIM devices costs? Is enabling
Recovery of reducing costs, which may offer ubiquitous device usage a viable
(A.18.7.) G adequate protection and functionality. deployment strategy?
Ubiquity The APIM may need to operate with an Are the APIM’s components universal enabling
(A.16.6.) G existing mechanism or infrastructure interoperability with alternative APIMs, in the
or use ubiquitous components. intended application context?
Table F.23: APIM’s Issues Evaluation Theme
479
Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Components The integration of disparate components To what extent do the APIM’s components
Integration may introduce technical vulnerabilities or integrate into a coherent solution to meet the
(B.24.1.) G usability deficiencies. stakeholders’ operational requirements?
Performance The False Acceptance Rates and the Does the accuracy of the identification decision
Indications False Rejection Rates should be meet stated entification and/or authentication
(A.14.3.) G compared to accuracy requirements requirements? What is the impact on timings
and impact upon throughput. from adjusting configured threshold settings?
Mechanisms’ Knowledge of the APIM’s capability to What is the probability that the candidate APIM
Consistency perform reliably, without degradation, is will perform its intended functions over a
(A.14.8.) G essential to manage risks. specified interval of operation?
Device The integration of signal sensing Are supporting devices and artefacts functioning
Interfacing devices, their firmware and integration coherently for their intended purposes in a
(A.14.9.) G to the application should ensure that way that meets the requirements for an APIM,
the security of the candidate APIM in order to serve genuine subjects and
is not circumvented. to detect attempts at circumvention?
Circumvention The probability of theoretical based What is the difficulty, in terms of knowledge and
Susceptibility attacks and also motivated attacks resources, to circumvent the APIM without the
(A.14.6.) G ER needs to be ascertained. need to deceive the processing logic?
Signal The unpredictability of subject’s signal Are the subjects’ signals sufficiently disguised
Predictability reduces the probability of successful to prevent attackers from determining these data
(A.14.10.) G guessing attacks. or succeeding signals?
Signal A significantly large key space should What is the APIM’s number of possible subjects’
Abundance deter impostors from brute force attacks signal permutations or total key space?
(A.14.11.) G and subject signal collisions. To what extent are subject signal collisions,
in entification mode, possible?
Subject Signal Safeguards are needed to ensure subjects’ Is the subject’s signal data easy to record or
Exposure signal data are not exposed to copy or acquire during storage, capture,
(A.14.12.) G unauthorised parties during storage transmission, extraction or identification
or during transactions. or authentication comparison processes?
Signal The clarification of these capabilities To what extent does the signal capture device
Robustness may necessitate other controls to withstand known attacks or theoretical attacks?
(A.14.13.) G counter identified vulnerabilities.
Exploitable Vulnerabilities should be declared What are the known exploitable weaknesses in
Vulnerabilities including those in the public domain the candidate APIM or in existing deployments?
(A.14.16.) G and those confidential to suppliers.
Vendor The stakeholders may gain comfort that What experience and capabilities does the
Track Record the supplier has previously delivered an candidate vendor have in deploying APIMs in
(A.12.20.) G APIM in this type of application context. this type of application context?
Table F.24: APIM’s Vulnerabilities Evaluation Theme
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Factor, Identifier Factor Criteria
and Status Explanation Questions
Artefact The logistics for distributing various What are the estimated costs for distributing
Distribution APIM components securely may involve devices, artefacts, initial credential data,
Costs internal or external distribution e.g. PIN, to subjects/users?
(C.25.1.) G channels.
Implementation The APIMs development costs may need What are the costs to develop or integrate the
Costs to be segregated from other types of costs candidate APIM, which includes software
(A.18.1.) G for stakeholders’ accounting purposes. implementation, testing and/or costs associated
with obtaining security accreditation?
Maintenance The introduction of new systems brings What are the operating and administrative
Costs capital costs and administration support costs for supporting the APIM, which
(A.18.2.) G costs, which may be absorbed in full includes costs of servers, networks, software,
or partly into existing operational budgets. personnel, and impact upon existing operations?
Mechanism’s The anticipated life expectancy may What is the life expectancy for the APIM,
Anticipated have implications on investments including sensors or smartcard readers and/or
Life Expectancy relating to the APIM’s usefulness smartcards or firmware? Does the APIM’s
(A.16.2.) G ER and derived benefits. design allow for the APIM’s life expectancy to
be extended to align with technological
advancements?
Cost of The costs of bespoke devices to capture What is the cost of the signal input device
Input Devices subjects’ signals is a major capital including any firmware, the cost of tamper
(A.18.3.) G cost to be absorbed by stakeholders. detection, including the protection of its
internal logic from examination?
Cost of The costs of smart cards together with What is the unit cost of an artefact
Artefacts the issuing of certificates needs to be incorporating associated production and
(A.18.4.) G segregated. ICC personalisation or similar costs?
Infrastructure The infrastructure costs may be separated What are the costs associated with the
Processing Costs from other operating costs; however, trust supporting infrastructure, which includes
(A.18.6.) G schemes may incur membership fees. communication networks or PKI based trust
schemes?
Other Parties’ The total cost to stakeholders should be What are the total costs for all stakeholders,
Costs ascertained to ensure that costs do not including hardware, software, devices, artefacts
(A.18.8.) G exceed predicted direct or indirect to ensure its compatibility in the application
benefits. context?
Costs The isolation of specific cost elements What elements are most likely to increase or
Influences may assist in identifying alternative decrease the APIM’s costs?
(A.12.15.) G technology configurations.
Costs to An estimation of the costs to manage What are the estimated costs to manage
Manage issues associated with an APIM and the the issues associated with the APIM?
Issues and costs incurred to counter identified issues What are the costs of the additional effort
Vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities need to be incorporated and controls to manage the APIM’s identified
(D.25.1.) into the APIM’s total operating costs. issues and vulnerabilities respectively?
Table F.25: Stakeholders’ Costs Evaluation Theme
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